

المؤسسات العسكرية العثمانية في العراق

٥٠ وليد خديوي

واحدة حدثت كل سنتين طوال فترة الاحتلال هذه التي دامت ما يزيد عن ستة قرون ٠ ومن ثم يمكن التكهّن بالدمار والآثار النفسية - الاجتماعية التي خلفتها هذه الحروب طوال هذه الحقبة من الزمن ٠

العامل الثاني هو دور المؤسسة العسكرية العثمانية ، ليس فقط في حكم العراق ، ولكن ايضا في خلق نواة المؤسسات العسكرية العثمانية المعاصرة التي شهدتها العراق ابان عهد الاستقلال . وفي التفاعل والترابط مع المؤسسات الاجتماعية العراقية ، وذلك عن طريق تملك الاراضي والتزاوج ، ومن ثم الاندماج في المجتمع العراقي وتسلم دفة الحكم - ليس فقط في العهد العثماني - بل في العهد الملكي ايضا ٠

تهدف هذه الدراسة الى اعطاء خلفية تاريخية لبعض العوامل السياسية والاجتماعية التي لعبت دورا بارزا في التأثير على نمو وتطور المجتمع العراقي خلال الفترة الواقعة بين سقوط الدولة العباسية في القرن الثالث عشر ، والاحتلال الانجليزي في اوائل القرن العشرين ٠

وقد تم اختيار عاملين اساسيين لعبا دورا بارزا في هذا المجال : اولهما هو دور الحروب والنزاعات العسكرية والصدامات المسلحة ما بين مختلف القوى الداخلية والخارجية في شتى مظاهر صراعها في الساحة العراقية ٠ وتشير المعلومات الاولى التي تم تجميعها في هذه الدراسة الى انه كان هناك ما لا يقل عن حرب

OTTOMAN MILITARY INSTITUTIONS IN IRAQ : A SOCIO-POLITICAL ANALYSIS

By : Dr. Walid Kadduri *

Introduction

The occupation of Baghdad by Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent in 1534 was the culmination of a score of foreign invasions and numerous internal armed conflicts. Domestic, regional and international factors precipitated the breakdown of Arab political rule. This disintegration was followed by the invasions of Hulaku -- 1258, Timurlang -- 1393, Shah Isma'il -- 1509, and finally, the dominance of the Ottomans for a period of approximately four centuries (1534-1914).

Since Babylonian days, an indispensable characteristic of a prosperous economic system in Iraq was a well constructed and sustained irrigation system. Because of the special topographic conditions of the land, the middle and southern parts of the country -- the alluvial plain -- depended heavily on the waters of the Tigris and Euphrates, and the livelihood of these two regions was directly influenced by the quality of the irrigation system.¹

With the gradual breakdown of the Abbasid Empire a deterioration of the land holding system took place along with a lack of maintenance and upkeep of the complex canals and irrigation projects that were constructed during the earlier years of that rule. A decrease in the revenue from agricultural

production was evident many decades prior to the invasion of the Mongols in 1258. As a matter of fact, this process started with the Saljuq and Buwaihid dynasties of the tenth, eleventh and twelfth centuries. The land revenue of **ard al-sawad** (southern rural area of Iraq) decreased nearly 43 %, as is shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1
AGRICULTURAL REVENUE IN
ARD AL-SAWAD DURING
THE NINTH AND TENTH CENTURIES

Year	Revenue (in Dirhams)
819	114,457,650
864	84,309,340
918	49,736,235

Source: Salih Haidar, «Land Problems of Iraq», p. 49.

Political conditions were not much better at the end of the Abbasid era and continued so during the following centuries. Local and foreign rulers multiplied, each carving out a principality separated temporarily from the central authority in Baghdad. Governors battled each other either in fear of being attacked first or for the purpose of occupying a newly vacant seat of government.²

Weakness of the central government, deterioration of the irrigation system and continuous foreign invasion led to a state of anarchy and violence which invited tribal

* Dr. Walid Kadduri, Political Science Department, Kuwait University.

1 Salih Haidar, «Land Problems of Iraq» (Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of London, 1942), pp. 6-8.

2 Abbas al-Azzawi, *Tarikh al-Iraq bayn Ihtilayn, II*, (History of Iraq between Two Occupations) 18 volumes; Saïda: Matba'at al-Irfan, 1935-1955), pp. 77 and 214.

raids. There were approximately eighty wars and armed conflicts during the period between the fall of the Abbasids and the Ottoman occupation (1258-1534). Records are missing for a major part of this period, especially the fourteenth century. It is estimated that an armed conflict took place once every three and a half years, with three major types of war prevailing: foreign invasions, rivalry among local governors and tribal warfare (see Table 2.)

The major regional conflict during this period (1258-1534) was the precarious balance of power between the Persians and the Ottomans. This conflict encouraged religious tension within Iraq and resulted in foreign political domination over the inhabitants of the region. Iraq became the scene of intermittent battles both before and after the invasion of Sultan Sulayman the Magnificent.

After a major battle between the forces of Sultan Salim and Shah Isma'il on August 23, 1514, in Chaldiran, North-West of Lake Urmia, Iraq became the battleground between Ottoman and Persian forces. Neither side won decisive battles, and both Empires were always ready for wars. Iraq, with a population almost equally composed of Sunnis and Shi'is, and located on the borders of the two powers, was a natural battleground for this politico-religious conflict. 3

TABLE 2
WARS IN IRAQ BETWEEN 1258 AND 1914

Regime	Years of Rule	Number of Wars
Mongols (1258-1338)...	81	11
Jalairid (1339-1411)...	73	21
Turkomans + Persians (1412-1534)	123	48
First Ottoman Period (1535-1638)	104	32
Second Ottoman Period	193	182

(1639-1831)		
Third Ottoman Period	41	34
(1832-1872)		
Fourth Ottoman Period	41	34
(1873-1914)		
Total	650	362

Sources: al-Azzawi, *Tarikh al-Iraq*, vols. I-VII; Longrigg, *Four Centuries*. It should be noted that many armed conflicts among the tribes and the local rulers, particularly in the early periods, are not recorded.

Note: According to Quincy Wright, war is a «...socially recognized form of intergroup conflict involving violence.» «*A Study of War*,» I.Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1942, p. 10.

Conflict with the Persians was not the Ottomans' only motive for the occupation of Iraq. Ottoman expansion into Europe came to a standstill at a period when the government and its institutions were still strong, while simultaneously the Portuguese began to expand into the various territories adjacent to the Indian Ocean, creating a possible future threat to the southern flank of the Empire 4. Thus, a combination of socio-political disintegration, a religious conflict between the two major Muslim sects and the rival designs of imperial powers contributed to the advance of the Ottoman armies into Iraq where they were to rule for nearly four centuries.

Ottoman rule, especially before 1832, was characterized by the weakness of the central government and the dominance of the local governors. Peace and tranquility were rare. The causes of disorder were conflict between the Ottoman and Persian Empires, rivalry among the local rulers and tribal feuds and raids. A total of 282 wars and armed conflicts occurred during this period, or a war every year and a half.

Notwithstanding annual warfare, scores of floods and plagues, and chaotic conditions in the countryside, where the tribes eluded Ottoman rule, Ottoman rule left a distinct im-

3 S.H. Longrigg, *Four Centuries of Modern Iraq* (London: Oxford University Press, 1925), pp. 30-31. Also, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, *Kurdistan and the Kurds* (Prague: Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, 1965), p. 36.

4 Muhammad Anis, *al-Dawla al-Uthmaniya wa al-Sharq al-Arabi, 1514-1914* (« The Ottoman State and the Arab East, 1514-1914 ») (Cairo: Maktabat al-Anglo al-Misriya, n.d.), p. 103.

cratic institutions, land registration, educational policy, relations with international and print upon the country. Military and bureau-regional powers and the policy adopted with regard to tribal confederations played an important role in laying the foundations of modern Iraq.

The Ottoman system of government was able to sustain itself, particularly in the Muslim provinces, on religious grounds no less than on military strength 5. The power of the rulers depended on their military institutions; their authority on the religious sanctification which they received from the **'ulama** (scholars). The upkeep of the system, as well as its administration was in the hands of the bureaucracy, whose main function was to collect taxes and channel them to higher authorities. The social system, according to Karapat, was divided into four groups: the military, the men of the pen (bureaucratic and religious institutions), the merchants and the peasants 6. However, it was the military group, through their political control, and the peasants, through their economic production, that provided the essential foundation for the maintenance of the state.

Direct Ottoman participation in the affairs of Iraq was limited to military and civilian institutions, leaving other functions to the local population.

The Military Institutions

The situation in Iraq during the Ottoman period favored the dominance of military forms of authority for a number of reasons.

First, there were continuous threats from Persian forces and sometimes actual occupation of Iraqi territory. These continued despite the «permanent peace» signed in 1639 by the Ottomans and Persians by virtue of which the frontiers were defined in general terms.

A century later Shah Nadir conducted intermittent battles with Ottoman forces in Iraq for a period of fourteen years (1730-1744), at the end of which time the 1639 agreement was reaffirmed. But Persian forces, shortly afterwards, resumed their attacks, capturing and occupying Basra twice. It was only when the Treaty of Erzerum was signed in 1849 that fighting ceased. 7

A second reason for the predominance of military institutions was a «state of continuous warfare» within Iraq. Dr. Ali al-Wardi, the Iraqi sociologist, attributed this violence to cultural characteristics of the tribal system and the carry-over of these characteristics into the towns and cities as the tribesmen gradually became settled 8. There were wars among the tribes, between tribes and the government, and between tribes and cities. Along with these conflicts, there were feuds within towns or among two or more towns.

A third factor was the nature of the regime: a foreign occupation. Endless campaigns were necessary against a restive local population.

Military officers were the highest salaried and most powerful group in the society receiving the best economic rewards that the state could offer: vast estates of land. A large number of the Ottoman officials stationed in Iraq, for either civilian or military reasons, were officers. They had wide contacts with the local population. Through marriage with **al-'ayan** (notables) of Baghdad and Mosul they were slowly integrated into the local society and came to rule, not only because of their Ottoman origin, but also because of their local prestige.

The Ottoman Army was to have its most important effect on Iraqi society through be-

5 Halil Inalcik, «The Nature of Traditional Society-Turkey» in **Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey**, ed. by Robert E. Ward and Dankwart A. Rustow, Studies in Political Development 3 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), p. 43.

6 Kemal H. Karapat, «The Land Regime, Social Structure, and Modernization in the Ottoman Empire» in **Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East**, ed. by William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 41-69.

7 Great Britain, Foreign Office, **Mesopotamia** (London: His Majesty's Stationary Office, 1920), p. 21.

8 Ali al-Wardi, **Dirasa fi Tabi'at al-Mujtama' al-Iraqi** («A Study in the Nature of Iraqi Society») (Baghdad: Matba'at al-Ani 1965), pp. 166-191.

coming identified with modernization. The nineteenth century reforms in the Empire began as reorganization of the army. The people identified modernization with the new military institutions and the educational system attached to them. The educational monopoly that the military possessed left the wealthy and urban members of the population no choice but to send their children to the military schools, since the other alternatives (religious and civilian schools) did not offer the means for rapid advancement and social prestige which they desired. 9

The reform measures began in earnest in 1826 when the Janissaries, who formed both the standing army and the reserve (former officers turned into landlords) were disbanded. The establishment of military schools staffed by European officers was the first step in the establishment of a new army to replace the Janissaries. Students from all the regions of the Empire were trained in the fields of mathematics, French, history, strategy and tactics. 10

Antagonism developed between the old and new armies, but as these schools began to be staffed by Ottoman officers, and as the advantages of the new system became apparent, the attempt to obstruct the military reforms came to a standstill.

A by-product of the military reforms was the political awareness and the rise of nationalist feelings in the ranks of the new officers earlier than in other institutions. This occurred not only among the Turkish members of the new army, but also among the Arabs, and especially the Iraqis. The social mobility and common outlook of the cadets were key elements in the later rebellions against the Empire.

THE OTTOMAN ARMY IN IRAQ

The Janissaries

The incorporation of the Iraqi *ayalats* (provinces) 11 into the Ottoman Empire

meant a perpetuation of the military rule that had existed there since the fall of the Abbasids. The military administration which exercised authority during the first Ottoman period (1535-1638) was responsible for the defense of the country against tribal raids and Persian aggression, and for the operation of the *ayalats'* civilian bureaucracy.

The Janissaries, who ruled during the first part of the second Ottoman period (1639-1750), continued to carry out these functions. The most important change was in the bureaucratic organization of the military establishment. However, military authority over the civilian bureaucrats appointed by the capital remained.

The economic basis of both periods of rule was the use of the agricultural surplus to support both the imperial government and the local rulers. The land holding system was a complex mixture of three arrangements: a military-feudal land tenure system as in the rest of the Ottoman Empire; remnants of Islamic law; and the de facto control by the tribes of the land they could settle and defend. This three-layered system came about when the invading Ottoman forces abolished earlier military fiefs and replaced them with *aradi amiriya* (public land). The majority of the agricultural land was so characterized. The exceptions constituted the remnants of the Islamic land tenure system. Those people with *hujja shar'iya* (title deed) were allowed to retain the land in the form of *mulk* (absolute ownership). Those who possessed *waqf* land (religious or charitable endowments), either individuals or institutions, were allowed to keep it. *Waqf* estates were mainly farm lands around towns and cities.

Public land was divided into two major categories. A vast amount was distributed among the Janissaries and the governors of the provinces. In return for ownership of this land, they were responsible for providing men and material in time of war. They constituted an addition to the regular army, an

9 Sulayman Faydi, *Fi Ghamrat al-Nidal* (« In the Profusion of Struggle ») (Baghdad: Shari-
kat al-Tijara wa al-Tiba'a al-Mahduda, 1952), p. 14.

10 Dankwart A. Rustow, « The Military-Turkey » *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*,
ed. Ward & Rustow, p. 360.

11 Reorganized as *wilayats* under the law of 1864.

active reserve that could be mobilized on short notice. These were called **Spahis** or **Za'ims**, depending on the extent of their obligations. Ownership of public property gave these officers and high Ottoman administrators **haq al-tasarruf** (right of usufruct) but not **haq al-raqaba** (right of ownership).

The other public lands, although owned by the government, were used and cultivated by the tribes and deemed as their property. The government did not acknowledge this tribal custom, but kept silent about it in order to collect as much tax as possible, while waiting for an opportunity to establish control over what it considered its property. 12

The army in Iraq during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was similar in structure to military organizations elsewhere in the Empire. It included the **Qibugulis** (royal guards), the Janissaries, **Jaish al-Wilaya** (army of the province) and the navy. In Iraq, however, **Jaish al-Wilaya** and the Janissaries were by far the most important. 13

In Baghdad, **Jaish al-Wilaya** was made up of the security forces of the **Wali**. They consisted of 8000 **Bairliquis** (native guards), sub-divided into the infantry and **Tobarquli** (cavalry). The infantry was composed of 500 **Fufkajis** (riflemen) and 500 **Madfa'is** (artillery men), as well as **Cinarkhajis** (repairmen). The cavalry consisted of **Koklis** (volunteers), these were the reserves that the **Za'ims** and other military feudatories contributed in times of war as part of their feudal obligations. 14.

Janissary forces, on the other hand, were regular members of the Ottoman Army. Nominally, they were under the authority of the **Wali**. In fact, however, they controlled not only the **Jaish al-Wilaya** and local security forces, but also the governor himself. The appointments and dispositions of the **walis** were decided by them.

Assisting the Janissaries in their military functions were mercenaries. Kurdish princes

and tribes. The Babans supplied 10,000 fighters; Arab shaykhs and their tribes approximately 2000 armed men. Additional men were supplied by the Mamluks 15. As the Janissaries became semi-independent of the capital, they were bound to place their major reliance on the tribes and the Mamluks. The tribes presented no threat to Janissary dominance, as they were occupied with internal rivalry and protecting themselves against external threats. But the well-trained and educated Mamluks eventually overpowered the Janissaries and actually came close to separating the Iraqi **ayalats** from the Ottoman Empire.

The Mamluks

In their eighty-one years of rule over Iraq (1750-1831), the Mamluks held power independently of the Sultan, while formally continuing to be part of his Empire. They established an **esprit de corps** among their cadets and succeeded to a large extent in winning over the local population by appeasing the notables, **'ulama** (scholars), Arab shaykhs and Kurdish princes.

They were far more successful than the earlier military establishments in establishing order, creating a sense of security, diminishing the power of the weak but unruly tribes and developing religious and educational institutions. Longrigg describes the policy of their first leader, Hasan Pasha, as «...continuity of control, rough injustice, and a firmness upon which men could count.» 16.

The Mamluks were slaves of Circassian origin, brought to Arab lands by the Ottoman armies in order to serve in provincial courts. The original Mamluks were from Tiflis, but other Circassian tribes, such as Luz and Abazeh, intermingled with them. They gradually rose to parity with their former masters and finally became the masters themselves. Thus, at a time of great crisis in the Empire, «...the slave-ruler was himself the Ottoman Pasha, appointed and yearly ratified by the

12 Haidar, «Land Problems of Iraq» pp. 158 and 171.

13 Ahmad Ali al-Sufi, **al-Mamalik fi al-Iraq** («Mamluks in Iraq») (Mosul : Matba'at al-Ittihad al-Jadida, 1952), p. 197.

14 Ibid.,

15 al-Azzawi, **Tarikh al-Iraq**, IV, pp. 274-279.

16 Longrigg, **Four Centuries**, p. 127

Padishah.» 17 The Mamluks took over the government of Baghdad without a direct and early challenge from Istanbul, not only because Istanbul was weak, but also because they never officially renounced the authority of the Ottomans.

The Mamluks established a modern educational system. Foreign teachers were brought to Iraq for the first time. They were limited in number and their students were exclusively Mamluk children, but modern sciences and foreign languages were introduced to the country. This program of education, coupled with their military training, gave the Mamluks qualifications for both civilian and military posts which were not enjoyed by other groups. When the Ottomans reestablished their control in 1831, they found it necessary to rely on the Mamluks for administrative matters. 18

The Mamluks took advantage of the changing economic relations in the region to invite foreign commercial interests to explore the terrain and communication routes and establish commercial agents in the various **ayalats**. Their measures included an increase of trade with Persia, particularly through Basra and Khanaqin routes; the diversification of trade with the French, Dutch and British (a step made easier by the collapse of the Portuguese domination over the Arabian Gulf); and the establishment of a branch for the East India Company in Basra during the third decade of the eighteenth century, a British agency in Baghdad in 1752, and a branch for a Dutch industrial concern. 19

The Mamluks pursued a policy of establishing contacts and granting privileges to local notables and tribal chiefs. Whereas in earlier periods, the local Ottoman governor ignored or neglected these domestic forces, the Mamluks granted additional monetary and economic privileges to the Muslim leaders, the **millet** (non-Muslim religious community) leaders and the notables, and helped to reesta-

blish many of the destroyed schools and religious institutions. These leaders, in turn, by their cooperation, made it easier for the Mamluks to defy Ottoman political power. Thus, when the Wali Sulayman Pasha died in 1760, the Janissaries, the notables and the **ulama**, upon the request of the Mamluks, nominated a local Mamluk official for the post of **wali**, and sent a **madbata** (petition) to Istanbul to that effect. The Ottomans agreed to this demand, fearing the Iraqi Mamluks and local notables would change their allegiance to Persia. 20

The Mamluks' tribal policy was another new step in establishing a **modus vivendi** with domestic groups, in this case with the majority of the population and the most difficult group to handle. It was clear to Mamluk leaders that if the power of the government in Iraq were to be firmly established, if foreign commercial interests were to be attracted and if commercial agricultural produce were to be produced for export, rural security was essential, particularly along the rivers and other major routes of transportation. 21 To achieve these goals the Mamluks followed a new policy of subduing the weak and unruly tribes, while encouraging and assisting strong tribes and confederations as long as they cooperated with the government.

Steps taken by the Mamluks encouraged a process that was already gathering momentum in Iraq, particularly in the North. A score of families, through religious influence, tribal power and/or shifts in allegiance between the Persian and Ottoman Empires, were able to entrench their power in the local areas and make it difficult for the central authority to do otherwise than cooperate with them.

The leaders of these principalities enjoyed a semi-independent relationship with the governor of Baghdad. The Mamluks established good relations with as many of them as possible, keeping several sons of the leading fami-

17 Ibid., p. 198.

18 al-Azzawi, *Tarikh al-Iraq*, VII, p. 10.

19 J.-B. Rousseau, *Description du Pachalik de Baghdad* (Paris 1809), excerpted in Charles Isawi, ed. *The Economic History of the Middle East* (Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 135-136. Also, Longrigg, *Four Centuries*, p. 157.

20 al-Azzawi, *Tarikh al-Iraq*, VI, p. 149.

21 Ibid., pp. 232-233.

lies as hostages in Baghdad in case the tribes refused to pay the necessary taxes or provide men in time of war, or if they caused trouble in the region (though troubles continued despite these precautions). 22

The balance of power between domestic forces and the capital which the Mamluks established broke down just when their last and strongest ruler was attempting to imitate the movement toward semi-independence in the other Arab provinces. The rule of Da'ud Pasha and the Mamluks came to an end in 1830 for several reasons: a simultaneous flood and plague that killed nearly two-thirds of the inhabitants of Baghdad; a stronger government in Istanbul with greater determination to restore its actual rule in these southern *ayalats*; and an angry local population burdened with heavy taxes, tribal attacks and Wahhabi massacres.

The Modern Army

The pressures of European representatives in Istanbul, domestic and foreign threats to the imperial system itself and a disposition towards reform and modernization among the newly Western educated Ottoman officials hastened the formation of a modern army. This renovating process in the capital of the Empire had serious repercussions in the provinces, particularly Iraq. The presence of the Sixth Ottoman Army in the Iraqi *ayalats* after 1848, as part of this reorganization, assisted the political ascent of a large number of Iraqis of Turkish descent. They entered the military service during the second-half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth century and after independence played a significant role in the affairs of the new state. A second and perhaps more important consequence of the military reforms for the development of modern Iraq was the opening of military schools in Baghdad and other major towns and the dispatch of hundreds of students to the military schools in Istanbul. These graduates played an im-

portant role in the Arab nationalist movement and the establishment of the Arab states.

The modern army, after the **Tanzimat** (reforms), was divided into four sections. The **Nizamiya** force (Regular Army), the First **Radif** (First Reserve), the Second **Radif** (Second Reserve) and the **Mustahfizliya** (*levée en masse*). Service in the army was compulsory for those males between the ages of twenty and forty, with Christians and Jews allowed to waive this duty by a **badal 'askari** (commutation fee) of thirty-six piasters a year. The recruits' first six years were spent in the Regular Army, while the next eight were divided between the First and Second Reserves and the last six were spent in the *levée en masse*. If a recruit was able to produce a cavalry troop horse, he could bypass the Regular Army and join the cavalry of the First Reserve.

Ottoman territory was divided into seven **urdus** (military governments). Each **urdu** provided in peace time a Regular Army corps, and in war time added to it an army corps for each of the Reserves. The *levée en masse* was either an independent battalion, or was joined with the First and Second Reserves to complete these units. At times of war, the three army corps of each **urdu** formed an Army. During peacetime, the troops of each unit were stationed in their home territory. 23 Sixth **Urdu**, which was the Army of Iraq. Officially, 6000 troops of various units were to be kept in the *ayalat* of Baghdad, while the others were to be distributed in eight districts: Mosul, Kirkuk, Sulaymaniya, Basra, Hilla and two other districts «the names of which are not known.» 24

The Sixth Army Corps **Nizamiya** forces had an infantry of 8 **alliya** (mechanical) regiments, each having 4 **taburs** (battalions) of 1000 men each and nearly 70 officers. The actual number of soldiers ranged between 6000 and 8000 in addition to two regiments of **nishanjliya** (riflement), 250 strong. The rifle-

22 Longrigg, *Four Centuries*, p. 207.

23 J. A. Barlow, A. Howlett and S. H. Godfrey, *Gazetteer of Baghdad* (Compiled under the orders of the Quarter Master General in India for Political and Military Reference, 1889. Reprinted by the General Staff, India, 1915. Catalogue number B-41/F. O.U.U.O.) Similar : Government Central Press, 1915, p. 44. Also, al'Azawi, *Tarikh al-Iraq*, VII, p. 226.

Baghdad was the headquarters of the

24 Barlow, *Gazetteer of Baghdad*, p. 44.

men were all Arabs, while the regular infantry were nearly one-third Arabs and the rest Kurds.

Arms supplied to the infantry consisted of one-third Martinis (American) and two-thirds Sniders (German). Salaries were often months in arrears, but food and accommodations were well provided for.

The cavalry consisted of six regiments with 600 men (soldiers and officers) in each. They had about 600 horses, 150 mules and about 150 assorted guns, many old and unserviceable. The actual number of useable guns at one time was 40, with 24 in Baghdad. Each infantry battalion had one mountain gun with a mule equipment, and, as in the Regular Army, all the gunners were Arabs.

The Engineer Corps was 250 strong, mostly employed at the Army Clothing Factory in Baghdad. There was also a Land Transport Corps of 250 men.²⁵

Iraq was supposed to furnish the First and Second Reserves with 65,000 men. However, according to British officers' estimates at the time :

...the number said to be actually present at drill for a month in the year is said to be only a little over 3000, i.e. : Baghdad-1000 ; Kirkuk-200 ; Mosul-900 ; Sulaimaniyah-200 ; Hilla-900 ; Total-3200.²⁶

An example of the distribution of forces in Iraq was given in a report submitted by the British Political Resident in May 1881. (see Table 3).

At the time of the downfall of the Mamluks, the plague of 1830 and the decline of the revenue of the *ayalats* because of floods and increasing tribal disorder there resulted a decrease in the number of troops in Iraq from 10,000 to 3000.²⁷ However, the number soon increased again under pressure of wars between the Empire and European Powers, domestic upheavals in the other provinces and serious tribal rebellions in Iraq itself.

To meet the increasing needs of the Empire and to create a modern army, the Ottomans

adopted a regular conscription system. Recruits from the provinces were required to join the new forces. This was an alien practice to the Iraqis, who opposed it vehemently and in different manners.

The tribes of the Middle Euphrates and Kurdistan strongly opposed any measures that would lead to the strengthening of the armed forces at their own expense. Since it was their men who would be inducted into the army, the tribes would grow weaker even

TABLE 3
ACTUAL DEPLOYMENT OF THE SIXTH
ARMY (NIZAMIYYAH) IN IRAQ
March, 1881

Baghdad	2650
Hilla	550
Khanaqin	550
Diwaniya	750
Samarra	500
Hindiya	250
Amara	250
Dulaym	250
Karbala	250
Nasiriya	1250
Najaf	250
Mosul	1250
Neighborhood of Mosul	250
Kirkuk	1300
Sulaymaniya	250
Amadiya	250
Aqra	250
In pursuit of Hammawand tribes	500
Total	11,550

Source : Barlow, *Baghdad Gazetteer*, pp. 48-49.

as the army grew stronger. These groups expressed their opposition by withdrawing into the desert or the mountains, where the regular forces could not catch them, or by fighting the forces that came to induct their men. Thus, when the Wali of Baghdad in 1858, Akram Umar Pasha, attempted to draft the tribal men of the Middle Euphrates, they rebelled. He was obliged to lead his troops personally into Hilla, Najaf and Karbala, in order to crush

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

²⁷ al-'Azzawi, *Turkish al-Iraq*, VII, p. 24.

the resistance. 28

In the cities, different steps were taken. At first the local elites-**qudat**, **muffis** and **nuqaba**, members of the local assemblies, and the **millet** leaders - opposed the conscription measures. In an attempt to silence this formidable opposition, only 500 men were drafted from Baghdad and 63,000 piasters were distributed to the leading notables and religious figures 29. Nevertheless, a decade later, during Midhat's reign, riots and looting took place in Baghdad and the government resorted to force to crush the opposition of the local population and execute the draft law in the city. 30

Measures not provided for by the law were used to fulfill the conscription quotas. The Wali of Baghdad in 1861, finding that usual methods of induction were creating difficulties with the local population, sent to the Army of Yemen, via Basra, any person who was caught either drinking or stealing. 31

The police force was separate from the army. Unlike the military officers, an Iraqi police officer was a member of the local population - usually a Kurd, Persian or Baluchi - and did not receive the same professional training, either in Istanbul or the provinces, as other **ayalat** officers.

The long duration of Ottoman rule in Iraq meant the gradual integration and assimilation of a number of civilian and military bureaucrats into Iraqi society. The many Turkish families who opted to remain came with one of the military campaigns or as relatives and subordinates of one **wali** or another. Some intermarried with notable and religious families. Others sent their sons to be trained for either the military service or civilian bureaucracy and through them back to serve in the Iraqi administration.

These families (al-Chaybachi, al-Chaybachi, al-Daghistani, Shawkat, Sulayman, al-Urfali and al-Yamulki) — through social status, political power and massive wealth — attached themselves to the highest posts in Iraq, both before and after the establishment of the new state.

Military Education in Iraq

The Ottoman reforms encouraged the gradual breakdown of tribal power in Iraq and fostered the growth of a rudimentary native bureaucracy. An Ottoman-Iraqi elite equipped with modern skills came to power, mainly as a result of the new military educational program.

Military educational reforms did not reach the provinces until three decades after they began in the capital. At first all military students were sent directly to Istanbul. The School of Military Sciences received the few students from the provinces as well as the Turkish students. The first group of Iraqis graduated in 1869 and were immediately assigned to the Sixth Army, stationed in Iraq.

Two men played an important role in spreading the new military education to the Arab provinces in general and Iraq in particular. Midhat Pasha came to Baghdad as **Wali** in 1869 and instituted reforms in the **wilayet** during the next three years. Iraq became the first Arab province, except for Egypt, to graduate students from local military schools (1879). Colonel von der Goltz played a prominent role in modernizing the Ottoman Army after 1883.

In Iraq, two levels of military education were established. On the primary level, **al-Madrasa al-Rushdiyya al-'Askariya** was founded in 1870 by Midhat Pasha. There students learned painting, French, Turkish, grammar, math, writing, Persian, calligraphy and religion - but not Arabic. The staff consisted of twenty-five teachers, all Turks. A similar institution was founded in the North, at Sulaymaniya, for Kurdish students. The graduates of that institution moved to Baghdad for high school and eventually to the School of Military Sciences in Istanbul.

On the secondary level, **al-Madrasa al-'Idadiyya al-'Askariya**, founded in 1879, prepared graduates from the Iraqi **Wilayet** to enter the military schools of Istanbul. Training was for three years, in such subjects as history, geography, math and mechanics. Boarding faci-

28 *Ibid.*, p. 118

29 *Ibid.*, p. 119

30 *Ibid.*, pp. 200-202.

31 *Ibid.*, p. 137.

lities were provided for students from outside Baghdad. The first class of thirteen students graduated in 1881, and nearly 1000 students had graduated by 1913. 32

While an average of thirty students per year graduated from *al-'Idadi al-'Askari* during the thirty-five year period, only an average of fifteen Iraqis per year graduated from the School of Military Sciences in Istanbul. (33) The total number of Iraqi officers trained in Istanbul prior to World War One could not have exceeded 500. (34)

The significance of military education in

Iraq becomes clearer if we consider the generally low level of Iraqi education compared with other *wilayets* and the favored position of military education within Iraq. In a study of the twenty-two *wilayets* conducted by the Ottoman Ministry of Education one year before World War One, it was found that Iraq was in the lowest third of the Empire in terms of the number of students in public primary schools. Baghdad was the sixteenth, Mosul the twentieth and Basra the twenty-third and last. A comparison with other Arab *wilayets* is found in Table 4.

TABLE 4
NUMBER OF PRIMARY STUDENTS IN
THE ARAB WILAYETS — 1913

Wilayet	Number of Students
Halab	8773
Syria	7881
Beirut	7054
Baghdad	3573
Diyar Bakr	2594
al-Yaman	2553
Mosul	2134
al-Hijaz	1024
Basra	950

Source: Abu Khaldun Sati' al-Husri, *Mudkhakkirati fi al-Iraq, 1921-1927* (My Memoirs in Iraq, 1921-1927), I, Beirut: Dar al-Tali'a, 1967, p. 119

TABLE 5
HIGH SCHOOL STUDENTS IN BAGHDAD (1913 - 1914)

TYPE OF SCHOOL	No. of Schools	No. of Students
Intermediate School	1	260
Teachers' Training School	1	200
Industrial School	1	70
Military Primary School	2	70
Military High School	1	500
Law School	1	250

Source: al-Hilali, *al-Ta'lim fi al-Iraq*, p. 279.

32 — Barlow, *Baghdad Gazetteer*, p. 5. Also, Abd al-Razzaq al Hilali, *Tarikh al-Ta'lim fi al-Iraq fi al-'Ahd al-'Uthmani, 1963-1917* («History of Education in Iraq during the Ottoman Regime, 1638-1917») Baghdad: Sharikat al-Tiba'a, 1959, pp. 162-164.

33 — al-'Azzawi, *Tarikh al-Iraq*, VIII, pp. 65 and 165.

34 — Walid Khadduri, «Social Background of Modern Iraqi Politics» (Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The Johns Hopkins University, 1970), pp. 39-41.

The majority of secondary level students attended military schools rather than law, industrial and teachers' institutions as illustrated in Table 5.

Those who continued to study beyond the secondary level usually attended the military rather than the legal, medical or engineering colleges. No more than ten Iraqis graduated from the American University of Beirut before 1917 (35), while no more than sixty attended the non-military colleges in Istanbul.

Thus, the level of education in Iraq was among the lowest in the Empire. At the same time, a majority of Iraqi Muslim students in public schools attended military high schools. Finally, except for a very few doctors, lawyers and engineers, all of the graduates from foreign institutions of higher learning were educated in military schools.

A combination of motives — educational, financial and social — encouraged students to choose military education. The Ottoman Government was interested in incorporating representatives of all the *wilayets* into its army, and so prepared intensive military educational programs. This was at the expense of the civilian educational program, which was still under the control of the traditional bureaucracy and therefore ineffective and inefficient.

The government, through its military institutions, paid all educational costs and living expenses of the students while they were in military schools, including the expenses incurred in connection with travels from Baghdad to Istanbul. The urban petit bourgeois families took advantage of this opportunity and began to send their children to modern schools at the end of the nineteenth century. Unlike the wealthy Iraqi families, they were unable to send their sons to foreign schools,

the only alternative to military higher education.

Unfortunately, the opportunity to educate a broad based modern Iraqi generation was lost by a discriminatory act on the part of the Ottoman administration. Children of the minorities were not incorporated in the new system. The Christian and Jewish students were able to attend their own parochial schools, financed and staffed by foreign institutions. The children of the Middle Euphrates region, mainly Shi'i, were deprived of either public or private modern schools and the Ottomans did not construct new schools in this region until a latter period of their rule. As a reaction to this policy, Shi'i notables hesitated to send their sons to institutions of learning other than their own—those being mainly of the traditional type. The result was the existence of a sizeable educationally advanced and experienced Sunni leadership at the end of World War One, while the Shi'i community was limited in the number of men who qualified for employment in the civil bureaucracy of the new state.

A final consequence of the military educational program and the modern schools in general was the orientation towards government employment that the new system established among the educated. The system prepared students for bureaucratic posts. It was these jobs that stimulated the petit bourgeois to send their children away from *al-Katatib* (low elementary religious schools) and the traditional educational system into the modern schools. Government jobs brought not only prestige, regular income and a profession for the job-holder, but also an opportunity for the advancement of the other members of the family.

35 — Abd al-Wahab al-Qaysi, "The Impact of Modernization on Iraqi Society during the Ottoman Era; a study of intellectual development in Iraq, 1869-1917" (Unpublished thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1959), Table 9, p. 88.