

IBN KHALDUN'S TYPOLOGY OF SOCIETY IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN THOUGHT

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In the past three decades, social scientists have been increasingly interested in Ibn Khaldun's writings, especially his analysis of **badawa** (nomadism) and **hadhara** (civilization). But what lesson can be drawn from studying the theory of a fourteenth century writer? This question puts us face to face with a controversy that has engaged the mind of modern man for some time.

Some thinkers are of the opinion that there is no use in studying the theories of the past, it is more useful to concentrate on understanding the most recent ones since they contain the valid elements of the past theories and they are, accordingly, the end-products of what the creative minds of the past have produced. Is this argument correct? It would seem that this is the case, to some extent, in the field of natural sciences, where the last-developed theories are, more or less, the sifted end-products or the previous ones. In the social sciences, however, the matter is quite different. The newer theory is not necessarily the better or the more valid. Those who are influenced by the pattern of the natural sciences are usually inclined to view social theories in the same light which they view natural science theories, without observing the major difference between the two. A social theory is usually expounded by its author in response to a certain problem which is, more or less, restricted in its cause and effect to his time and place. It is, in other words, part of the culture within which it appears.

The superficial student tends to belittle the importance of past theories mainly because he overlooks the historical perspective in studying them and tries to view them through the perspective of his

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own culture . Consequently , he considers them naive and even ridiculous. This is, in fact, the problem with some of the modern students of Ibn Khaldun. They tend to read his writings in the light of modern thought — style , and so they often find them boring rather than interesting, useless rather than useful. By viewing an old social theory within the context of its culture, one may be able to understand certain aspects of social phenomena that he is unable to understand otherwise. A social phenomenon, as Scheler points out, has several phases. A «socially - bound» observer can see only one phase of it - that is, the phase toward which his group has been directed.

The historical and sociological relativities of norms, purposes and goods of society... is only a relativity of perspective in the absolute realm, for each represents a partial participation in the «eternal and objective logos.» Given all cultures, past, present, and future, the logos may be expressed so fully that there is a total perspective, the varieties of cultures contributing, as Scheler says to the meaningful unity of a magnificent painting¹.

In order to see a social phenomenon in all its phases , it is necessary therefore to view it through the eyes of the various groups that are interested in it. Mannheim says:

In certain areas of historical - social knowledge it should be regarded as right and inevitable that a given finding should contain the traces of the position of the knower. The problem lies not in trying to hide these perspectives or in apologizing for them, but in inquiring into the question of how, granted these perspectives, knowledge and objectivity are still possible. It is not a source of error that in the visual picture of an object in space we can, in the nature of the case, get only a perspectivistic view. The problem is not how we might arrive at a non - perspectivistic picture but how, by juxtaposing the various points of view, each perspective may be recognized as such and thereby a new level of objectivity attained. Thus we come to the point where the false ideal of a detached, impersonal point of view must be replaced by the ideal of an essentially human point of view which is within the limits of a human perspective, constantly striving to enlarge it self².

This may explain partly, at least, why social scientists are more interested than natural scientists in studying the history of their theories. The social scientist believes that by studying the various theories of the past (in the light of their various social environments) he may develop a profound insight into the real meaning of the modern theories. Moreover, by seeing how an early thinker attempted to solve the problems of his time and by checking the weak and strong points in his theory, one may find, within his mind, a powerful «intuitive» urge toward a similar attempt. In his attempt, he may be more successful than the earlier thinkers, for he is able to examine the social phenomenon from more angles. He is less «socially-bound» in his world-view, because he sees through the perspectives of the early thinkers as well as through his own. According to Mannheim, creative thinking, or what he calls «synthetic thinking.» is «a prerogative of the socially-unbound or free class of intellectuals, who (can) discover the various right or partial truths and synthesize them into a new view.»³ It may be safe to say, then, that the less socially-bound the theorist is, the deeper his insight will be into the real meaning of a social phenomenon.

A question may be raised here: Is it possible for a social thinker to be completely socially-unbound? A complete unboundness is tremendously difficult and may be, in a sense, impossible. The human mind is usually imprisoned within three circles - personal attitudes, class position and cultural values. At any rate, this should not discourage the social thinker from trying to be socially-unbound, as far as possible. Following Titchenor's suggestion, it may be safe to say that the social thinker is able to be objective, in a way, at least for a small fraction of his time.⁴

In fact, we can find an excellent example of such a compartmentalized life in Ibn Khaldun himself. Ibn Khaldun's religious devotion did not prevent him from describing a social phenomenon as it is. He has taken the schizoid compartmentalization that has characterized the thought-style of his contemporaries and developed it to its logical conclusion.

It seems, however, that not all people are equally capable of achieving scientific objectivity. It can be said that there is a particular

type of personality that fits, more or less, into such a socially - unbound pattern - the marginal man. Some writers have been accustomed to looking at the marginal man with disfavor. He is in their opinion the carrier of moral and social disorganization. ⁵ In ancient times marginal men were not able, as they are now, to disrupt the moral values of their group. Moreover, owing to the lack of efficient means of transportation and communication, the number of marginal men was not large enough to accomplish that task. The marginal man was obliged then to replace the locally — restricted conscience by a freer one. He helped, to a great extent, in moral progress by extending the moral limits to include outside groups. In this way, the local god or totem which symbolized social values has been replaced by a universal God with a universal moral system. The ordinary man who has learned to view things through the eyes of his groups was hardly able to do that, he could not even imagine its possibility. The marginal man then soared high above the local moral systems into a synthesized, generalized one. ⁶

Park states that «the marginal man is always relatively the more civilized human being.» By the term «civilized». Park means, most probably, «individualized» or «emancipated» from the locally- restricted conscience. It seems that the factor which makes the marginal man a trouble - maker or an agent of social and moral disorganization may make him at the same time a creative personality or a liberal thinker. As Ibn Khaldun has ¹⁷ observed, the areas of moral disorganization are usually fertile for the growth of arts and sciences.

In discussing the characteristics of the «stranger,» who is in some sense a marginal man, Simmel reaches the same conclusion. According to Simmel, because the stranger is not rooted in the peculiar attitudes and biased tendencies of the group, he stands apart and tends to be objective in his outlook with a peculiar composition of nearness and remoteness, concern and indifference.

Modern civilization is intensively facing the problem of the marginal man - with its double - phased phenomena. Marginal men of today are so many that the so - called «beyond -conscience thinking»

phenomenon begins to prevail. Instead of the Prophets and the conscientious reformers of ancient times, we find today Hegelians, Romanticists, Pragmatists, students of the sociology of knowledge, and the like. With the growth of large urban centers it is quite possible that in the future the marginal personality will become the ordinary rather than the exceptional type of personality.

Mannheim points out that every thinker is limited by the pre-conceptions and motives of his cultural group and social class. Nevertheless, a sociologist may study the ideologies or culturally limited views of all classes and nations. By becoming an observer of other men's knowledge and opinions, the sociologist will be in a position to interpret his group's ideas in relation to others. As an interpreter, he rises above a merely partisan point of view.⁹ A man who is ordinarily educated to view things through the social values of his group is not able to transcend beyond conscience into a state of creative objectivity. It should be remembered at this point that the marginal man cannot only be objective in observing the values of the various groups; he also develops a sense of understanding or *verstehen*, to use Weber's terminology. In this way, he is not merely an indifferent recorder, but rather a sympathetic observer of the various phases of social phenomena.

The rise of sociology indicates the prevalence of the marginal man's attitudinal - complex in modern thinking. The marginal man of ancient times could not dare reveal his objective attitude to the masses, lest he be condemned as a traitor or an infidel. The majority of the people were value-ridden and biased against the values of the out-groups. It seems, therefore, that the objective view of social life is a new phenomenon which has developed with the rise of the marginal man in the industrial civilization of today. It is interesting to note that most of the founders of modern sociology and other related disciplines were, in one sense or another, marginal men. In Europe, many of them were Jews.¹⁰ It may suffice to mention the names of Gumplowicz, Marx, Simmel, Bergson, Durkheim, Oppenheimer, Freud, and Mannheim. It is also interesting that accomplishments in sociology in the United States are superior, in many ways, to those of any other country in the world. This may be attributed, to a great extent, to the variety of cultural backgrounds of the peoples inhabiting this new

country, or, in other words, to the marginal personality prevalent in this complex society.

According to Park , the vast expansion of modern civilization during the last four centuries «has brought about changes more devastating than in any earlier period in the world history.» This expansion has brought also «an interpenetration of peoples and a fusion of cultures.» As a result of this culture contact, the personality type of the marginal man has been produced, «a type which if not wholly new is at any rate peculiarly characteristic of the modern world.»¹¹

We should keep in mind that it is still in the family and under the influence of the tribe, the sect, or the local community that man acquires those habits, sentiments, attitudes, and other personality traits that characterize him as human.¹² But, modern man is often obliged to come out, in one way or another, from his «sacred» shell in order to face a complicated world of an intertribal, interracial, and international nature. This may explain the reason why the distinction and the comparison between the «sacred» and the «secular» society constitutes one of the most frequent subjects in modern sociology. Some of the prominent sociologists of modern times have been concerned, in one form or another, with a typological study of these two or equivalent types of society. Thus, we find: **Gemeinschaft** and **Gesellschaft** (Tonnies), mechanical and organic solidarity (Durkheim), sacred and secular society (Becker), localism and cosmopolitanism (Zimmerman), sacred and secular society (Becker), localism and cosmopolitanism (Zimmerman), status and contract relationship (Maine), primary (as vs. secondary) group (Cooley), stationary and changing society (Ogburn), unbonded and multibonded society (Sorokin), traditional and rational society (Weber), and folk and urban society (Redfield)¹³ The major features or characteristics of these typologies are similar to Ibn Khaldun's **badawa** (nomadism) and **hadhara** (civilization).¹⁴ It appears that the science of society itself would be almost impossible if there was no «secular» society that could be contrasted with the «sacred» society. As we have already stated, a man who has not been familiar with societies other than his own primary group is seldom able to be objective or scientific in his social observation. He needs to be somewhat socially-unbound in

order to understand fully his own society as well as others. He needs to be a marginal man.

It is of significance that Comte who is popularly considered the «father» of modern sociology has built his whole social theory on the thesis of the three states in the development of human intellect. By carefully examining his theory, we may find in it a strong allusion to the typology of «sacred» and «secular» societies. In speaking of Comte. House states:

... He made the generalization that «from the nature of the human intellect, each branch of knowledge in its development has to pass through three different theoretical states: the theological, or fictitious, state; the metaphysical, or abstract, state; and the scientific, or positive.» The first two of these states, however, he regarded as closely similar to each other; the real advance is made when the positive state is reached. The theological state is that in which all questions of causation are answered in terms of the activity of supernatural beings; the metaphysical state is that in which abstract forces or entities are conceived as the causes of phenomena; while in the positive state a branch of knowledge abandons the search for absolute causes and seeks simply to establish laws of coexistence and sequence. As the advance to the positive state is made, imagination is systematically subordinated to observation. In short, by «positive,» as the term is applied to a science or branch of knowledge, Comte meant much the same thing that we usually express by the term «scientific». 15 .

Comte's «positive» stage in the development of human intellect is greatly reminiscent of the «secular» society, while the «theological» stage? «in which all questions of causation are answered in terms of the activity of supernatural beings,» parallels the «sacred» society.

When we come to Spencer, the «godfather» of sociology, we find in his writings a similar strong allusion to the typology of «sacred» and «secular» societies. «He regarded the development and equilibrium of the social order as a specific manifestation of a generic ten-

dency or process which operates throughout the universe In **First Principles**, he sums up the theory in a single definition,» which appears, with minor variations, throughout his later writings: «Evolution is an integration of matter and concomitant dissipation of motion during which the matter passes from an indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a definite, coherent heterogeneity; and during which the retained motion undergoes a parallel transformation.»¹⁶ As a matter of fact, the «incoherent homogeneity» of society here is very similar to the mechanical solidarity in Durkheim's theory whereas the «coherent heterogeneity» is similar to Durkheim's organic solidarity. It can be said also that Spencer's distinction between «militant» and «industrial» societies has some relevance to the same dichotomy.

Turning back to Ibn Khaldun, we find him a marginal man in a peculiar way. His fate had destined him to live along the border -line between the «**sacred**» and the «**secular**» society, or according to his own terminology, between **nomadism and town civilization**. In so far as the cultural conflict in general is concerned Ibn Khaldun was not particularly different from any other marginal man, but he experienced a sort of social situation which is seldom available to the Western thinkers of the twentieth century. We may be able, therefore, to find in Ibn Khaldun's writings a particular perspective which can hardly be found in the writings of any other social thinker of ancient or modern times ¹⁷

As an example of the «sacred» society, Ibn Khaldun refers to the nomadic tribe. Here lies a point of tremendous sociological significance. The nomadic tribe is, undeniably, similar to any other «sacred» society in several aspects of social life; but it has, nevertheless, a peculiar characteristic which is worthy of investigation: the constant movement from one place to another without losing its social integration or weakening its moral values. The lack of social disorganization may be attributed to the fact that the group moves as a whole, as a unit, carrying with it its cultural traits and its strong social solidarity. Their natural as well as their social environment does not change much from one place to another. The nomads are well adapted

to this process. The simplicity of the **bedouin's** life is to be noted in all its aspects - food, drink, clothing, and personal possessions ¹⁸ They are content, as Ibn Khaldun points out, with the barest necessities of life. ¹⁹ They are accustomed to care very little for material goods. They do not use anything that handicaps them from quick departure or efficient movement. To compensate for this sort of scantness in material satisfactions, the nomads can be said to have developed a strong tendency toward non - material satisfaction, e. g. fame , status, and praise. The extreme desire for fame among the nomads may be considered as a factor in strengthening the nomadic tribe. The nomadic person is always inclined to follow the social values of his group and to become a respected member.

Looking through the perspective of Ibn Khaldun we may be able to notice an interesting polarization between the nomadic craving for non-material satisfaction, on the one hand, and the civilized yearning for material enjoyment, on the other hand, or to use Ibn Khaldun's terminology between the intensity of the **asabiyya** in nomadism and the lack of it in civilization. Here lies a highly interesting point: this polarization often becomes a **cause for a peculiar social phenomenon. Despite their desire for non - material satisfaction**, the nomads do not usually refrain from enjoying certain material aspects of life when they conquer a civilized nation or come into close contact with it; but **material satisfaction causes damage to the social values and to asabiyya** itself. At first the nomad sees no harm in enjoying a little of the luxury of civilization; he may not be able to **forsee the** ultimate consequences in the distant future. Eventually, his present whim will develop, as Ibn Khaldun points out, into a permanent habit; and so , **asabiyya will be replaced by moral laxity and personal disorganization.** -

It should be stated here that Ibn Khaldun **emphasized** the fact that the strong **asabiyya** of the nomads leads them willy-nilly to conquer the towns that border their desert. Because the town dwellers lack **asabiyya** and firm morality, they easily yield to the conquest and provide their conquerors with luxurious commodities. Consequently, the conquerors enjoy consuming these products without realizing the detrimental consequences. Thus, they decline gradually, giving

ground to a new wave of nomads who come up with a strong **asabiyya** which leads them to follow the pattern of their predecessors.

This is indeed an excellent example of a dialectical process. Ibn Khaldun was fortunate to observe it in an actual and tangible form. As a matter of fact, many thinkers, in ancient and modern times, have discovered some sort of dialectical process in human phenomena, but they have not been able to observe it in their life time as Ibn Khaldun did. In ancient times, they derived the notion of dialectic not from the actual happenings of the social phenomena but rather from the cyclic nature of certain phenomena such as the continuous succession of day and night, summer and winter, and sowing and reaping seasons. Through this native observation, they tried to construct a dialectic theory or what has been called a «millennial hope.» They seem to have constructed a scheme for a future hope in order to counter-balance the disappointment of their present hope. In modern times, the dialectic theory can be said to have been misused or lost between the extreme idealism of the Hegelians and the extreme materialism of the Marxists. The fate of the dialectic theory today can be likened to that of the **shaikh's** beard which was, according to an Arabic proverb, destroyed by his two wives, the old and the young because each picked off the hair that did not suit her age.

We believe therefore that modern social scientists should look back to the fourteenth - century Arab sociologist, Ibn Khaldun, in order to see dialectic theory in a much earlier setting, undistorted by any idealistic or materialistic preoccupation. In light of Ibn Khaldun's theory, one may be able to see that dialectic theory is not a universal law as its exponents are inclined to suggest. It does not explain all the phenomena of change. Social change cannot be explained in one single formula. The dialectical form can be said therefore to be one of these various explanations of social change. Studying Ibn Khaldun's theory, we notice that the dialectical process requires certain conditions:

(1) There should be a sort of polarization in the value systems of the two cultures (**badawa** and **hadhara**) between which the dialectical

interaction takes place. Each culture should possess certain characteristics that the other normally lacks. Thus, a cyclical movement may arise as a result of the desire of each culture to seek in the other what it lacks in itself.

(2) There should also be a polarization within each culture, between what it possesses and what it lacks. That is to say, what it possesses cannot exist side by side with what it lacks. In **badawa**, for instance, man cannot possess a strong **asabiyya** and at the same lead time a luxurious life; he cannot, in other words, enjoy the habit of nonmaterial satisfaction along with that of a material one. He will lose one if he obtains the other. Hence, the dialectical process begins operating as soon as he conquers civilization and adopts or accepts its luxurious life. ۲۵).

In this way, Ibn Khaldun explains the reasons behind the dialectical process in human history. He considers it a result of a dichotomous polarization between two value systems. It is inevitable, not because there is a universal idea or «spirit» influencing its movement from behind the scene, nor because there is a teleological factor or a prime mover driving the world toward a certain end. It is a local phenomenon relative to the time and the place in which it arises. Thus, Ibn Khaldun provides us with an explanation of the social change in his culture more convincing than that of many of the modern theories in this respect.

This theory, in fact, can be of great use in explaining certain historic events that took place in a social situation similar to that which Ibn Khaldun has described. Let us take, for example, the well-known successive waves of nomads ʿarab who invaded the ancient civilized Near East during the four milleniums before Christ. It is a peculiar phenomenon that needs to be carefully explained. Writers have given several explanations but to little avail. Huntington and his school have tried to explain it through a geographical factor; that is, the Arabian desert had been subject to a prolonged period of desication, and consequently its population was forced to migrate to, or invade, the neighboring civilizations. It seems that the desication factor is a necessary but not sufficient cause for these nomadic waves. It may

explain the overflowing of the desert population toward the outside world, but it does not sufficiently explain why it overflowed in waves. Ibn Khaldun's theory appears here to be of some importance in explaining a certain phase of these great historic events.

Ibn Khaldun seems to be quite optimistic as regards this cyclical process of human history. His optimism may be indicated by his often quoted theory of imitation. According to this theory, the conquered people are always fond of imitating the customs, beliefs, dress, and other characteristics of their conquerors. In his own words:

Man ;always; believes in the perfection of the conquerors to whom he has submitted. This is either because he has become accustomed and conditioned to look up to them, or because he believes in their perfection as a rationalization for their victory over him and his submission to them, convincing himself that their victory over him **has not been** because of their military excellence or **asabiyya**, but rather because of their good customs and beliefs; and so he **always** tries to imitate them in everything they have Even if there are two neighboring nations, where one of them is more powerful than the other, a great diffusion of traits will run from the strong to the weak.²².

In view of Ibn Khaldun's conviction that «might» tends to be associated with «right,» and studying Ibn Khaldun through his real scale of values, we can clearly see the strong element of optimism in his theory. Since the nomads are far better than the civilized peoples whom they often conquer, human society is therefore gradually improved through the process of imitation.

To emphasize Ibn Khaldun's point, **badawa** is the birthplace of perfect men, while **hadara** is their graveyard. The dialectic process, it is true, carries the perfect men from the desert and buries them in **civilization**; but **this does not indicate at all a backward trend in human evolution**. The process can be likened to the life-cycle of the individual man, through which he is first born and finally dies, whereas humanity in general continues to move forward.

Here Ibn Khaldun stands in complete opposition to many social

theorists. His hope seems to lie in the ultimate victory of the nomadic values over those of civilization. 23 of the «sacred» society over the «secular» one. He believes that moral values originated and are well maintained only where **asabiyya** is strong. As soon as man comes out of his «primary» shell and lives among weak **asabiyyas** and heterogeneous peoples, his animal nature begins to grow in strength at the expense of his human nature. Philosophically minded thinkers may not agree with Ibn Khaldun on this point. They may consider the strong ethnocentrism of the «sacred» society as a handicap, rather than as a facilitating element for the improvement of morality.

To decide whether morality improves or declines as a result of the shift from the «sacred» to the «secular» society, depends on the way one looks at it. The moralists, who are oriented toward humanity in general and who wish to see all the various people of mankind united under one social or political system, are naturally inclined to see that morality improves with the shift from the «sacred» to the «secular» organization of society. Their criterion of good morality is not in the intensity or the quality of morals but rather in the enlargement of the circle embraced by the moral feelings. According to this criterion, the secularization of society is therefore quite beneficial to morality; it weakens the **ethnocentric** or the tribal **spirit which characterizes** «sacred» society and tends to make men treat each other equally regardless of their pedigree or group attachment.

Ibn Khaldun might see in such moral consideration an element of the same idealism which he has bitterly attacked. In his opinion, morality is not a product of individual will power or armchair speculation; it is a product of social organization. He admits that the circle of moral feelings in civilization embraces a larger number of people than does the **asabiyya** in nomadism; but this should not be taken as a sign of improvement in morality. When **asabiyya** weakens as a result of the social secularization, the vehement **attachment to group** values weakens too. Herein lies one of the penetrating insights of Ibn Khaldun. His theory reflects, of course, the conditions of his society; but understanding the past is necessary for the understanding of the present. In contrast to the idealistic thinkers, Ibn Khaldun provides us, at this point, with a sociological analysis of great significance. His analy-

sis, however, cannot be unconditionally applied to modern civilization, but it can be, nevertheless, quite useful for the understanding of the background out of which modern society has grown.

NOTES

- 1 — H. Becker and H. O. Dahlke, «Max Scheller's Sociology of Knowledge.» **Philosophy and Phenomenological Research**, Vol. 2 (March, 1942), p. 314.
- 2 — K. Mannheim, **Ideology and Utopia** (New York: Harcourt, Barce, 1936), pp. 266 — 267.
- 3 — H. E. Barnes, et al **Contemporary Social Theory** (New York: Appleton - Century, 1940), p. 84.
- 4 — L. von Wiese, **Systematic Sociology** (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1932), p. 7. See also Y.F. Haddad «Mannheim's Concept of the Detached Intellectual.» **Journal of Social Sciences**, Vol. 5 (January, 1978).
- 5 — See, for example, P. Landis, **Social Control** (Chicago: Lippincott, 1939), pp. 419 - 420.
- 6 — Studying the life stories of the founders of the three great monotheistic religions of the world we find that they were more or less marginal men: Moses was a Jew and reared in the Pharaoh's palace. When he grew up, he left Egypt and lived for several years among the nomads. Jesus spent some years of his childhood in Egypt and returned as a boy to Palestine. Mohammed spent more than thirty years in traveling mainly as a merchant and caravan leader.
- 7 — R. E. Park, «Introduction,» in E.V. Stonequist, **The Marginal Man** (New York: Russell 1961), p. xviii.
- 8 — See R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, **Introduction to the Science of Sociology** (Chicago: university of Chicago Press, 1920), pp. 324 - 325.
- 9 — See Mannheim, **op. cit.**, **passim**; and W. A. R. Leys, **Ethics and Social Policy** (New York : Prentice - Hall, 1944), p. 266.
- 10 — See Stonequist, **op. cit.**, pp. xviii, 3, 76ff; and Park and Burgess, **op. cit.**, p. 323.
- 11 — Park's Introduction to Mannheim's **Ideology and Utopia**, pp. xiv-xv.
- 12 — See, for example, **Ibid.**, p. xiv; and C. H. Cooley, **Social Organization** (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1909), especially chs. 2 and 3.
- 13 — F. Baali and J.S. Vandiver, **Urban Sociology** (New York : Appleton -Century-Crofts, 1970), pp. 91-92 . See also O. E. Klapp, **Models of Social Order** (Palo Alto, California: National Press Book, 1973), pp. 144 - 151.
- 14 — According to Sorokin Ibn Khaldun's analysis of the **badawa** and **hadhara** «is one of the most

- penetrating, detailed, and enlightening.» P.A. Sorokin's «Forward» to F. Tonnies, **Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft**, translated by C. P. Loomis (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 1957), p. ix. See also P. A. Sorokin, **Society, Culture, and Personality** (New York: Harper, 1947), p. 20. Sorokin believes that Ibn Khaldun is «entitled to be called the founder of sociology, and possibly more than anybody else is he entitled to be regarded as the founder of rural - urban sociology.» P.A. Sorokin, et al, **A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology** (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1930), Vol. 1, p.54. See also P.A. Sorokin, **Sociological Theory of Today** (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 504.
- 15 — F. N. House, **The Development of Sociology** (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1936), p. 115.
- 16 — Cited by **Ibid.**, p. 124.
- 17 — See H. Simon, **Ibn Khaldun's Science of Human Culture**. Translated with a preface by F. Baali (Lahore, Pakistan: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1978), pp. 166 — 167, 170.
- 18 — F. Baali, **Relation of the People to the Land in Southern Iraq** (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1966), p. 6; F. Baali, «The Bedouins of Southern Iraq: An Inquiry into Their Economic and Social Life.» AM.A. Thesis, University of Kansas, 1957, pp. 41 - 44; F. Baali and G. A. Hillery, Jr. «The Desert Bedouins: A Comparison with the Village.» in progress; and M. F. Jamali, **The New Iraq: The Problem of Bedouin Education** (New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1934), pp. 19-26.
- 19 — Ibn Khaldun, **Muqaddimah**, (Beirut: Dar al -Kashshaf), pp. 400 - 401.
- 20 — In view of these two requirements, it seems that the dialectical process can hardly arise as a result of the contact between the «secular» and the «sacred» societies in the modern times. There is today no polarization between a simple and conquering society, on the one hand, and a complex and submissive society, on the other hand. It may be said that, in the present time, the complexity of culture goes hand in hand with the ability to conquer. Modern war is no longer carried on in the same pattern as that of the old time. Today, the personal fortitude and bravery of the soldiers are not as important in winning a war as the quality and the quantity of the weapons and the cleverness of the command. Cf. W. L. Wilkie, **One World** (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1943), p. 68. Thus, the contact between the «secular» and the «sacred» societies of today runs according to a linear pattern rather than a dialectical one.
- 21 — « It was in Arabia that the ancestors of the Semetic people - the Babylonians, the Assyrians, the Chaldaeans, Amorites, Aramaeans, the Phoenicians, Hebrews, Arabians and the Abyssinians - had their origin. Here they lived at some time as one people .» P. K. Hitti, **The Arabs: A Short History** (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1956), P. 7. The «transplantation en masse or in bands of human groups from a pastoral desert region to an agricultural territory constitutes a common phenomenon in the Near East and provides an important clue to the understanding of its long and checkered history. The process by which a more or less migratory people imposes itself upon a people which has become rooted in the soil usually results in the invaders assimilating to some degree the main features of the previously existing civilization and in infusing a certain amount of its blood, but hardly ever in the extermination of the indigenous population. This is exactly what happened in the ancient Near East, whose history is to a certain extent a struggle between the sedentary population

already domiciled in the Fertile Crescent and the nomadic Arabians trying to dispossess them. For immigration and colonization are, as has been well said, an attenuated form of invasion.» P. K. Hitti, **History of the Arabs** (London: Macmillan, 1946), p. 12.

- 22 — Ibn Khaldun, **Muqaddimah**, p. 147. It is interesting to note the similarity between Ibn Khaldun's theory of imitation and that of Tarde. According to Tarde, imitations «usually proceed from the socially superior to the socially inferior.» See P. A. Sorokin, **Contemporary Sociological Theories** (New York: Harper, 1928), p. 639.
- 23 — At the time of Ibn Khaldun, nomadism was growing at the expense of civilization in North Africa, especially after the invasion of the Hilali tribes. Cities began to dwindle in importance and population, and the sedentary culture was on the decline. The nomadic chieftains were competing with each other to conquer and rule what had remained from the declining civilization. Ibn Khaldun's optimism can be considered therefore as a reflection of the actual trend in his society.