فكرة القومية وعلاقتها بالدين

د. نصير عاروري

يتيج من القومية العربية بالرغم من تبادل فكرة فصل الدين عن الدولة لدى الدول العربية التي نالت استقلالها بعد الحرب العالمية الأولى. كما وأن القادة والمفكرين العرب القوميين قد استعملوا الدعم الاجتماعي في مساعيهم مع الاستعمار الغربي، في فترة ما بين الحربين. وتم تكوين الدراسة آملاً جمعاً من كتابات عبد الرحمن البراز وساطع الحضري وعباس الريحاني عزام وميشيل عقل، ومن الجدير بالذكر أن المفكرين السنيين لم يختلفوا عن زملائهم المسلمين في هذا المضمون. فقد أعتبروا أن الإسلام قد قدم القيم الخلقية لفكر القومية العربية وقد تكون استمراراً في هذا المضمون.

أما في فترة ما بعد الحرب العالمية الثانية فقد شهدت الدولة الدينية انتقال من الامام الدين بالنظر جلياً في السياسة سواء كان ذلك في المؤسسات العسكرية أو في السلك الاجتماعي. وتناقش الدراسة بأن هذا العالم الدينى قد تمكّن من ملء الفجراي الإيديولوجي ومن هذا ظهرت الإشتراكية العربية.

وتناقش الدراسة العلاقة بين الدين والقومية في فكرة الثورة الفلسطينية حيث تظهر الطابع الدينى في حركة المقاومة أيضاً.

بتوجس هذه الدراسة فكرة تطور القومية الشرق الأوسط منذ أواخر القرن التاسع عشر والمواليد التي أدت إلى ظهور هذه الفكرة، وهي الاستعمار الغربي والعثماني، فالقومية كانت بمثابة السلاح الفكري للاستفادة من النفس الإنساني الإيجابي، ولقد تطور الفكر القومي في مراحل عدة كانت أولى مرحلة حركة الإصلاح التي كنّتها نهضة التجمع الدولي الإسلامي تحت رأية واحدة تنكسها من مجابهة الغرب على أساس متبنية لهذه الحركة قادرة جمال الدين الامناوي والاسم محمد عبد الله، رجل أهم ما جاء في هذه الحركة بالنسبة لتبنّى فكرة القومية الفردية على الإسلام كدولة وثيقة بالنظر إلى كافية ومجموعة يغفو، ومن هنا حصل اللقاء بين الإسلام والقومية في عدوانهما للتدخل الإسلامي، ومن الجدير بالذكر أن أهم ما قدّمه الامناوي للفكر الإسلامي هو الجمع بين النزعة العربية والروحية الإسلامية. فكان كأبا لأشكال التجاوبية أوسع باسلة أوروبية ودلالات خلقية إسلامية.

وتناول هذه الدراسة تطور فكرة القومية في كتاتيب أحمد الطفيسي السيد وقاسم علي وسعد زغلول، وتناقش بأن العالم الدينى يقيم جزءاً لا
NATIONALISM AND RELIGION IN THE
MIDDLE EAST: ALLIES OR ENEMIES

Naseer H. Aruri *

The idea of nationality was unknown to the Arab people who inhabited the Ottoman domains in the early part of the 19th century. At that time Islam provided a superstructure within which all loyalties, ethnic or cultural, were superseded, and it remained the basis of unity in principle until nationalism began to supplant it. People considered themselves subjects of the Ottoman Caliph, not members of an Arab nation.

The rise of nationalism in the second half of the 19th century may be attributed to two factors: Ottoman rule and Western imperialism. European ascendancy created a need for self-defense among the inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire. Their response to a superior technology evolved within the context of Islam. Their state seemed incapable of giving them protection or providing them with the good life. To remedy this state of affairs, the Muslims began to seek more effective means to regain their integrity and self-respect. In this endeavor, Islam presented itself as the only bond of union upon which a movement of reconstruction and regeneration could be based. The decline of the Islamic state under the impact of European ascendancy was as a result of the erosion of the role of religion in society and its declining influence in the soul of the Arab people. The remedy was sought in a reformed and purified Islam which could then become the basis for a union of Muslim states who would deal with the West from a position of strength. The Pan-Islamic movement which grew under the intellectual guidance of Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani in the last quarter of the 19th century proposed to mobilize the Islamic public against European assaults and corrupt leadership at home. It represented a new attitude toward politics all over the Muslim East. It was revolutionary inasmuch as it came into conflict with the traditional concept which viewed Islam as a mere system of beliefs and practices. This dimension of Islam was subordinate to the concept of Islam as a state and perhaps as a nation. As a political force, it would enable men to come together in an effort to create viable political existence and a new self-conception with which to confront alien domination.

The following remarks by Al-Afghani might be easily taken for a political speech by a contemporary nationalist save for the inclusion of Arabs in and deletion of Ottomans from the list of nations which invaded Egypt:

*Had there been blood flowing in your veins or nerves in your body — you would have never consented to live a life of misery and submissiveness. Invaders took turns in occupying your country. Greeks were followed by Persians. Romans. Arabs. Kurds. Mamluk. French and Alawites. They have torn your skin and crushed your bones while you lay in a state of suspended animation like a rock in the wilderness. Arise from your sleep and shake off the dust of laziness and resolve to live freely like other nations, or die like martyrs.*

For Al-Afghani, reformed Islam was the

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way to salvation and self-respect. He characterized Islam as one of the strongest links which binds the "Turk with the Arab, the Persian with the Indian, and the Egyptian with the Maghrebite." Although this supranational phenomenon appears to be incompatible with Nationalism on doctrinal grounds, it nevertheless coincided with it in opposition to the European intruder. Nationalist and religious solidarity reinforced each other in their rejection of alien domination. Islamic reformers as well as secular nationalists agreed that European strength lay in modern science and technology. Afghani denied that Islam was opposed to science and emphasized that the West had in fact achieved power under the influence of Islamic scientific progress. But whereas Europe went on to make great strides in scientific discoveries, the Muslim world turned away from science and became stagnant. Afghani asserted that Islam was capable of assimilating Western technological skills and urged Muslims to acquire such skills for their own defense. In other words, he proposed to copy the techniques of the West in order to defeat the West and regain for Muslims their self-respect. Majid Khadduri writes that Afghani's principal contribution to Islamic political thought was his "combination of European materialism with Islamic spiritualism," for he advocated the preservation of Islamic religious and moral values.

For the secular nationalists of the late 19th century, European strength was attributable to constitutional government in addition to scientific progress. A highly educated elite of thinkers accepted Western liberalism of the 19th century. They upheld individual freedoms of speech and press as attributes of political justice. Like Afghani, they were also engaged in a search for the secrets of Western ascendency, and their works reflected an acceptance of a religious orientation. Ahmed Lutfi al-Sayed was a liberal-reformist, an advocate of realism and rationality, a nationalist tainted with Pan-Islamism. Other men in his circle included secularists like Kassem Amin, the champion of feminism, and Sa'ad Zaghlul, the founder of the Wafd in 1919.

Thus as political movements preoccupied with the problem of alien domination, Pan-Islamism and nationalism complemented and reinforced each other. L. Gardet suggested that the nationalist movements among Muslims are essentially Islamic reactions against alien domination. They were both able to arouse a spirit of discontent among the people, but neither movement succeeded in liberating the Muslim society from internal or external oppression. The liberal nationalist movement established roots among the landed aristocracy and the rising middle class but failed to entrench itself among the masses. It was a political movement which concerned itself with ideas and moral values but remained largely devoid of any social content. Pan-Islamism on the other hand was taking roots among the lower middle class of artisans, shopkeepers and the clergy. It endeavored to attain its goals by attempting to convince established governments that the path to liberation from alien domination lay in reform.

Both movements therefore were able to meet on the plane of liberation from foreign domination, but failed to offer a constructive and practical program to achieve their goal. As W. Cantwell Smith wrote: "It is easier to see what one is or should be fighting against than to imagine what one is or should be fighting for." 7

It is in this context that the proximity of the pre-war Pan-Islamism and liberal nationalism can be seen. Given the fact that the vast mass of population were more effectively moved by religious symbols, the secular nationalists at the turn of the century provided their movement with the necessary religious coloration as to make it more appealing to a larger segment of the public. Religious concepts were integrated into the nationalist dogma and were used to achieve secular purposes. Only in this way did the masses gain entry into the arena of political life in the 20s. With the absorption of Islam into the nationalist credo, political life was no longer the monopoly of a literate urban and aristocratic elite. Leonard Binder wrote:

«Heretofore Nationalism was the private preserve of the better educated and the highly Westernized. The Key to popularizing either nationalism or Islamic modernism is to include some of both in one's doctrine.» 8

The fusion of nationalism and Islam did not prevent the former from contributing to the fragmentation of the Muslim state. Although nationalists agreed to accommodate Is-
Islam as a culture and religion, they remained opposed to the fundamentalist aim of reassertion of Islamic unity irrespective of nationality. It was Islam the state rather than the culture or religion which they opposed.

The events of the 1920's in the history of the fertile crescent reveal that nationalism was a contributing agent in the process which led to the disestablishment of Islam as the basic foundation of the state. The rise of the Muslim Arabs at the calling of Christian England against the Ottoman Caliph provides eloquent testimony to the fact that the impulse of Islamic unity irrespective of nationality was no longer operable. But the Arab Revolt did not represent the conflict between religion and nationalism. Rather it represented the developing fusion of Islam and Arab nationalism. The Arabs who sought secession from Islamic unity, were opting for a national existence within an Islamic context.

The intellectual foundations for this fusion of religion and nationalism had already been laid down by thinkers who regarded themselves, to use Sylvia Haim's phrase, as both Arab Muslims and Muslim Arabs. Mohammed Abduh's idea impregnated the National Party of Mustafa Kamel. 9 Rashid Rida equated striving to revive Arab glory with working for Islamic unity. He accepted nationalism as the basis of the Islamic state. His colleague, Abdal-Rahman Al-Kawakibi, stressed the need for an Arab Caliph who would be assigned religious authority. Negib Azuri, a Christian Ottoman who made the first open demand for secession of Arab lands from the Ottoman Empire, adopted Al-Kawakibi's idea of an Arab Caliphate but drew a distinction between the spiritual and temporal realms. The principle of separation of state and religion became part of the constitutions of the Arab states, which gained their independence after the first World War. Islam as a constitutional system and as political organization began to disintegrate in the few years which preceded the first World War and was actually overthrown in 1924 when the caliphate was terminated by Kemal Ataturk. Such termination destroyed the institutional and geographic basis of Pan Islamic ideology. 10 But the influence of Islam did not cease to exist in the social patterns of behavior and in the administrative and decision-making apparatus of the Arab states. II Despite their secular commitments, nationalist leaders of the 1920's used religious symbols and sought the support of religious groups in their struggle to gain independence from the European imperialist powers. They regarded Islam as an integral part of Arab heritage.

Abdal-Rahman Al-Bazzaz saw no contradiction between Islam and nationalism. For him, the Prophet was a founder of the Arab nation, and Islam was the incarnation of the Arab national spirit. It was a national religion whose inner core was truly Arabic. 12 Al-Bazzaz likened the position of Arabs in Islam to that of the Russians in the communist order. 13 Islam and nationalism were intimately connected according to Al-Bazzaz because they share the language of the Quran and a cultural heritage.

Other Arab thinkers during the inter-War period regarded Islam as a component rather than opponent of nationalism. Their nationalism had no ideology; its central concern was national self-determination, and, as such it remained essentially negative until the post-Second World War period. Nationalist leaders as well as the nationalist doctrine felt the need to cater to the masses as long as the goal of self-determination continued to take precedence over social and economic reforms. Lacking a coherent ideology and a positive program of political and social action, both nationalism and Islam converged in supplying the psychological needs of men in the society.

It is interesting to note that nationalist thinkers of this period, whose doctrine included no catering to the masses, were able to avoid reliance upon religion, whereas the politically active and practical men did not hesitate to fill the ideological vacuum by drawing on religious symbols and Muslim sentiments. They paid lip service to Islam in order to gain the support of religious groups and that segment of the masses which is more effectively stirred by appeal to religion. Sati Al-Husri was representative of thinkers whose primary interest was that type of nationalism which emphasized the importance of language and ethnicity, and which kept political activities apart from nationalist considerations. It was the cultural Arab nation and not the political state which
is the principal object of Al-Husri’s concern.»
14 Although he felt that Islam was not inimical to nationalism, he, nevertheless, had no faith in the ability or desirability of religion to provide the basis around which society should organize. 15 The following passage from his book Al-Urubah Awwalan (Arabism First) expresses the primacy of Arabism over all other loyalties:

«More than religion, more than patriotism and nationalism even, the banner under whose shade all Arabs should unite is the banner of Arabism and we should all say, Arabism first.» 16

And again he wrote:

«I profess the religion of Arabism with all my heart.» 17

Other nationalists with practical tendencies, however, chose certain aspects of Islam and presented them as a vital force to regenerate Arab life. Abdul-Rahman Azzam, the first Secretary-General of the Arab League argued in 1943 that Islamic ideals constituted the basic values of modern Arab nationalism. 18 Even Christian Arab thinkers began to advance the notion that the association of religion and nationalism was inescapable. Michel Aflaq, founder of the Ba'th Party in the 1940s, represented Islam not as a divine revelation but as a response to Arab needs at the time of Muhammad. 19 It was an Arab movement. He felt that Europe was fearful of Islam:

«She now knows that the strength of Islam has been reborn and has appeared in a new form: in Arab nationalism.» 20

For him as well as for other secular thinkers of his time, Islam supplied the ethical values which could sustain the Arab nationalist movement. Such values were so ingrained in Arab society as to constitute a basic ingredient of nationalism. To him Islam was the embodiment of the spirit of the Arab nation. Aflaq expresses contempt to the orthodox and traditional dimension of Islam which emphasizes « superficial worship. » He felt that adherents to this form of Islam often find themselves as tools for Western imperialism. The nationalists therefore have a special responsibility to separate the two dimensions and utilize the positive ethical values in the struggle for self-determination:

The day will come when the nationalists will find themselves the only true defenders of true Islam, and they will have to create in it a new meaning if they are determined to preserve good reason for the survival of the Arab nation. 21

Quastanti Zura'al, a Christian educator, also stressed the need of spiritual values and found no inherent conflict between religion and nationalism. He said:

«Arab nationalists should fall back on the sources of their religion and derive from it inspiration and spiritual guidance.» 22

And again:

Nationalism... spiritual movement as it is, must converge toward religion and draw from it strength, life, sublimity, and excellence. 23

He considered Muhammad an Arab leader who was sent to them when their divisions and quarrels were at the extreme:

When the Arabs today look back on the past, they find that the origin of their union and the seed of their unity was the work of the Arab leader Muhammad B. Abdullah. 24

Nabih Amin Faris and Edmond Rabbath expressed the same thought when the former wrote: « the birthday of the Prophet is the birthday of Arabism. » 25 and the latter argued that Islam is in essence a national religion.

Nationalist thinkers and leaders of the interwar period, therefore, in spite of secular commitment, felt that the association of religion and nationalism was inescapable. The practical men of action among them used religion in their endeavor to mobilize the public for liberation and self-determination. And the less practical intellectuals, many of whom were Christians, found in Islam inspirational and spiritual guidance for shaping Arab life. The doctrinal aspects of Islam were of no concern to either one of these groups. Whereas the approach of the former to religion was utilitarian, that of the latter was secular relating to the ethical and spiritual aspects of Islam. The debate of the religiously oriented groups with the secularists during this period was not therefore as polarized as one might expect such a debate to be. Their concerns were not mutually exclusive.
One might expect that Pan-Arabism, as a political movement with social aims, might come into conflict with Pan-Islamism, which aimed to reassert Islamic unity irrespective of nationality. This was not the case, and whatever debates went on between these two groups were held within the framework of a broad agreement on the association of religion and nationalism. There are several variants of nationalism as well as of Islam. At no time during this period were there significant clashes between the doctrinal aspects of the two phenomena. Even the Muslim Brothers who cling tenaciously to Pan-Islamism and who emphasize Islam as a form of political organization and a legal system were able to accommodate an important aspect of Arab nationalism. Hassan Al-Banna wrote:

Arab unity is an essential pre-requisite for the restoration of Islam's glory, the reestablishment of the Muslim state, and the consolidation of Muslim power. This is why it is the duty of every Muslim to work for the revival and support of Arab unity. 26

He also wrote:

The truth is that just as Islam is a religious faith and a system of worship, it is also patriotism and nationality. 27

Had the nationalist thinkers of the interwar period advanced a coherent ideology, a genuine debate between ideological Islam and ideological nationalism might have emerged. But in the absence of such ideology, and because of the significance which nationalists attached to language and ethnicity, nationalism and Islam had no cause for a real confrontation. The emphasis on language and a common historical tradition could lead even secular nationalists as Westernized as Hazem Nuseibeh to conclude that «not only is Islam the greatest fact in the Arab national history thus far... but their entire civilization has arisen and has developed within its all-embracing doctrines.» 28

We may conclude at this juncture that Islam was upheld by nationalists as part of the national legacy and as an integral part of the nationalist credo. So long as the struggle for independence accounted for the principal object of political concerns in the interwar period, Islam and nationalism were able to compliment and reinforce each other. But that negative variant of nationalism became irrelevant to the social conditions of the postwar period. Independence has been achieved and therefore nationalism had to be infused with a positive spirit.

The era of the coup d'état which commenced with the 1950s witnessed a social change which ushered a new group into the seats of power in the Arab World. This group, which consisted of Army officers and professionals whose roots were in the lower middle class, was confronted with new questions and new concerns. The nationalist struggle began to face new challenges and acquire new dimensions. It stressed neither ideas and moral values, which constituted the hallmark of the late 19th century liberal nationalists, nor political independence, which was the principal object of the nationalist movement in the 1930s and 40s. It was faced with the permanent challenge of the total reconstruction of society, which involved the distribution of political power and the instrumental means of pursuing public goals. Democracy must now be seen in the perspective of social and economic justice and not in terms of voting and elections. Nationalism had to be seen not in terms of criteria such as cultural heritage, race or religion, but in terms of a sense of loyalty to and political identification with the body politic. Such identification would be based on criteria such as cohesion and legitimacy rather than those of language and ethnicity alone. Such were the challenges which faced the new generation of nationalist leaders. Rising to the challenge would involve the risk of a confrontation between nationalism and religion, for the demands of modernization in the post-war period threatened to uncover the masks with which nationalism and religion covered their faces during the previous period when the task of societal reconstruction remained subordinate to the negative struggle for independence.

Will the secular nationalists fall back on Islam to supply the social contents to the nationalist movement? And were they to continue to appeal to religious loyalty to mobilize mass support for their domestic programs and foreign policies? Or will they shatter the consensus of the previous period and act autonomously as the only force capable of bringing about true participation?
This is not intended as an exhaustive study of these questions. It simply proposes to shed some light on the interaction of religion and politics during the past two decades. It may be recalled that the issue of the separation of state and religion had already been settled in the Arab world. But the real issue is whether secularism has been fully accepted by the Arab regimes on whose shoulders lies the task of modernization. It has been argued by Leonard Binder that «the Islamization of nationalism proceeds... and it is possible to look forward to the eventual accommodation of Islam and the nation state.»

Ibrahim Abul-Lughod went even farther by suggesting that the resurgence of Islam in Arab politics is reflected in the institutional and juridical structures of the Arab states and in the social patterns of behavior, and that Islam has been able to fill the ideological vacuum, hence Arab Socialism. Hisham Sharabi, on the other hand, has argued that the post-WWII generation differed markedly from the previous one in the sense that for it, Islam as a truly sustaining force, had completely collapsed.

An examination of the constitutional and political development of the Arab states, in which nationalist forces gained the upper hand in the 1950’s, reveals that none of these states has rejected the legitimization of an established religion. The Egyptian constitution of 1956 as well as the principles of Union between Egypt, Syria and Iraq in 1963 included «establishment» articles. The Algerian constitution of September 8, 1963 declares Islam as the state religion. The National Council of the Algerian Revolution adopted a program defining the basic principles and goals of the F.L.N. In regard to Islam, it stated the following:

Ours is the culture of Islam... We do not harm to this culture if we believe it is merely religious.

After it has been cleansed, Islam must be embodied in two things besides religion: education and personal life.

Syria’s provisional constitution of April 17, 1964 states that «the religion of the head of state is Islam. Muslim jurisprudence is the principal source of legislation.» And Iraq’s provisional constitution of April 29, 1964 declares that «The Iraqi Republic is a democratic socialist state deriving the rudiments of its democracy and socialism from the Arab heritage and the spirit of Islam.» The Yemen Republic is even more emphatic in its incorporation of Islamic precepts in its constitutional structure. The first statement ever issued by the Revolutionary Council (Sept.26, 1962) declared that the revolution has taken place in the name of God and the people. The Yemeni constitution of April 28, 1964 recognizes Islamic jurisprudence as the source of all legislation. It made the observance of Islamic ethics a duty imposed on all Yemenites. In the administration of justice, Islamic law was made the sole authority for all judges.

The presence of the Islamic dimension may also be seen in statements of policy by nationalist leaders. Despite his suppression of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt in 1954, Nasser continued to cultivate the support of religious leaders for the purpose of sanctioning the nationalist ideology, which he called «Arab socialism». Unlike Kemal Ataturk, who attacked religion as a reactionary element in the society, Nasser discovered its revolutionary potential in a manner which parallels Lenin’s discovery of the revolutionary potential of nationalism. For him, socialism was an indigenous ideology rooted in the nation’s Islamic heritage. In a speech commemorating the ninth anniversary of the Revolution, Nasser stated the following:

The Islamic state was the first socialist state... In the days of the Prophet, and at the present time, the poor were and are protected from the rich. In the days of Omar, land was nationalized and distributed among the agricultural workers... Islam is thus a socialist religion.

The Egyptian Prime Minister Zakaria Mohieddin told the National Assembly the following:

The United Arab Republic has spared no efforts in disseminating accurate information about Islam... Those who are struggling to attain the goal of social equality and who are working to achieve a higher standard of living for the people are applying the maxims of the true religion. Cairo has been and will always be a citadel of faith and a center of Islamic activity for the ge-
nereal welfare of the people. 34

The Prime Minister was alluding to the Islamic Pact which the United States was promoting as a successor to the Baghdad Pact. Egypt denounced this as an imperialist reactionary alliance aimed at spreading the idea of Islamic unity to counter Arab unity. 35 In an attempt to counter this Western attempt to cultivate the support of the religiously-oriented states in the Middle East, the Egyptian Prime Minister gave a speech which was entirely devoted to the notion that religion occupies a most prominent place in Egyptian society. 36 Al-Azhar was portrayed as the principal organ for spreading the message of Islam. Its budget was increased from 1.6 million Egyptian pounds in 1951-52 to 5.6 million in 1965-66. More than 2000 graduates of Al-Azhar were dispatched to various Islamic countries in 1965. Islamic libraries were attached to more than 3000 Egyptian mosques and several civic and educational establishments, youth centers, and labor unions. A special station to broadcast readings from the Quran all over the world was established in Egypt in 1964.

Even the Palestine liberation movement which launched the motto of a Palestinian democratic secular state for Muslims, Christians and Jews, found it necessary to sprinkle its literature with religious symbols. The very first communique issued by Fat’h begins by the religious phrase: «Ittikal Minna ala Allah», and «Iman Minna bi Wajib al-Jihad al-Muqaddas».

A memorandum which Fat’h addressed to the Conference of Muslim Scholars convening in Cairo on September 28, 1968 begins thus: From the land of occupied Palestine, of al-Aqsa and the Dome of the Rock, the fighters of Fat’h address this message to you as they raise their arms for the jihad to defend the Holy Land which has been desecrated by the Zionist occupation. 37

The memorandum considered Palestine a Muslim question and its liberation the duty of every Muslim. Any attempt by an Islamic nation to establish relations with Israel was considered an act of treason and deviation from the Islamic path. The memorandum requested the delegates to proclaim «jihad until liberation».

Letters prepared by fighters of Fat’h reveal deep religious sentiments and a firm faith in the rewards of martyrdom: «Al-Shuhada’a Ahia’ ina Rabbihim Yurzaqoun».

The battle of al-Karameh which took place in March, 1968 between the Palestinian guerrillas and Israel’s regular forces was compared by Fat’h to battles of the early Islamic period: Badr, Yarmuk, Al-Qadisiya, Hittin, and Ein Jalout. 38

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, most secular of the Palestinian guerrilla organizations, also recognized the utility of Islam. The Front’s magazine, al-Hadaf, wrote:

We should like to emphasize that the masses of the Islamic world constitute a shield and an ally to the Palestine Revolution. 39

The preceding is not intended to convey the notion that Arab nationalism is being Islamized. Islam is not advanced here by contemporary nationalists as an ideology but as an instrument of political power and foreign policy. Neither nationalism alone, nor religion by itself proved capable of reconstructing Arab society and modernizing it. In their attempts to deal with internal and external pressure, contemporary Arab leaders seem to have opted for a fusion of religion and nationalism as a means with which to organize society.

Does religion have the cohesion necessary to make it a modernizing force? And to what extent will religious loyalty prove to be a barrier to modernization?

FOOTNOTES

4. Ibid
5. Khadduri, p. 57
6. Ibid., p. 58
13. Haim, p. 59
15. Sylvia Haim claims that Al-Husri's use of religious concepts for a secular purpose was his greatest innovation
16. Cleveland, p. 173
18. Haim, p. 55
22. Khadduri, p. 184
23. Haim, p. 108
24. Haim, p. 110
25. Haim, p. 62
26. Sharabi, p. 110
27. Sharabi, p. 110
28. Bender, p. 137
29. Abu-Lughod, "Retreat From The Secular Path?"
34. Speech of March 5, 1966. (Cairo: Department of Information), p. 7
36. Zarkaria Mohieddin's speech of March 5, 1965
38. *Al-Thawra Al-Falastiniya* (A special issue commemorating the Battle of Al-Karamah, April 1968), p. 5