
THE CONSISTENCY OF UNITED NATIONS REPRESENTATIVES' ATTITUDES: THE CASE OF ARAB AND AFRICAN DELEGATES

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In this paper the focus will be on the factors and elements which describe the Arab and African caucusing groups in the United Nations (UN), and the delegates' attitudes toward the world organization. It will also describe and analyze the structure and the dynamics within the African and Arab caucusing groups, and thus the emphasis will be on the group meetings and their frequency, formality of meeting, the process of decision making during the group meeting, and the factors that are expected to influence the group voting behaviour.

The purpose of this study is to examine and to describe the various attitudes of Afro-Arab delegates toward many aspects of their internal and external caucusing system. In this regard, it might be assumed that the opinions of Afro-Arab delegates reflect the policy of their home national governments for three reasons. Firstly, the Afro-Arab delegates are able to influence their governments regarding UN matters. Secondly, their experience with UN politics is one of the main sources of information for the governments they represent. Finally, because of their position and influence in their home governments, they can make decisions on behalf of their countries on various matters without direct instruction from their governments (Vincent, 1964).

Data and Methodology

All the data analyzed in this paper are based on the responses to a mail questionnaire that was sent to the delegations of Afro-Arab countries in the

UN. Since the Afro-Arab missions in the UN use three official languages, the questionnaire was written in Arabic, English, and French in order to increase the rate of response as much as possible. The questionnaires were sent twice, and fortunately the number of responses (N=33) permitted some analyses concerning the Arab and African caucusing groups in the UN. The mail questionnaire, addressed to various Afro-Arab states as well as to the representatives of the League of Arab States (LAS) and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in the United Nations, does not reflect a random sample technique, because it was sent to most of the Afro-Arab missions in New York ⁽¹⁾

The responses which this study examines represent the views of different factions and sub-groups within the Afro-Arab nations. The responses represent various views of Afro-Arab delegates: conservative, moderate, revolutionary, aligned, non-aligned, French, English, and Arabic speaking. As a result, the questionnaire responses cover a wide range of views.

The main objective in sending the questionnaire to the LAS and OAU offices in New York is that they are presumed to represent their members' views; therefore, this particular questionnaire is expected to reflect the common view of all member states, and thus it enhanced the level of precision and accuracy of this study. The mail questionnaires were answered either by the permanent representatives of the Afro-Arab missions in the UN or other officials of high diplomatic rank designated by them. The mail questionnaire is included in Appendix A.

Regarding the mail questionnaire used in this study, two comments are in order. Firstly, the questionnaire is, by and large, identical to that developed by Vincent (1964:144-149). Similarities exist in many aspects, such as focusing on the group meetings, frequency of meetings, formality of meetings, and attitudes toward the UN. Secondly, there are some differences between this study and Vincent's questionnaire regarding objectives and purposes. While this study focuses primarily on particular voting groups, the African and Arab groups, Vincent's emphasis was on the UN caucusing groups as a whole. Finally, the study of identical aspects tested by Vincent in the early 1960s will show how the consistency of

Afro-Arab delegates' attitudes has changed over time, a subject which will be discussed later.

Since the responses to the questionnaire were confidential, this study will not refer by name to the delegates who responded to the questionnaire or to their home governments. The questionnaire responses will be classified under two categories: African and Arab delegates.

Similarity and Variation Between the Arab and African Delegates' Attitudes in the UN

The purpose of this section is to analyze and compare the attitudes of the Afro-Arab delegates toward matters that are expected to affect the voting cohesion of their countries. The Afro-Arab delegates' attitudes involve four aspects: meeting (Table 1), attitudes toward the UN (Table 2), factors affecting voting cohesion (Table 3), and perception toward the importance of issues (Table 4). By and large, this study assumes that similarity rather than variation will be the rule rather than the exception, because of the common interests among Afro-Arab clusters. The Afro-Arab states share a similar colonial experience and economic conditions among other things, and these similarities are expected to narrow the differences between the delegates' attitudes regarding various aspects of concern. The comparison between the Afro-Arab delegates will show the degree of similarity and variation between their beliefs and feelings regarding the four mentioned aspects.

Regarding the frequency of meeting, both the Arab and the African groups meet frequently when the General Assembly (GA) is in session and infrequently during the rest of the year (Table 1).

Thus, meetings and their frequency are a response to the rising needs of the delegations and their regional arrangements. Further, formality during the caucusing meetings of both groups is the rule rather than the exception due to the high diplomatic character of those attending the meetings, e.g. ambassadors. The Afro-Arab delegates believe that the group meeting has an impact on their members in the present, and they expect that it will increase in the future.

Table 1
Attitudes Toward the Arab and African Group Meetings

Question No. *	Group **	Delegates' responses ***													
		1	%	.2	%	.3	%	.4	%	.5	%	.6	%	NA	%
04	A	-	-	-	-	6	46	-	-	3	23	4	31	-	-
	B	-	-	-	-	4	20	-	-	5	25	9	45	2	10
05	A	5	38	6	46	1	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	8
	B	4	20	14	70	2	10	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
06	A	9	69	3	23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	8
	B	12	60	7	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5
07	A	2	16	9	69	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	15
	B	7	35	12	60	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5
08	A	6	46	6	46	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	8
	B	8	40	8	40	2	10	-	-	1	5	-	-	1	5
09	A	2	15	2	15	-	-	8	62	-	-	-	-	1	5
	B	-	-	1	5	-	-	17	85	1	5	-	-	1	5
10	A	-	-	9	69	4	31	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	B	-	-	15	75	5	25	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
11	A	3	23	7	45	1	8	2	15	-	-	-	-	-	-
	B	3	15	17	85	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
12	A	2	15	7	45	-	-	4	31	-	-	-	-	-	-
	B	2	10	8	40	2	10	3	15	5	25	-	-	-	-

Source : Mail questionnaire sent to various Afro-Arab missions at the UN in 1984 (N = 33).

* See Appendix A for questions 1 - 25 included in the questionnaire.

** Group A = Arab group (N = 13)

Group B = African group (N = 20)

*** .1 through .6 refer to different answers for each question in the mail questionnaire.

NA = No answer given by delegates

The Arab and African delegates also share the attitude that decisions taken by them at the UN should be binding upon their home national governments. Similar attitudes toward supranationalism reflect their willingness to strengthen and enhance their position in the UN. Another similarity is that the majority of the delegates in both groups emphasize the non-existence of voting procedures during their meetings. This is basically because consensus is the ultimate goal to be reached where issues of common concern are involved. Consequently, a cohesive voting position can be exhibited during the GA voting process.

Since the African and Arab delegates stress the importance of consensus in their meetings, the procedures followed in completing their agendas are also similar in the sense that they reflect a process of

interaction among the group members and not the work of a particular committee. Furthermore, they emphasize that during their group meetings various issues of common and partial concern are discussed. Although consensus is the ultimate goal of their caucusing, the Afro-Arab groups try to discuss and, if it is possible, to coordinate and reach agreement on issues involving their partial interests. The Arab delegates (69%), however, believe that their caucusing group is expected to have more of a future impact upon its members, an expectation emphasized less (50%) by the African delegates (Table 1).

Table 2 shows that the African (75%) and Arab (77%) delegates share a similar belief regarding the UN as the potential world government, but their attitudes reflect skepticism rather than optimism. By and large, the Arab (77%) and African (50%) delegates also share a similar skepticism toward the subject of world peace in an international system of anarchy. The majority of the delegates agree on the impossibility of the existence of permanent world peace under the present national system. Regarding the future effectiveness of the UN in an international system of anarchy, most of the Arab (85%) and African (75%) delegates agree on the existing situation as continuing (Table 2).

The Afro-Arab delegates also do not share the same attitude concerning the subject of the contribution of the UN to international peace and security. While most of the African delegates (80%) who participated in answering this questionnaire share a positive feeling regarding the UN contribution to peace, the majority of the Arab delegates (61%) share a negative attitude, and thus disagree on peaceful contributions by the world organization. The Middle East crisis seems to play a considerable role in affecting the Arab delegates' attitudes concerning the UN contribution to world peace and security.

Since the Arab delegates were dissatisfied with the contribution of the UN to world peace, they were expected to support any systematic change within the GA, in which they have influence, to achieve control of the peace-keeping forces. Thus, the Arab delegates are more supportive (92%) of the idea of GA control of the peace-keeping forces than the African delegates (70%). Furthermore, the Arab delegates continue to have a more positive attitude (62%) favoring GA control of the peace-keeping forces than

Table 2
Attitudes of Afro-Arab Delegates Toward the UN

Question No. *	Group **	Delegates' responses ***													
		.1	%	.2	%	.3	%	.4	%	.5	%	.6	%	NA	%
14	A	1	8	2	15	-	-	10	77	-	-	-	-	-	-
	B	1	5	1	5	6	30	9	45	2	10	-	-	1	5
15	A	1	8	1	8	10	77	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	7
	B	2	10	4	20	4	20	6	30	2	10	-	-	2	10
16	A	1	8	10	77	-	-	2	15	-	-	-	-	-	-
	B	3	15	12	60	3	15	2	10	-	-	-	-	-	-
17	A	1	8	3	23	5	38	3	23	1	8	-	-	-	-
	B	3	15	13	65	2	10	2	10	-	-	-	-	-	-
18	A	2	15	10	77	1	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	B	6	30	8	40	4	20	-	-	2	10	-	-	-	-
19	A	4	31	4	31	3	23	1	8	1	7	-	-	-	-
	B	3	15	4	20	4	20	1	5	3	15	-	-	2	25
20	A	10	77	-	-	1	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	15
	B	14	70	-	-	3	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	15
21	A	-	-	4	31	8	62	9	69	1	8	2	23	1	7
	B	2	10	2	10	15	75	12	60	-	-	8	40	1	5
22	A	1	8	11	85	-	-	12	92	-	-	-	-	1	8
	B	-	-	20	100	-	-	20	100	-	-	-	-	-	-

Source : Mail questionnaire sent to various Afro-Arab missions at the UN in 1984 (N = 33).

* See Appendix A for questions 1 - 25 included in the questionnaire.

** Group A = Arab group (N = 13)

Group B = African group (N = 20)

*** .1 through .6 refer to different answers for each question in the mail questionnaire.

NA = No answer given by delegates

the Africans (35%), even if there were to be change in the General Assembly's voting system and procedures. The Arab delegates emphasize the need for a structural change in the UN that would give a balance to the GA and the Security Council (SC). This view was less stressed by the African delegates who are more willing to emphasize the status quo in the UN.

Regarding their reaction to the actual performance of the GA, the Arab (77%) and African (70%) delegates share similar attitudes, and they agree on increasing the power of the GA in order to achieve a real balance with the SC. Therefore, their attitudes on predicting an increase in the future importance of the GA and the continuing power of the SC are essentially

identical. Furthermore, they share a positive belief and satisfaction concerning the voting system of the GA, and a negative attitude and dissatisfaction with the voting procedures of the SC.

Table 3 indicates that a combination of pan-nationalism and national interests according to the Arab (85%) and African (80%) delegates are the most influential factors affecting their delegations' voting behavior. Also Table 3 shows that more Arab (85%) than African (65%) delegates emphasize that their countries vote with the group position most of the time; none report to the contrary.

Table 3
Attitudes Toward Factors Affecting Voting Cohesion

Question No. *	Group **	Delegates' responses ***											
		.1	%	.2	%	.3	%	.4	%	.5	%	NA	%
01	A	1	8	1	7	11	85	-	-	-	-	-	-
	B	1	5	3	15	16	80	-	-	-	-	-	-
02	A	11	85	1	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	7
	B	13	65	7	35	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
03	A	9	69	-	-	4	31	-	-	-	-	-	-
	B	14	70	2	10	3	15	1	5	-	-	-	-
12	A	2	15	7	54	-	-	4	31	-	-	-	-
	B	2	10	8	40	2	10	3	15	5	25	-	-
13	A	1	7	7	54	-	-	5	39	-	-	-	-
	B	7	35	6	30	1	5	4	20	1	5	1	5
23	A	1	8	7	54	-	-	5	38	-	-	-	-
	B	2	10	11	55	3	15	2	10	2	10	-	-
24	A	12	92	1	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	B	16	80	3	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	5

Source : Mail questionnaire sent to various Afro-Arab missions at the UN in 1984 (N = 33).

* See Appendix A for questions 1 - 25 included in the questionnaire.

** Group A = Arab group (N = 13)

Group B = African group (N = 20)

*** .1 through .6 refer to different answers for each question in the mail questionnaire.
NA = No answer given by delegates

Since more than two-thirds of the African (70%) and Arab (69%) delegates emphasize the need for reaching consensus in order to build a united position toward many matters of concern, they stress the existence of different levels of coordination and cooperation between their delega-

tions and their caucusing groups prior to the voting process. The collaboration process is one of the major factors affecting the level of cohesion of both groups, and thus the delegates stress the existence of the coordination and cooperation process.

Expectation concerning the future impact of the Arab and African clusters involves prediction. Therefore, disagreement might exist as a result of the complexity of the subject. Table 3 shows that more Arab (69%) than African (50%) delegates are optimistic regarding the increasing future impact of their groups. On whether the voting clusters will show a high level of cohesion or not, the African (65%) and Arab (61%) delegates share a common attitude and optimism, and most of them predict an increase of voting cohesion. The East-West conflict is another factor influencing the Afro-Arab voting behavior, but the majority of African (65%) and Arab (62%) delegates stress that it is possible for the Third World nations to remain neutral in Cold War matters. The African (80%) and Arab (92%) delegates also agree on the impact of the UN caucusing groups as assisting the UN in achieving its functions and objectives.

Table 4 shows the rank of issues in terms of their importance to the Afro-Arab delegates (N=33). The more important items to the Afro-Arab clusters mean that they involve a high level of intergroup coordination and the less important matters mean they indicate a lesser degree of consultation, and thus the group cohesion is expected to reflect such distinction and scaling. As expected, a higher rank was given by the Afro-Arab delegates to the issues which involve common interests, such as African, Arab, and self-determination matters. Further, a lower rank was given to those issues which involve partial and divergent interests, such as social, internal-UN, and East-West questions.

Moreover, if we break down the Arab and African groups into sub-groups, such as non-Arab-African, Arab-African, and Arab-Asian, a variation regarding issues-scaling is observed. The perceptions of African delegates on the nine types of issues are expected to be different from that of the Arab-African and non-Arab-African delegates. By comparing the perceptions of these indicated groups and sub-groups, as shown in Table 4, it is possible to note that the nine types of issues were ranked differently in terms of priorities. While African and economic issues were ranked highest

Table 4
Groups' Perception Toward the Importance of Issues

Group \ Issues :	25.1*	25.2	25.3	25.4	25.5	25.6	25.7	25.8	25.9
African	1**	4	2	6	3	5	8	9	7
Non-Arab-African	1	4	3	5	2	6	8	9	7
Arab-African	2	1	3	7	4	5	8	9	6
Arab-Asian	3	1	2	5	4	7	9	8	6
Arab	3	1	2	7	4	6	9	8	5

Source : Mail questionnaire sent to various Afro-Arab missions at the UN in 1984 (N = 33).

* According to the questionnaire, numbers 25.1 through 25.9 refer to different types of issues (see Appendix A, question number 25).

** Numbers 1 through 9 refer to the rank or the importance of issues according to the Afro-Arab delegates.

by the non-Arab-African representatives, issues concerning Arab and African matters were ranked highest by the Arab-African delegates. However, on those issues involving divergent interests, the Arab-African and non-Arab-African delegates agreed on their importance; therefore the lowest rank was assigned, e.g., Cold War and internal-UN matters.

Obviously, the non-Arab-African representatives gave a lower rank to Arab issues and a higher rank to African items, a situation that did not match that of the Arab-African delegates who gave a higher rank to issues involving Arab matters. By ranking the Arab issues in the first position, the Arab-African delegates indicated a stronger feeling toward pan-Arabism than pan-Africanism. However, the Arab-African representatives ranking the African issues as the second in terms of importance (after Arab issues, see Table 4), and the non-Arab-African delegates ranking the Arab issues as fourth suggests that the Arab-African delegates are more concerned about African matters than the non-Arab-African delegates are concerned about Arab issues.

Furthermore, Table 4 indicates that the non-Arab-African representatives gave higher priority to economic issues than the Arab-African representatives. While economic issues were ranked by the non-Arab-

African delegates as second in terms of importance, the Arab-African delegates ranked them in the fourth position. It seems to be that the economic situation in the developing nations has a greater impact on the non-Arab-African UN delegates, and consequently they gave higher priorities to economic issues (NIEO), a situation less emphasized by the Arab-African delegates.

Further examination of Table 4 indicates that the Arab delegates whose countries are members of the OAU gave a higher rank to African issues than given by the Arab-Asian representatives. Also, while East-West questions were ranked lowest by the Arab-African delegates, the Arab-Asian representatives, to some extent, gave Cold War items a higher rank. This may be a result of conservative-moderate ideological views among the majority of the Arab-Asian delegates. However, other types of issues were, generally, given a similar rank.

Similarity and Variation Regarding the Arab Delegates' Attitudes in the 1960s and 1980s

This study assumes that a variation of the Arab delegates' attitudes as regards their meetings and the UN is, by and large, an evolving phenomenon. The Arab delegates' attitudes of the 1960s will be different from their attitudes in the 1980s. One way to examine the similarity and variation of the Arab delegates' attitudes may be demonstrated by comparing the findings of this study and that of Vincent's study (1964). Most of the questions used in this study are identical to those of Vincent regarding meetings and attitudes toward the UN. However, differences in Arab delegates' attitudes are expected to exist between the two studies, mainly because the time period in which both studies examine the Arab delegates' beliefs are different, and thus two decades of differences are expected to produce some changes in attitude regarding meetings and the UN.

Similarity and Variation in Attitudes Toward the Arab Group Meeting:

Tables 5 and 6 demonstrate the similarities and variations of the Arab delegates' attitudes in the 1960s and 1980s. The Arab delegates' attitudes toward the frequency of meeting are, by and large, a consistent phenomenon over the two decade period. The meetings of the LAS group are

still infrequent and depend upon the rising needs of its membership. Regarding the formality of meeting, there is a considerable change in the delegates' attitudes. While Vincent's data show a split among the Arab delegates' attitudes between formality and informality, this study's responses stress a complete agreement of the delegates on the formality aspect (Table 5).

Table 5
*Comparison Between the Arab Delegates' Attitudes Concerning
Caucusing Meetings in the 1960s and 1980s*

Subject / Periods	1960s	1980s
Frequency of meetings	Infrequent meetings	Infrequent meetings
Formality of meetings	Less formal	Highly formal
Voting during meetings	Never occurs	Never occurs (sometimes)
Preparing the agenda	By the group chairmanship	Interaction among the group membership
Focus of meetings	General and several important issues	General and several important issues
Desirability of binding decisions	Less desirable	More desirable
Impact of meetings on governments	Less impact	More impact
Future impact of the group	Less impact	More impact
Future cohesion	High level of voting cohesion	Higher level of voting cohesion

Source : J. Vincent (1964) *The Caucusing Groups of the United Nations: An Examination of Their Attitudes Toward the Organization*. Stillwater: Oklahoma State University, and mail questionnaire sent to various Arab missions at the UN, 1984 (N=13).

The Arab delegates' attitudes regarding the frequency of voting during caucusing remain consistent over time in both studies. Most of the responses in both studies stress that voting never occurs, while some mention the infrequency of voting. Regarding the preparation of an agenda, the responses of this study emphasize that it reflects the group members' interaction and consultation with the LAS office in New York, a process different from that of Vincent's work which stresses the dominant role of "... a rotating monthly chairmanship" (1984:26). Both studies agree that

during the Arab group meetings other general and specific important issues are the focus of the caucus.

The Arab delegates' attitudes toward different aspects of the group meeting reflect strength or at least an increase in their positive attitude. Firstly, the attitude toward the binding nature of the group decisions upon its members has become stronger. All the responses of this study refer to a complete agreement in support of the idea of binding decisions, a situation that did not exist in the 1960s. This change in attitude shows that the group members are more willing to carry out group decisions than they were formerly.

Secondly, the impact of the Arab group meetings on the delegates' home governments has increased over the two decades. While all the responses of this study refer to a considerable or some observable impact of the Arab group meeting upon its members, Vincent's data do not show such distribution among delegate attitudes. Thirdly, the more recent data show a stronger attitude regarding the increased future impact upon the delegate home governments. Finally, the Arab delegates' attitudes toward the future cohesion of the Arab group have remained somewhat consistent over time.

Similarity and Variation in Attitudes Toward the UN: The Arab delegates' attitudes toward the UN reflect two almost opposing views: firstly, a sense of disappointment; and secondly, a feeling that it is the body in which they can express their views. The disappointment of the delegates is due to the inability of the UN to carry out goals that emphasize significant principles, such as self-determination and the non-acquisition of territory by force. They argue that big power conflict is the main reason behind the inability of the UN to carry out its duties.

Secondly, the UN is the parliamentary body in which the Arab delegates can freely express their countries' views, and thus they can mobilize the support of other states to their causes. The Arab states' emphasis on basic principles, such as self-determination and the non-acquisition of territory by force, gained the support of many members, particularly those of the Third World. The UN has achieved importance because it reflects these two views, and the Arab delegates cooperate with it accordingly. Since this

study assumes that the delegates' attitude is a changing factor over time, it is expected that the Arab delegates' feeling about the UN in the 1980s is different from that of the 1960s.

The comparison between the findings of this study and that of Vincent regarding the attitude toward the UN involve eight aspects. Firstly, the Arab delegates now agree more on the impact of the UN caucusing groups in assisting the UN in achieving its objectives. The alignment of the Arab states with other UN caucusing groups, such as the African, the Afro-Asian, and the group of 77, helped the Arab countries to gain the support of the other nations for the Arab causes and thus improved the delegates' attitude toward the impact of the UN caucusing groups upon the world organization to aid it to achieve its goal in an area considered very important to the Third World nations, e.g. self-determination and human rights .

Table 6
*Comparison Between the Arab Delegates' Attitudes
Toward the UN in the 1960s and 1980s*

Subject / Periods	1960s	1980s
Groups' impact on UN	Considerable impact	Higher impact
Powers of the GA	More powers	More powers
Satisfaction with voting system of GA and SC	Satisfied with GA and dissatisfied with SC	Satisfied with GA and dissatisfied with SC
Shift of focus on GA and SC	More focus on GA and less focus on SC	More focus on GA and less focus on SC
Future importance of GA and SC	More important GA	More important GA in order to achieve a balance with SC
Permanent world peace	Skeptical view	Skeptical view
Effectiveness of the UN	Effective	Effective (more)
GA control of peace-keeping forces	Considerable degree of agreement	Higher degree of agreement
GA control of peace-keeping forces with change in system	Lesser degree of consensus	Higher degree of consensus
UN as a basis of world government	Higher support	Lower support

Source : J. Vincent (1964) *The Caucusing Groups of the United Nations: An Examination of Their Attitudes Toward the Organization*. Stillwater: Oklahoma State University, and mail questionnaire sent to various Arab Missions at the UN, 1984 (N=13).

Secondly, the Arab delegates' attitudes show a slight change in the 1980s over the 1960s regarding the willingness to increase GA power. As demonstrated before, the Arab delegates' attitude toward increasing GA power reflects their emphasis on a real balance between the GA and the SC.

Thirdly, there is considerable change in the Arab delegates' attitudes concerning the voting system in the SC and the GA. The recent data show that there is more satisfaction with the voting system of the GA and more dissatisfaction associated with that of the SC. The Arab delegates' attitudes toward the voting system of the GA and SC reflect their willingness to achieve a balance between the two organs. The veto power and the principle of one-nation one-vote have contributed, by and large, to non-dramatic changes in the delegates' attitudes toward the voting system in the UN.

Fourthly, the Arab delegates' attitudes remain, to a considerable degree, consistent over time with their prediction concerning the shifting of the importance of the GA and SC. There is also, to some extent, a consistent attitude toward the future importance of the GA, and thus the emphasis on the status quo of the GA remained stable over time (Table 6 and Vincent, 1964:28).

Fifthly, there is a change regarding the belief of the possibility of a permanent world peace without change in the UN structure. The data of this study indicate a higher level of disagreement among the delegates concerning the possibility of a permanent world peace. The Arab delegates have changed in favor of the possibility of the UN effectiveness in an international system of anarchy. The UN of the 1980s deemphasizes the East-West conflict of the 1960s and emphasizes the North-South dilemma of the 1970s. The change in the UN focus affects the Arab delegates' attitudes toward the increased effectiveness of the UN in which their influence has increased along with that of Third World nations.

Sixthly, the favorable feeling of the Arab delegates regarding the GA control of the peace-keeping forces with no change in its voting system has changed dramatically in the 1980s as compared to that of the 1960s. Also, there are favorable attitudes concerning the GA control of peace-keeping forces even with a change in its voting system. The GA control of the

peace-keeping forces may be considered by many of the Arab delegates as one of the measures which could achieve a real balance between the GA and the SC.

Finally, the Arab delegates' attitudes have changed negatively in supporting the idea of the UN as a basis for a world government. Thus, the comparison between the findings of this research and that of Vincent shows that, by and large, there are changes in the Arab delegates' beliefs over time regarding many aspects of the group's caucusing meeting and attitudes toward the UN. On the other hand, the Arab delegates have remained consistent in their attitudes toward some aspects, which seem not to have changed over the last two decades, e.g. the voting system of GA. This comparison proves, generally, the assumption that the UN delegates' attitudes are a changing element over time.

Similarity and Variation Regarding the African Delegates' Attitudes in the 1960s and 1980s

A similar comparison to the Arab delegates' beliefs in the 1960s and 1980s will be the focus of this section regarding the African delegates' attitudes. The African delegates' attitudes of the 1980s would seem to be different from that of the 1960s as regards the group meetings and the UN because of the time factor involved.

Similarity and Variation in Attitudes Toward the Group Meeting: The African delegates' description of their caucusing meeting indicates a consistent attitude over time because of their stress on the infrequency of meetings. While Vincent's data refer to some aspect of informality in the meeting, all the responses of this study stress the formality of the African caucusing group meetings. One reason that might have contributed to the change of the African delegates' attitudes toward the formality question is the impact of the OAU's creation in 1963. Vincent's data reflect the African attitudes either prior to or at least in the early years of the OAU's formation. Regarding the question of votes taken during the African caucusing meeting, responses in both studies stress that voting never occurs (Table 7).

Table 7
*Comparison Between African Delegates' Attitudes Concerning
 Caucusing Meetings in the 1960s and 1980s*

Subject / Periods	1960s	1980s
Frequency of meetings	Infrequent meetings	Infrequent meetings
Formality of meetings	Less formal	Highly formal
Voting during meetings	Never occurs	Never occurs
Preparing agenda	By committee and chairmanship	Interaction among the group membership
Focus of meetings	Several important issues	General and several important issues
Desirability of binding decisions	Less desirable	More desirable
Impact of meetings on governments	Less impact	More impact
Future impact of the group	Less impact	More impact
Future cohesion	High level of voting cohesion	Higher level of voting cohesion

Source : J. Vincent (1964) *The Caucusing Groups of the United Nations: An Examination of Their Attitudes Toward the Organization*. Stillwater: Oklahoma State University, and mail questionnaire sent to various African missions at the UN, 1984 (N=20).

Committees no longer play a major role in preparing the agenda of the African caucusing group's meetings as Vincent's data had indicated. Now the agenda is the result of an interaction between the African delegates and the OAU office in New York. Furthermore, the type of issues discussed in a normal meeting have been enlarged in terms of focus, and thus the caucus now deals with general and several important items. Restriction of the African meeting to a few issues or a single issue no longer exists, because of the African states' increased role in world politics.

With the increase in size of the African group since the 1960s, the African delegates' attitudes toward the group have strengthened for various reasons. Firstly, their attitudes toward the binding nature of the caucusing group decisions have changed from less supportive into a more supportive position. Secondly, the African caucusing group's impact upon the African governments has changed dramatically in favor of supporting the actual

group impact. The recent data show that all the African delegates agree on the existence of the strong influence of the group meeting on their home governments, a situation which is not shown in Vincent's data.

Thirdly, although the data of this study along with that of Vincent's show a split among the African delegates' attitudes regarding the increase of future group impact upon its members, the responses of this study show more acceptability by the delegates of the idea of increasing future impact. Thus there is, to some extent, a change in the attitudes among the African delegates in the sense that they have become more willing to accept the idea of an increase of their group's future impact. Finally, the African delegates' attitudes, at least partially, have changed in favor of increasing the future cohesion of the group.

Similarity and Variation in Attitudes Toward the UN : As mentioned earlier, the African delegates' attitudes are expected to change over time, and their reactions regarding the UN are no exception. The UN of the 1980s is different from that of the 1960s in the sense that the African nations are now playing more significant roles in UN politics than they did formerly. The impact of the African nations along with that of the Third World countries has left its mark upon the world organization by making the UN shift its focus from East-West to North-South issues. The variation and similarity of the African delegates' attitudes toward the UN can be clarified in several dimensions.

Firstly, the delegates' attitudes toward the impact of the UN caucusing groups as assisting the UN have changed noticeably in favor of agreeing with such an influence. Secondly, on whether or not to increase or decrease the powers of the GA, there is a change in attitude toward favoring the increase of its powers more than formerly (Table 8).

Thirdly, there is also a dramatic change regarding satisfaction with the voting system in the SC. The data of this study show a higher degree of dissatisfaction with the SC's voting system due to the frequent use of the veto power. On the other hand, there is a consistency of attitudes toward the voting procedures in the GA because of the equal weight the African states enjoy in the GA.

Table 8
*Comparison Between African Delegates' Attitudes
 Toward the UN in the 1960s and 1980s*

Subject / Periods	1960s	1980s
Groups' impact on UN	Considerable impact	Higher impact
Powers of the GA	More powers	More powers
Satisfaction with voting system of GA and SC	Satisfied with GA and dissatisfied with SC	Satisfied with GA and dissatisfied with SC
Shift of focus on the GA and SC	More focus on GA and less on SC	More focus on GA and less on SC
Future importance of GA and SC	More important GA	More important GA in order to achieve a balance with SC
Permanent world peace	Skeptical view	Skeptical view
Effectiveness of the UN	Effective	More effective
GA control of peace-keeping forces	Considerable degree of agreement	Higher degree of agreement
GA control of peace-keeping forces with change in system	Less degree of consensus	Less degree of consensus
UN as a basis of world government	Higher support	Lower support

Source : J. Vincent (1964) *The Caucusing Groups of the United Nations: An Examination of Their Attitudes Toward the Organization*. Stillwater: Oklahoma State University, and mail questionnaire sent to various African missions at the UN, 1984 (N=20).

Fourthly, there is a change in attitude regarding the future importance of the SC and the GA. Recent data indicate that the SC will be less important in the future. Both studies, however, emphasize an increase in the GA's importance. Fifthly, regarding the possibility of a permanent world peace with no change in the UN Charter, the majority of the responses, by and large, reflect a skeptical view toward the possibility of the existence of peace in an international system of anarchy.

Sixthly, concerning the impact of the East-West conflict on the effectiveness of the UN, the African delegates' attitudes have changed favoring the possible future effectiveness of the world organization. Their attitudes, as the recent data indicate, are shifting to a more supportive position concerning the effectiveness of the UN. Regarding the question of

who should control the peace-keeping forces, the African delegates' attitudes have changed to an increasingly supportive position for GA control of peace-keeping forces. Concerning GA control of the peace-keeping forces with a change in its voting system, their attitudes, to some extent, remain consistent over time.

Finally, the African attitudes toward the UN as an alternative to a world government have changed further, assuming a position of extreme opposition to the idea of a world government. Thus, the comparison between the data of this study and that of Vincent's show, by and large, a change of African delegates' attitudes on subjects concerning group meetings and the UN. However, their attitudes remain consistent regarding a few subjects, such as their satisfaction with the GA voting system.

Conclusion

The Afro-Arab cooperation in the political and economic fields has affected, generally, the similarity of attitudes among the Afro-Arab delegates over four dimensions: meeting, attitudes toward the UN, factors affecting voting cohesion, and the perception of the delegates regarding the importance of issues. On the other hand, the Afro-Arab delegates' attitudes of the 1980's vary greatly from those of the 1960s because of the following factors. Firstly, UN membership has changed in favor of the Third World nations. Secondly, the UN has shifted its emphasis from East-West to North-South issues. Thirdly, the Third World nations have become active national actors in world politics, e.g. the non-alignment movement and the NIEO. Thus, the Afro-Arab delegates' attitudes have changed in favor of strengthening the coordination and cooperation efforts among themselves, thereby presenting a unified position regarding many issues.

Notes

- (1) The questionnaire of this study incorporates, to a large extent, identical questions (N=20) to that employed by Jack Vincent (1964: 144-149). However, minor editorial changes have been added to Vincent's questions without changing the meaning (question number 5, 6, 10, 11, 13-23, 30-32, 42, and 47). The reason for incorporating the identical questions from Vincent's study is mainly to compare the Afro-Arab delegates' attitudes in two different eras: the 1960s and 1980s.

References

Vincent, J.

- 1964 The Caususing Groups of the United Nations: An Examination of Their Attitudes toward the Organization. Stillwater: Oklahoma State University.

Appendix A

Questions Included in the Mail Questionnaire

1. Which of the following factors has more influence on your country during the voting process in the UN? (Pan-nationalism (e.g. African pan-nationalism) / The national interest of the individual state / Both national interest and pan-nationalism / Other opinion)
2. Does your country vote at the UN on all resolutions with its caucusing group? (Most of the time / As much as possible / Sometimes / Other opinion)
3. How often does your country organize its efforts before voting in the General Assembly of the UN with the caucusing group in New York and the regional organization headquarters in Addis Abba? (Very often / Often / Sometimes / Very seldom / Other opinion)
4. How frequently does the African caucusing group meet? (Daily / Three or four times a week / Weekly / Bi-monthly / Monthly / Other opinion)
5. Does the African caucusing group meet regularly? (Yes / No / Other opinion)
6. How formal are the African caucusing meetings? (Highly formal / Fairly formal / Somewhat informal / Highly informal / Other opinion)
7. To what extent do you feel the African caucusing group meetings have impact upon your national government's instructions to you? (Considerable / Some / Hardly any / None / Other opinion)
8. Do you think it would be desirable to eventually have the decisions which emerge from the African caucusing group meetings to be binding upon the members of the group? (Highly desirable / Desirable / Undesirable / Highly undesirable / Other opinion).
9. How often are votes taken in the African caucusing group meetings? (Often / Sometimes / Infrequently / Never / Other opinion)
10. How is the agenda for the African caucusing meeting arrived at? (Committee / Other opinion)
11. What is the range of issues discussed at the normal African caucusing meeting? (General UN issues / Several important issues / A few issues / A single issue / Other opinion)

12. In respect to your government policy, do you feel that the African caucusing group is likely to have more impact in the future? (Highly probable / Probable / Improbable / Highly improbable / Other opinion).
13. Do you feel it is likely the African caucusing group will tend to vote more as a unit in the future? (Highly probable / Probable / Improbable / Highly improbable / Other opinion).
14. Do you feel that the UN may provide the basis of a world government? (Highly probable / Probable / Improbable / Highly improbable / Other opinion).
15. Do you believe that permanent world peace is possible under the present national state system with no change in the UN system or function? (Highly probable / Probable / Improbable / Highly improbable / Other opinion).
16. Do you feel that the UN is as effective as it can be in carrying out its objectives, taking into consideration the East-West conflict? (Highly effective / Effective / Ineffective / Highly ineffective / Other opinion).
17. Do you agree that the UN has contributed significantly in increasing the possibility of international peace and security? (Highly agree / Agree / Disagree / Highly disagree / Other opinion).
18. Would you favour the creation of peace-keeping forces under the control of the General Assembly with its present membership and voting system? (Strongly favor / Favor / Do not favor / Strongly do not favor / Other opinion).
19. Would you favour the creation of peace keeping forces under the supervision of the General Assembly if its membership or voting system were changed? (Strongly favor / Favor / Do not favor / Strongly do not favor / Other opinion).
20. If you are dissatisfied with the role and performance of the General Assembly, what would you suggest to change it?
(By generally increasing the General Assembly's power relative to other organs / By generally decreasing the General Assembly's power relative to other organs / Other opinion)
21. In the future do you predict that the GA and the SC will become more important or less important relative to the other organs of the UN?
(Security Council : More important / Less important / Remain the same).
(General Assembly : More important / Less important / Remain the same).
22. How satisfied are you with the present voting system of the following organs of the UN?
(Security Council : Satisfied / Dissatisfied / Other opinion).
(General Assembly : Satisfied / Dissatisfied / Other opinion).
23. Do you feel that it is possible for the Third World nations to be neutral in conflicts between the big powers? (Highly possible / Possible / Impossible / Highly impossible / Other opinion).

24. Do you feel that the formation of caucusing groups has generally helped the UN in terms of its charter functions? (Yes / No / Other opinion).
25. If you had to rank the following issues in terms of their importance for your country, how would you rank them? (Mark 1 for the most important, 2 for the second most important, 3 for the third most important, etc.).

African questions (e.g. South Africa)
 Arab issues (e.g. Palestine case)
 Anti-colonial and self-determination
 Nuclear weapons matters
 Economic issues (e.g. NIEO)
 International law and legal items (e.g. Law of the Sea)
 Internal-UN cases (e.g. UN elections and spending)
 Cold War questions (East-West conflict)
 Social issues (e.g. human rights)
 Other opinion

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The Consistency of United Nations Representatives' Attitudes : The Case of Arab and African Delegates

Mustafa Abdalla Abulgasem

This study examines the consistency of the attitudes of Arab and African delegates to the United Nations based on responses to a questionnaire. A variety of subjects are considered, such as their attitudes toward group meetings, the nature of binding decisions, world peace, and the effectiveness of UN organs. The Arab and African delegates' attitudes toward their caucusing groups and the United Nations are, essentially, similar. Therefore, the Arab and African delegates agree that their caucusing meetings as well as the effectiveness of the UN should be strengthened. However, the Arab and African delegates' attitudes of the 1960s varied from those of the 1980s, particularly with regard to their attitudes toward the binding nature of group decisions and the increasing role of the UN General Assembly.