المنافع الاجتماعية في اختيار السياسة الخارجية في دول العالم الثالث

بهجة قراني

تحاول هذه المقالة توضيح العلاقات الثنائية بين دول العالم الثالث والدول المتقدمة خاصة العظمى منها.

وقد اعتمد الكاتب في هذا المجال على آراء اربع مدارس في هذا الخصوص حيث لخصها واستخلص اهم نتائجها بعد اختبار نروجها. وباختصار الكاتب مصر كحالة لتطبيق دراسته حيث خضع هنا الفروض لعدة اختبارات كبيرة.

واخيرا خرج الكاتب بضرورة إجراء دراسات على مناطق جديدة في هذا المجال. وقد جاءت الدراسة بصورة تحليلية جديدة لا شك أن الدراسات الاجتماعية في حاجة إلى أتمها.
SOCIETAL VARIABLES IN FOREIGN POLICY CHOICE IN THE THIRD WORLD: CONCEPTUALISATION AND AN EMPIRICAL CASE STUDY

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1 — FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND THE THIRD WORLD

The “underdeveloped study of underdeveloped countries” can be periodized for the sake of analysis into three stages:

1.1 The “Small-State-as-Pawn” Assumption: is characteristic of the heyday of the traditional power paradigm and adopted a purely reductionist approach. Thus “newly-independent” states, like almost every other phenomenon in the contemporary international system, were analysed as a function of the predominant East-West conflict. Consequently, third world states could not be conceptualised as having purposeful and self-contained foreign policies, but were analysed as objects of the superpowers’ competition, pawns in the cold war conflict rather than as entities in their own right. This is the postulate underlying Dulles’ indictment of nonalignment as “immoral” in 1956, and of Morgenthau’s use of “neutralism” and “neutrality” interchangeably in his 1957 Yearbook article (Morgenthau, 1957). Even in the 1960’s Morgenthau’s classification variants of third world foreign policy could not go beyond three categories — all based on the East-West conflict. These categories are (a) “escapism pure and simple”, (b) “moral indifference”, and (c) “surreptitious alignment with the Soviet bloc”.

1.2 The “Interchangeable Actor” Assumption: The development of the behavioural “protest movement” and the rise of “scientific politics” in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s also affected the “underdeveloped study of underdeveloped countries”. Consequently, the “small-state-as-pawn” assumption was increasingly replaced by the “interchangeability” assumption, elaboration of universal models where Nepal and Sweden, Algeria and Great Britain were treated as “actors”, and thus considered interchangeable eggs in the same basket (e.g. Kaplan’s International System). This is why, perhaps, many of the case studies on third world countries published in this period could not draw on this literature in their analyses, and oscillated between the traditional power paradigm and the adoption of intuitive nomothetic approaches. Three notable

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studies on third world countries manifest this tendency (Johnstone, 1963; Phillips, 1964; Smith, 1965) in addition to the individual chapters in the Macridis and Black-Thompson readers (1958, 1963).

1.3 The “Pre-Theory” and “Structured Empiricism” Approaches: Mobilising their efforts toward theory-building in the specific foreign policy subdiscipline, a few analysts drew on the conceptualisation, hypotheses and methods of the recent social science literature while avoiding the simplicity of the interchangeability assumption of the early model-builders.

“Since,” Rosenau affirmed, “there can be no real flourishing of theory until the materials of the field are processed, i.e. rendered comparable, through the use of the pre-theories of foreign policy”, he assumed the task of elaborating a pre-theory which would provide “a basis for comparison in the examination of the external behaviour of various countries in various situations”. This pre-theory is based on 5 sets of independent or explanatory variables: (a) Idiosyncratic or individual: all of those aspects of a decision-maker, “his values, talents and prior experiences, that distinguish his foreign policy choices or behaviour from those of other decision-makers”. (b) Role: “the external behaviour of officials that is generated by the roles they occupy and that would be likely to occur irrespective of the idiosyncrasies of the role occupants”. (c) Governmental: “those aspects of a government’s structure that limit or enhance the foreign policy choices made by decision-makers”. (d) Societal: “nongovernmental aspects of a society which influence its external behaviour”. (e) Systemic: the “external environment or any actions occurring abroad that condition or otherwise influence the choices made by its officials”.

But Rosenau went beyond listing to establish the ‘relative potencies’ of each independent variable according to some specific classificatory criteria: (a) size (large/small country); (b) state of the economy (developed/underdeveloped); (c) political accountability (open/closed political system); (d) penetration/non-penetration; and (e) issue-area (status, territorial, human and non-human resources) (1966).

Three years later (1969), Brecher and his colleagues at McGill University published a multi-variable input-conversion-output-feedback system model of almost 14 independent variables clustered in 5 input variables located (following the Sprouts’ example) in the psychological and operational environments. Whereas the operational environment is not neglected, the emphasis is clearly on the psychological environment which includes “two closely-related sets of data”: (a) attitudinal prism: psychological predispositions of the decision-makers; and (b) elite-images: cognitive distances between images and reality. As for the dependent variable — the foreign policy output — it is to be classified according to 4 issue-areas: military-security, political-diplomatic-economic-developmental, and cultural-status. Brecher followed up this “research design” by applying it in a 1400 page two-volume study of Israel’s foreign policy and decisions (1972, 1974).
If a unified list of explanatory variables can be sorted out through the comparison of Rosenau's and Brecher's frameworks, the same cannot be said about assigning the most important independent variable. Brecher et al. assign priority in their 'research design' to the individual-psychological variable and Brecher confirms it in his empirical analysis of Israel's foreign policy system. "Elite images", he affirms, "is the decisive input of a foreign policy system" (1972: 11). If we compare this with the potency established in Rosenau's "pre-theory", we find that Israel-Brecher's empirical domain-falls in the "small, developed and open political system" type of actor. The most potent independent variable in this case is the global systemic, whereas the individual-psychological variable occupies the 5th and last rank.

2 — Toward The Comparative Politics — International Relations Linkage

Notwithstanding these divergences, these efforts at general theory-building can encourage us to try to close the gap between general theory and its relevant application to third world policies. This can be achieved by basing our analysis on two specific assumptions: (a) the rejection of the black-boxing of the social system as the "small-state-as pawn" assumption has tended to do; and (b) that foreign policy patterns in these states are based on societal and political conditions that are sui-generis (e.g. social disorganisation, predominantly personalised political processes at the national level, "dependency" at the international level), conditions which justify treating them as a type (with sub-types) in their own right, rather than as "actors" among others in the global system.

Since very few studies have tried to deal empirically with societal issues in third world foreign policy-making (Korany, 1974, Weinstein, 1972 & 1976), in order to establish the Comparative Politics-International Relations conceptual linkage we have been advocating for over ten years (Farrell, 1966), we are singling out "modernization" as the independent variable-set.

2.1 The analysis of modernization is crucial since its complex character can shed light on societal processes and structure. Thus one cannot deal with modernization without considering the effects of the "colonial intrusion" that disturbed these societies. Secondly, the modernization process affects political structures and behaviour by leading to the praetorian (Huntington, 1968) or prismatic (Riggs, 1964, 1967, 1968, 1970) political system. Thirdly, the modernization process and the resultant political system are both affected by — and affect — the rate of economic development. In this sense, Easton's labelling of a summary variable (1965) applies perfectly to "modernization" also.

Yet despite the importance of the determining effect of this variable on social structure and process, it has been strangely neglected in International Relations generally (Morse 1970, 1976). Even more surprising is that in Comparative Politics — and with the increasing rate of publications on the subject — the definition of the phenomenon still seemed elusive. Black, for instance, defined modernization as "the process by which historically evolved institutions are adapted to the rapidly
changing functions that reflect the unprecedented increase in man's knowledge, permitting control over his environment, that accompanied the scientific revolution" (1966: 7). Levy has aimed to be mainly operational by taking as "the measure of modernization the ratio of inanimate to animate sources of power". That is to say "the higher the ratio, the higher is the degree of modernization" (1966: 9-15 and 35-38, 1972: 3). Deutsch (1961) uses eight indicators to measure the process, (which he calls social mobilization) but emphasises its instability dimension. For the original images of mobilization imply in fact two distinct images: (a) the state of uprooting from old habits, traditions, patterns of relationships and social commitments; and (b) the induction of these uprooted persons into alternative patterns of group membership, organisation and commitment. Huntington (1968) agrees. "Modernization", he says, "involves in large part the multiplication and diversification of the social forces in society. Kinship, racial and religious groupings are supplemented by occupational, class and skill groupings" (1968: 9). Basing himself on the hypothesis that "modernity (an end product) means stability (whereas) modernization (the process) means instability", he develops the concept of the praetorian social system. The characteristics of this system are "politicized" political forces, a rise in political participation, a lag in political institutionalisation and actual intervention of the military to take political power. "In a praetorian system" he says, 'social forces confront each other nakedly; no political institutions, no corps of professional political leaders are recognized or accepted as the legitimate intermediaries to moderate group conflict". The result then is that "the wealthy bribe, students riot, workers strike; mobs demonstrate, and the military coup" (1968: 196).

2.2 The foregoing conceptual analyses can be synthetized into three principal propositions leading to a fourth hypothetical one:

1 — The process of modernization is universal both in time and space.

2 — This process entails the predominance of conflict between the two ideal types of the "persistent" and the "becoming" which results in social disorganization and political instability.

3 — Since different indicators (Deutsch 1961, Black 1966) of the process show that in the third world its pace is singularly rapid and its "crises" (Binder 1971) are simultaneous and not sequential, it follows that its social disorganization and political instability effects are singularly acute in these polities.

4 — Survival of the policy being the ultimate objective, policymakers would promote integrative functions through consensual and "popular" foreign policy choices.
3 — METHODOLOGY AND SUBJECT DELIMITATION

3.1 The Comparative Case Study: In the crisis that has characterized political analysis, some (false) dichotomies have been unintentionally exaggerated: e.g. holistic versus atomistic analysis, quantitative versus qualitative, and the case-study versus comparative approach. It is a sign of scientific maturity that these simplifications are increasingly abandoned, and these divergent approaches are now considered different, but not mutually exclusive, strategies on the research continuum toward theory-building. But the so-called case study/comparative analysis dichotomy seems to die hard. Already in 1970, Russett attracted attention to the unhealthy effect of this “protracted guerrilla warfare”. “Specifically”, Russett says, “the so-called nomothetic-idiographic dilemma is an artificial one, (for) neither the case study nor the general kind of . . . correlational (i.e. comparative) study can alone provide the basis for reliable and valid generalisations about international politics”. He thus emphasised “the value of both and how the two must complement each other in critical ways”. Consequently, Russett went on to detail the pay-offs of this traditional genre of case study as a heuristic device, a technique of hypothesis-generating and hypothesis-testing. But Russett did not make explicit his definition of a case study nor specify its different types. He assumes the case-study as being only the traditional narrative and descriptive type, i.e. a non-cumulative literary genre (1970: 425-444).

However, two recent contributions in social science methodology criticise the case-study as only a genre and emphasise its importance as a method in theory-building. Lipphart (1975) suggests the comparable-cases approach where different case-studies are selected and analysed comparatively. They are then used in generalisation-building through minimising the variance in background variables while maximising the variance in the independent and dependent variables. Much more detailed and ambitious is Eckstein’s (1975) project to deal with the case study as a method of three dimensions: (a) the general role the case-study method can play in the development of theories concerning political phenomena; (b) the use of this method at various stages of the theory-building process; and (c) the way this method is best conducted for purposes of devising theories. Without going in detail into the advantages of the N-1 method compared to the present extensive multi-case comparative approach (e.g. economy and depth versus dispersion and possible shallowness), we should however, draw attention to the prerequisites of this case-study-as-a-comparative method (by opposition to the traditional case study as a literary genre). These prerequisites are: (a) the N-1 is not to be a substitute for, but a companion to, the multi-case comparative study; (b) rigour in conceptualisation has to be kept and consolidated (ranging from organising research designs to formal models); (c) general principles of exactitude in data-collection and data-analysis are to be, of course, respected; and (d) if the case chosen cannot be statistically representative, it should be typologically so, in order to respect acceptable rules of generalisability on the basis of its findings. Briefly, as an analysis of Indo-
nesia's foreign policy has proved, the possibility of comparative analysis depends less on seeking theoretical safety in numbers or the use of a common framework than "on the willingness of writers of case studies to put their conclusions in the form of general hypotheses, using well-known, loosely defined variables capable of easy translation from one study to the next" (Weinstein, 1972).

3.2 Typological Representativeness: Because of the diversity in its political regimes, its geo-strategic position, its wealth in primary products and its penetration by the actors of the other subsystems (especially the superpowers), the Middle East looks like a third world in miniature. We can even go further and state that — according to the level of world attention given to it — the Middle East seems to constitute a "privileged" subsystem. Thus of the total world events amounting to 25,760 for 1966-1969, the Middle East accumulated 2,862 or 11.1%. Compared to another "privileged" subsystem — South-East Asia — this latter received during the same period 1926 events or 7.46% of the world total. If we extend this period under analysis from 48 months to 64 (Jan. 1966 to April 1971), the total flow of events reported amounts to 39,121 of which 4,811 (12.7%) went to the Middle East. This is the same percentage that went to the other privileged subsystem: South-East Asia. This shows that even with the military intensification of the Vietnamese conflict and the extension of the American military intervention to Cambodia, together with the lessening of the military conflict in the Middle East following the acceptance of the Rogers' Plan and the implementation of the cease-fire, the level of world attention toward the Middle East did not diminish (McClelland: 1973).

The choice of the Egyptian case is based on the following considerations: (a) it is the only state actor that is (geo-culturally) both Asian and African; (b) Nasserism has represented an influential ideological current not only in the Middle East but also in the third world; and (c) this actor has manifested a very active international behaviour (proportionately to its relatively modest capabilities). Thus in the ranking of the 60 most active countries during the first half of 1966, Egypt figures in the 8th position and in the total of actions directed to the Middle East from January to December 1969 (i.e. a total of 2,862 events), Egypt alone received more than a quarter (25.15%).

This short methodological discussion shows that both the Middle East subsystem and the Egyptian actor are representative "samples" of a wider "population", and hence our findings can be logically generalisable to other parts of the third world.

3.3 The analysis is based on the collection and classification of domestic events data from a variety of sources; a universal source, Keesings Archives; a regional one, Middle Eastern Affairs; and two national ones: Al-Ahram and La Bourse Egyptienne. The time span is the crucial 31-month period starting with the establishment of the military regime.
and ending with the emergence of Nasser as its main representative and legitimate incarnator. The two procedures used for the analysis of the domestic data are: (a) structural analysis of the main political forces, their social bases, belief systems and values; and (b) quantitative indicators to measure the rise and decline of conflict, as well as the emergence of charismatic legitimacy through popular choice in the foreign policy field.

The equation for the policy’s survival used here is the simple but basic Weberian one: C= F+L, where control of the political system is a function of the ratio between force and legitimacy. If “L continues to increase, C becomes more and more dependent on F, creating a condition of increasing instability” (Dekmejian, 1971: 2-17).

4 — THE EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS

4.1 The Modernization Process in Egypt and its Systemic Strain: In his first book after the coup d’état, the Philosophy of the Revolution, Nasser depicts in a very metaphorical but telling way the process of social change that hit Egypt:

“Our modern awakening . . . began with a crisis. In my opinion our case very much resembled that of a sick man who spent a long time in a closed room. The heat in that closed room became so intense that the man was in anguish. Suddenly a violent storm blew, smashing all windows and doors, and strong currents of cold air began to lash the body of the sick man who was still perspiring. The sick man needed a breath of air. Instead, a raging hurricane assailed him, and fever began to devour his feeble body. This was exactly the case of our society . . . a society not yet crystallised . . . still in a state of ferment and agitation. It is not yet stabilised in its gradual development compared with other people who passed before on the same road”. (42-43 emphasis added).

Nasser then goes on to point out the adverse effects of this speedy process of social change:

“Undoubtedly this state of affairs is responsible for the lack of a strong united public opinion in our country. The difference between an individual and another is vast, that between a generation and another is vaster still”.

To underline his point, Nasser gives the example of

“an average Egyptian family - one of the thousands of families which live in the capital of the country. The father, for example, is a turbaned fellah, a thorough-bred country-fellow. The mother is a lady of Turkish descent. The sons and daughters attend schools respectively following the English and French
educational systems. All this is in an atmosphere where the thirteenth century spirit and twentieth century manifestations intermingle and interact" (43-44, emphasis added)

As with most Egyptians, this speedy process of social change does not leave Nasser's mind in peace:

"I see all this and feel in my heart that I know the cause of this bewildering perplexity torturing our minds and this astounding confusion destroying our very existence".

Then comes a note of hope:

"I then say to myself surely our society will crystallise; surely it will be satisfied; surely be welded into a strong homogeneous whole" (Ibid., emphasis added)

But first

"It is required that we strain every nerve to hold our ground during this period of transition" (Ibid., emphasis added).

This holding of "our ground during this period of transition" (i.e. social integration) is not, however, guaranteed since Egypt is going through a period — again as Nasser expressed it — characterised by:

"the disintegration of values, dislocation of beliefs, dissension and conflict among both classes and individuals" (1953: 27).

Literary works — ranging from the treatises of Taha Hussein (the "Dean of Arab literature") to the novels of Naguib Mahfouz — analysed these strains (of modernization) as arising from conflict between the cultures of the "spiritual East/materialist West" and/or the collision of "the old versus the new."

But rather than continuing to analyse these societal conflict clusters in detail, we have to emphasise that in addition to these inherited elements of social conflict, the new military elite added their own — because of their commitment to the acceleration of modernization through "revolution."

"Experience has proved and proves every day that revolution is the only road by which the Arab struggle can cover its transition from the past to the future . . . and bridge its transition from its present state to its aspired state (Nasser 1962: 11-12, emphasis added).

The result was a series of bloody clashes between the new governing elite and the main organised political forces (e.g. the Wafd, the Moslem Brethren), and fissures within the basis of their coercive power: the army itself.
4.2 The Conflict with the Wafd: Though the Wafd has not been sufficiently investigated, all specialists agree that this organization represented the first collective attempt to oppose British occupation and to constitute a "Wafd" delegation) to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference to defend Egypt's case for independence. Thus the Wafd continued to represent for many Egyptians, not a political party but the nation itself. Its founder — Zaghloul Pasha—declared in 1924, "I am not the head of a political party but the delegate of the nation". During the 1925 elections, he reiterated that the Wafd was entering the elections not as a political party, but as the representative of the Egyptian nation. In fact, the people reserved for him the title of "Zaim," called his house the nation's home and his wife "the mother of Egyptians (Hillal, 1977: 138). Even after its misadventures, divisions and rumors of corruption, when the new regime decreed — in late 1952 — the abolition of political parties and the confiscation of party funds, of the 95,000 Egyptian pounds confiscated, 90,000 belonged to the Wafd alone.

This privileged position is due to the Wafd's character as a national front, a meeting point identified with the struggle for political independence, around which rallied the broadest and most divergent social strata of the Egyptian policy. Consequently, in the triangular conflict between the monarchy, British occupation forces, and the nationalists, the Wafd came to represent the latter. The King wanted to continue his autocratic rule, the British wanted to preserve their post-1882 colonial position and the Wafd pursued the dual aim of trying to limit the monarchy's autonomy while at the same time securing the country's political independence. In this triangular contest, the Wafd's two adversaries resorted to coercion to settle their differences with the party. The result was that in the period 1923-1952, the Wafd governed alone for only 6 years, 2 months and 29 days, and participated in coalitions for 2 years and 5 days — thus totalling 8 years, 3 months and 4 days in more than 28 years (Hillal: 140). But because of its financial resources, its capacity to manipulate nationalist symbols and its power to mobilise mass support among strategic segments of the population, the Wafd could initiate riots and engage in semi-revolutionary mass-agitation almost when it wanted.

Thus the Wafd's identification with Egypt's nationalist fervor, parliamentarianism and the whole process of liberal thinking explain the new elite's hesitation and caution in the inevitable clash. Within a few hours of the coup's success, Nasser had discussed with his Wafdist friend, Abul Fath, the form of the emerging political system and the possibility of reconvening the Wafd-dominated, 1930-parliament. On the 3rd of August 1952, a meeting was organized between 3 RCC* members (Nasser, G. Salem and Kh. Moheii El-Din) and Serag El-Din, the Wafd's secretary-general. But the two sides were separated not only by differences over the form of the emerging political system but also over their respective conceptions of the whole social system, a precursor of their eminent conflict over the land-reform law. Consequently, on September 9, the Naguib cabinet approved a bill on the "reorganisation of political parties". Since
these political parties — the bill said — were based on personalities rather than principles, they should drop all members suspected of corruption and offer real platforms with alternative policies. Naguib gave the parties thirty days to “reorganise” themselves.

Though some of the Wafd leaders were ousted, the popular leader of the party — Nahas — refused to submit to “any mortal force”. “Allah only could remove me”, the old Pasha said. He was backed by the Party lieutenants: “no Nahas, no party”, the slogan went. But since this constituted a challenge to the new government’s determination to prevent Nahas from continuing to lead the party, the Wafd finally decided to register under new leadership. The Party’s council, however, voted (8 Nov. 1952) to keep Nahas as the Party’s honorary president. But when the Wafd at last went to register — with other political organisations — under a new leadership, they learnt that all political organisations had to be “purged”. Consequently, the many lawyers that swelled the Party’s ranks decided to fight the constitutionality of the law on the purging and reorganisation of political parties before the State Council, Egypt’s highest judicial body (November 11, 1952).

Perhaps because of the Wafd’s capacity to marshal “mass support”, and since the Army movement was declared a “thawra” (revolution), the cabinet issued a decree giving Premier Naguib absolute power, effective as of July 23 (November 13, 1952). Naguib was vested with the full sovereignty of the nation, and the cabinet’s measures were deemed acts of sovereignty not subject to court decisions. Consequently, the Wafd was prevented from fighting its case before the State Council. Thus, while the Wafd — backed by other political organisations — could marshal popular support, it lacked the effective means of (physical) force. The military — on the other hand — possessed the means of (physical) force but lacked the mass political organisation that could marshal popular support. There was, thus, a stalemate in the Egyptian political system.

Moreover, the economic situation was deteriorating. Purchases by Britain — the main customer for cotton (the basis of Egypt’s economy) — dropped from 35 million Egyptian pounds in 1951 to 5.7 million in the first 10 months of 1952. It was estimated that this cotton “bubble” had cost the Egyptian government, in all, some 30 million Egyptian pounds. While Britain attributed this drop in cotton purchases to commercial reasons, the Egyptian authorities and the press accused Britain of intrinsigent colonialism and the intention — as Naguib himself was reported saying — to ruin Egypt by an economic blockade. But the fellahin of Egypt would not easily grasp the niceties of sophisticated economic arguments and they started remembering — not without melancholy — the 1951-soaring cotton prices, associating them with the Wafd’s economic policies rather than with the Korean War (Lacouture, 1962: 227).

The situation was even worse, for no legal or quasi-legal means had yet been devised to manage conflict and maintain the system. In this system under stress, Naguib was reported to have become a tired man, and
steps were taken towards political detente. An administrative tribunal was permitted to sit in on the hearings of the Wafd’s case, to include Nahas as its honorary president, and El Tawil as founding member of the reorganised Wafd Party; but these hearings were to take place in camera. Virtually all political prisoners — including the Wafd’s Secretary-General, Serag Ed-Din — were released. Naguib had two meetings with Nahas, who declared that he would withdraw his resignation as the Wafd’s leader. There were even rumours that the “Pasha” might take part in an all-party national front for the purpose of “achieving national objectives” and draft a new constitution.

But a truce with the Wafd could not result in a solid detente, let alone collaboration. Since the military were bent on adopting an agrarian reform law and putting on trial politicians and officials accused of nepotism and corruption, they were bound to clash — sooner or later — with many Wafd personalities. Thus, press censorship was reimposed more vigorously (28th December, 1952), while 800 high Egyptian officials “resigned” or were dismissed as part of the “purging of the government”. Cairo University and all its faculties — except those of medicine and Arab studies — were closed, and 123 students were arrested. And in January the abolition of all political parties was decreed. Only one very influential organisation managed to escape abolition, by alleging that it was not a political organization but a religious one. This was the all-to-strong Moslem Brethren.

4.3 The “Free Officers” and the Moslem Brethren: The preoccupation of the Wafd and minority political parties with political authority in the pre-revolutionary political system left vast areas of social thought and popular action neglected. Because the majority of Egyptians are attached to Islam, at a time when this religious value system was suffering erosion, there was a feeling of social loss, value vacuum and hence an urgent need for a comprehensive creed of societal change (Dekmejian, 1970: 18). This explains the speedy success of the Brethren from a small reformist society founded in 1928 by an unknown school teacher to the status of a mass revivalist movement with about 1,000,000 members and sympathisers, including 30% of Cairo University students in the late 1960’s (Hillal 1977: 298; Lacouture, 1922: 27). By providing a comprehensive and indigenous doctrine based on the unity of thought and action, and Islamic fundamentalism (“the Qur’an is our constitution”), the Brethren provided each follower with specific tasks and duties, thereby “creating in him the esprit de corps of the indoctrinated believer who was also a participant with vested interests” (Dekmejian, 1970: 19). Consequently, the organisation had a strong hand in the functioning and/or breakdown of the Egyptian political system. For instance: (a) in the 3-year period from the Second World War to the Palestinian war, the Brethren made its influence felt through the following: attempts to assassinate Nahas Pasha (Dec. 1945, April 1948; Nov. 1948), the assassination of Finance Minister A. Osman (Jan. 1946), the dynamiting the of Metro film theater (May, 1947), the assassination of the Acting President of
Cairo’s Court of Appeal, and a riot foretold in Nov. 1948 that ended with 20 dead and 61 injured. Consequently, the Prime Minister ordered the organization’s dissolution. In December, the Cairo police-chief was killed in his armored car, and three weeks later it was the turn of the Prime Minister to be assassinated in the elevator of the Ministry of the Interior itself. (b) Another indicator of the Brethren’s influence was their penetration — both on the level of thought and action — of the Free Officers secret society. As early as 1946 there were contacts between the two organizations through Sadat. Consequently many members of the new elite were influenced by the Brethren’s vision and action, and at least one prominent founding Free Officer preferred to dissociate himself from the new governing elite rather than renounce his membership and allegiance to the Brethren. This latter, in fact, claimed that at least a third of the Free Officers were linked to the organization.

This explains why the Brethren was the only organization that knew the time of the coup in advance, and was asked to accord popular and physical support. This also explains why, on the morning of the coup, the Morshed (Supreme Guide) was invited to the RCC. But the Morshed came 4 days later, after preparing the Brethren’s ‘white paper’ elaborating a political program based on the Qur’an as a constitution, the list of 5-6 ministers from the Organization, and the organisation’s demand for the right to veto all legislation connected with Islam. A month and half later when the civilian Prime Minister resigned, the Brethren asked for two ministries and suggested the names. The military accorded them only one, and to a man of their choice. When this latter accepted nomination against the Brethren’s will, he was “excommunicated” from the Organization.

The definitive break came when the military government replaced the Rector of Al-Azhar Islamic University on January 7, 1954. On January 12, fighting erupted between the supporters of each side, resulting in injuries for the pro-regime students. The following day troops surrounded the Brethren’s headquarters and began a round-up, arresting 78 leaders, including the Morsher himself, to be followed by 400 other members. The Organization itself was dissolved, and a nation-wide state of emergency was declared on January 14th. The Organization still continued to bomb and blow up bridges, but when they shot and missed Nasser (October 26), the regime proceeded with their liquidation.

4.4 But in conflict with these organized political forces, could not the F.O. count on “the people” — the under-privileged classes? After all, it was in the name of “the people” that the army movement started. Precisely, it was a prominent segment of the people — i.e. the workers — that initiated the first violent, bloody crisis of the “white revolution”. On August 12 (20 days after the coup), a group of trade-union workers, employed in National Misr Co., started a riot in Kafr El-Dawwar, the Delta industrial town about 20 kilometers from Alexandria. They asked “in the name of the army”, for the removal of 3 members of the manage-
ment, occupied the factories, and to react against police firing, set two factories on fire. It was precisely the army which was dispatched to deal with the workers' procession. The result: 9 dead, 25 wounded, and 200 workers arrested. On August 14, a military court—headed by a prominent member of the junta—was convened to hang the two presumed leaders of the riot.

Though it had managed to protect "public order", the new regime found its political position weakened further. For after hailing "the movement of the people", the Egyptian Leftists then issued tracts denouncing "military dictatorship which saved the King, the feudalists and the traitors, but stained its hands with the workers' blood" (Lacoueure, 1962: 157).

4.5 Fissures Within the Army: Since the movement lacked from the very beginning its own political organization to mobilize and channel public support, the new regime's systemic control continued to rest on the army. Yet it was the army that suffered its most important fissures in February-March 1954 in what is called "The Crisis" (Baghdadi: 1977; Hamroush, 1974; Naguib, 1974; Ramadan, 1976; Sadat, n.d., Shalaby, 1976).

The structure of authority of the July Movement was in the form of a pyramid. At the top there were Nasser and the RCC members. This RCC was based on a larger group: the Society of Free Officers—about 100 to 250 members who initiated the coup (Naguib, 1974; Lacoueure, 1962). The basis of this two-layer authority was the army itself, with its 2,000 officers and 100,000 men monopolising unequalled centralised physical force in the political system.

But the army is not—as the literature generally assumes—a socially homogeneous group with uniform political ideas. Divergences existed even within the small elite initiating the coup, as Nasser explained in 1953:

"The political ideas of the Free Officers differed, according to their temperaments and the family or social milieu from which they came... It was necessary to improvise... The divergences of political ideas then obliged us to separate from those who did not agree to apply the majority decisions of the Council of the Revolution and then those of the Government we set up" (Stephens, 1971: 112-113).

The first public clash—less than 3 months after the coup—was with Col. Mehanna—head of the influential artillery division, a potential choice to lead the coup before Naguib was finally chosen, and the Army's representative in the 3-member Regency Council. With 24 other key officers, he was tried by the RSS itself, presided over by Nasser in person. But the intra-elite conflict continued until it culminated in the 1954-systemic crisis, a public break between Naguib and the RCC.
**Long-term sources of the conflict** centered round (a) the generation gap (Naguib, 51, versus the average age, 34, of the RCC members); (b) the degree of socialization and integration in the ancien regime (Naguib's distinguished red cap of a lieutenant-general, title of "iewa" and son named after the king vs. the rank and file of activist young officers emphasising the merits of a "mobilisation" regime); and (c) character (Naguib's conciliatory attitude toward his colleagues of the ancien regime vs. the revolutionary and coercive ethos of his young colleagues). Naguib summarized basic differences very well in 1954:

"Abdul Nasser believed, with all the bravado of a man of thirty-six, that we could afford to alienate every segment of Egyptian public opinion, if necessary, in order to achieve our goals. I believed, with all the prudence of a man of fifty-three, that we would need as much popular support as we could possibly retain. I further believed that it would be better to sacrifice, or at least delay, the attainment of some of our objectives in order to ensure the attainment of others" (Naguib, 1955: 124; Naguib, n.d.).

**Immediate sources of the conflict** were Naguib's towering popularity and his insistence on making his formal titles (P.M, and President) coincide with effective authority. When the RCC resisted and tried to bypass him, he entered into contact with members of other political forces (e.g. Wad/ Moslem Brethren). Then, on February 23, 1954, he declared to the RCC: "I can no longer carry out my duties in the manner that I consider best calculated to serve the national interest" Naguib, 1974, 116-148).

The timing was well-chosen to threaten the regime's maintenance. Besides the vacuum created by the departure of this "considerable charismatic potential" just a month after the conflict with the Brethren, Naguib of Sudanese origin — was also counting on his key position to initiate discussions of the Egyptian-Sudanese union during a visit to Khartoum a week later. With the resignation made public, huge masses filled Cairo's streets in Naguib's favour. Much more serious were the divisions within the Army and the RCC itself. The red-major, Kh. Mohei ed-Din, — the RCC's youngest member — supported the rebellion of the Armored Corps against Naguib's resignation. With the failure of other RCC members to dissuade the rebelling officers, Nasser himself had to go to their headquarters. Besieged and harassed, he had to give in to their demands: the return of Naguib as President with Kh. Mohei ed-Din as Prime Minister. But with the opposition of other army divisions, another compromise was elaborated : Nasser would be the Prime Minister while Naguib would continue as President. This compromise, however, did not solve the problem of authority ambiguity and hence could not last long. Thus the crisis erupted again in March, but after Nasser had prepared himself to dominate the government. Nasser's strategy — which was ini-
tiated when Naguib was in Khartoum — can be summarized in three tactics: (a) conquer the Army, the source of unequalled organised force and hence the base of the regime’s (coercive) control; (b) deprive Naguib of his supporters, especially those who were capable of channelling organised mass support; and (c) let Naguib work himself into an untenable political position. This was done when the RCC — to comply with Naguib’s wish to return to previous parliamentary life — declared the possibility of its dissolution and ‘end’ of the revolution. The Army saw the prospect of its being eased out of government and the discredited politicians of the ancien regime restored, and thus turned en bloc to defeat Naguib in April. The battle of Nasser and the RCC for systemic control was won. But this control was mainly coercive, as the following conflict indicators (Taylor & Hudson, 1972: 88-124) for 1952-54 show:

1 — Protest Demonstrations: for the three-year period 1952-1954, the total number amounted to 17, with an annual mean of 5.67, whereas 1955 did not witness any protest demonstrations, and the total for the 12-year period, 1956-1967, was 5, and thus an annual mean of .42.

2 — Riots: the total for the three-year period 1952-1954 was 16 with an annual mean of 5.33; the year 1955 did not witness any and the total for the 12-year period 1956-1967 was 3 riots and thus an annual mean of .25.

3 — Deaths From Domestic Violence: in the three-year period 1952-1954, the total number of deaths amounted to 316, with an annual mean of 105.33; no deaths from domestic violence are mentioned for 1955 and the total for the 12-year period 1956-1967 was 23 persons with an annual mean of about 1.92.

4 — Governmental Sanctions to neutralise or eliminate a perceived threat amount, for the three-year period 1952-1954, to 143, with an annual mean of approximately 48; the year 1955 witnessed only 2 governmental sanctions, and the total for the 12-year period 1956-1967 was 170, with an annual mean of about 14.17.

5 — Armed Attacks by (internal) organised groups totalled, for the three-year period 1952-1954, 158 attacks with an annual mean of 52.67; whereas no armed attacks are mentioned for the year 1955 and the total for the 12-year period 1956-1967 was only 4, and thus an annual mean of .33.

Moreover, our event-data show that the 31-month period of high conflict and systemic strain (July 1952-January 1955) witnessed the uncovering (according to governmental sources) of 6 plots against the new regime, the (declared) political hanging of at least 17 persons, a nationwide strike, an assassination attempt on Nasser’s life, and a national state of emergency that was declared twice. Moreover, the constitution of
military tribunals and/or public political trials amounted to no less than 15 cases; (declared) political arrests among leaders of political parties, army officers, student leaders... amounted to at least 1487 persons; and even 5 prominent leaders of the Brethren were deprived of their Egyptian nationality. Press censorship was imposed during most of the period (for instance, it was ended on March 6, 1954 after almost two years to be re-imposed on March 30, 1954); the Council of the Press Syndicate was dissolved and the Middle East News Agency was suddenly closed; and 6 newspapers and magazines (including the widely-circulated Wafd newspaper El-Misri) saw their licences revoked. The bureaucracy itself was not left untouched by the political conflict: 800 high civil servants were dismissed as well as 40 university professors (including the deans of the faculties of Law, Medicine and Commerce). Last, but not least, the period under analysis witnessed seven cabinet turn-overs.

But, by the end of 1954, the military — headed by Nasser — were in a stronger position in the political system than they had ever been before; Naguib was retired and under house arrest; the Brethren were severely crippled as an organisation, with its Morshed in prison and some of its leaders deprived of Egyptian nationality; the leftists and all old party organisations were not only dissolved but their leaders were no longer permitted not participate in the system even in a personal capacity due to decrees of “azl Siassi (deprivation of political rights); and dissidents in the army were disposed of so that the army would stay solidly behind the new political elite.

5 — But as Nkrumah is said to have noted: “You can do everything with bayonets, except sit on them”. The new regime, then, had to try to increase the “legitimacy” or “support” (Easton, 1965) component in its systemic control. Here intervenes our hypothesis on the integrative function of foreign policy. For while 1954 witnessed the military’s victory in systemic control based largely on the marshalling of coercion, 1955 may be regarded as the consolidation of this systemic control — but this time the new regime was increasing based on rising support and legitimacy. The sources of this support were the two (interdependent) elements of charismatic appeal and national self-assertion through non-alignment. In fact

“almost inadvertently the military began to discover a new base for legitimacy — the leader’s popular appeal. This appeal was generated by Nasir’s phenomenal success in the international arena during 1955 and 1956” (Dekmejian, 1971: 39). Landmarks in this period such as his leadership of the “Arab nationalist trend” against the “colonialist” Baghdad pact, his emergence as a “third world” leader at the Bandung Conference, his arms deal with the Socialist bloc resulting in the break of Western monopoly of arms sales, his nationalisation of the Suez Canal Company, and successful resistance to the “tripartite imperialist aggression”, constituted the bases of Nasser’s rising charisma:
1. Nasser’s success in these foreign policy moves brought him popularity not only among the Egyptian masses but also among the Arab masses. Consequently, instead of anti-Nasser street demonstrations in Damascus, or protest cables from Baghdad, or nation-wide anti-Nasser strikes in Jordan, a large portion of the Arab masses rallied behind Nasser and at times even against their national governments.

2. An indicator of the acceptance and support the new regime enjoyed in Egypt itself is that the Egyptian masses tended to model their political culture on that of Nasser. In this respect, in the 1955-1956 period Nasser’s

"Own personal message ... brought about a substantial normative change in the belief system of Egyptians. Increasingly, Egyptians began to look at themselves as Arabs, thus sharing and adopting their leader’s belief system ... " (Ibid., 40).

And what is a better proof of the people’s acceptance of a leader and his new regime than their integration of his own value system into their own belief system.

From 1955 then, the new elite’s systemic control tended to be increasingly based on rising mass support and legitimacy, derived from Nasser’s charisma coinciding with his “positive neutralism”. The (1955-56) charisma-neutralism correlation is confirmed by the following graphs, where the lines measure the direction of both variables (Ibid: 112-114).

![Nasser's Charismatic Ascendancy](image)

![Rise of Positive Neutralism](image)
From the mid-1950's, then, the new regime saw its "legitimacy" component rising — as the "conflict data" for 1955 indicate. This rising legitimacy and support are correlated with the adoption of a foreign policy that appealed to "the people". As Nasser himself admitted after attending the Bandung Conference and visiting some Asian countries:

"My visit to India was the turning point in my political understanding. I learned and recognized that the only wise policy for us consisted in adopting positive neutralism and nonalignment. On my return home, the reception that greeted this policy convinced me that it was the sole possible policy, that could attract the broadcast support of the Arab people" (Abdel Malek, 1968: 227).
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