

Beyond Weberian Bureaucracy: Max Weber on Bureaucracy and his Critics

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Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to link Weber's theory of bureaucracy with the basic methodological foundations of his sociology. The essay argues that, although contemporary sociologists widely recognize Weberian bureaucracy, they fail to pay serious attention to its *formation as an ideal type* that captures an essence and involves hypothesis formation. Instead, many commentators view Weber's model as an "iron cage" that aims to depict reality accurately. More specifically, this study examines the extent to which Weber's analysis of bureaucracy conveys the central aspects of his methodology. Since ideal types are his major research tool, the discussion focuses on these hypothesis-forming models instead of common mistaken views that treat ideal types as "real social structures". The article also emphasizes Weber's rejection of sociological positivism, which breaks sharply from his methodological individualism.

Key words: Weber, Bureaucracy, Methodology, Ideal types, Iron cage, Positivism.

Introduction

Max Weber is well recognized for his analysis of bureaucracy. Coser and Rosenberg correctly consider him to be the first social scientist that began the systematic study of bureaucratic organizations (1989: 326). In all likelihood, his discussion of this topic is cited in

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sociological literature more than any other sociologist.⁽¹⁾ Rarely can one find a study of organizations that does not cite his pioneering work, and various commentators acknowledge his contribution to the social theory of modern bureaucratic organization. Giddens (2001), for example, maintains that after his death more than eight decades ago, Weber's work is still the cornerstone on which analyses of organizations depend. Similarly, Tijsterman and Overeem maintain that his account of bureaucracy has "paradigmatic status" within public administration (2008: 73). At the same time, Habermas states that, for Weber, "bureaucratization is the key to understanding modern societies" (1987: 306). Swedberg also regards the Weberian theory of bureaucracy to be "one of the most famous parts of his work" (2005: 18). Without a doubt, Max Weber is still the single-most important scholar of bureaucracy and his theory of this form of organization remains the foundation of the theoretical analysis of any administrative organization, public or private.

Although diverse interpreters acknowledge Weber's study of bureaucracy, they have failed to comprehend it adequately as an ideal type. It goes without saying that this does not suggest that they are unaware of it as an ideal type; rather, it means that they fail to demonstrate *how he employs this major methodological tool in his analysis of bureaucratic organization*. Under the influence of positivism⁽²⁾, the focus of much of the secondary literature about his sociology of organizations is on his famous list of "the characteristics of modern bureaucracy" (Weber, 1968: 196-98; 1978b: 957-58). Contrary

(1) See for example (Freund 1968, 234-35; Giddens 1971, 158-60; Bendix 1977, 423-30; Coser 1977, 230-33; Warwick, 1978: 5; Johnson 1981, 225-28; Turner and Beeghley 1981, 237-39; Peters and Waterman 1982, 19; Hilbert 1987: 70-86; Scott, 1992: 38-45; Koven, 1994:82; Ringer, 2004:220; Stillman II, 2004:83; Clegg, 47-48: 2006).

(2) August Comte coined the term "positivism" in 1830s (Wernick, 2006). The central thrust of the doctrine of positivism is that the only valid knowledge is scientific knowledge. Positivists are mainly concerned with "discovering laws" and "facts" instead of understanding ultimate causes and subjective meanings. The assumption behind their "scientific" approach is that knowledge of reality is "objective" and independent of the human mind.

to Weber's methodological individualism⁽³⁾, which depicts these features as ideal types, most of these commentators view his typologies as "practical guidelines" for successful organizations. In part, one can attribute such common confusion and misrepresentation to Weber's own writings. His "texts are often difficult to decipher" and the "heroic work of Weber's many translators, who have broken up his lengthy sentences and paragraphs, added subheadings, and written clarifying endnotes, has not alleviated this problem" (Kalberg, 2005: 40). Although his methodology is unambiguous, nowhere in his sociology of organization does he clearly examine the relationship between bureaucracy *as a methodological device* on the one hand and actual bureaucratic organizations on the other. Such ambiguity has lead researchers such as Thomas Burger (1987) and Hans Bruun (2007) to argue that there are "deficiencies" in his construction of the ideal type. In short, one can say that Weber's writings on the connection between forms of bureaucratic organization and the explanation of ideal types do not present a coherent view.

As is well-known, the status of bureaucracy as an ideal type is widely discussed in the secondary literature in sociology and other fields. The commentaries on this theme are commonly discussed by sociologists of organization and by other social scientists. This article, therefore, does not seek to provide a commentary upon the secondary analysis of bureaucracy that can be found in any textbook on the sociology of organization, nor does it analyze the relationship between this type of organization and various social, political and cultural factors. Rather, the aim here is to examine the theme of bureaucracy in the light of Weber's methodology. The main objective is to show how Weber utilizes bureaucracy as an ideal model in his substantive texts. In presenting a more accurate interpretation of the utilization of bureaucracy as an ideal type, this essay specifically examines the widespread mistaken view of Weberian bureaucracy as "*sui generis*" and the extent to which Weber's study of this organization is consistent with his emphasis on "value-free"

(3) Methodological individualism refers to "the view that the individual human being, and the rational consciousness of that being, are the only valid starting point for historical and social explanation" (Laibman, 2007:369).

sociology. As will become apparent, his model of bureaucracy constitutes a heuristic concept rather than a "social fact" and his analysis of bureaucratic organizations clearly reveals his strong commitment to "value-free" social science research.

I. Bureaucracy as *Sui Generis*

Weber's methodology involves an understanding of aspects of infinite reality through conceptualization. His concept of "the ideal type" analyzes various social, cultural and economic phenomena. Rational bureaucracy, patrimonialism, the spirit of capitalism, charisma, and the Protestant ethic are among his well-known ideal types. Undoubtedly, ideal types are at the center of Weber's methodology (Mommson, 1992: 121; Ringer, 2000: 110; Swedberg, 2005: 119). Weber himself points out that ideal types are essential for sociological analysis since "sociology seeks to formulate type concepts and generalized uniformities of empirical process" (Weber, 1978a: 19). Sociology, therefore, concerns itself with the construction of ideal types for analytical and explanatory purposes. Although sociologists who examine his analyses of bureaucratic organization discuss these models, they rarely depict bureaucracy as a *pure construct*⁽⁴⁾ designed alone to capture the essence of the *patterned actions of individuals* in organizations. Instead, innumerable commentators pay lip service only to his usage; others view Weber's concepts as contrary to their intended purpose as defined in his methodological writings.

One of the major misunderstandings in the secondary literature involves a consideration of the bureaucracy *sui generis*. Common among positivist interpreters, this formulation views Weberian bureaucracy as a "real" social structure that accurately represents empirical reality. Under the influence of functionalism, Peter Blau contends that Weber's analysis of bureaucracy involves an "implicit functionalist scheme" (1970: 143).

(4) For Weber "pure" simply means sharp and precise. "The more sharply and precisely the ideal type has been constructed...the more abstract and unrealistic in this it is, the better it is able to perform its functions in formulating terminology, classifications and hypotheses" (1978a: 21). Weber does not claim that the formation of ideal types depicts the concrete actions of individuals. Instead, what he maintains is that sociologists take into considerations the patterned actions of individuals when they formulate pure ideal types.

Likewise, Alexander (1985) holds that Weber's essay on the characteristics of bureaucracy "is actually a detailed description of the particular *objective arrangements* through which his type of bureaucratic authority is able to exercise domination" (p.104, emphasis added). He insists that such an approach reflects an interest in "the structure of domination" (p. 105), which consists in "the instrumentalism" of Weber's theory. Moreover, it is common for sociologists of organization with positivist orientations to describe Weber's conception of bureaucracy in the same style. Perrow, for instance, holds that the Weberian model of bureaucracy involves a group of characteristics that "relate to the structure and function of organization" (1986: 47), and Scott refers to "the structural characteristics of bureaucracy" (1992: 38). Also, Klagge indicates that "Weber clearly understood the dual potentials of bureaucracy as an organizing structure (1997: 64).

The assumption behind these interpretations is that their usage of the term "structure" has the same meaning as for Weber. However, positivist schools use "structure" differently. In functionalism, for example, structure denotes relationships that actually "exist" among social actors in an organization. These theorists then divide the structural aspects of the bureaucratic organization into formal and informal systems of relationships and examine "functional" and "dysfunctional" elements. In contrast, "structure" refers in Weber's analysis of bureaucratic organization to the distinctive features of bureaucracy. He, for example, refers to the advancement of "the bureaucratic structure" and to bureaucracy that is "among those social structures which are the hardest to destroy" (1978b: 989). Weber's main purpose is with capturing regular action-orientations rather than with providing an "objective" interpretation of a social phenomenon. As a collective entity, bureaucracy is an abstract from reality to help researchers understand it. However, the fact that it is an abstraction from a concrete case or cases by no means suggests that this model precisely reflects a real social structure. Weber insists that "it is probably seldom if ever that a real phenomenon can be found which corresponds exactly to one of these ideally constructed pure types (1978a: 20).

Unlike Max Weber, Emile Durkheim argues that there are "social facts" or collectivities that exercise their power over the consciousness of individuals. They are "diffused over society as a whole" and possess

"specific characteristics", which make them "independent of the particular conditions in which individuals find themselves" (Durkheim, 1984: 39; 1982:50-59). His study of suicide (Durkheim, 2007), for example, aims at discovering "social facts" that are unrelated to the consciousnesses of individuals and in general are over society. Durkheim, along with other positivists, utilizes the same scientific method to gain valid knowledge about social and natural phenomena. In the positivist perspective, there is no major difference between studying social and natural phenomena. In **The Rules of Sociological Method**, Durkheim distinguishes between material and nonmaterial social facts, which are "endued with compelling and coercive power by virtue of which, whether [the individual] wishes it or not, they impose themselves upon him" (Durkheim, 1982:51). For him, the state, society, law and bureaucracy are material social facts, while cultural norms and values are nonmaterial social facts.

In contrast, Max Weber opposes sociological positivism, which dominates sociology to this day, especially in the United States and the Arab World. He clearly distinguishes between natural and social sciences and asserts that there are no "social facts" since knowledge of cultural reality is always significant from particular points of view (1949: 81). The task of the sociologist is to construct clear concepts to study "a small portion of existing concrete reality", which "is colored by our value-conditioned interest and it alone is significant to us" (1949: 76). Sociologists construct general concepts such as bureaucracy by examining various kinds of phenomena in order to capture their essence. In part, these models are based on a small portion of reality, but they are not accurate reflections of it. In fact, Weber warns against confusing the ideal type with reality (1949: 101). For him, bureaucracy is an ideal type that involves, in its construction, both mental and empirical elements rather than a social structure that actually captures "existing" relationships in organizations. As a heuristic instrument, it assists sociologists to describe and explain empirical aspects of bureaucratic organizations that, from a particular point of view, are significant. These "one-sided" models are limited in their scope. The assumption behind this limitation is that social reality is too complex and diffuse to be reduced to "real" concepts and "laws" (Weber, 1949: 105).

Far from being *sui generis*, Weber's chapter in *Economy and Society* constructs bureaucracy simply as a heuristic tool. Like other types, it is "particularly useful in research and exposition" (1949: 90). The model, in other words, enables the sociologist to examine certain isolated aspects of reality that become significant because of their value-relevance. This means that the extent to which actual administrative functions and regulations are compatible with the Weberian model of bureaucracy depends on the case under scrutiny. "Whether the empirical-historical course of development was actually identical with the constructed one can be investigated only by using this construct as a heuristic device for comparison of the ideal type and the 'facts' " (Weber, 1949: 101-102). However, an investigation of this nature would never indicate complete compatibility between the ideal model and the empirical case because the pure mental construct "cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality" (1949: 90). The fact that ideal types are empirically grounded implies that the researcher can expect the "emergence" of certain features of the model. After all, this should not come as a surprise since ideal types "exist in reality to some extent" (1949: 90).

From this perspective, bureaucracy is neither a "social fact" nor an analytical construct rooted in the imagination of the sociologist. Rather, it is a heuristic tool constructed on the basis of empirical observations.⁽⁵⁾ Like other ideal types, its aim is to assist sociologists to understand social reality. To Weber:

In *all* cases, rational or irrational, sociological analysis both abstracts from reality and at the same time helps us to understand it, in that it

(5) Many commentators criticize Weber for failing to notice "the informal side" of bureaucracy. Peter Blau (1965), (1970) was among the first to raise this issue. More recently, Allen points out that "[a]ll business operates by a double code. There is the formal rule-bound culture and an informal culture based on connections and personal networking" (2004: 114). These critics pay no attention to the nature of ideal types and their research orientation. From a Weberian point of view, these generic concepts are "one-sided" models that serve as standards against which *certain aspects* of reality are compared and "measured". Contrary to the positivist perceptions of his models, Weber has never claimed that they are "objective" tools or "factual structures". Hence, any sociological investigation will certainly show "the other side" of bureaucracy. As indicated before, Weber does not expect ideal types to match reality simply because they are "one-sided" mental constructs incapable of depicting the inexhaustible complexity of social reality.

shows with what degree of approximation a concrete historical phenomenon can be subsumed under one or more of these concepts (Weber, 1978a:20, emphasis in original).

Max Weber is concerned primarily with what motivates the actions of individuals rather than with discovering scientific laws that are independent of their will. At the core of his methodology is identifying subjective meanings of social actors, which almost always involve different kinds of motives. For him, "the orientation of action to an order involves a wide variety of motives" (Weber, 1978a: 31). His methodological individualism rests primarily on understanding meaningful patterns of social action by individuals in groups in specific sittings. The sociologist formulates ideal types for the purpose of interpreting social action and understanding meanings that actors attribute to their behavior.

II. Bureaucracy and Value-free Sociology

Different commentators have different perspectives on Weberian bureaucracy. One interpretation views Weber as an advocate of bureaucratic organization, or rationalization in general, while another takes the opposite view. This commentary portrays him as a pessimistic sociologist who fears the iron cage of modern bureaucratic organizations. A third interpretation disagrees with these two readings, insisting that he recognizes both the "negative" and "positive" sides of bureaucracy. Implicit in all of these commentaries is the idea that Weber violated the principle of value-neutrality when he analyzed bureaucracy as a modern phenomenon. The following discussion briefly examines these trends in the literature. It focuses on the "iron cage" commentary, which depicts Weber as a pessimistic theorist. This section attends more to the latter interpretation since it occupies a large part of the literature compared to the two other understandings. The aim here is to argue that Weber is consistent with the basic methodological axiom laid down in his sociology.

A. Weber as an Advocate of Modern Bureaucracy

In his discussion of Weber's theory of rationalization, Habermas argues that "Weber is *full of admiration* for the organizational accomplishments of modern bureaucracies" (1987: 307, emphasis added). This argument is consistent with his view of Weber as a legal positivist

who advocates the separation between formal legal rules and morality (see Habermas, 1984: 262; 1987: 304). Habermas insists: "Weber studies the rationalization of action systems only under the aspect of purposive rationality" (1987: 303). He refers to Weber's metaphor, "the shell of bondage" saying that "[t]his metaphor of an animate machine creates some distance from the purposive model and already suggests the idea of a system stabilizing itself in relation to a contingent environment" (1987: 307). Similarly, Alexander views Weberian bureaucracy as merely an instrument of domination. Whereas he acknowledges the possibility of treating Weber's theory of bureaucracy from "the perspective of the overall pattern of normative legitimization", he argues that the central thrusts of Weber's essay on bureaucracy "concern the issue of *enforcement* of the rules through hierarchical control" (1985: 104, emphasis in original). In his view, Weberian bureaucracy is no more than an instrumental Hobbesian device. He also sees little difference between Weber's and Marx's discussions of hierarchy (Alexander, 1985: 105). Although Habermas and Alexander represent two different schools in sociology, they both agree that Weber's analysis of bureaucracy involves mainly power and domination.⁽⁶⁾

Furthermore, both, along with other sociologists, incorrectly presuppose that Weber's construction reflects his personal beliefs about power and domination. However, the formation of the ideal type in itself does not suggest that its contents reflect the sociologist's ethical, legal or religious views. Indeed, it can be "in conflict with his own normative attitudes" (Weber, 1949: 43). Researchers form these concepts with an eye on comparing the model with empirical reality. Weber states:

Whatever the content of the ideal-type, be it an ethical, a legal, an aesthetic, or a religious norm, or a technical, an economic, or a cultural maxim or any other type of valuation in the most rational form possible, it has only one function in an empirical investigation. Its function is the comparison with empirical reality in order to establish its divergences or similarities, to describe them with the *most*

(6) Ironically, other commentators argue that bureaucracy has nothing to do with domination. For example, Parkin argues that "bureaucrats are always the servants and never the masters" (Parkin, 2002: 89).

unambiguously intelligible concepts, and to understand and explain them causally (1949: 43, emphasis in original).

The fact that the formation of the ideal type involves various kinds of elements does not mean that the researcher is free to impose his value-judgments on the aspects of reality that he wishes to explain. Weber insists that, once the sociologist selects his subject, which only happens on the basis of his interest and values, he must commit himself to value-neutrality throughout the subsequent investigation. In addition, it is worth mentioning that analysis of the ideal type's content in light of the values of the researcher (e.g. concerning power, domination, and/or religion) has nothing to do with Weberian sociology. Ideal types are "conceptual instruments for *comparison* with and the *measurement* of reality" (Weber, 1949: 97, emphasis in original) rather than ends in themselves (1949: 92). Even if one were to assume that Weberian bureaucracy is nothing but a "Hobbesian device," it certainly says very little about Weber's personal views of power and domination.

B. Weber as a Critic of Bureaucracy

Unlike the first major commentary, which overemphasizes power and domination in Weber's analysis of bureaucracy, this interpretation labels Weber either as a passionate critic of bureaucratic institutions or as a pessimistic thinker. For example, Mommsen (1992) holds that "Weber's theory of bureaucracy was an exercise in *defending humanity*" (p. 115, emphasis added). He believes that "*much of Weber's work* is devoted to mobilizing resistance to the universal trend towards bureaucratization" (p. 118, emphasis added). However, most commentary on this theme views Weber as a passive sociologist with gloomy views regarding the future of humanity and the ability of individuals to defend their rights against the unrestrained power of modern bureaucratic organizations. The focus here is largely on his predictions regarding the consequences of the increasing process of bureaucratization and rationalization. The following discussion examines the iron cage metaphor in relation to Weber's emphasis on value-free sociology.

C. The Iron Cage "Problem"

The iron cage is Weber's most famous metaphor. Since Parsons' translation of the term, which originally appeared in **The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism**, it has taken on a life of its own (Baehr:

2001; Swedberg, 2005:132; Weiskopf, 2002: 81; Kalberg, 2002: 245). Most interpreters and commentators of Weber's works have referred to this concept (see, for example, Mitzman: 1970, Coser: 1977, Barker: 1993, Habermas: 1987, Nugent: 1994, Klagge: 1997, Sica: 1990, Warner: 2007). Indeed, it is the most discussed metaphor in sociology.

A number of sociologists attribute the widespread discussion of the iron cage to Parsons's translation in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (Parsons, 1976:181). Kalberg and Swedberg suggest that Parsons' inaccurate translation is responsible for the extensive discussion of the issue; the German term *stahlharte Gehäuse* literally means "steel-hard casing" (Kalberg, 2002: 245) or "hard as steel" (Swedberg, 2005:132). However, their explanation does not adequately explain the widespread usage of the metaphor; rather, it indicates that the other translations grasp the meaning of the German term more accurately.⁽⁷⁾ Neither Weber nor Parsons is "responsible" for the "mythical status" of the metaphor in sociology. This is because the iron cage is mentioned only twice in the PE and a similar phrase "the shell of bondage" is mentioned a few times in *Economy and Society* (Weber, 1978b: 1402). Considering the encyclopedic nature of Weber's works, these expressions are marginal, even if we assume that they are "pure value-judgments". Kalberg mentions other reasons. He argues, for example, that the iron cage metaphor "is derived largely from [Weber's] political and social-philosophical essays rather than his sociological writings" (2001: 182). He also rejects depicting Weber as a "pessimist" and insists that "rather than a reality, or even a short-term scenario, the iron cage constituted to Weber a nightmare vision that *might be* on our horizon (2001:181, emphasis in original).

The "iron cage" and "shell of bondage" involve no value judgments. Instead, they merely reflect Weber's expectations regarding the future consequences of bureaucratization. He predicted, for example, that the

(7) Like other translations of any major work, Parsons' translation of *The Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Capitalism* has its problems. The emphasis on the iron cage "problem" alone and the disregard of other inaccuracies in the PE and ES translations suggests that the widespread discussion of the iron cage has little to do with Parsons. Rather it implies that sociologists, for their own reasons, find it "fascinating" to discuss the consequences of rationalization and bureaucratization.

traditional French system of local party administration would fail because it depended on notables rather than on modern bureaucracy (1978b: 1399). At the same time, he observes that "[i]ncreasingly the real work in all organizations is done by salaried employees and functionaries of all kinds. Everything else has become window-dressing" (1978b:1400). Based on these observations it is not surprising for him to conclude that "[t]he future belongs to bureaucratization" (p. 1401). In other words, Weber's expectations echo empirical observations rather than value-judgments. Since rational forms of bureaucracy increasingly dominate various aspects of society, he *expects* them to shape the lives of individuals in the long-term future as well. For him, the necessary condition under which such domination "might happen" occurs whenever "a technically superior administration *were to be the ultimate and sole value* in the ordering of... affairs" (Weber, 1978b:1402, emphasis in original).

D. Weber as an Analyst of Negative and Positive Sides of Bureaucracy

The third major commentary holds that Weber is neither an advocate of bureaucracy nor a critic of bureaucratization. Instead, he sees the *negative* and *positive* aspects of bureaucratic organizations. Wrong, for example, rejects the view that Weber is an advocate or an apologist for bureaucracy. He states that Weber "... argues merely that *if* you wish to achieve certain administrative or productive goals in a large and territorially extensive society, *then* you must have a bureaucratic organization to do so" (1970: 34, emphasis in original). In his analysis of the relationship between the city, capitalism and bureaucracy, Ringer argues that there are two competing faces of modern bureaucracy in Weber's texts: an idealized bureaucracy that Weber advocates and the negative bureaucracy that he fears (Ringer, 2004: 220, 224).

Although this commentary is "sympathetic" to Weber's sociology, its employment of value-laden words ("positive" "negative") conflicts with his ideal type analysis of bureaucracy. He insists on interpreting a particular cultural phenomenon by adhering to the principle of value free analysis. This view presupposes the separation between the realms of "is" and "should be". He also insists that an ideal type has "no connection at all with a *value-judgment* of reality *on the basis of ideals*" nor with "any type of perfection other than a purely logical one" (1949: 98-99, emphasis

in original). Weber argues that "*the elementary duty of scientific self-control*" as well as the avoidance of "serious and foolish blunders requires a sharp, precise distinction between the logically *comparative* analysis of reality by ideal-types in the logical sense, and the *value-judgment* of reality on *the basis of ideals* (1949: 98; emphasis in original). He opposes the involvement of value-judgments in the collection of data, and their analysis and in the formation of ideal types.

Conclusions:

Weber's sociological analysis of modern bureaucracy can be easily misrepresented and mistaken if his basic methodological tool -the ideal type- is misunderstood. In his comparative-historical analysis, he utilizes this heuristic model to study the development of modern bureaucracy. His multi-causal approach reveals its complex interconnections with social, legal, economic and political factors. In this context, Weber pays more attention to the preconditions that lead to the development of modern bureaucracy than to the consequences of bureaucratization. The secondary literature on Weber on bureaucracy, however, largely focuses on the latter subject. In fact, many commentators are preoccupied with "the iron cage" metaphor and Weber's political and personal views regarding formal bureaucratic rationalization rather than with his sociological analysis of bureaucracy per se. This essay concludes that it is impossible to comprehend Weber's treatment of bureaucracy without connecting his discussion with his basic methodological foundations, especially the ideal types. As a heuristic tool, bureaucracy is anchored in empirical reality; however, it is by no means a "social fact" or a "structure" in the positivistic sense. Like his other hypothesis-forming models, its formation involves the concrete patterns of action of individuals. The role of this "one-sided" *mental construct* is to help sociologists understand the social action of actors in organizations.

The utilization of ideal types as concepts that "actually depict reality" consists with sociological positivism rather than with Weber's methodological individualism. In his opposition to sociological approaches influenced by Comte's positivism, he introduces these models, which are constructed based on the assumption that reality can never be comprehended in any set of analytical concepts (Weber, 1949). Weber's analyses of economic, social, and cultural organizations involve clear

distinctions between diverse kinds of concepts for the purpose of isolating unique aspects of social reality. He, for example, draws a distinction between capitalism and modern capitalism, a distinction that stands at the foundation of his entire analysis in **The Protestant Ethic and the Sprit of Capitalism**, (Kalberg, 9: 2009). Similarly, he distinguishes between traditional bureaucracy and modern rational bureaucracy. His main aim is to understand "the characteristic uniqueness of the reality in which we move" (1954: 72). For him, the task of the sociologist is to determine how much the "ideal type" approximates and how much it diverges from concrete reality. In this sense, modern bureaucracy is an analytical construct that the sociologist employs as a measuring tool to determine how much it diverges from concrete characteristics of bureaucratic organization.

Acknowledgments:

The author wishes to thank Dr. Stephen Kalberg and Dr. Abdalla Alfasal for their insights and suggestions on an earlier draft of this study.

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
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Submitted: December 2008

Approved: November 2009



ما وراء البيروقراطية: ماكس فيبر ومنتقدو نظريته في البيروقراطية

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ملخص: تهدف هذه الدراسة إلى ربط نظرية ماكس فيبر في البيروقراطية بالقواعد المنهجية التي حددها في علم اجتماعه، وعلى الرغم من انتشار نظرية فيبر في البيروقراطية انتشاراً واسعاً بين علماء الاجتماع وغيرهم من المهتمين بدراسة المنظمات، فإنها لم تلق أي اهتمام جدي بصفاتها نموذجاً مثالياً يحوي جوهر البيروقراطية، ويشتمل على مرتكزات لتشكيل فرضيات بحثية. بدلاً من ذلك، ينظر كثير من الباحثين لنموذج ماكس فيبر في البيروقراطية على أنه "سياج حديدي" يهدف إلى تصوير الواقع تصويراً دقيقاً. لذا، تسعى هذه الدراسة إلى بحث مدى اشتغال تحليل ماكس فيبر للبيروقراطية على المرتكزات البحثية التي حددها في منهجه الاجتماعي. وحيث إن النماذج المثالية تمثل الوسائل البحثية الرئيسة التي استحدثها ماكس فيبر، فإن هذه الدراسة سوف تركز عليها بصفاتها نماذج لتشكيل الفرضيات بدلاً من الرؤية الشائعة التي تصورها - خطأ - كأبنية اجتماعية حقيقية. كما تركز هذه الورقة على منهج ماكس فيبر الفردي ورؤيته التي تعارض الوضعية الاجتماعية. **المصطلحات الأساسية:** ماكس فيبر، البيروقراطية، المنهج، النماذج المثالية، السياج الحديدي، الوضعية.

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