THE EMERGENCE OF AN URBAN ZA'IM:
A SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS

E. A. Early*

I. INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
   A. THE PROBLEM AREA

Organizational patterns in urban areas of the third world have been the subject of many recent anthropological studies. Some have concentrated on the villager who 'goes urban' but, encapsulated by fellow migrants from the effects of urban society, retains his rural habits. Others, eschewing this 'urban village' approach, have focused on an administrative (or other territorial) unit to determine the categories of interaction utilized (e.g. tribal, village, professional). Some, especially in tribal Africa, have found that the unit of interacting relations does not coincide with tribal or governmental units. They have dealt with social fields of interaction; urban areas consist of a number of microfields, which overlap with rural microfields, since they are not geographically bounded. Such studies have often asked how recent migrants deal with their new surroundings, and have suggested such mechanisms as kin assistance, voluntary associations, and patron-client ties.

This paper addresses itself to the issue of the relation between changing organizational patterns experienced by migrants, and the dynamics of the emergence of urban leaders.

The underlying issue of these urban studies is the shifting bases of interaction in a dense population environment. Do, for example, categories such as religion or tribe become irrelevant as more urban/rational referents such as employment take their place?

The following case study of a voluntary association of the Shi'i community in Beirut, Lebanon, was initiated to evaluate the role of religious institutions and behaviour in a developing society. The author asked two basic questions about the association: 1) What was its structure 2) What was its role in Lebanese society —i.e. was it a traditional agency blocking modernization, or did it exhibit adaptive, catalytic qualities.

* E. A. Early is currently a Fulbright scholar in Cairo and is associated with the University of Chicago.
Al-Jami‘iyah al-Kheriyyah al-Islamiyyah al-‘Amiliyyah
(the Amiliyya Islamic Benevolent Society) was founded in 1923 by Shi‘i Muslims living in Beirut, Lebanon. Rashid Baydoun, the son of a Damascus merchant family, served as its president from 1925 until his death in 1971. The Society’s fundamental aim has been to provide education and social services for the Beirut Shi‘i community, composed largely of recent migrants from eastern Lebanon and from Jabal Amil (Mount Amil) — a mountainous area of south Lebanon populated mainly by Shi‘a. It is from this area that the Society took its name.

The research revealed the most interesting aspect of the association to be its role in both furthering and justifying the wide-ranging social contacts of its president, Rashid Baydoun. Both his leadership and the Society’s activities were seminal in the development of the Lebanese Shi‘i community in the early part of this century. Baydoun was a leader with a style unprecedented in that subsociety; the association proved to be an agent of mobilization for the isolated Shi‘i.

The research initially followed the conventional lines of an institutional analysis. But it became clear that a study confined to the Society’s functioning would neglect crucial issues—for example, its role as a political platform for its president, or its relation to changes taking place in the larger society. Therefore, the author began to acquaint herself with the links between the president and/or association and other individuals, groups and institutions. Although she did not utilize formal network analysis techniques, the course of research prompted her to ask question raised by its theorists. For instance, it proved enlightening to examine the recruitment of individuals to social networks, and the ramification of social contacts between and across institutions.

In this paper, the author investigates the efficacy of network analysis in the problem area outlined. A model of the Society president’s leadership, based on a description of his social networks, is suggested. These networks facilitated his rise in a milieu of traditional, patrimonial leaders, as did his adoption of a style compatible with this heritage. The paradigm of six kinds of networks should clarify the points of articulation among the president, the association, and the larger society.
B. NETWORK ANALYSIS

First, some summary statements on network theory will be given. The theoretical backdrop to social network analysis can be viewed as the convergence of three, at points mutually supportive, trends.

1. Modification of the primary/secondary relations model.

In classical sociological theory, a correlation was drawn between decrease in amount of physical space (urbanization) and increase in secondary (non-affective) relations; more recently theorists have become aware that relations of affective solidarity (primary relations) are not restricted to folk and kin settings. It has even been suggested that the closely-knit social network is a new version of the primary group.

2. Introduction of the social field concept.

Some anthropologists have felt a model in which social interaction is neither geographically or institutionally bound, to be most informative. They have utilized the concept of social field, defined by activity, to account for far-reaching effects of groups and institutions, and to avoid segregating rural and urban institutions.

3. Development of more dynamic models.

The core problem in devising a model which can account for change has been described as refining the concept of social organization — particularly the exercising of choice and the mobilization of resources. Social network analysis allows for this purposive element.

These three trends raise the same questions as network theory; how to revise anthropological theory to account for the experience of an individual caught between folk society and complex society — where, unlike folk society, relations tend to be single-stranded and institutions incongruent with each other. Network theory is still being refined, but promises to be of theoretical importance in describing a rapidly urbanizing area with its medley of life styles, where patterns of organization and authority are being transformed.

Because social networks ramify across and between institutions they provide a means of examining the interrelationships of the behaviour of people in different contexts, a feature which the very abstraction necessary in institutional analysis precludes... an analysis using social networks... through
the notion of multiplexity allows the behaviour in terms of one
normative framework to be related directly to that in another.\textsuperscript{2}

Network analysis is predicated on a model of urban anthropolo-
gy recognizing fields of interaction determined by social activity. A
field encompasses both social networks, and institutions such as
kinship or government). Social network is defined as social linkages
or channels among individuals involved in social transactions.\textsuperscript{3}
There are of course myriad kinds of networks — for information
conveyance, political influence, and economic assistance, to name a
few.

In this case study the author considers six paradigmatic net-
works in which Rashid Baydoun participated. This will, by elucidat-
ing the links among the President, Society, and larger community,
complement an institutional approach to the Society. It will also
provide the core of the new leadership model utilized by Baydoun.”

Network analysis is especially productive in situations where
individuals are not already in solidary social groups whose norms
inform social action. At such a time, people may ally to achieve
ends not provided for by formal structure. This was the situation
among Beirut migrant Shi’a in the 1920’s and 30’s when Rashid
Baydoun fostered alliances among people from a plethora of refer-
ence groups. These are described by network theory as action sets
— that is, sets of network linkages temporarily mobilized by an
ego for certain ends.\textsuperscript{4}

II. THE AMILYYA SOCIETY

Before presenting the model of social networks, the author will
depict the southern Lebanese Shi’i community and outline the Ami-
liyya’s programs.

A. The Southern Lebanese Community

At the beginning of the twentieth century the Lebanese Shi’i
community was concentrated in the northern Biqa’ valley at Baal-
beck, and the Jabal 'Amil area of southern Lebanon. According to
legend, 'Amil is a Yemenite tribe that migrated to the Levant in
pre-Islamic times. Jabal 'Amil has served as the focal point of Shi’i
continuity since the waning of the Fatimid Empire at the end of the
eleventh century. This had been the golden age of the Shi’a marked
by such kingdoms as the Banu Ammar in Tripoli. With the rise of
the Seljuks from the east and the Mamlukes from the west, the
community became more isolated — at times ignored and at others
uncomprehended by the outside world. Its spatial and social seclu-
sion was exacerbated by the practice of Taqiyyah (dissimulation),
or profession of the ruler's faith; and by the Shi'i retreat to the
geographically remote areas of Jabal 'Amil in times of stress.

For many centuries, Jabal 'Amil sustained its religious heri-
tage through a succession of learned men, with little notice from
the outside world. Al-Maqdisi characterized them in the tenth cen-
tury as follows:

By the small springs, men have come to devote their lives
to prayer and have built for themselves houses of rushes. Here
they live on edible fruits and derive an income, albeit small,
from the Persian reeds, myrtles and other shrubs, which they
carry and sell in the neighboring towns.  

By the sixteenth century there were several Shi'i madarís ad-din
(religious schools) in the area; they had a curriculum with more
theological and literary studies than the time-honored kuttab,
or Quranic school. An interregnum in the community's cloistered exis-
tence came in that century when Shah Ismail requested Shi'i theo-
logians to staff the administration of his Safavid dynasty. Accord-
ing to a Damascus sayyid, the brilliance of 'Amil learning at that
point was due to the calibre of the 'ulama, "who see schools were
never empty . . . although they had no 'awkhf support as did
schools in Syria, Iran, India, Iraq, and Morocco."  

In recent centuries, Lebanese Shi'a began to refer to them-
selves as Matáwilah, from wala "to take someone as a protector" —
in this case the Imam Ali. The term Matáwilah, or Matwali, served
to distinguish them as Ja'fariyyah (who accept the first twelve
Shi'i Imams) as opposed to the Isma'iliyyah Shi'a, whom they con-
sider heretics.

On the political scene, the Mamlukes gave way to the Ottomans,
under whom there were a series of confrontations between Jabal
'Amil and the Druze of Jabal Lubnan to the north. A Shi'i historian
recounts a clash with the Ma'ni, who ruled Jabal Lubnan in the
seventeenth century.

During the rule of Prince Ahmad al-Ma'ni, they (the Mat-
wali) announced their independence from Lebanon. The Prince opposed this move and in 1665, attacked Nabatiyyeh... The fire kindled between the Ma'nis and the Matwali leaders...
The people had reached such a high point of solidarity, that even firing by a farmer shooting an animal brought response.7

In the eighteenth century, Jabal 'Amil was organized in a confederacy under Sheikh Nassif an-Nasser; it had frequent skirmishes with the Shihabis, the successors to the Ma'ni. The area was also attacked by the infamous Jazzar Ahmad Pasha of Acre; he is reported to have taken the books of 'Amil libraries with him. One writer claims that "the bakeries of Acre burned seven days on the fuel of the books of Jabal 'Amil."8

The area, far from strategic coastal towns, was largely ignored by the Ottomans, whose policy supported traditional leaders, who in turn collected taxes and gave allegiance to the Ottomans. The Ottomans favored the main ruling the household of the South, the As'ads, the latter descendants of Ali Saghir tribe, will be dealt with in the discussion of leadership below. Jabal 'Amil was among the last areas to be exposed to western influences, such as the cultural awakening sparked by missionaries in the late nineteenth century.9 Outsiders' perception of it is reflected in nineteenth century travelers' accounts:

I had been much dissuaded from venturing among the Metuali (sic), or Kizzilbash, as they were ferocious and fanatic they would not eat with Christians or Mussulmans, nor use the dishes out of which they had eaten; that I risked being stoned as well as maltreated in a country where there was absolutely nothing of interest either in the way of scenery, antiquities, or people.10

Another traveler relates how the Matwali of Baalbeck were accused by their neighbors of "practicing debauchery... and participating in impious rites and human sacrifice."11

In addition to being isolated, the South was also decentralized. It was marked by factions, with ulama' (theologians) and zu'amâ (leaders) joining to oppose other theologians and leaders. The lack of a consensus mechanism was demonstrated by the fate of an effort initiated in 1910 by a group of 'ulama' from the South, who wanted to found a Kulliyah (a college with a broader curriculum than a
madrasat ad-din) there. The various zu'ama’ with whom they were allied had different demands and the split ultimately blocked the effort. The extreme decentralization was reflected in the religious institutions. The 'awqaf (religious endowments) remained unorganized. The madāris ad-din usually lasted only the lifetime of their founders.

The Lebanese Shi’a situation altered considerably with migration during the 1920’s and 1930’s, and the creation of a confessional, participant democracy in Lebanon. No longer confined to subsistence farming by an environment of sterile limestone marked by arable gorges, its people became involved in the wartime economy of Beirut, trading in Latin America, and gold and diamond dealings in Africa.

The first major migration from southern Lebanon to Beirut took place in the 1920’s (although Shi’a expelled from Baharri and Kiserwan areas had been living in Beirut since the nineteenth century). Migrants escaping the austere life of the village met stern circumstances in the city. They lacked necessary education for participation in an urban job market; there were no zu’ama (leaders) to provide the traditional buffer between them and government institutions. They remained on the periphery of society.

It was painfully obvious in the 1920’s that education was a prerequisite for Shi’i participation in government and business. The Amiliyya Society’s provision of educational programs came at a critical time. Its activities buoyed community standards and also offered a source of Shi’a identity. The four kinds of Society activity are summarized below.

B. The Society’s Activities

1. Education

The primary purpose of the Amiliyya, “to provide education for the sons of Jabal ‘Amil,” was met in 1929, 6 years after the Society’s founding, with the establishment of a primary school in central Beirut. The most impressive expansion of Society activities occurred between 1937 and 1948. In December of 1937, permits for 37 schools in the South were obtained. Most villages had had only the kuttab (Quranic school) up to that time. Although less than that number were actually opened because of financial and political innuendoes (to be discussed below), residents recall these as a sig-
significant contribution to villages previously neglected by the Ottomans and French. During this period, President Baydoun made two of his three money-raising missions to the African migrant community. The Society channeled the contributions of these trips into the building of a high school, which opened in 1948. In 1954 the Society started a girls' school which has recently added intermediate and high school levels. That same year a boys' school was opened in a converted, once elegant old house; this was the first time the Society offered free tuition. Recently, a technical high school was founded by a society connected with the Amiliyya.

2. Religion

The main religious observance of the Society has been that of the Imam Hussain's martyrdom on the plain of Karbala in the month of Muharram. Before the school was built, the reading of the battle story during the first ten days of Muharram was held in private homes, and the speakers were from Damascus. The Society followed the trend of that city's mujtahid. Muhsin al-Amin, of omitting the battle re-enactment and limiting the speeches to accounts found in hadith.

The Society has seen the tenth day of Muharram ('Ashura') as a chance not only to bolster Shi'i consciousness, but also to foster intersecitarian dialogue. Believing that Hussain's death is a humanistic event, the Society invites Sunni and Christian speakers to speak. Hussain and Christ are frequently compared. The Society has also used this traditional rite for secular, financial ends; it solicits most personal contributions for the year at this time.

3. Youth

Youth activities, understandably, have been emphasized by the Society since its first years when it sent youth groups to Jabal 'Amil to study geology, botany, and geography. A striking statement to the nation were the five Amiliya sports rallies held between 1946 and 1955. A paramilitary youth club founded by Rashid Baydoun in 1944, al-Tala'i' (The Vanguard), participated in these rallies; more will be said about it later.

4. Welfare

In the beginning the Society provided individual assistance to the indigent on an ad hoc basis; burial and medical expenses were dispersed by council action. Eventually the Society abandoned such
personalistic charity. Twenty years after its founding it adopted more regularized forms, such as health clinics.

Considering the role of the Society and its president in providing the above services offers a valuable insight into the extent of continuity between the southern patrimonial and Beirut urban Shi'i communities. Since this will be done from the perspective of the President in Section III, a few comments about the structure of the Society itself are in order.

Over the years, the Amiliyya's operations have been marked by two major trends.

1. The conversion of its financial base from private contributions to more regularized, predictable sources.

In the first year of operation, the Amiliyya Society's budget was derived entirely from private donations; by the 40th year of operation, that source had dropped to 7.5%. Over the years, financial support of basically 3 types has been cultivated: a) education grants from the French mandate and Lebanese government b) contributions from abroad — for example Iran c) revenue from investments in real estate (awqaf). The financial base of the Society has been transformed to make it more capable of utilizing available resources.

2. The retention of a centralized administration which, adapted informally in order to cope with expanding facilities.

As the Amiliyya's activities grew, it added positions such as directors of the new schools; however, there was not a concomitant increase in the delegation of authority. The President and Administrative Board retained control. One informant expressed it: "The President is the Constitution." (The original constitution of the organization has been revised once — in 1936; at that time a few positions were added, resulting in a horizontal expansion of the Society.) The organization has become more complicated, with a proliferation of subunits, but not more bureaucratic — in the sense of rational division of labor and specific delegation of authority.

Both of these structural features are the very underpinnings of Rashid Baydoun's ability to forge personal networks within and beyond institutional, sectarian, and national boundaries. It was by
negotiating across boundaries that he facilitated the transformation of the Society's financial base (as will become clear in Section III.). It was by continuing an active personalistic participation within them that he encouraged a centralized administration; the retention of direct loyalty to him immensely enhanced his status."

III. RASHID BAYDOUN: A NEW STYLE OF URBAN LEADER

A. His New Style

It is inevitable that Rashid Baydoun exhibited some non-traditional characteristics, for he himself lacked the traditional patrimonial base of power of the classic za'īm (leader). This kind of leader flourished in south Lebanon during the Ottoman period; he inherited his position from his family, who were landlords, and was allowed an iron hand over his clients as long as he paid sufficient tribute. Baydoun's family were merchants from Damascus, and were originally involved in the Society because of their financial connections.

It is equally noteworthy that Rashid Baydoun did not hesitate to take on attributes of a classic za'īm when he deemed it appropriate. He ultimately adopted a leadership style mediating between behavior of the patrimonial landlord and the urban bureaucrat. His choice reflects an important force of social change: namely, the individual caught between different frames of reference. This phenomenon has received much attention by theorists. Failers points out the difficulty of analyzing the modern African chief's role, which is played out in a matrix of diverse, often conflicting institutions. Epstein suggests the efficacy of the principle of 'situational selection' for resolving inconsistent spheres of social interaction in an urban social system.

It should be noted that Baydoun was an integral part of two social groups: his family and the Society. One brother was connected with a bank which often handled the accounts of migrants in West Africa. The other was in the construction business. They and their contacts were involved in Amiliiya projects; the latter is presently director of a technical school associated with the Amiliyya. Khuri has noted a similar phenomenon in a Beirut suburb where three kinsmen perform "complementary, orchestra-like roles" of a proprietor and professional politician, an entrepreneur on whom leadership has been conferred, and a founder of a municipal club.
There was a symbiotic relation between Rashid Baydoun and the Amiliyya Society which made the distinction between his actions and the Society's insignificant for those involved in it, and ambiguous for the researcher trying to sort them out. It is quite certain that nothing went on in the Society without his consent. It is also undeniable that his personal political gains benefited the Amiliyya.

The above two groups served as operative bases, providing initial social ties for Bayodun. Had he restricted his actions to these two microcosms, he would have failed to become an urban za'im. But he forged new constellations of relations, assuring himself of positions in social networks supporting his leadership. Had Baydoun been the son of a landlord he might have depended on his family's networks and become a traditional za'im. But he utilized a wide spectrum of ties ranging from kin and sectarian to parliamentary and business. Such a use of traditional ties within a modern framework is not uncommon. For example, Meeker's study of the Black Sea aghas, cites an agha who adopted the ideas of the reformers, even to the extent of dropping the name of his patronymic group; once he attained power, he once again surrounded himself with members of his kin group, whose name he also took back.20.

Baydoun's credibility as a leader was strengthened by a series of well-planned moves establishing him as a benefactor. The southern landlords did not find it in their self interest to educate their clients. The most powerful one, from the As'ad family mentioned above, is reported to have warned a follower that if he allowed his son to attend an Amiliyya school in the South, his son would not return to work the farm. Baydoun was the first Shi'i leader to reject that philosophy.

Baydoun was a successful social entrepreneur whose ability to meet social needs and expectations produced a large following. The common interests shared by him and his followers was based — not on traditional supports — but on Baydoun's new bases of power. It was this shared interest which fostered the profound respect shown to Baydoun at Amiliyya rallies.

Charisma ... is a legitimation grounded in a relationship of loyalty and identification, in which the leader is followed because he embodies values in which the followers have an 'interest.' ... The charismatic leader, more than other kinds
of rulers, whose leadership may repose on quite different bases — patronage, force, constitutional authority, traditional right to rule, etc. is singularly dependent upon being accepted by his followers. 21.

We turn now to a closer look at the ties which allowed Baydoun to attain such a position. My perspective has changed since initiating the study, and the model, while generated from questions raised in the course of research, was not actually utilized at that time. As presented here, it generally describes the components of Baydoun's social networks.

B. The Model: Social Networks Sustained by an Urban Za'im.

Rashid Baydoun's efficacy as za'im was based on his participation in a large number of social networks. The following describes the six most recurrent types; the networks are classified by the social field defining them. The first three social fields (patronism, factionalism, and sectarianism) are quite general, whereas the second three (broker, redistributor, world spokesperson) describe the activity of a leader performing a specific function. The former, then, discuss general bases of interaction, with which the latter may intersect.

In presenting these networks, and their ties and social fields, two major questions will be kept in mind.

1. How did they link Rashid Baydoun to strategic institutions, groups, and the larger society?

Social networks are one way of describing the linkages between microcosms, such as the Amiliyya or the Shi'i quarter in the Beirut of the 1920's, and the larger society. Baydoun's connections were to important institutions of that microcosm — e.g., Parliament; the financial world.

2. What were Rashid Baydoun's motives in participating in various networks, as well as the motives and orientations of other participants?

Some of the networks clearly centered around Baydoun, like the 'ego-centric' network sometimes used in research; one case was the faction he sponsored, based on a youth movement. But in other networks, Baydoun was only a participant; one instance is that of national leaders, where each member had distinct motives and strategies based on his constituency.

— 12 —
1. **PATRONISM.**

This network is marked by the patron-client tie, defined here as a specific relation between two people with differing abilities to offer goods and services; the patron provides commodities in exchange for the client's support (political and other). Patronism links the rural inhabitants to urban society; as we shall see, Baydoun was at one time a patron representing south Lebanese interests in the capital city. Patronism also cuts through the maze of officialdom which faces the villager once he arrives in the city.

The diversity of urban life and regulation by specialized agencies whose equivalent functions in the village would be on an informal level throw up complicated strata of power and authority which can only be dealt with by cultivated friendship and patronage. 22

Studies of Middle Eastern society have concluded that the most important attribute of power is the ability to provide personal services. 23

The social field of patronism was Beirut and southern Shi'a responses to a changing national society. The former had left their tradition za'im but, like the latter, were still accustomed to his services. Baydoun mediated on their behalf to help them find jobs and to increase their educational qualifications. He asserted their rights as Shi'a — whether to hold a percentage of government jobs, or to enter the mosques in Beirut. Shi'a clients participated in his network because he could cope with the exigencies of their situation, and he offered them an escape from more restrictive alliances with southern zu'ama' (leaders).

2. **FACTIONALISM.**

Factional ties were not new to the Middle East, but, as in the above case, Rashid Baydoun invoked them in a non-traditional, specific way. The social field of his factional network was southern Lebanese politics. In the early twentieth century it was factionalized, with no encompassing framework such as the dual clan structure of the Druze. Until 1969, Lebanese Shi'a did not even have an official religious leader, or assembly.
Baydoun's response to this situation was to cultivate his own faction, that is, a temporary group recruited by a leader using structurally diverse bases.

(These bases) may rest upon kin ties, patron-client relations, religious or politico-economic ties or any combination of these; they are mobilized and made effective through an authority structure of leader and henchman... 24

Baydoun's faction was based on created ties, in contrast to that of the most powerful southern za'im Al-As'ad. The latter's was less a faction than a traditional group inherited from his family.

The catalytic event which coalesced Baydoun's faction was his founding of a youth party Al-Tala'i'if (The Vanguard) in 1944, in an effort to further his southern following. In form it was not unlike the Kataeb and Najjadah paramilitary parties of the 1930's. Al-Tala'i'if was, at its height, a well-organized youth movement with dues, drills, and a special khaki uniform with a party button. On the latter was a drawing of the two-bladed sword of Ali, the first Shi'i Imam, with the name of the party and the phrase thū al-faqār ("belonging to the sword of Ali"). Its members participated in festivals, parades, and receptions for dignitaries.

The party was the cause of Ahmad As'ad's creation of An-Nahda ("The Renaissance") in the following year. Upon establishment of his party, As'ad intimidated many of the Al-Tala'i'if members in the South into discarding their buttons. Orders for their harassment were executed through his long standing retinue of zilm (followers).

The difference between the two factions was evident in their activities. Baydoun's was run by an ordered hierarchy of community and regional leaders. It published a Constitution with the stated aims of uniting the youth fighting illiteracy, raising the peasants' cultural and social standards, and establishing close relations with other Arab governments. 25 As'ad's party, on the other hand, had no special organization, dues, meetings, uniform, or platform. He depended on its traditional network of zilm to produce crowds for his rallies. The symbols of the two parties also emphasized different appeals. Baydoun's use of Ali's sword identified his movement with the religious community. As'ad's use of a cedar tree surrounded
by two wheat stalks, was more suggestive of agriculture and pатримонialism.

An indication that Southerners perceived the two as different kinds of leaders is their present-day memory of them as society president and party president, respectively.

People were moved to ally with Baydoun for reasons other than the appeal of his party. For example, his Society had been instrumental in bringing schools to the southern villages. It acquired a permit for schools in the South in 1937. Sixteen were initially opened, including one at Habbouch, a few kilometers from the village of another southern za'im, Youssef az-Zein. By 1944 the village schools were closed—at least partially due to the pressure of southern zu'am, who found the project a threat and applied pressure on the Lebanese government.

Several efforts were made by Shi'ites living in Beirut to open schools in the South. It was related that their work was always thwarted and defeated by the opposition of the zu'am. Rashid Baydoun was first elected deputy from the South. It is not insignificant that with the schools’ closing, and the banning of his youth party, Baydoun’s political efforts became more centralized in Beirut. In 1947, he switched to a Beirut seat in the Parliamentary elections.

One could speculate that a large measure of Baydoun’s success in simulating a traditional faction was his place outside of the system. He used its form to provide recognizable accoutrements for those accustomed to it, and yet appealed to their desire to be rid of it. His faction was guided by a traditional conception of leadership—e.g. in its emphasis on personalism and public gatherings; followers responded to him because he offered a convincing cultural form of leadership.

But the content of Baydoun’s leadership was new. He in effect turned the traditional za'im duty of providing security and shielding a community from the outside world, on its head. He helped mobilize a community through a specific commitment to provide the very services that would spell the death of the traditional zu'am. Baydoun was a leader with no vested interest in isolating his community from the affairs of a modernizing society.
3. Sectarianism.

Rashid Baydoun constantly invoked the Shi'i idiom in cultivating his following. Sectarian identity provided reference to an enduring social category, and helped solidify other ties. It also strengthened Baydoun's hand in his negotiations as the head of the Shi'a. In the beginning, he was unprecedented among the Shi'a, and could claim to be their spokesperson by virtue of the lack of competition by similarly oriented leaders. Later, however, he was challenged by other new zu'amah and most recently by Imam Mousa Sadar, who formed the Shi'i High Council in 1969.

Baydoun's position as a sect spokesperson was dramatically underlined when his community was presented to the nation at Amiliyya Sports Rallies, attended by members of all the sects. After a large parade at one of them, officials in government circles grew uneasy about the extent of his influence, and reportedly asked As'ad to found An-Nahda.

In addition to these generalized sectarian ties were the specific bonds which Baydoun sought with the 'ulama'. He desired religious validation, with an eye to obtaining general blessings and specific fatwas proclaiming that contributions to the Amiliyya were a religious duty. Unaligned 'ulama' saw Baydoun as an earnest, honest man who was offering the only modern Shi'i education in Lebanon, and would provide them a position in the changing situation. Certain of them expected favors in return. (See number five below for the details of Baydoun's role as a redistributor.) For example, one of the theologians issuing a fatwa was Muhsin al-Amin, a mujtahid in Damascus who had been assisted by Baydoun's father in establishing two schools there.

4. Broker

A broker is someone who can mediate between a person in an action set, which is a set of network linkages temporarily mobilized by the broker to achieve desired ends, and some other person with whom he has contact. Baydoun's position as broker was assured by his competency over a political junction within the social field of Lebanese confessional politics. His financial contacts as businessman and the brother of a banker; political liaisons as deputy and occasional minister; social-religious links as Society president all complemented this role. Baydoun was privy to specialized information,
also a critical resource.

A broker is a middleman who can convincingly mix more than one political culture.

The political middleman is a leader largely by virtue of presenting and representing the communications of his multiple publics to each other . . . Since the middleman's publics are often structurally complex, and since the ideologies which he links — particularly the ideas on legitimacy — are often even more complicated, the legitimacy of the middleman will of necessity include conflicts, and contradictions of interest.

Baydoun's most common task as broker was to present the communications of the Shi'i community to the national institutions and representatives, and vice versa. He worked behind the scenes, visiting the French representatives and Lebanese officials, and in Parliament, to state the grievances of the Shi'a. His stands in Parliament included the following:

1. request for more national employees from the Shi'a
2. opposition to a rent control bill favoring Sunnis who were more established urban land owners
3. support of a bill for national schools which would have increased the number of schools in south Lebanon
4. call for a watchdog over government finances — which were rarely expended on Shi'i regions of Lebanon

He constantly reminded his constituency of his endeavors:

I have been for you like the sword that is prepared to overcome any difficulty and fight any deviation . . . I raised my voice many times in Parliament in defense of the sons of the South . . . we succeeded in paving some of the roads of the area, and in reclaiming some of the water springs . . . and I mediated with the government to send a medical delegation to the South . . . and I have offered individual service both in aiding the mistreated and in employing people in the government.

As a broker, Rashid Baydoun was at the node of several intersecting networks. He held a central position in some — most notably that of his Shi'i clients. He was more on the periphery of others, but he retained enough leverage to mediate between parties. He functioned as a bridge among various sets of actors, such as
government officials or financiers, and the Shi'a ʿulama'. His structural position as broker is crucial to a paradigm of his leadership style.

Within his field of broker activity, Baydoun initiated an assortment of ties, rather than depending on one crucial attribute, such as land ownership. Khuri's model of a leader in a Beirut suburb describes him as holding a 'variety of assets' including family background, family associations, a sports club, faction-client relationships, connection with community leaders living outside the suburbs, and a series of personal services rendered. "The political significance of these assets lies precisely in their concentration in the hands of one leader, and not in the individual quality of each." 29. Baydoun, like the leader Khuri describes, drew his power from the diversity of his ties.

5. REDISTRIBUTOR.

The archetypical redistributor is the chief in a basic subsistence society who derives prestige and power from his skill at redistributing within a system of refined reciprocities. In this paper the term refers to someone who makes resources — goods, services, governmental concessions, knowledge, influence — more readily available.

Much of Rashid Baydoun's power was used in his adeptness at spreading others' resources. A helpful model is the Melanesian 'Big Man' presented by Sahlin as a leader who can create and use social relations which give him leverage on others' production and the ability to siphon off an excess product . . . (The 'Big Man' combines with) an ostensible interest in the general welfare a more profound measure of self-interested cunning and economic calculation . . . His every public action is designed to . . . show a standing above the masses. 30.

Like the 'Big Man', Baydoun gained his authority through a series of acts within a redistributive network. Structurally, his position was similar to that described for the broker — at the intersection of several networks (which can be thought of as partial networks within his redistributive network). One where he was in the center was that of the Amil lyya financial
campaigns; here his African trips were the most prominent. The range of individual contributions in such drives was broad, and that some were token in amount did not detract from their symbolic linking of donor and organization, and thereby the organization's president.

In other instances, Baydoun occupied a more peripheral point in a network of ties, but from that vantage point he still controlled a range of resources. Parliamentary and commercial ties were indispensable, as were private friendships with leaders such as Bishara al-Khuri, Riad Solih, and Henry Faron (all non-Shi'i). Baydoun also sustained lucrative relations with the Persian government, and later when the Amiliyya became interested in technical education, with the German government.

A striking example of Baydoun's alliances was his friendship with Bishara al-Khuri, president of the Republic from 1943 to 1952. The latter attended many of the Amiliyya programs, and facilitated several Society activities. Khuri's intervention allowed Baydoun to purchase government land for the Society without a public auction — which might have tripled the price of the land. Khuri lifted wartime rations so that the Amiliyya could get needed building materials for its high school; when the government rented a Society building (the present Ministry of Finance), it paid rent three years in advance.

The network through which Baydoun channeled general benevolence, and specific favors was an important aspect of his leadership. His new style was couched in terms of a new form of association — the voluntary society. The symbiotic relation between the two has been mentioned. Baydoun's compelling presence and the Amiliyya's success in furthering Shi'i welfare and sense of identity combined to induce a loyalty previously reserved for patrimonial zu'ama.

6. WORLD SPOKESPERSON.

Rashid expanded his sectarian contacts by becoming an "international spokesperson" for Shi'a abroad. His Society's solicitations of funds from emigrants was not uncommon in a country whose GNP was annually boosted by money sent home. But Baydoun's three personal trips to West Africa, initiated in 1938 before jet-setting business was in vogue, were fairly dramatic settings for
cementing personal and spiritual bonds.

Baydoun was regarded as an emissary to a dispersed community. Bishara al-Khuri described him as "the best link between the country of Lebanon and the people in the countries of emigration, and a loyal missionary in bringing you (emigrants) what our hearts hold dear." Baydoun recounted hardships such as walking "long distances visiting distant villages, looking for emigrants... through jungles full of lions and poisonous insects, crossing rivers with dangerous crocodiles..." to underline his predication.

Baydoun was not only a spiritual link to the homeland, but also a distinguished courier for the personal business of African emigrants. His family bank handled many of the emigrants’ accounts. His honesty was proverbial. This, coupled with the fear that their Lebanese relatives might dip into their reserves, led some of the emigrants with children in the Amiliyya schools to entrust Baydoun with their funds.

These trips were valuable not only for solidifying an international network, but also for granting specific personal favors that were potential levers for Baydoun’s interests as a redistributor. For example, he chose his travel companions for more than compatibility in the jungle; in 1938, an Amiliyya teacher Kamal Meruweh went with him and made valuable contacts for Meruweh’s subsequent establishment of Al-Hiyāt newspaper.

Baydoun’s ties with emigrants supported his claim to be the spokesperson of the Shi’i community. But they also marked him as someone with relations stretching ‘beyond’ his immediate constituency. As an “international spokesperson” he connected more than one geographical group. This structural position of ‘mediator to the outside’ also supported his ability to act as a broker linking more than one political culture, and a redistributor linking resources and exigencies.

IV. CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The above describes how Rashid Baydoun’s style of leadership was sustained by various kinds of networks. It is suggestive of the possibilities of using social network analysis to understand such organizational patterns in third world urban areas as migrant adjustment and leadership formation. A complete analysis would re-
quire more data on specific individuals and the positions they occupied in Baydoun's social networks. This would allow evaluation of networks he was involved in, the intensity of interaction, the incidence of multiplex bonds, and the extent of overlapping networks. One could then judge such issues as the degree to which the bases of interaction suggested above complement one another; and Baydoun's centrality in the networks, and the relation of this to his authority. (Centrality is a measure of the degree to which a given ego connects individuals without direct lateral links in a network.) Lacking such complete information, the paper will be concluded with a few generalizations about Baydoun's networks, which also summarize his style as a new kind of urban za'īm.

A. Rashid Baydoun responded to the changing organizational needs of migrants by offering specific patron-client ties.

His political platform was a program of specific benevolent services, based on his power as redistributor and patron — derived from a strategic position in several social networks.

Studies of urban migrants have emphasized that while initial adjustment of new arrivals may be a matter of settling in an area buffered by fellow villagers, the subsequent adaptation to urban culture is dependent on allying one's self with an 'outside patron' who is perceived to have more access to power. Rashid Baydoun fit that description.

B. Rashid Baydoun activated both traditional and modern ties in forging his social contacts.

Adapting to the situation at hand, Baydoun recruited action sets, or joined those of others, based on a wide range of ties. He acted on village and sectarian ties when collecting Society funds; he acted on parliamentary ties when joining with Sunnis in a coalition to oppose a teacher bill injurious to the Sunni's Maqased schools and his Amiliyya schools. These examples only suggest the range of his actions. He avoided a permanent alliance with a given group, and thus retained the ability to "contract various relationships across any social boundary." Rashid Baydoun's location bridging networks was a crucial factor in his ability to lead.

His was not an institutionalized position, but one carved out in the mores of Beirut/Lebanese social structure. Baydoun could
activate links with various clusters of social actors to form alliances as needed. His authority was achieved by his ability to bring mutual interests together.

D. The overlapping of Rashid Baydoun's networks increased as the Shi'a became more integrated into the Lebanese confessional system.

In the beginning, Baydoun's major task was information conveyance between a cloistered community and national powers. But with time, his clients became less dependent on his mediation, and were more likely to know members of his other networks.

E. There was a close correlation between the expansion and contraction of Rashid Baydoun's networks and the Society's activities.

In the beginning the Society's main concern was education. As Baydoun's interest in the political expediency of ceremonially heading the Shi'a community grew, new activities such as the Sports Rallies and the Scout troupe were initiated under Society aegis. As Baydoun aged, such activities waned, and in 1971 the Society was once again providing only educational services.

---

V. FOOTNOTES

1. For a discussion of the dynamic nature of social organization, see Raymond Firth's Essays on Social Organization and Values. (1964: London, Athlone Press.)


3. It is assumed that a social network can be characterized both by morphological criteria (anchorage, reachability, density) and interactional criteria (content, directedness, frequency). For a discussion of the characteristics of a network, see the Introduction in Mitchell.


He describes them as "inter-active quasi groups." (p. 97)


9. Non-Christian groups, most notably the Sunnis, were also active. The latter, more urbanized than the Shi'a, opened schools in Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli soon after the founding of the Sunni Maqased Society in 1878.


12. The events of the Arab revolt of 1916 offer an indication of the initial Shi'i participation in the Lebanese community. Among those hanged in Beirut by the Ottomans in 1916 were Abdul Kareem Khalil of Sidon and Salih Haidar of Baalbeck. The former founded a Literary Club in Sidon in 1913 with the aim of 'raising the social, literary, and intellectual levels as a service to the Arab nationalist ideal.'

13. The Ottomans had founded only one school in the southern interior, in Nabatiyya.

14. For example, government appointments almost completely ignored the Shi'i sect during this period. Baydoun, in an effort to pressure for change, put an advertisement in the news-
paper asking all Shi'a with a primary school diploma to come meet him. It is reported that no one came.

15. The mujtahid is one who interprets the Quran and Hadith through reasoning or analogy (the principle of ijtiḥād).

16. Amin's stance was opposed by some of the south Lebanese — most notably Sheikh Abdu Hussain Taqi Sadaq. The controversy probably stemmed more from political sources, and the economic benefit of holding the festivities on the tenth day. The split of those opposing and supporting followed local factional lines.


23. See, for example, Kamal Malikiyya's Al Jama'at wa-Qiyyadat fi Qariyya Arabiyya. (1963 : Sirsiliyyan. Egypt.) Chapter IV.


32. Speech at Ashura : 12 November 1948. From the files of the Amiliyya.


ظهور زعيم حضري: تحليل اجتماعي

د. 2010 ايرل

تتناول هذه الدراسة العلاقة بين أنماط النظم الاجتماعية التي نتجت عن الهجرة والظروف المحيطة بظهور القادة الحصريين. وتشير الدراسة إلى أن أغلب القيادة في الشرق الأوسط خاصة ما يتعلق منها بالمجاعات الدينية، ومنها الطائفة الشيعية في لبنان كمثال.

وقد فرضت تلك القيادة مجتمع المتطرفًا قد قام على أسس دينية، متضمنة أيضًا سلوك تلك القيادة في المجتمع. وفيما يتعلق بكل القيادة في لبنان خاصة يردد البحث سؤالين رئيسيين:

1 - ما هو هيكل القيادة.

2 - ما دورها في المجتمع اللبناني، هل كان دوراً تقليدياً ثابتاً، أم أنها مهيئة ادّة تحضير مفرزة الكثير من القيم الحضارية الجديدة؟

كما تناول البحث بالتحليل تاريخ وظيفة بعض الجمعيات والروابط الاجتماعية الدينية منها مبرزا دور كل منها في المجتمع ومتلا تطور بعض القيم التي أو جديتها.