
AN EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS OF CORRELATES OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN THIRTEEN ARAB STATES

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INTRODUCTION

The first edition of the **World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators** stated as its purpose the "attempt to compare nations on a great variety of politically relevant indices — to present some of the data necessary for the further development of a science of comparative and international politics —".¹ The present study is written in this spirit. It seeks to investigate the relationship between political violence if any, and social and economic development in thirteen Arab states. These states are: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia and Yemen.

The comparative study of violence is an ongoing concern in political science. While empirical works on violence are numerous in the United States, they are virtually non-existent for the Arab World.² This paper, then, is a modest attempt to fill the gap in the literature of the comparative study of political violence.

In this study political violence is the dependent variable. It is operationalized in terms of the number of incidents of internal disorders (riots, strikes, assassinations, coups, and revolutions) in the aforementioned states.³ Our independent variables are political and socio-economic. Data are primarily extracted from **The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators**.⁴

As for the quality and accuracy of the data, we believe that what is generated in these countries leaves much to be desired. As Taylor and Hudson state " — there is a clear tendency for the

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quality and availability of data to rise with the level of economic development in a country. This is simply a matter of resources." ⁵ Admittedly the economic resources are available in some of the thirteen countries but the human resources needed to collect and evaluate the data are absent.

Another problem is the lack of international agreement on the definition of certain items, this is in spite of United Nations' efforts to establish standard definitions for census-taking, accounting, and other data-gathering and data analysis procedure.

Another major difficulty arises from the distortion of data by national governments for a variety of reasons. It is very difficult for an independent investigator to determine the accuracy of the data. It is not uncommon for governments, as Taylor and Hudson state to keep two sets of books.

Despite these difficulties, we feel that the data are valid if used with care. As Sartori aptly puts it : " We are not unconcious of the inherent difficulties but at the same time we are not over-conscious of these difficulties." ⁶

Methods

The aggregate data analysis employed in this present study includes product moment correlation analysis, partial correlation, and multiple regression analysis.

The gross interrelationships as measured by the simple correlation co-efficients between the independent variables and the dependent variables are examined. Partial correlation analysis is then used to determine the independent influence of each independent variable on the dependent variable, while controlling for the effects of the other independent variables. The results, it is hoped, could provide a foundation for a complex multivariate " theory " of political violence in the thirteen Arab states.

Multiple regression is used to obtain the slopes of each independent variable against the dependent variable in order to examine how much change in the dependent variable is accounted for by changes in the independent variables. Finally, the multiple correlation of all the independent variables versus the dependent variables

will measure the total influence of our socio-economic and political variables on political violence, assuming an "additive theory of violence" for the thirteen Arab countries. The additivity assumption does not seem unreasonable, given the **exploratory** nature of our study.⁷

WORKING HYPOTHESES

The units of analysis are thirteen Arab countries. These countries are sufficiently homogeneous to merit their use as the **universe** in our analysis. Our hypotheses are :

- (1) Political violence is **inversely** related to welfare orientations.
- (2) Political violence is **positively** related to militaristic orientations.⁸
- (3) Political violence is **inversely** related to the rate of government turnover.
- (4) Political violence is **inversely** related to the level of wealth.
- (5) Political violence is **positively** related to the distribution of communication media.
- (6) Political violence is **positively** related to a country's inability to provide health care services.
- (7) Political violence is **inversely** related to literacy rates.

DATA

Three political variables : welfare orientations, militaristic orientations, and the rate of governmental turnover are investigated. In addition, four socio-economic variables : the communication factor level of wealth, standard of health care and the general level of education are also investigated. All nine variables are listed below. As noted earlier, the data are mostly extracted from **The World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators**.

POLITICAL VARIABLES:

(1) Welfare Orientations are measured by the expenditures of the central government on social security and public enterprises as a percentage of the Gross National Product (GNP).

(2) Militaristic Orientations are measured by the size of the army. Large armies may serve as either a major source of social mobility or social immobility.

(3) The Rate of Governmental Turnover refers to the legitimate succession of governments (including monarchies and military dictatorships) as opposed to coups d'états.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC VARIABLES

(1) The Communication Factor is measured by radios per 1000 population.

(2) The Level of Wealth is measured by such variables as GNP per capita, percentage of unemployment among the working age population (1958-1960), and per capita income. GNP per capita, or the rate of growth in wealth, is frequently used as a measure of comfort or well-being, whereas unemployment percentages are fair indices of activity. Per capita Income, according to Russet *et al.*, is a good index of economic viability. However, one must bear in mind that the G.N.P. does not necessarily reflect the actual distribution of wealth.⁹

(3) The Standard of Health Care is measured by inhabitants per physician. This variable suggests a measurement of relative well-being for these countries. It is important to note that the quality or quantity of medical personnel may be a reflection of available resources or the consequences of deliberate public policy. Obviously, the actual number of physicians does not include their distribution. Moreover, health care delivery systems in the Arab world are often imbalanced between rural and urban areas.

(4) The Level of Education in the Society is measured by the literacy rate of the population aged 15 and over.

The countries and variables under study are shown in Table I. Table II displays these data after they were subjected to Pearson's product correlation analysis.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The simple gross relationships between the independent and the dependent variables are readily seen in Table III.

Judging by partial correlation and co-efficients, the most important variable is per capita income, which is inversely proportional to the number of disorders. In other words, the lower the per capita income, the higher the incidence of violence. The GNP per capita is inversely proportional to the number of disorders. Hence, the lower the GNP per capita, the higher the amount of violence. These two conclusions are in keeping with our working hypothesis stated above, namely, that **political violence is inversely related to the level of wealth measured by per capita income and GNP per capita.**

Russet, et al., have by contrast found GNP per capita to be the least important variable. Two possible explanations account for the variance between our findings and those of Russett's.

- (a) We used both per capita income and GNP per capita rather than one or the other, and this may have contributed to a splitting of the effect of well-being.
- (b) Our universe is more homogeneous than that of Russett's.

The stability index is inversely proportional to the number of disorders. This finding is in keeping with our hypothesis, that **political violence is inversely related to the rate of governmental turnover.**

The fourth finding is in keeping with our hypothesis, namely, that **political violence is positively related to the distribution of the communication media.**

Army size is found to be positively related to the number of disorders. This finding is in keeping with our hypothesis ; **political violence is positively related to militaristic orientation.**

The sixth finding is also in keeping with our hypothesis ; **violence is inversely related to the level of health services available to the population.**

The seventh finding is also in keeping with our hypothesis, namely, that **political violence is inversely and negatively related to welfare orientations.**

The rate of unemployment was found to be only slightly related to political violence. While unemployment is potentially very explosive as an issue in Western countries, it is not that uncommon a phenomenon in the countries under study.

The percentage of literacy is found to be inversely related to the number of disorders. This finding is in keeping with our hypothesis, that violence is inversely related to the literacy rate. However, in this case, violence has only a slight inverse relationship with literacy. This indicates that illiteracy is not a good explanatory factor of violence in the thirteen Arab countries for two reasons:

- (a) The educational systems in the countries under study inhibit independent thinking, and promote conformity. Hence the educated tend to become instruments of the status quo and not necessarily instruments of violent change.
- (b) The educated elite is made up of the sons and daughters of upper middle-class and well-to-do families. These elites have a stake in the status-quo .

We need to further assess the relative importance and the independent effect on each variable in predicting political violence, i.e., the variables that are most interrelated in explaining political violence. To pursue this investigation, partial correlation and multiple regression analysis are applied to the data matrix. The results are shown in Table IV.

The nine independent variables explain over three-fourths of the variance of our dependent variables as manifested in a high multiple correlation co-efficient of (0.8782). The fit is impressive despite the unavailability of some of the data. It does seem therefore that these variables are very important in at least partially explaining a major portion of the variation of political violence in these Arab countries.

In examining the partial correlation co-efficients we find that the relationships are somewhat different from those that we have observed in the simple gross relationships between the independent and the dependent variables.

In looking at the per capita income, we see that its relationships with violence (-0.712) is even higher than that reflected by its simple correlation of (-0.48). Again, our working hypothesis is upheld ; the higher the per capita income, the lower the violence.

Per capita income appears to be an important, if not the most important, variable in explaining violence in these Arab countries.

This modifies Russett's findings, which stressed other variables, such as voting turnout and life expectancy. The Beta weight of (-3.111) also reflects the strength of the above relationship.

The relationship between army size and violence (0.076) seems to be lower than that reflected by its simple correlation of (.222). The Beta weight of (.112) also reflects this lowering of the relationship. However, despite its weaknesses, this relationship still upholds our hypothesis, that political violence is positively related to militaristic orientations. One explanation is that perhaps the fusion of civil-military rule in these Arab countries has a neutralizing effect on its relationship to violence.

The relationship of Central Government expenditures /GNP to violence (-0.579) is different from the (.072) reflected by its simple correlation. It would seem that our hypothesis is upheld, namely, that violence is inversely and negatively related to welfare orientations. The Beta weight of (-0.583) seems to reflect the strength of this relationship.

The relationship of the stability index with violence (-0.675) is even higher than that reflected by its simple correlation of (-.253). Again, our basic hypothesis is upheld ; violence is inversely related to the rate of Governmental turnover. The Beta weight of (-1.058) also reflects the strength of this relationship.

In studying the relationship of radios per 1000 population to violence (-0.149), one finds that it is different from the (0.218) reflected in its simple correlation. This finding does not uphold our original hypothesis, that violence is positively related to the distribution of communication media. Again, as indicated above, this variable is not a stable one since much of its effectiveness is centered on the kind of information put out rather than on the number of radios **per se**. Furthermore, the relationship of communication to violence is highly dependent on the shifting political environment.

The relationship of GNP per capita to violence (0.551) is quite different from that reflected by its simple correlation of (-0.378), and the Beta weight of (2.348). This discrepancy is due, we think, to extreme variations in GNP per capita in these Arab countries. (For example, while the GNP per capita at the time the data were collected was \$ 2900 in Kuwait, it is about \$ 50 in Yemen and \$ 60 in the Sudan).

The relationship of the ratio of unemployment to violence (-0.058) is slightly different from its simple correlation of (0.066) . Both relationships are slight. This is due, we think, to the weakness of trade unions in these Arab countries and the general acceptance of unemployment, disguised or otherwise, as a way of life. The Beta weight of (-0.091) reflects the looseness of the above relationship.

The ratio of inhabitants per physician varies in its relationship with violence (-0.429), as opposed to the simple correlation of $(.126)$. This relationship upholds our hypothesis, that violence is inversely related to the level of health services available to the population. The Beta weight of (-0.494) reflects the strength of this relationship.

This relationship of the percentage of literate population to violence (-0.609) seems to be even higher than that reflected by its simple correlation of (-0.032). Again, our hypothesis is upheld namely ; that violence is inversely related to the literacy rate of the population. The Beta weight of (-0.712) reflects the strength of this relationship.

In order to take a better look at the fit of our equation, let us examine that portion of the variance which is unexplained by our nine independent variables in the thirteen Arab countries. These are reflected in the residuals left in predicting the number of disorders per Arab country from our set of nine predictor variables. The closer a residual is to zero, the better the fit of our equation and hence, the explanation of political violence for that particular country. The results are displayed in Table V.

The results for Libya, Lebanon, Kuwait and Egypt are best explained by regression analysis. Table VI displays countries rank ordered according to size of residual.

Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Iraq and Algeria are the deviant cases in our universe. These countries are not typical of other Arab countries. (At the time Saudi Arabia and Jordan were said to be "traditional" while Syria, Iraq and Algeria were said to be "revolutionary"). The similarity between these countries lies perhaps in their extreme political and socio-economic stance. Problems of external environmental influence, such as military preparedness, have an amorphous bearing on these countries.

SUMMARY

This study is an exploratory attempt to explain political violence in the Arab countries in terms of socio-economic and political determinants. Socio-economic determinants, particularly per capita income, were found to be slightly more important than political measures in explaining political violence. Among the political factors, executive stability appeared to be the most important. It is suspected that the relationship between the other political variables, such as army size, are curvilinear, (since the area has had a long tradition of theocratic military-civilian dominant rule), thus leading to an almost zero or a weak relationship with violence. A curvilinear regression analysis using political variables against the dependent measure might lead to more fruitful results. We are in the process of remedying the shortcomings of the present study and are using more up-to-date data

TABLE I
COUNTRIES AND VARIABLES UNDER STUDY

| Countries | No. of Disorders Y | Per Capita Income S X1 | Army Size X2 | Gen. Govt. Expend. G.N.P. X3 | Stability Index X4 | Radios per 1000 pop. X5 | G.N.P. per Capita X6 | Unemp. as % working age X7 | Inhab. per Physician X8 | % or pop. Literate X9 |
|------------------|-----------------------|---------------------------|-----------------|---------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|-------------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Algeria | 93 | 225 | 84,000 | N/A | N/A | 54.1 | 178 | 0.09 | 6096 | 19.0 |
| 2. Egypt | 34 | 137 | 300,000 | 36.1 | 1.21 | 65.8 | 142 | 1.92 | 2600 | 1.9 |
| 3. Iraq | 44 | 144 | 65,000 | 32.5 | 0.81 | 21.2 | 156 | 0.04 | 5600 | 10.0 |
| 4. Jordan | 38 | 252 | 35,000 | 47.5 | 0.84 | 37.7 | 129 | N/A | 5800 | 17.5 |
| 5. Kuwait | 6 | 3670 | 3,000 | N/A | N/A | N/A | 2900 | N/A | 930 | 30.0 |
| 6. Lebanon | 27 | | 15,000 | N/A | 0.81 | 60.8 | 362 | N/A | 1100 | 47.5 |
| 7. Libya | 7 | 748 | 10,000 | N/A | 2.20 | 63.1 | 60 | N/A | 5800 | 13.0 |
| 8. Morocco | 49 | 200 | 36,000 | N/A | 3.00 | 45.5 | 142 | 0.53 | 9400 | 12.5 |
| 9. Saudia Arabia | 6 | 475 | 38,000 | N/A | 5.67 | 12.1 | 170 | N/A | 13000 | 2.5 |
| 10. Sudan | 45 | 80 | 80,000 | N/A | 2.00 | 0.9 | 60 | N/A | 40000 | 9.0 |
| 11. Syria | 42 | 194 | 70,000 | N/A | 0.54 | 57.3 | 173 | N/A | *4600 | 7.5 |
| 12. Tunisia | 35 | 200 | 32,000 | N/A | 3.00 | 63.5 | 173 | N/A | 8200 | 17.5 |
| 13. Yemen | 36 | 110 | 90,000 | N/A | 8.50 | N/A | 50 | N/A | N/A | 2.5 |
| Means | 35.46 | 525.77 | 62,808 | 8.93 | 2.19 | 37.07 | 361.15 | 0.19 | 7932.7 | 17.56 |
| Stan. Deviations | 22.96 | 962.2 | 76,268 | 17.26 | 2.45 | 26.56 | 766.85 | 0.53 | 10296.93 | 12.20 |

Source : Bruce M. Russet, et. al., **World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators**, (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1967), J.C. Hurewitz, **The Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension** (New York: Praeger, 1969); **International Yearbook of Education Vol. XXX** (UNESCO, Geneva: International Bureau of Education, 1968). **Conference on Public Education XXX 1st session** (Geneva: International Bureau of Education, 1968). N/A Not available.

TABLE II
COUNTRIES AND VARIABLES UNDER STUDY : PEARSON'S CORRELATION ANALYSIS

| | No. of Disorders | PCI | AS | CGE/ GNP | ST | PROP | GNP CAP | EM | PHYS | LIT. |
|------------------------------------|------------------|--------|--------|----------|--------|--------|---------|--------|--------|------|
| | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | 9 | 10 |
| 1. No. of Disorders | -0.481 | | | | | | | | | |
| 2. Per Capita Income | 0.222 | -0.304 | | | | | | | | |
| 3. Army Size | | | | | | | | | | |
| 4. Cen. Govt. Expenditure / G.N.P. | 0.072 | -0.197 | 0.462 | | | | | | | |
| 5. Stability Index | -0.253 | -0.263 | -0.007 | -0.286 | | | | | | |
| 6. Radios per 1000 pop. | 0.218 | -0.356 | 0.265 | 0.100 | -0.402 | | | | | |
| 7. G.N.P. Per Capita | -0.378 | 0.978 | -0.244 | -0.161 | -0.307 | -0.375 | | | | |
| 8. Unemp. as % working age pop. | 0.066 | -0.155 | 0.901 | 0.427 | -0.109 | 0.353 | -0.113 | | | |
| 9. Inhabitants per Physician | 0.126 | -0.237 | -0.169 | -0.173 | 0.028 | -0.349 | -0.238 | -0.146 | | |
| 10. % of pop. Literate | -0.032 | 0.320 | -0.087 | -0.065 | -0.640 | 0.448 | 0.384 | 0.020 | -0.365 | |

TABLE III

GROSS RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN INDEPENDENT AND
DEPENDENT VARIABLES

| | <u>No. of Disorders</u> |
|---|-------------------------|
| Per capita Income | -0.481 |
| Army Size | 0.222 |
| Central Government Expenditure / G.N.P. ... | 0.072 |
| Stability Index | -0.253 |
| Radios per 1000 population | 0.218 |
| G.N.P. Percapita | -0.378 |
| Unemp. as % Working-Age Population ... | 0.066 |
| Inhabitants per physician | 0.126 |
| % of Population literate | -0.032 |

TABLE IV

Partial Correlates and Standardized Regression Co-efficients
(Beta Weight): Socio-Economic and Political Variables
vs. Political violence

| | Partial Correlates Coefficients | Standardized Regression Coefficients. |
|--|---------------------------------------|---|
| Per Capita Income | -0.712 | -2.111 |
| Army Size | 0.076 | 0.112 |
| - Central Government Expenditure/ G.N.P. | -0.579 | -0.583 |
| Stability Index | -0.675 | -1.058 |
| Radios per 1000 population ... | -0.149 | -0.216 |
| G. N. P. Per Capita | 0.551 | 2.348 |
| Unemployment as % Working-age population * | -0.058 | -0.091 |
| Inhabitants per Physician | -0.429 | -0.454 |
| % of Pop. Literate | -0.609 | -0.712 |
| R (Multiple correlation Co-efficient) = 0.8782 | | |
| R ² (Co-efficient of Determination) + 0.7712 | | |
| The regression equation is the form $y = B_1X_1 + B_2 X_2 - B_{10}X_{10}$ (The B's are Beta Weight) | | |

TABLE V
REGRESSION ESTIMATES AND RESIDUALS

| Observations | Actual Y Values | Predicted Y Estimates | Residuals |
|-----------------|--------------------|--------------------------|-----------|
| 1. Algeria | 2.506 | 1.570 | 0.935 |
| 2. Egypt | -0.064 | 0.015 | -0.079 |
| 3. Iraq | 0.372 | 1.112 | -0.740 |
| 4. Jordan | 0.111 | -0.455 | 0.566 |
| 5. Kuwait | -1.283 | -1.310 | 0.027 |
| 6. Lebanon | -0.368 | -0.363 | -0.004 |
| 7. Libya | -1.239 | -1.236 | -0.002 |
| 8. Morocco | 0.590 | 0.405 | 0.184 |
| 9. Saudi Arabia | -1.283 | -0.759 | -0.523 |
| 10. Sudan | 0.415 | 0.281 | 0.133 |
| 11. Syria | 0.285 | 0.962 | -0.677 |
| 12. Tunisia | -0.020 | 0.200 | -0.220 |
| 13. Yemen | -0.020 | -0.420 | 0.400 |

TABLE VI
COUNTRIES RANK ORDERED ACCORDING TO SIZE OF
RESIDUAL

| Country | Residuals |
|---------------------|-----------|
| 1. Libya ... | -0.002 |
| 2. Lebanon ... | -0.004 |
| 3. Kuwait ... | 0.027 |
| 4. Egypt ... | -0.079 |
| 5. Sudan ... | 0.133 |
| 6. Morocco ... | 0.184 |
| 7. Tunisia ... | -0.220 |
| 8. Yemen ... | 0.400 |
| 9. Saudi Arabia ... | -0.523 |
| 10. Jordan ... | 0.566 |
| 11. Syria ... | -0.677 |
| 12. Iraq ... | -0.740 |
| 13. Algeria ... | 0.925 |

NOTES

The present paper is one of a series of reports which will be published by the authors. Admittedly the data in this report are old, yet we felt that interested scholars of the Middle East might find this report useful. Future reports will use more up-to-date data. A report in progress is utilizing the data presented by Charles L. Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, **"World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators,"** 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).

We would like to thank our colleagues, Naseer Aruri Lincoln Bloomfield, Hani Faris, Yasumasa Kuroda, Fehmi Saddy, Michael Suleiman, Janice Terry and Iliya Harik who read and commented on this paper. We are solely responsible for the final form which the article has taken.

The Fortran IV computer program used in this analysis was **SFAOIB Correlations Plots and Standard sources . . . Standard Program Library Routine.** Kuwait University Computer Center.

1. Quoted in Taylor and Huson, **World Handbook**, p. 1.
2. Among the major works on violence see, Lincoln Bloomfield and Amelia Leios **Controlling Small Wars : A Strategy for the 1970's**, (New York : Knopf, 1969); Harry Eckstein, ed **Internal War** (New York: Free Press, 1964); R. Vonder Mehden, **Comparative Political Violence** (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1971) ; J.F. Short, Jr., and M.E. Wolfgang, eds., **Collective Violence** (New York : Harper & Row, 1972) ; T.R. Gurr, **Why Men Rebel** (Princeton Princeton University Press, 1970); W. J. Crotty **Assassinations and the Political Order** (New York : Harper & Row, 1971) ; H. D. Graham and T. R. Gurr, eds. **Violence in America** (National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence 1969); H. G. Nieburg, **Political Violence : The Behavioral Process**. (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1969). Empirical treatment of violence in the Arab Middle East is found in Yasumasa Kuroda's " Young Palestinian Commandos in Political Socialization Perspective" **The Middle East Journal** (Summer, 1972) 253-270; Thomas J. Sloan's, **International Interactions: Events-Data Analysis Applied To the Middle East** (St. Louis, Missouri: Consortium for International studies education of the International Studies Association, 1975) and Edward Azar's **Probe for Peace : Small State Hostilities** (Minneapolis : Burgess Publishing Co., 1973).
3. Ground-breaking work in the use of event data in the comparative analysis of political stability and disorder was carried out by R.J. Rummel, "Diemensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," in L. Von Bertalanffy and A. Rappoport eds., **General Systems** (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Society for General Systems Research, 1964). 1-50. Another important pioneer in this field is R. Tanter " Diemensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1948-1960 ", **Journal of Conflict Resolution** 10 (March 1966) : 41-64. Cf. R. J. Rummel, " The Dimensionality of Nations Project," in **Comparing**

Nations : The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research," eds R. L. Merritt and S. Rokkan (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1966), 109-29 ; T. R. Gurr and C. Ruttenburg. **The Conditions of Civil Violence : First Test of a Casual Model,** Research Monograph No. 28. (Princeton : Princeton University Center of International Studies, 1967). Cf. J. K. Feierabend and R. L. Feierabend. "Agressive Behaviors within Polities, 1948-1962 : A Cross National Study. **Journal of Conflict Resolution** 10 (September 1966), 249-71. It is worth noting here that leading writers on political violence differ in their definitions of the concepts. Gurr, **Why Men Rebel**, 1-2, says that "Political violence refers to all collective attacks within a political group as well as incumbents – or its policies." Eckstein, **Internal War**, 12, defines "internal war" as a kind of social force that exerted in the 'warlike' in character and involving the serious disruption of settled institutional patterns." Von der Mehden; **Comparative Political Violence**, 7, adopts a very broad definition suggested by H. L. Nieburg, **Political Violence, The Behavioral Process**, (New York : St. Martin's Press, 1969), 13.

4. Bruce M. Russett, et al., **World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators**, (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1967)
5. Taylor and Hudson, **World Handbook**, p 8.
6. G. Sartori, " Concept Misinformation in Comparative Politics." **American Political Science Review**, 64 (December 1970), 1034-1035 Also see William M. Chandler and Marsha A. Chandler, " The Problem of Indicator Formation in Comparative Research." **Comparative Political Studies**, 7 (April 1974), 26-46.
7. See for example : Hayward R. Alker, Jr., **Mathematics and Politics** (New York: MacMillan Company, 1965), 107. Alker notes:
 - (1) that land inequality causes violence ; (2) that a high level of agricultural employment (indicating fewer social opportunities, fewer increases in wealth, power and other desired values) also causes violence "
8. In view of the gross nature of the figures used to present this variable, its effect on violence should not be taken very seriously. For example, some relation to population size should be indicated, together with a measure of the influence of the military on society
9. While we distinguish between the levels of wealth and communication for the purposes of this study, in general these tend to increase simultaneously.

she nevertheless persists in calling it the Yom Kippur War, which is an indication of sympathy with the Israeli point of view. Furthermore, the term "terrorism" or "terrorist" is quite often used (pp. 43, 44, 46, and 49) to describe acts by the Palestinian guerrillas in their attacks on Israel. However, when the Israelis attack the guerrillas or attack the neighboring Arab countries, no such term is used. In fact, the term used is "retaliation." The implication is that "terrorism" is only practiced by the Arabs and the Palestinians. Any actions taken by the Israelis are in retaliation to this and, no matter how great the assault, it is not called terroristic. It might be added that, indeed, no justification is given in the case of attacks by the Palestinians, as if the Palestinians did not attack the Israeli positions and Israeli targets in "retaliation" for their own uprooting from their own land, namely Palestine. This is **never** mentioned as retaliation. Furthermore, throughout the pamphlet the main issues are presented from the Israeli perspective and using Israeli terminology. For instance, on page 105, in summarizing what the main issues are, number seven is called "Administration of Jerusalem." It is not presented as "return of Arab Jerusalem," nor as "an issue that divides Arabs and Israelis," nor is it stated in terms of the "status of East Jerusalem." It is presented merely as "Administration of Jerusalem," which is exactly the wording that the Israelis use.

Finally, the bibliography alone is enough to condemn Dr. Feste as biased and to reveal her pro-Israeli, anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian attitudes. Under section B, entitled "Middle East Politics," nineteen sources are listed. Out of those 19 references, 11 are by Israelis or pro-Israelis. Furthermore, not one single reference out of the nineteen is by an Arab or a pro-Arab writer. If Dr. Feste did indeed rely on these sources, and only on these sources, then it becomes quite obvious why her presentation is pro-Israeli and generally anti-Arab and anti-Palestinian.

It is important to point out here that I am **not** offering a blanket condemnation of the works identified as "Israeli" or "pro-Israeli," nor am I suggesting that they are generally not scholarly. What I **am** saying is that the Palestine-Israel and Arab-Israeli conflicts are emotional and controversial subjects, and that almost **all** scholarship on these topics is to some extent biased. It is, therefore, imperative that students and writers (such as Dr. Feste) be informed of the different points of view, presented by **equally good** scholars

Karan Ann Feste

**Conflict in the Middle East: A Public Policy Simulation
Washington, D.C. The American Political Science Association,
1975 .**

Reviewed by: Michael W. Suleiman*

I shall first present a general criticism of the pamphlet and then later develop the details of the following arguments:

1. The overall presentation is definitely pro-Israeli.
2. The Israeli position is adequately explained and justified every time a situation is presented.
3. The Arab position is generally not adequately explained and not justified.
4. The Arab position is not clearly presented.
5. The Arab position is at times distorted.
6. There are several errors of fact in the presentation, errors that reinforce the above distortions.
7. The main issues are not clearly defined and/or some of the main issues are left out.

The above charges are very serious indeed, in and of themselves. They are even more important when we remember that the author claims (on page one) that the **understanding** of the positions held by the conflict participants is one of the main aims of the pamphlet. Furthermore, the student is told (p. 76) that "part of the assignment means that you must be able to empathize with the positions currently taken by policy-makers in the country [that the student represents] in order to generate reasonable and viable policies consistent with those positions." Now let me come to the details which support the statements I have just made.

1. The presentation is generally given from a pro-Israeli point of view. For instance, the war in 1973 is not referred to as the October war, or the 1973 war or the Ramadan War, as the Arabs call it, but rather the Yom Kippur War as the Israelis call it. Even though Dr. Feste (on page 20) tries to explain that indeed the Yom Kippur War is not a designation that the Arab states prefer,

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on both sides. Hence, the need for Dr. Feste to read more widely, especially works presenting a pro-Arab perspective and to provide the student with references equally divided between pro-Arab and pro-Israeli perspectives. The references Dr. Feste cites in the pamphlet are listed below, and the Israeli and pro-Israeli ones are marked with an asterisk.

- * 1. Abir, Mordechi, "Sharm-al-Sheikh — Bab al-Mandeb : The Strategic Balance and Israel's Southern Approaches," Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, Jerusalem : The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, March, 1974.
2. Adelphi Papers, **The Middle East and the International System : The Impact of the 1973 War**, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring, 1975.
3. Adelphi Papers, **The Middle East and the International System : Security and Energy Policy**, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Spring, 1975.
- * 4. Allon, Yigal, **The Making of Israel's Army**, New York : Bantam Books, 1971.
5. American Friends, **Search for Peace in the Middle East**, Greenwich Conn. : Faucett, 1970.
- * 6. Blum, Yehuda Zvi, "The Juridical Status of Jerusalem," Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, Jerusalem : The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, February, 1974.
7. Bowie, Robert R., **International Crises and the Role of Law : Suez 1956**, New York : Oxford University Press, 1974.
- * 8. Brecher, Michael, **The Foreign Policy System of Israel**, New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, 1972.
- * 9. Curtis, Michael (ed.), **People and Politics in the Middle East**, New Brunswick, New Jersey : Transaction Books, 1971.
- * 10. Dowty, Alan, "The Role of Great Power Guarantees in International Peace Agreements," Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, Jerusalem : The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, February, 1974.

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- * 11. Fein, Leonard, **Politics in Israel**, Boston : Little, Brown, 1967.
 - 12. Howard, M. And R. Hunter, " Israel and the Arab World : The Crisis of 1967," Adelphi Papers, No. 41, London : The International Institute for Strategic Studies, October, 1967.
 - 13. Institute for Strategic Studies, **The Military Balance**, London, annually.
 - 14. Karpat, Kemal H. (ed), **Political and Social Thought in the Middle East**, New York : 1968.
 - 15. Lall, Arthur, **The U.N. and the Middle East Crisis, 1967**, New York : Columbia University Press, 1968.
 - * 16. Laqueur, Walter, **The Road to Jerusalem : The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Conflict**, New York : 1968.
 - * 17. _____ (ed.), **The Arab-Israeli Reader : A Documentary History of the Middle East**, New York : Bantam Books, 1970.
 - * 18. Ma'os, Moshe, " Soviet and Chinese Relations with the Palestinian Guerilla Organization," Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems, Jerusalem : The Hebrew University of Jerusalem, March, 1974.
 - * 19. Safran, N., **From War to War : The Arab-Israeli Confrontation 1948-1967**, New York : 1969.

In general then, since the Israeli point of view is justified and the Arab viewpoint is not clearly indicated or it is distorted or not explained, the overall tone of the presentation is definitely pro-Israeli.

2. Now let us come to a discussion of where Israel's position is justified and any mention of what may be considered bad elements or bad acts by the Israelis not presented. An example is provided on page 24, where Egypt's position in nationalizing the Suez Canal Company and what happened afterwards is not adequately explained. In fact, the whole narrative is presented from a Western and an Israeli point of view. When discussing the Israeli position we are told that " Israel was becoming more concerned about the shipping difficulties ; and, in addition, border raids across Egypt particularly from the Gaza area, into Israeli territory for terrorist

activities were increasing. Together these created an intolerable situation for Israel's policy-makers." In other words, the Israeli point of view is justified and, in essence, the reader is told that Israel was quite justified in launching the attack on Egypt on October 29, 1956.

Another example is provided on page 27, where the reader is told that in the 1967 War "the Arabs insist they did not intend to attack Israel but were trying to prepare for the Israeli blow," and that "the Arabs felt that the Israeli action was another episode in the long-term campaign of Israeli aggression and conquest against Arab peoples." However, the Israelis are not presented as "claiming" or "insisting" or "feeling." We are told "the Israelis were seized by the fear they were to be attacked from all sides by an enemy who was determined to eliminate them." In other words, Dr. Feste herself presents the issue as if **she** believes this happened. She is not quoting the Israelis as doing this. On the other hand, when the Arabs are talked about, the writer, in essence, says that she does not necessarily accept their word; but that she merely reports **them** as having "said" this or "felt" that. In this same example, the writer ignores, or perhaps is ignorant of, the fact that the Israelis themselves were indeed concerned about a military **coup** d'état if the Israeli political leadership did not launch an attack against the Arabs. Furthermore, (on page 30), after we are told that the Arab position is not as clearcut as the Israeli position, the Israeli position is stated in "more precise terms." We are told that the Israelis "desired freedom of shipping for their vessels in the Gulf of Aqaba and an end to Arab terrorism and a neutralization of the threat of attack on Israel by the joint Egypt-Syrian-Jordan military command." No reference at all is made to the possibility that the Israelis desired additional territory. However, later on the same page we are told that "the fact that the single military organization accomplished this [the 1967 victory] in such a short time is impressive." Dr. Feste then states that the victory "indicates the extremely high level of military preparedness and operations in the Israeli system, and the seeming lack of it among the Arab states. As war victor, Israel claimed it had achieved a viable geo-strategic position, where new borders, taking into account the occupied territories, were formed at natural barriers — the Suez Canal waterway as the boundary with Egypt, the Jordan River, demarcating it with Jordan, and the Golan moun-

tainous region dividing Israeli-Syrian borders." If, indeed, the Israelis were as prepared and as successful in carrying out such a major operation in a short time, surely the writer and the reader have a right to contemplate that perhaps the Israelis had been thinking about, if not preparing for, such an invasion and that it was not merely in response to Arab harassment. Secondly, since Israel announced that it had achieved a viable geo-strategic position, might not the reader then legitimately think and argue that Israel wished to expand its borders to these positions and was waiting for the right opportunity to do so? Dr. Feste, however, does not present the reader with such options. Still another example is provided on page 46, where Dr. Feste states that "from the Gaza Strip numerous terrorist raids have been launched into Israel. Since the Six Day War, Israel has controlled the Strip, ruling by a military government." Thus, the reader is presented with a picture of Arabs conducting terrorist raids, whereas Israeli rule in Gaza which has been judged as very oppressive by the residents as well as outside reporters, both Arab and Western, is **not** referred to in these terms at all. Finally, in exercise 4 (pp. 76-78) the student is presented with problems to discuss and to evaluate. These problems contain, for instance, guerrilla activity and border raids. However, the writer did **not** include for discussion Israeli aerial bombings in Lebanon, for instance, which also cause civilian casualties.

3. When presenting Arab actions, Dr. Feste offers no justification. For instance, on page 36, she states that "the fourth and largest Arab-Israeli War erupted on October 6, 1973, on the Jewish national holiday, Yom Kippur. Egyptian forces crossed the Suez Canal into Sinai, establishing two long narrow bridge-heads along the east side. Syria drove into the Golan Heights. Egypt and Syria were supplied by massive military airlifts to Israel." Here, the reader is not provided any explanation as to why Syria and Egypt had to resort to force in October, 1973. There is no background, no explanation, no justification, as was done when Israeli actions were reported. Furthermore, the reader, an American who tends to be in any case in a situation where he looks upon the United States and the Soviet Union as enemies and rivals, is presented with a picture where Syria and Egypt are on the side of the enemy, i.e. supplied by the U.S.S.R., whereas Israel is on the side of the United States. Another example where the Arabs are

made to appear as rather nasty and not to have their position explained is provided on page 45, where the student is told that before the Six Day War, when Israel took control of the Golan Heights, the Syrians used the Golan Heights "as a military fortress as it offered them a position from which to observe Israeli activities and to fire on Israeli territory." The student is not told when Syria used the Golan Heights as a place from which to fire on Israeli territory, why they fired on Israeli territory, nor that there was a dispute between Israel and Syria concerning the no-man's land and that often it was Israeli activity in this no-man's land that brought the Syrians to fire upon the Israelis.

4. An example of how the Arab position is not clearly presented may be seen on page 29, where the writer claims that "the Arabs found it emotionally and politically impossible to accept Israel as a permanent fact of life or to forego harassing it and conspiring against it." Two points need to be brought out here. First, the Arab goals are presented only in the negative, namely that the Arabs have no positive goals except to harass Israel and to conspire against it. Secondly, the reader is, in essence, told that there was no justification for the Arabs to oppose the Israelis, except that Israel was an emotional and political issue that was impossible for them. Dr. Feste thus ignores, or is ignorant of, the fact that Israeli occupation of Palestinian land is, indeed, enough justification. Also (on page 46) when talking about the Israeli take-over of Arab Jerusalem, (although the writer avoids using these words and merely says Israel presently occupies the whole city and environs), Dr. Feste claims that the matter of protecting the Holy Places has been a concern in the Arab-Israeli conflict. In other words, the whole issue is presented as if it were merely protection of the Holy Places. The Arab point of view as to why Arab Jerusalem is so important to them, the fact that it was not in Israeli hands until 1967, the fact that the city itself had been predominantly Arab and that the Israelis deliberately and methodically changed the character of the city after 1967, the protests concerning the changing of the character of the city, the high-rise buildings that were introduced and produced an international furor — all these issues are not presented. Finally, (on page 90), the writer refers to "retaliation activities for countries affected by guerrilla attacks," but there is no reference to "retaliation activities" by guerrillas and by Arab countries against Israeli attacks.

5. The distortion of the Arab point of view is widespread and found throughout the pamphlet, but specific major examples may be cited. On page 35, for instance, the reader is told that SAM-3 missiles were introduced in 1970 after the cease-fire arrangement between Israel and Egypt. According to the writer, these SAM-3 missiles were introduced "in violation of the agreement. The Arabs [meaning the Egyptians] had hoped to equalize or counterbalance the striking Israeli military capability." This, needless to say, is the Israeli point of view. In fact, Egypt maintained that these missiles were placed **before** the cease-fire, but no mention of this is presented in the pamphlet. Furthermore, when talking about President Nasser, an anti-Nasser and anti-Egyptian point of view is presented, as is clear from the following: "Nasser died in September, 1970, when he had just accepted the American initiative which intended to reactivate Jarring talks, stressing these talks aim at real and lasting peace. Yet he spoke of military solutions, and some observers feel he did not want peaceful coexistence. He had instituted a series of reforms in Egyptian society and developed a new pride among the Egyptian people. Yet he ran a semi-police state and spent money for military advancement rather than putting it into domestic development." This is particularly disappointing in that no criticism of Ben-Gurion or any other Israeli leader was offered nor was there any criticism of Israeli society.

On page 39, the reader is told that "in November, the [U.N. General] Assembly passed a resolution asserting the rights of the Palestinians to return to their homes." Surely, Dr. Feste means "affirming" rather than "asserting"? After all, it was the same Assembly that voted to partition Palestine and to create a Jewish homeland. I wonder why the same words were not used to describe that decision, and is it not showing a bias in favor of the Israelis to use different words in describing General Assembly actions in talking about Arabs and Israelis?

6. We come now to a detailing of the errors of fact, some of which contribute to the bad image of the Arabs and to the good image of the Israelis. On page 20, Dr. Feste states that in 1948-49 "approximately 200,000 Palestinians fled their homes because of the fighting." Although there is some disagreement as to the number of Palestinians that fled their homes, there is no authority that presents it as 200,000. In fact, on p. 42 Dr. Feste herself

states the figure as 750,000.

On page 25, we are told that Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal. In fact, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal **Company**.

On page 26, Egypt, Syria, and Iraq are presented as sharing a common religion. The correct statement should read that the majority of their opulations share a common religion, namely Islam.

On page 34, the reader is told that " following the 1967 War, Egypt made the decision to close the Canal indefinitely." However, according to the Egyptians, the Canal was blocked by sunken ships.

On pages 28 and 39, the Palestinians are referred to as " Palestinian peoples," as if to indicate that the Palestinians constitute many peoples, and not just one people and one community. Also on page 38, it is mentioned that " Yasir Arafat was recognized as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian peoples." To begin with, Yasir Arafat was **not** so recognized. It was the Palestine Liberation Organization that was recognized as, **not** a representative of the " Palestinian peoples," but the representative of the Palestinian **people**.

On pages 38 and 39, the reader is told that the Arab nations meeting in Rabat, Morocco, in 1974 agreed on a multi-billion dollar program to aid the PLO. The PLO has received aid from some Arab countries, but it certainly is not as rich as the above statement implies.

On page 43, Yasir Araft is described as " spokesman for the PLO." He is, indeed, that ; but he is also, and more appropriately, the head of the PLO.

On page 46, the reader is told that " the City of Jerusalem was to be separated from Israeli and Jordanian control and placed under a special international administration " according to a General Assembly resolution in 1949. Needless to say, prior to this and far more importantly, the 1947 Partition Resolution called for an internationalized Jerusalem separate from a Jewish state and a **Palestinian Arab state**.

On page 57, the reader is told, " the most significant resolution remains the one adopted at the Security Council meetings in November 1967." I wonder if Dr. Feste does not consider the Partition Resolution in 1947 as a " most significant resolution "

or, for that matter, many of the other resolutions referring to the rights of the Palestinians.

On page 62, the United States is presented as a "a major supplier to Israel" of arms, whereas "the Soviet Union has extended massive aid to Egypt and Syria." I believe that it is clear, also, that the United States has extended "massive aid" to Israel. If the words "massive aid" are to be used then they should be applied to both. Alternatively, "major supplier" should be used to describe both donors.

7. It is obvious from the above that Dr. Feste is not well informed as to what the main issues are in the M.E. conflict. Here again, her reliance on pro-Israeli sources makes her identify the issues as the Israelis see them. Since most of these have been detailed above, only brief remarks will be necessary at this time.

A. There are two major issues (not just one) in the M.E. conflict. The most important issue is the conflict between the Palestinian Arabs and the Zionists-Israelis. The other and less important issue is the conflict between Arab states and the state of Israel which is basically an extension and an outcome of the Palestine-Israel conflict.

It is true that the Israelis, the West and some Arab countries, have generally acted as if the Palestinian people do not exist. However, this is not sufficient reason for a scholar to ignore, or be ignorant of, this question. Perhaps Dr. Feste can more comfortably deal with the Palestinians as the **basic party** to the conflict now that the U.S. government is publicly moving in this direction.

B. Among the major issues completely ignored in Dr. Feste's presentation and left out of the 12-item listing of "major issues" on page 105 is the basic demand of the Palestine Liberation Organization, namely the setting up of a secular democratic state in Palestine in which Jews, Moslems, Christians, and atheists would live as free and equal citizens. Dr. Feste may or may not agree with this position. However, as a scholar writing on the subject, Dr. Feste is obligated to present this option and viewpoint to the attention of the student.

C. While Israeli security is an important issue, it is equally important to consider the security of the Palestinian Arabs as well as the security and territorial integrity of the various Arab countries.

Richard C. Gripp,

The Political System of Communism,

London, Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1973,

Reviewed by: G. Sakwa

In recent years a number of political science concepts, which have been pioneered in other areas, have been adapted to the study of communist political systems. David Easton's work, in particular has habituated scientists to think in terms of social inputs and governmental outputs and the feedback between them which maintains the system in equilibrium. Easton's model has been supplemented by 'system functionalism' the idea that every society has a set of logical and coherent "functions" which may be performed by different political institutions or organisations in differing societies. These political science and comparative approaches which were applied to the study of Western democracies and in a more pioneering way to the Third World, have during the last decade or so also been applied to the examination of Communist systems. The concepts of nation-building (e.g. J. F. Kautsky) and political integration have thus been applied to communist studies. They have proved useful in differentiating between modern and pre-modern societies with all their attendant paraphernalia in the form of political parties, pressure groups and communications systems. Such approaches help to answer the crucial question; are "the developed communist countries less modern than the democratic ones or simply modern in different ways?"¹

The term 'totalitarian' can never be value-free and there have been a number of great debates in the field of communist studies, about its continued utility.² It has been defended, albeit in a somewhat revised and modified form, most notably by Leonard Schapiro.³ However, the communist world has become very differentiated indeed. Classifications have been produced distinguishing between European and Asian Communism but these regional headings are totally inadequate. It is a truism to point out that Yugoslavia, the USSR and Albania have produced different models of communism and that so have China, Cuba and eventually,

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D. If it is necessary and important to justify Israeli actions, then it is equally necessary and important to justify Palestinian and Arab actions.

E. The question in relation to Jerusalem is not only "Administration," nor is it merely a conflict over "protection of Holy Places." It is also, and fundamentally so far as the Arabs are concerned, one of return of Arab Jerusalem which Israel annexed after the 1967 War. Another issue is the change in the character of old (Arab) Jerusalem by the construction of high rise apartment buildings and the influx of a large Jewish population.

F. If guerrilla raids (attacks, terrorist activities) are an important issue, so are Israeli raids (attacks, terrorist activities) against Palestinian targets and Arab countries.

G. U.N. Security Council resolution 242 (of November 22, 1967) was a significant one — but surely not the "most" significant. If one resolution is to be singled out as the most significant, it is the 1947 General Assembly Partition Resolution.

H. One extremely important issue, which has been very much highlighted by Dr. Feste's presentation, is that the public and many scholars in the West, especially in the U.S., have viewed the Palestine-Israel and Arab-Israeli conflicts from a pro-Israeli perspective. Since U.S. attitudes and decisions have a tremendous bearing on whether or not the above issues are peacefully resolved, ignorance and neglect of the points of view of one of the parties to the conflict, namely Palestinians and Arabs, is indeed a major impediment to peace in the Middle East