تأثیر النخب الموحدة بالتوافق والنخب المنقسمة على عملية الانتقال الديمقراطي في الديمقراطيات الناشئة

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المصطلحات الأساسية: النخب الموحدة بالتوافق، النخب المنقسمة، الانتقال الديمقراطي، التحول الديمقراطي، علم الانتقال، الديمقراطيات الناشئة.
The Effect of Consensually Unified and Disunified Elites on the Democratic Transition in Emerging Democracies

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Abstract: This paper aims to explain why some countries succeed and others fail in democratic transition. It concentrates on domestic interactions between national elites, either the consensually unified or disunified elites, and analyzes the different outcomes associated with transition. The main assumption concerns the correlation between unified and disunified elites and the probability of facilitating or impeding democratic transition. This study is based on a comparative analysis, and it examines the main assumption in 50 emerging democracies between 1974 and 2015, depending on the 'Polity Score Index IV', that compares the status of those countries before and after the transition period in parallel with the existence of unified/disunified elites. The paper concludes that the unified elite boost the probability of a successful democratic transition, while the disunified elite enhance the probability of the failure of the process of democratic transition. Nevertheless, the current study does not neglect other important factors that explain the different paths of democratic transition in emerging democracies.

Key words: Consensually unified elite, Disunified elite, Democratic transition, Democratization, Transitology, Emerging democracies.

Introduction

Understanding the factors facilitating or impeding the process of democratic transition is a central goal of any political scientist. Some of these approaches and theories focus on the various causes of regime

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change, while others greatly emphasize on such prerequisites for democratization as a socioeconomic development. Seymour Martin Lipset developed the 'Modernization Theory' and concentrated on the relationship between democracy and development (Lipset, 1959). On the other hand, Lipset’s theory was criticized by many scholars, such as Barrington Moore who rejects the relationship between democracy and development as a socio-economic development; he argues that industrialization, in particular, does not necessarily translate into the intermediary variables that are conducive to democracy. He also stresses on the point that socio-economic development leading to democracy is not inevitable. Moore insists on the role of bourgeoisie in the emergence of democracy-no bourgeoisie, no democracy (Moore, 1969: 360).

Gill, partially agreeing with Moore, also states that further research indicates that the nature of the relationship is not linear; “the probability of democracy does not increase automatically as the level of development rises.” (Gill, 200: 8). However, another perspective distinguishes the emergence of democracy and democratic consolidation. Przeworski, for instance, argues that economic development does not tend to generate democracies, but democracies are much more likely to survive in wealthy societies (Przeworski & Fernando, 1997). Another approach concentrates on political culture based on the connection between "civic" culture and the stability of a democratic regime (Almond & Verba, 1963). Furthermore, Diamond urges that changing social and economic conditions, such as economic development and its consequences, may shape a state’s political culture. There is historical evidence that attitudes and values may change in response to economic development and a democratic political culture may, thus, be the outcome of the facilitating of long periods of social and economic development (Diamond, 1992:475).

Moreover, economic development and cultural changes are linked in a complex pattern of a reciprocal influence. Originally, Protestantism may have facilitated the rise of capitalism, leading to economic

* Modernization theory examines how modernization processes, and economic growth in particular, relate to democratization and democratic consolidation. The most notable authors in this approach are Seymour Martin Lipset and Samuel P. Huntington, both of whom use quantitative data to argue that modernization has a profound and positive effect on democracy.
development, which in turn favored the emergence of civic culture. Hence, there is a connection between the cultural character of the society and the tendency to adopt democratic institutions (Inglehart, 1988). Also, many scholars confirm the correlations between communication, urbanization, education, and the transition to democracy (Cutright, 1963). On the other hand, many observers have suggested that international factors could be a facilitating or a hindering factor to democratic transition. In this regard, international factors (economic sanctions, pressures from the United Nations and the United States of America) may be decisive in determining whether a state becomes a democracy or not (Whitehead, 1986). Since the withdrawal of support for authoritarian regimes and the active promotion of values that facilitate democracy are important in this regard, it should, thus, not be assumed that the international context would automatically favor democratization (Huntington, 1991).

On the other hand, a central debate within the literature on colonial causes of democracy concerns the identity of the matters of a colonizer (Hadenius, 1992; Woodberry 2012). Michael Bernhard concentrates on the relationship between the nature of colonialism and its effect on democratic survival. He assures that the British colonial legacy has been overstated in certain regards. Specifically, former Spanish colonies have performed better historically in terms of democratic survival, (Bernard, 2004: 225).

Another perspective is based on ecological effect; Wittfogel came up with an analysis of oriental despotism which emphasized the role of irrigation works. In his view, many societies, mainly in Asia, relied heavily on the building of large-scale irrigation works. To do this, the state had to organize forced labor from the population at large. This required a large and complex bureaucracy staffed by competent and literate officials. This structure was uniquely placed to also crush civil society and any other force capable of mobilizing against the state. Such a state would inevitably be despotic, powerful, stable and wealthy. Therefore, this system gives the despot immense powers that can be used to benefit or undermine progress and prosperity. (Wittfogel, 1957).

Another approach focused on the role of the elites in democratic transition. This approach concentrated on the interaction of elite strategic choices as possible explanations for the success or failure of democratic
transition. The supporters of this view are concerned with the role of elites and their strategic choices, and splits within authoritarian regimes. Elite calculations, strategic choices and the interaction between choices were viewed as decisive in determining political changes whether democratic transition would/would not occur at all. In addition, the basic assumption of this approach is based on the dynamics of the process of democratization rather than on its conditions, as the preconditions of democratization do not guarantee successful democratization. However, this approach does not deny the importance of economic factors (Guo, 1999:136).

With regard to the elites, this study aims to examine the correlation between national elites, adopting consensus or disunity, on the outcome of democratic transition in order to explain the different consequences and paths of the transition in emerging democracies. It is known that there are many research studies and academic papers that have sought to examine this correlation. However, these were conducted on a narrow geographical scale in Eastern Europe, Africa or Latin America, but what is new in this paper is that it seeks to present a general explanation of the different paths of democratic transition in emerging democracies based on the types of elites and their ability to build a consensus. Thus, the unity of elites enhances the probability of democratic transition while divided elites may hinder democratic transition. Therefore, that elite disunity and democratic transition failure will continue until disunified and competing elites change their attitude and reach a consensual agreement through “elite pact”, “Elite Settlement”, “National Dialogue”, “Roundtable” or any other form of compromise between both parties. This paper examines this assumption in 50 case studies in emerging democracies between 1974 and 2015, depending on the Polity Score Index IV.

**Problem Statement**

This study aims to explain the different trajectories of democratic transition. It explores, in depth, the question as to why some countries with emerging democracies succeed while others fail in democratic transition. Although there are many factors facilitating or hindering the transition in emerging democracies, this study concentrates on only one factor, which is the interaction between national elite, either the consensually unified or disunified elite.
Research Questions and Hypotheses

The main research question is: to what extent does the elites’ unity/disunity contribute to facilitating or impeding democratic transition in emerging democracies?

The main hypothesis revolves around the type of national elite (unified/disunified) that has an influence on the process of democratic transition. In other word, there is a connection or correlation between domestic elite interrelations and the probability of facilitating or impeding democratic transition. According to the main hypothesis:

H1: The more the elites are consensually unified, the more likely the democratic transition process will be smoother and facilitated. In other words, there is a correlation between elite consensus and the probability of success of the democratic transition.

H2: The more the elites are disunified (divided), the more likely the democratic transition process will be hindered and impeded. In other words, there is a connection between elite disunity and the probability of failure of the democratic transition.

However, this study does not neglect the view that transition will happen despite the existence of unified/disunified elites and that transition may happen without consensus, however rare it is.

Definitions

National Elite

The concept of elite is fraught with problems, and the contingent nature of elite choices may be a barrier to theoretical progress. Scholars generally agree that national elites can be defined as top-position holders in the largest or most resource-rich political, governmental, economic, military, professional, communicative, and cultural organizations and movements in a society (Hoffmann, 1987:27), while Higley and Burton defines the national elite as the “people who are able, through their positions in powerful organizations, to affect national political outcomes individually, regularly, and seriously. Elites thus constitute a nation’s top leadership in all sectors: political, governmental, business, trade union, military, media, religious, and intellectual including both "establishment" and "counter elite factions””. National elite can be said to encompass "all those persons capable, if they wish, of making substantial political
trouble for high officials (i.e., other elite persons who happen to be incumbents of authoritative positions) without being promptly repressed. Also, they avoid assumptions about talents, moral qualities, degrees of consciousness and cohesion, or other properties (Higley & Burton, 1989/2012:247).

Consensually Unified Elite

Consensually unified elites consistently refrain from pushing their disagreements to the point of violent conflicts. They apparently share a tacit commitment to abide by common codes of political conduct centering on the norm of restrained partisanship. This combination of tacit consensus on the rules of the game and comprehensive integration disposes elite members to view decisional outcomes as a positive-sum or as a “politics-as-bargaining” game, rather than a zero-sum or as a “politics-as-war” game. With agreement on the rules of the political game and with decision-making access assured, the diverse and heterogeneous members accept various decisions they do not especially like because they expect to get their way on other issues they consider vital (Sartoi, 1987:226).

Consensually unified elites have two dimensions: normative and interactive. The normative dimension involves the extent of shared beliefs and values, as well as more specific shared norms, most of which are informal and uncodified, about political access, competition, and restrained partisanship. On the other hand, the interactive dimension involves the extent of inclusionary channels, mechanisms, and networks through which the elites obtain relatively assured access to decision-making centers. This explains why the elites and factions who regularly take opposing ideological and political positions in public consistently refrain from pushing their differences to the point of violent conflicts. Typical elites therefore enjoy considerable personal security, in the sense that they do not expect to be killed, imprisoned, or otherwise severely penalized for ending up on the losing side of a policy dispute. It follows that once this type of national elite is created, and so long as it persists, forcible seizures of government power by one or another discontented faction will not occur (Higley & Pakulski, 1999: 118).

Consensually unified elites are a precondition for, but not a guarantee of, stable democratic politics. The origins of this type of
national elite are therefore highly relevant to assessing the likelihood of
democratic transitions. Without a basic change to consensually unity
elites, there can be no lasting transition from an unstable and, at best,
only intermittently democratic regime, or from a stable but politically
unrepresentative regime, to a stable regime in which the sustained
practice of representative democracy is an actual possibility (Burton &

**Disunified (Divided) Elite**

Disunified or divided elites share some or no understanding of the
proprieties of political conduct, deeply distrust each other, interpersonal
relations do not extend across factional lines, and factions do not
cooperate to contain societal divisions or to avoid political crises (Higley
& Burton, 1989/ 2012:248). Moreover, emotions of anger, fear,
insecurity, distrust are the dominant in this type of elites, especially if
they are rooted in experience. In addition, its members take extreme
measures to protect themselves and their interests: killing, imprisoning,
or banishing opponents, fomenting rebellions against ascendant factions,
among others. In the context of elite disunity, these actions are often the
most rational ones available (Sartoi, 1987: 228).

Sanders identifies three indicators of political instability based on
divided elites: (1) a high incidence of political violence in the form of
revolts, riots, strikes, mass demonstrations, and individual actions; (2)
frequent changes in the makeup of governing coalitions and cabinets; (3)
the occurrence of coups d’état or other government overthrows high
incidence of political violence in the form of revolts, riots, strikes, mass
demonstrations, and individual actions (Sanders,1981:85).

As concrete indicators of regime instability are revolutions,
uprisings, or coups d’état aiming to change the control of government
executive offices and not orchestrated primarily by another nation-state,
irregular forcible power seizures are sufficiently frequent and visible, or
the expectation of them is so palpable that observers usually have little
difficulty recognizing a regime as unstable (Burton & Higley, 1987: 296,
298).

**Democratization and Democratic Transition**

Scholars typically break down democratization into a democratic
transition stage and a democratic consolidation stage. Democratic
transition involves the breakdown of the authoritarian regime and emergence of democratic institutions and practices. At some point, democratization shifts from a transitional stage to a consolidation stage (Sorensen, 2008: 194).

Potter defines democratization as the “political changes moving in a democratic direction” (Potter, 1997, 3). Also, Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter define “The ‘transition’ as “the interval between one political regime and another”. Transitions are delimited, on the one hand, by the launching of the process of dissolution of an authoritarian regime and, on the other, by the installation of some form of democracy, the return to some form of authoritarian rule, or the emergence of a revolutionary alternative” (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986:6). Thus, this process is divided into two phases as transition and consolidation (Pridham, 2000). However, transitions may result in the reappearance of an authoritarian rule or certain revolutionary alternative.

Linz and Stepan propose that a transition is deemed complete when political actors agree upon the procedures for the new system of governments and a free and fair election yields an independent government with the authority to enact new policies. Once a democratic transition has been completed, democratization proceeds to consolidation, which is the third and final phase. Consolidation involves the internationalization of democratic practices (Linz & Stepan, 1996: 3).

The literature on democratic transitions draws on experiences from transitions from an authoritarian rule focusing particularly on political pacts between elites and long term-political settlements in Southern Europe and Latin America during the 1970s and Eastern Europe after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although the majority of these transitions occurred several decades ago, insights into past transformations of elite relations can help us understand better how negotiations between traditional and emerging elites contribute to a peaceful transition from an authoritarian rule, depending on the renegotiation of the distribution of power between elites.

**Emerging Democracies:**
Since 1974, emerging democracies have been affected by the third wave of democracy, which first took place in Portugal in 1974, and then moved to Spain and Greece then to the south of Europe, Latin America,
Eastern Europe and some African countries (Huntington, 1991). Some of the emerging democracies, however, are neither dictatorial nor clearly headed toward democracy. They have entered a political gray zone. They have some attributes of democratic political life, including at least limited political space for opposition parties and independent civil society, as well as regular elections and democratic constitutions (Carothers, 2000).

**Theoretical Framework**

This study determines two aspects in studying the relationship between the elite and democratic transition.

**Transitology**

There is a widespread agreement among scholars that transitions to democracy have been elite-driven processes. Dankwart Rustow’s seminal article in 1970 first refocused the lens of inquiry on actors and the necessity of the elite consensus. In his approach, there is a phase of “**national unity**” and “sharing of a political identity”. This phase is followed by a “**political struggle**”. The claim made regarding this phase is that democratization is always born out of a conflict between opposing groups in all countries, rather than being a simple result of “peaceful evolution”. The **third phase** is the ’transition or decision phase’, during which political players “decide to compromise and adopt democratic rules”. In the last phase, which is called the **habituation phase**, those democratic rules become habituated. The political elites of the transition period are replaced by a new generation that has habituated democratic rules and believed in them. After that, a democratic regime is said to be established (Rustow, 1970: 14). Also, pact-making and negotiations between the regime “the soft-liners and the opposition forces “moderates” become an important point of democratic transition.” (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 36). They define these pacts as an “agreement among a select set of actors which seeks to define (or better to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power on the basis of mutual guarantees for the ’vital interest’ of those entering into it”. By creating these mutual guarantees, elites have less of an incentive to reform government in their interests, minimizing internal conflict between elite groups and political instability (O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986: 37).

Huntington implicitly recognizes that a fundamental change in the structure of elites must occur so as to achieve a smooth transition to
stable democracy. He also argues that this change may happen either through the "transformation" or "replacement" of the existing elite. Huntington’s transition through transaction is the elite-led version of democratization through instituting liberalization. In this model, democratization is initiated from within the regime (Huntington, 1984: 195). In order for this to occur, the government must be stronger than the opposition and five phases must develop. First, reformers emerge within the authoritarian regime. Second, they achieve the power in the regime. Third, attempts of liberalization fail. Fourth, the reformers challenge to the conservatives in the regime by using backward legitimacy, and fifth, they co-opt the opposition through negotiations and pacts (Huntington, 1991: 30). John Peeler pointed out that to spirit elite accommodation was requisite to the establishment and maintenance of liberal democracy in Latin America (Peeler, 1985:145).

The New Elite Paradigm

New elitist theorists use Huntington’s ‘waves’ to build typologies of elite interaction. This paradigm is based on a comparative perspective; it highlights the elite and is much more concerned with the behavior of the elites according to broader historical scenarios of authority transformation. The new elite paradigm (or new elitism) reframed the circulation theory to introduce the notions of elite settlements, elite convergences, elite unity and elite disunity as the determinants of democratic transition processes worldwide. This approach urges that democratic transitions and breakdowns can best be understood by studying basic continuities and changes in the internal relations of national elites (López, 2013: 3).

New elitists propose a typology of elite configuration: elites could be (a) disunified, (b) consensually unified or (c) ideologically unified. Consensual unity is associated with stable democracies, while elite disunity is associated with unstable democracies and authoritarian regimes. Ideological unity relates to totalitarian regimes (Higley & Burton, 1989/ 2012: 245).

They contend that national elite disunity and regime instability will persist unless the elites can transform and unify into “elite settlements”. Without this convergence, elites will most likely continue to reform political regimes in hopes of seizing power for their own interest. Higley & Pakulski elaborate by identifying key mechanisms that assure “unity in
diversity” amongst elites. They include a common elite commitment to
democratic institutions, restrained elite partisanship and reciprocal
recognition of elites by other elites. The new elitist model refers to the
fact that consensual unity is associated with stable democracies, while
elite disunity is associated with unstable democracies and authoritarian
regimes. It also points out several cases in history where elites migrated
from one type to another (mainly from elite disunity to consensual unity),
and how elite configuration is an important cause of political regimes
(Pakulski, 2012: 11).

Moreover, there are two important concepts presented by the model:
elite settlements and elite convergence. An elite settlement is where
previously confronting elites choose to negotiate a new political order, thus
recognizing each other as legitimate political actors. The result of an elite
settlement is some sort of a democratic rule, be it a full democracy or an
electoral or pseudo-democracy (Higley & Burton, 2006).

Elite convergence is defined as a phenomenon that often follows elite
settlements. It denotes a process in which, in an unstable democracy,
politically organized anti-system elites abandon radical opposition and
adopt a coalition strategy in order to amplify their chances of electoral
gain. Thus, previously radical elites accept the rules of the game,
converging with governing elites in the legitimation of democracy and the
rule of law. This process of elite convergence is often associated with the
transition from an unstable democracy to a consolidated democracy
where no elite group significantly challenges the regime (López, 2013: 5).

Higley and Burton explained some of the failed attempts to
democratize countries using force, pointing out Iraq as an example.
Such efforts fail because the bases of the previous non-democratic rule
persist as elites remain disunified. Among the examples of democratization
based on elite settlements provided by the authors are the end of
apartheid in South Africa, some Latin American cases and others in
Europe. New elitists propose a typology of elite configuration (Higley &
Burton, 2006).

However, this approach refers to “elite transformation” as the “elite
settlement” in which warring elite factions suddenly and deliberately
reorganized their relations by negotiating compromises on their most
basic disagreements, thereby achieving consensual unity and laying the
basis for a stable democratic regime. In addition, it determines the context and condition that facilitate the transformation of elite from disunity into unity as follows:

Firstly, it can be done through colonial home rule and struggles for independence that local elites had already received, or received in the course of those struggles, experience in political bargaining and restrained competitions. However, it is a condition that is no longer seriously present. It can also be achieved through basic and sudden elite settlements in societies at relatively low levels of socioeconomic development. A necessary condition for an elite settlement appears to be a level of socioeconomic development lower than that of most developing countries with disunified elites today (Burton & Higley:1987: 298).

Secondly, when there is a harsh conflict between warring elites and no sign that any faction has been a clear winner, and all factions have mostly been losers, elites are disposed, if at all possible, to compromise. An example of this is the recent experience of civil war, which entailed considerable elite fratricide but had no clear victor force elites to construct broad coalitions or to take turns in government office (Higley & Burton, 1989/ 2012: 251).

Thirdly, the opposing camps and factions making up disunified elites may begin to converge if some of the opposing elites form a broad political coalition mobilizes enough voters to win the elections repeatedly. This enables the coalesced elites to dominate government executive power and obtain the greater security that derives from this domination. An elite convergence may continue if factions are hostile to the winning coalition. Seizing power by irregular means is not a realistic possibility, and they must beat the winning coalition in election contests if they are to escape permanent political subordination (Higley, 2008: 8).

Fourth, although elite transformations are fundamentally “elite events,” mass variables are obviously important as elites always need mass support. Mass conditions and orientations thus establish fields of opportunity and constraint to which elites must respond. A major crisis may force the competing elite toward a settlement (Lowell & Higley: 1981). It appears that elite settlements are accomplished promptly or not at all. Triggered by a serious political crisis that threatens renewed elite
warfare, settlements involve intensive efforts to find a way out. Fear of the consequences of not doing so loosens the fixed positions and principles of various factions and disposes them to consider concessions that in other circumstances they would not countenance.

In this new elitist perspective, democracy can be the result of a pact between elites, who sometimes perceive more advantages in accepting elite circulation than in promoting a 'zero sum' game, whereas democracies built by disunified elites are unstable democracies, because the source of stability (elite union) is absent (López, 2013: 5).

Despite the importance of the new elite paradigm and transitology, they neglect the content of the pacts/elite settlements themselves from the analysis; they are only perceived as a movement toward "democracy by non-democratic means". However, this paper will be based on both aspects, transitology “especially the pact between the opposition and ruling” and the “The new elite paradigm” transformation from disunified into consensually unified elite through settlement.

**Research Methods**

This study is based on a comparative approach. It covers the study of political experience within more than one nation-state for the purpose of making systematic comparisons with concentrating on the cross-national approach that involves the simultaneous study of a large number of nation-states. Therefore, national elite interactions and the democratic transition are examined in a review of major transition in 50 different emerging democracies between 1974 and 2015, depending on the polity score to compare the status of the countries before and after transition period in parallel with existence of unified/disunified elites.

It is also worth mentioning that the "Polity Score IV" was designed to track transitions from autocratic patterns of regime authority to more democratic patterns of authority in a world dominated by autocratic regimes. The "Polity Score", which ranges from -10 to +10, with -10 to -6 corresponding to autocracy states, with -5 to 0 corresponding to closed anocracies. While democratic states fall between two values from 1 to 10, in this type there are sub internal categories. The first one ranges from 1 to 5 and corresponds to open anocracies, and the second one ranges from 6 to 9 and corresponds to democracies, while full democracy is at value 10. Hence, generally, non-democracy states fall between -10 and 0 while
democracy states fall between 1 and 10. (Polity IV Project, 2013). Although the Freedom House Index is based on (political rights, civil liberties and freedom status) that are often used by researchers as measures of democracy, the underlying concept for Freedom House is freedom and not democracy (Högström, 2013). However, Polity Score IV is used extensively in comparative politics, which measures polity scores, over times, including reversion, stagnation and progression associated with the mode of transition (Guo & Stradiotto, 2014).

Since it is difficult to examine the emerging democracies generally, the study focuses on selected representative samples (50 cases) that have been chosen from four continents as follows:

- **Europe:** Spain, Portugal, Greece, Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czech, Slovakia, Romania, Moldova, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Albania, Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia.

- **Latin America/Central America:** El-Salvador, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Chile, Peru, Bolivia, Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay.

- **Asia:** South Korea, Philippines, Magnolia, Thailand, Indonesia, Taiwan, Yemen, and Tajikistan.

- **Africa:** Benin, South Africa, Mozambique, Congo Brazzaville, Madagascar, Cap Verde, Namibia, Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, Burundi, Togo, Tunisia, and Libya.

Table 1 lists the 50 emerging democracies and their types of elites (unity/disunity). According to the Polity Score Index IV, if the index of polity score is moved from a negative value (-10 to -1) before the transition period to a positive value after the transition period from (1 to 10), in parallel with the existence of consensually unified elites, so there can be a correlation between unity elite and the probability of facilitating democratic transition. Whereas, if the index is stable at a negative value or moves from a positive to a negative value after the transition period and at the same time the type of elite is divided, it means there is a connection between elite disunity and the probability of failure of the democratic transition.
Table 1: Elite Unity - Elite Disunity and the Democratic Transition in Emerging Democracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Transition Period</th>
<th>Type of Elite</th>
<th>Polity Score Before Transition</th>
<th>Polity Score After Transition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>1975-1976</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1974- 1975</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>El Salvador</td>
<td>1980-1985</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nicaragua</td>
<td>1985-1990</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argentine</td>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
<td>1988</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bolivia</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican Republic</td>
<td>1978</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>1979-1992</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uruguay</td>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paraguay</td>
<td>1989-1992</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
<td>1988-1992</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>1987</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taiwan</td>
<td>1986-1992</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>1990-1992</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2006-2012</td>
<td>Disunity</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mongolia</td>
<td>1989-1992</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>1999</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>1989-1991</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1988-1991</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech/Slovakia</td>
<td>1989-1991</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1993</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>1989-1991</td>
<td>Disunity</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
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Cont/ Table 1: Elite Unity - Elite Disunity and the Democratic Transition in Emerging Democracies

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>country</th>
<th>Transition Period</th>
<th>Type of Elite</th>
<th>Polity Score Before Transition</th>
<th>Polity Score After Transition</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>9</td>
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<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>----</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Serbia</td>
<td>1999-2000</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moldova</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>---</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tajikistan</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Disunity</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-4</td>
</tr>
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<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>1990-1991</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Congo Brazzaville</td>
<td>1991-2000</td>
<td>Disunity</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cape Verde</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>1991</td>
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<td>----</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
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<td>-8</td>
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<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>1999</td>
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<td>-6</td>
<td>4</td>
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<td>Liberia</td>
<td>2003-2005</td>
<td>Consensually Unified</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Burundi</td>
<td>2003-2006</td>
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<td>-2</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Togo</td>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Disunity</td>
<td>-1</td>
<td>-5</td>
</tr>
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<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>2011-2015</td>
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<td>-5</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
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<td>Libya</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Disunity</td>
<td>-9</td>
<td>Failed State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yemen</td>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Disunity</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>Failed State</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Source prepared by scholar)

From the table above, 43 of 50 countries have fostered a peaceful transition when they succeeded in building a consensus and transformed their domestic interaction from disunity to unity (whether it was through pact, concession especially from ruling, settlement, roundtable negotia-
tion, or national dialogue). This means that about 86% of cases confirm the main hypothesis that there is a correlation between unity elite and the probability of facilitating democratic transition. There is a possibility that transition will be fostered when the elites are unified.

Analyzing the cases of the 43 countries, some important aspects were noticed. Most of the transition cases, at least in (South Europe and Latin America) were based on consensus between the military and civilian elites, through compromise, pact, political reforms, or the military was forced to make a concession and achieve a peaceful transition. In other words, military and civilian elites appear to be convinced that the only way to prevent chaos or the return to military rule is by supporting the democratic rules of the game e.g.: Chile, Bolivia, Argentina, Peru, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil. Therefore, the military played a determinant role in the downfall of the dictatorship (Pinto, 2005). According to Ozan Varol, the Portuguese coup of 1974 fits within the "democratic coup framework". The highly respected Portuguese military staged a coup against the authoritarian Estado Novo regime in order to make the nation move to democracy (Varol, 2012: 333).

Another motivation forcing the military to make agreement with the civilian elites - which led to the transformation of elite from 'disunified' to 'unified' - was the serious political crisis that threatens renewed elite warfare under pressures from demonstrations that forced the ruling elite to make settlement especially when there were economic crises. In 1975, Peru witnessed a division within the military bloc and a galloping economic crisis that led to the replacement of General Velasco Alvarado by General Morales-Bermúdez, who led the transition with the cooperation of the civilian elite (Juárez, 2005: 102).

Moreover, the democratic transition was accelerated by the absolute lack of the army's legitimacy, as a result of the defeat in war. It forced the military to make a compromise with the civilian elite to negotiate its way out of power, such as the case of the defeat of the Greek and the Argentine armies in the Cyprus war in 1974 and Falklands war in 1982, respectively (Cavarozzi, 1992: 224). Under pressures exerted by the opposition, General Banzer in Bolivia and General Pinochet were forced to make a pact with the civilian elite. Also, Brazil's transition to a democratic government was relatively effortless. In 1974, the military initiated the gradual process of political liberalization that culminated in the transfer of power to a civilian government 11 years later (Codato, 2006: 30).
Furthermore, the path of the democratic transition in many Asian countries has followed the same trajectory in many Latin America cases. The motivations of the transformation of the elite from 'disunified' to 'unified' was based on the internal pressures and demonstrations that forced the reformist within the regime to make concessions and engage in a compromise (South Korea, Mongolia, Taiwan (Shin, 2008: 11). Also, the military, in many cases, was forced to play a serious role in making consensus with the opposition for paving the way for a peaceful transition e.g. Philippines, Indonesia (Lee, 2009: 670).

Economically, East Asia differs hugely from the rest of the democratizing world. Unlike their peers in other regions, some countries in this region have achieved unprecedented economic growth and a social modernization under authoritarian rule, except for Mongolia and the Philippines. This pattern of rising economic prosperity and expanding social modernization under authoritarian rule sharply contrasts with that of incessant economic stagnation and social decay that Central and Eastern Europe had experienced under communist rule and Latin America under military rule (Haggard & Kaufman 1995; Linz and Stephan 1996).

On the other hand, mass mobilization and demonstrations that threaten authoritarian leaders encouraged leaders of opposition to exert pressure on the regime to achieve political transition e.g. Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria succeeded in achieving democratic transition through the so-called “Round Table talks”. Consequently, this transition combined the "Round Table" pact with demobilized publics. The period from March to October 1989 was a time of “negotiated-type transition” (Thomas, 2012: 95).

In another context, some countries have reached consensus among warring factions through a peace treaty, peace negotiations and power sharing to end the civil war and to pave the way for democratic transition. This has been manifested in the cases of El-Salvador, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic (Alvarez, 2010: 23) as well as Africa, Burundi, Mozambique and Liberia (Belluci, 2013).

Although the African image was one of the respectively fewer attempts at democratization that were not fully successful, there were some transitions that had produced consensual turnovers in ruling elites, such as Ghana, and, most recently, Nigeria, (Schmitter, 2017). In the
early 1990s, many African countries witnessed consensus through "national conferences-dialogue". These conferences were convened as a result of pressure exerted by citizens and elite classes for public dialogue about the democratization process: e.g. South Africa, Cap Verbe, and Namibia (Clark, 1994: 50).

It is worth mentioning that the recent experiences in certain regions of the Arab World, where the modes of transition were more violent and mass-driven, seem to have inverted this generally favorable trend. They degenerated into protracted civil war, such as the case of Libya and Yemen. However, Tunisia which followed the reform path more than the revolutionary one (was later supplemented by some pacts). Islamists and secular leaders have succeeded in making a pact to overcome their mutual fear and distrust by crafting agreements and credible guarantees in political society (Stepan & Linz, 2013).

However, it is to be observed that Madagascar witnessed a transformation in elite interaction from disputes to consensus. By 1991, the introduction of multiparty elections and the official start of democratic transition had been imminent. Staging a six-month general strike, Albert Zafy and other opposition parties exerted pressure on Ratsiraka to dissolve his authoritarian regime.

The FFKM, or the Council of Christian Churches, became the voice and mediator between the opposition and the incumbent. After a violent clash, Negotiations were quietly held and a transitional government comprised of FFKM and opposition leaders presided over the country before a referendum was conducted. In 1992, 75% of the public favored the introduction of multiparty elections. Albert Zafy beat Ratsiraka in the presidential election. (Rakotomanga, 2011: 49, 59). However, Madagascar witnessed a military coup after popular protests in 2009 which forced President Marc Ravalomanana to step down. Constitutional governance was restored in January 2014.

On the other hand, Serbia did not engage in any settlement between Milošević’s system and the oppositions but the latter succeeded to make a compromise with each other to pave the way to a democratic transition. There is a sharp contrast between radical-conservative parties (whose ideologies are based on Serbian nationalism, rejection of civic liberalism and the promotion of the Serbs as the dominant ethnic group that
advocates a strong role for the state in the economy by being anti-EU and NATO oriented), such as the incumbent Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) on one hand, and more moderate parties, particularly the Democratic Party (DS) led by Boris Tadić on the other (i.e. the democratically-oriented reform parties, advocating radical liberal economic reforms that are pro-EU and NATO oriented). This changed in 2000 with the 'Bulldozer revolution' when Milošević was forced to resign from power. A new coalition government formed by the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) committed itself to abandoning the past political practices seeking the democratization of the Serbian politics (Bochsler, 2010: 99,100).

Eventually, the conflict between Czech and Slovak elites over the institutions of their common state, and particularly over the division of authority between the national and republic governments, economic reform and attitudes to the Communist past, was effectively resolved by the “velvet divorce” of the two countries at the end of 1992. The 1992 velvet divorce boosted the unity of reformist Czech elites by removing the divisive Czech-Slovak ethnic rivalry and the policy clashes arising from unequal Czech and Slovak economic development. The Slovak elite, by contrast, emerged from the divorce fragmented along political, ideological, and ethnic lines, with ex-communist nationalists, led by Vladimír Meciar and his movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS), entrenched and locked in a bitter fight with political opponents pushing for democratic reforms and minority rights (Baylis, 2012).

Also, the elites of 5 out of 50 countries failed (in the transition period) to make a compromise. So the transition collapsed leading to a civil war or an armed conflict or a failed state, e.g. Libya, Yemen, Togo, Congo Brazzaville, and Tajikistan. This means that about 10% of case studies support the study’s hypothesis that the disunity elite have the probability to hinder the process of democratic transition. In other words, there is a connection between elite disunity and breaking down democratic transition.

Nevertheless, Thailand remains the only case that has witnessed a setback in democratic transition through the transformation of elites from consensually unified to elite disunity. The country represents a prominent model of a dismal transformation of elites from unity to disunity. Thailand had undergone over a dozen political regime changes.
There were 17 separate constitutions and 7 successful coups d’état from 1932 until 2014. The history of elite competition and the will of the military were key factors in the majority of Thailand’s older democratic regime changes. However, there have been three counts of popular democracy in Thailand. The most successful was a result of the political crisis of the 1990s, under the civil protests and international civil society, in 1992, in which the top elite (civilian and military) were forced to create a new pact. This agreement was based on minimizing the role of the military in politics. It was also agreed that the prime minister should be elected from among the members of the parliament instead of being selected by the military establishment. By August 1997, the new constitution had sought to pass legislation that would transform the government by elite militarists to a government by the people through the opening of both the Senate and National Assembly to direct elections (Nguyen, 2011: 44).

Unfortunately, less than 10 years later, the consensus between the civilian and the military was abolished after the military intervened to oust the democratically elected government, for what they claimed to be endemic corruption in the government on September 19, 2006, and on 22 May 2014, respectively. As Thailand witnessed intense political polarization as exemplified by the 2006 election disputes, this polarization was so deeply divided that it destabilized Thai politics and ultimately Thaksin’s administration was so controversial and polarized that the country was fragmented into two polarized factions. The country was so divided that the King moved to support a military coup to restore stability, thereby ending Thailand’s longest period of liberal democracy (Nguyen, 2011: 50).

Also, in Romania’s case, the country witnessed a transition without elite consensus. There had been no negotiations, compromises or dialogues between the elites, and the country witnessed a violent transition. The transition to democracy in Romania began with the toppling of the former regime and the execution of the man who had been the country’s maximum leader for 24 years, Nicolae Ceausescu. Such a revolutionary beginning was in stark contrast to the process of negotiation between the government and opposition, which has been the general feature of transitions to democracy in Central and Eastern Europe (Paramio, 2002). Pact transition was not possible in the case of
Romania. The effects of the totalitarian sultanism on the transition to democracy were well described by Linz and Stepan (1996). Romania was the last in following transition to democracy in CEE, and it was at the same time the most violent as the country was not ready at all for a round table (Posa, 2008: 38).

After Ceausescu had been executed, the Romanian Communist Party was banned. There were no pacts, no negotiations, and no compromises. The National Salvation Front nominated Iliescu as candidate for the presidential elections (Steinman, 2012). Presidential and parliamentary elections were held on May 20\textsuperscript{th}, 1990, and Iliescu won the elections with almost 90\% of the popular votes and thus became the first Romanian elected leader. Thus, the external factor can explain the transition without consensus as membership in western institutions, such as the EU and the NATO, forced the leaders in Romania to have real incentives to deepen democracy.

Accordingly, this paper concluded that there were four patterns of the relationship that holds between consensual unified/disunified elite and the probability of success or failure of the democratic transition: consensual unified that is likely to foster democratic transition, transition without elite unity, disunified elite and the likelihood of failure of democratic transition, and transformation from unity to disunity elite which leads to the failure of the transition.

Conclusions

This paper aimed to explore the question as to why some emerging democracies succeed while others fail in the process of democratic transition. Although there are many factors that impact the facilitation or hinderance of the process of transition in emerging democracies, this study has concentrated on only one variable which is domestic elite interrelations (consensually unified /disunified). It is based on how the transformation from disunified to unified elite has fostered democratic transition through settlement, national dialogue, concession, compromise or any other form of settlement. Thus, in order to examine the main assumption on which it is based, there is a connection or correlation between domestic elite interrelations and the probability of facilitating or impeding democratic transition. This study examined this assumption in
50 emerging democracies between 1974 and 2015, depending on the 'Polity Score Index IV'.

As a result, the study found four patterns of relationships that hold between consensually unified/disunified elite and the probability of success or failure of the democratic transition: consensually unified and the probability of fostering democratic transition, transition without elite unity, disunified elite and probability of the failure of democratic transition, and transformation from unity to disunity elite and failure of the transition. Moreover, it concludes that 43 out of 50 countries have fostered a peaceful transition when they succeeded in building a consensus, which means that about 86% of cases confirm the main hypothesis. Also, the elites of 5 out of 50 case studies failed during the transition period to make a democratic transition and the outcome of the transition was either a civil war or an armed conflict revolution-a military coup.

Nevertheless, Thailand remains the only case where elite unity converted to disunity and the transition process broke down. In this case, the consensus between civilian and military was eliminated less than 10 years later, after the military intervened to oust the democratically elected government on September 19, 2006, and on 22 May 2014, respectively. On the other hand, although the democratic transition in Romania was not achieved via compromise or settlement between elites, it succeeded in transforming toward democracy. The external factors especially the role of the European Union could be one of the actual reasons justifying the success of this case.

In conclusion, this study finds that there is a correlation between the elite unity and the probability of having a successful democratic transition, while there is little prospect of disunified elite succeeding in making a smooth transition. In addition, transformation from unity to disunity may, to some extent, lead to democratic transition breakdown. Other factors that can explain the different outcome of democratic transition in emerging democracies (socio-economic, type of regime, external factors, political culture) have not been neglected in this study as well. A great number of scholars have examined 50 or more emerging democracies (Geddes, 2014; Higly, 2014; Diamond, 2008; Przeworski, 2000; Huntington, 1991), but from different perspectives in order to determine and build a grand theory to understand and explain the different trajectories of the democratic transition in emerging democracies in general.
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