

Social Administration and Social Science

Joel Prager *

Nothing is more terrifying than ignorance in action. (Goethe)

To know the truth partially is to distort the Universe ... An unflinching determination to take the whole evidence into account is the only method of preservation against the fluctuating extremes of fashionable opinion. (Whitehead)

It is often said that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Not surprisingly, social administration (or social welfare) (1) is frequently cited as proof **par excellence** of this cliché. For many, indeed, too many, social administration promises much, tries hard, but delivers very little. That people should freely criticize and have "salient misgivings" about social welfare as a field of study and as a profession is understandable. As a field concerned with "the study of the development, structure and practices of social services," and the "attempt to apply social sciences to the analysis and solution of a changing range of social problems," (2) controversy over its practical efficacy and theoretical character is inescapable. Moreover, as a profession intimately, directly and visibly involved in social pathology, value conflicts, social disorganization, deviant behaviour and social reactions, it is in the frontlines, dealing with the victims and casualties of society. (3)

While criticism of social administration comes in many different forms and from many quarters inside and outside the profession, for the purposes of this paper we are primarily interested in those that question social administration's academic and professional **raison d'être**. In particular, we are interested in those critiques that raise four fundamental questions:

1. What is social administration? Is it a field of study? A supradiscipline? Or is it a multi-disciplined grab bag lacking any coherent theoretical framework or methodology?

* Professor of Political Science at the University of Calgary.

2. How should it be taught? Should emphasis be placed on case-work practice? Or should the focus be on empirical research and/or theory building? Perhaps the main thrust should be on social policy and policy making? Should a sociological or psychological perspective dominate?
3. How should it be practiced? Should consensual and apolitical activities be the **modi operandi**? Or should the profession encourage political activism and direct involvement? Should it focus on administrative involvement? Information and advisory functions? Social control? Or should it be task centred?
4. What goals should it pursue? How should social administration deal with such problems as liberty, equality, social control and conformity? Should it attempt to integrate various disciplines and concentrate on policy analysis, policy strategies and social engineering?

While analytically distinct, these four questions are intimately and inextricably bound together. They have a common fate; the answers we give to one cannot but affect the answers we give to the others. By defining social administration in a particular fashion, we are likewise defining or significantly delimiting its teaching, practice and goals. We, of course, can avoid such contentious problems by claiming social administration is what social administrators do. But this is question-begging and is tantamount to putting one's head in the sand like the proverbial ostrich. The intellectual and professional problems confronting social administration are real and especially so in their consequences. It is necessary for us to do some stocktaking, to consider where we are and where we wish to go. Such self-examination" ... can no longer be considered as a 'thing apart'; as a phenomenon of marginal interest, like looking out of the window on a train journey. They are part of the journey itself." (4)

In the discussion that follows, I shall attempt to provide some answers to these questions. There are, of course, no definitive answers and I do expect and hope to receive alternative views and opinions. Above all, the paper is meant to stimulate discussion. And it may well be that when all is said and done, we will agree to disagree. Or it may be that positions hitherto deemed to be in direct opposition may have more in common than originally recognized. In any event, this paper

is a first attempt to map out the role that the social sciences are to play in the development of social administration, both as an academic field of study and as a profession.

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

What do we mean when we speak of the social sciences? Ironically, despite the ubiquity of the term and the existence of over 100,000 specialists calling themselves social scientists, (5) there is no agreed upon definition or universal system of classification. Part of the difficulty rests with the relative infancy of most of the disciplines collectively known as the "social sciences": Anthropology, Economics, Geography, History, Law and Jurisprudence, Political Science, Psychiatry, Psychology, Social Administration, Sociology and Statistics. (6) It is often forgotten that many of these disciplines are of recent vintage, that many obtained their autonomy during the latter part of the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth centuries. It was in 1865, for example, that courses focusing on social problems were first introduced into the curricula of many North American universities; and it was not until 1906 that "applied sociology" or what we call social administration today, thanks to Lester F. Ward, became academically acceptable. (7) Before as well as during this period, most of the disciplines that we today call the social sciences were classified as belonging to moral philosophy, theology and jurisprudence. (8) Not surprisingly, then, until recently, more effort was spent on establishing the autonomy of a discipline rather than on unearthing the theory and perfecting the practice of social science. (9)

Yet the problem remains: What precisely do we mean when we speak of the social sciences? For us, the social sciences are concerned with the behaviour of man in society, the role and impact of social institutions and practices and the genesis and solution of social problems. Put another way, it is **not** the method or theory that makes social science unique; it is its subject matter. That is, regardless of the distinct character and division of labour and the intellectual and methodological variety that exist between and among the disciplines of social science, they are bound together in a common enterprise. They are committed to the knowing and understanding of society, the conditions and processes that form, shape and direct human interaction. And, equally important, they are committed to comprehending, defining, clarifying, evaluating and solving social problems. This is the **sine qua non** of the social science

enterprise. It is this "concern for man himself and his fate," as Albert Einstein recognized, that "must always form the chief interest of all technical endeavours." This fact, Einstein exhorted, must never be forgotten or compromised in the "... midst of diagrams and equations." (10) How much more so for social administration!

The recognition, identification and definition of social problems vary of course temporally, spatially and culturally. What may be a problem at one time or in one place may not be in another time or place. In this sense, then, the repertoire of social problems confronting social scientists is neither universal nor fixed; it changes in complexion, substance, meaning and urgency. Like Sisyphus who struggled valiantly and repeatedly to push a huge boulder to the top of a mountain only to have it fall, again and again, the social sciences are continually involved in defining, analyzing and solving social problems

The awareness of a social problem, i.e., how and to whom a problem becomes salient, (11) is, of course, not the exclusive preserve of social scientists. The process of discovery can and often does come in many different forms. Among the most common methods of problem identification, the following stand out in their frequency. (12)

1. Detached scholarly diagnosis. While scholars select a problem because it interests them or affects them directly, it does not follow that they are indifferent or opposed to doing their work as thoroughly and as carefully as possible. In short, they wish to have their work stand up to the careful scrutiny of empirical and logical criteria. Thus, the researchers who worked on **The Limits to Growth** and called our attention to the profligate waste of the earth's resources attempted to assure their professional credibility by the manner in which they conducted their research and presented their findings.

2. A "Voice in the Wilderness." The identification of problems can come about when individuals "publicize and dramatize" a situation otherwise ignored. Ralph Nader is perhaps the best known practitioner of this method.

3. Pressure group activities. The collective action of individuals to assert the presence of a condition previously ignored is fairly commonplace. The issues of child labour, cruelty to animals and racial discrimination owe a good deal of their prominence to such lobbying techniques.

4. Elite concern. At times individuals holding key economic, political, social and economic positions purposely bring neglected issues into the limelight. A recent case in point is immigration policy and Canada's demographic future.

5. Society-wide concern. The proverbial man on the street forces governments to deal with problems that otherwise would receive low priority. Crime and law enforcement appear to be some of the problems of special concern to the public.

The task of the social scientist, then, is not simply to identify social problems. In addition, he or she must sort out the differing and often contradictory definitions of a problem once it has been isolated. Different groups often operate on different assumptions and consequently play down certain aspects and concentrate on others. The social scientist must try to disentangle these competing definitions by analyzing the implicit and explicit assumptions made by interested parties about the scope, nature and solubility of a problem or set of problems. He does this by scrutinizing and testing these assumptions against empirical reality with finely honed methodological tools. The best in this genre may fairly be termed "connoisseurship." (13) Thus, the social scientist may conclude that what at first appeared to be a problem, e.g., pornography or smoking marijuana, may not be on closer inspection. Or it may be the opposite: a clear and present danger exists requiring governmental intervention. If the latter situation occurs then the social scientist must contribute to finding some solution. It is here that the social scientist's knowledge of social processes comes to the fore. For it is with this knowledge that the social scientist seeks to discover the "strategic points of intervention in the social structures and processes that produce the problem." (14) There is one final step demanded of social scientists and this is, for some, the most debatable. Namely, the social scientist should suggest "alternative moral points of view" in assessing social problems. The assembling and interpretation of facts are not, despite claims to the contrary, value-free. "Facts speak for themselves, but do not select themselves." Try as he may, the social scientist cannot dissociate himself from moral prescriptions and value judgments. One therefore cannot simply take refuge by talking about the pros or cons of a particular policy relating to abortion, for example, without at the same time becoming involved with contending moral alternatives. Means must be related to ends and while the means are subject to technical

evaluation, the ends in the last analysis reflect "operational moral codes." The choice of certain policies and hence solutions cannot escape these valuative judgments. (15) As Gunnar Myrdal has noted:

That a term is value-loaded is, even when used in scientific inquiry, not of itself a ground for objection. It has been a misguided endeavour in social science for a little more than a century to seek to make 'objective' our main value-loaded concepts by giving them a 'purely scientific' definition, supposedly free from any association with political valuations... There is no way of studying social reality other than from the viewpoint of human ideals. A 'disinterested social science' has never existed and, for logical reasons, cannot exist. The value connotation of our main concepts represents our interest in a matter, gives direction to our thoughts and significance to our inferences. It poses the questions without which there are no answers. (16)

Ideally, then, these are the tasks of social science. Regardless of discipline, this is the stuff of the social science enterprise:

1. The study of man as a "social animal," from norms, values, expectations and practices, to social institutions, processes and problems.
2. The development and dissemination of knowledge, from data gathering to the devising and application of theoretical and methodological tools of analysis.
3. The identification, definition and solution of social problems.
- b. The positing of alternative moral codes.

II

Philosophers of science usually argue that a field of study, a "discipline" must have a clearly defined subject matter and a relatively specialized and developed set of concepts, methods and theory. According to Thomas Kuhn (17) this is how disciplines have historically developed, how knowledge has grown and how problem solving has been possible. Without a paradigm, i.e., a clearly defined subject matter and developed set of intellectual tools, theoretical and methodological, anarchy reigns and we are not able to unravel mysteries or go beyond *ad hoc* solutions. The absence of a parading deprives us, if we push the argument to the extreme, of a process and rationale for selecting problems, for choosing

and evaluating the relevance of available knowledge, and for systematic and effective problem solving. (18) In sum, then, we are unable to: (19)

1. clarify and identify problems;
2. describe problems;
3. analyze problems;
4. rationally apply available knowledge;
5. forecast future developments;
6. invent, evaluate and select alternative solutions and moral positions.

Thus a political scientist in defending his discipline's autonomy will normally argue that politics is concerned with "who gets what, when, how" or with the "authoritative allocation of values" or with the activities "of the most inclusive structures in a society that have recognized responsibility for performing, at a minimum, the function of goal attainment by means of legitimate decision." (20) He will most likely brag about the conceptual "richness" of his field, citing the "state," "political" parties, "the machine," and "lobbying" as examples **par excellence**. He will in all probability give a **tour d'horizon** of the discipline's intellectual arsenal mentioning the sophistication of the methodologies employed in voting studies and the power of stratification (elite), pluralist and deterrence theories. And if not overwhelmed by false modesty, he may end his discipline's defence by citing Aristotle: politics is the "master science."

Needless to say, if one wants to discredit, belittle or ignore an academic enterprise, one of the most potent means is to deny that it is a field of study or has a paradigm. And where social administration is concerned, critiques of this kind are legion. One merely has to peruse the professional journals or standard textbooks to see the defensive postures taken, the thousands of pages devoted to justifying social administration as a field and delimiting its subject matter and methods of enquiry. (21)

The critiques of social administration usually take the following form:

1. Social administration is not a field of study; it is a residual category where refugees from various disciplines gather.

2. The subject matter of social administration is so inclusive that it contributes to a "jack of all trades and a master of none" mentality.
3. There is a paucity of theory and methodological sophistication resulting in indiscriminate borrowing from the other social sciences.
4. Social administration relies on **ad hoc** solutions and holds little promise for the development of systematic knowledge and "structured rationality" in dealing with social problems.
5. Social administration is a breeding ground for "activists" or "ideologues," not highly trained specialists.
6. Paradoxically, social administration is an elaborate employment agency that reinforces the status quo. It provides the manpower to treat the victims of the social system and does not deal with the "causes."

Are these claims true? And if they are, what damage do they do to the credibility of social administration as a profession and intellectual enterprise? For the sake of convenience, we shall deal with these claims under three headings: a) the ill-defined subject matter, b) the multi-disciplinary nature of social welfare and c) the professionalism of its graduates.

The ill-defined subject matter

a) Argument

The distinguished scientist, Sir Julian Huxley, has observed:

The lack of a common frame of reference, the absence of any unifying set of concepts and principles, is now, if not the world's major disease, at least its most serious symptom. (22)

For some, Huxley's observation is especially apropos for social administration. Rarely is any precise statement given on the class of phenomena that social administration proposes to study; instead, what is more often the case, social administration is defined in terms of objectives, e.g., combatting "want, disease, ignorance, squalor and idleness." (23) Indeed, the definition of social welfare adapted from the World Health Organization would appear to attest to the claim that

social administration is not primarily concerned with knowledge, with facts and the explanation of facts, but with the grandiose, if not utopian, pursuit of solving mankind's problems.

Social welfare is a state of complete physical, mental and social well being and not merely the amelioration of **specific ills**. The enjoyment of the highest attainable **standard of life** is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social conditions. The **welfare** of all peoples is fundamental to the attainment of peace and security and is dependent upon the fullest cooperation of individuals and States. The achievement of any State in the promotion and protection of **social welfare** is of value to all. Unequal development in different countries in the promotion of **social administration, particularly in relation to the abolition of poverty**, is a common danger. **Normal** development of the child is of basic importance; the ability to live harmoniously in a changing total environment is essential to such development. The extension to all peoples of the benefits of **social**, psychological, medical and related knowledge is essential to the fullest attainment of the social welfare. Informed opinion and active cooperation on the part of the public are of the utmost importance in the improvement of the **welfare** of the people. Governments have a responsibility for the **social welfare** of their people which can be fulfilled only by the provision of adequate social and economic measures. (24)

How can anyone, except Plato's philosopher king, extract a unifying set of concepts or coherent subject matter? Given the magnitude, complexity and changeability of problems, where does one begin? How indeed does one provide professional training given such a "vast, varied and voluminous" subject matter? Is it no wonder then that social administration's road to hell should be paved with good intentions? Surely, the division of labour that exists between and among the other social sciences is more rational, relevant and effective?

b) Counter-Argument

Alex Inkeles has recently written that

Decrees dividing the realms of human learning have none of the force of law. Scholars and scientists go where their interests lead them; they study what they like when they wish; they are natural poachers

with little regard for property rights and 'no trespassing' signs. The arbitrary definition of fields of study, while often aesthetically satisfying, is, therefore, generally a poor guide to what is happening. (25)

Historically, all of the social sciences have been unabashed poachers. And it is ironic that such critics should turn a blind eye not only to the genesis of their own disciplines but to their own "trespassing." When a political scientist examines "socialization" and discusses learning theory, perception, norms and values, communication networks, occupation, class, education, is he willy nilly a psychologist, a sociologist or a social psychologist? If he is still a political scientist, why borrow heavily and often indiscriminately from other disciplines? Should not these disciplines, given the division of labour and the subject matter, study socialization? The political scientist as well as "poachers" from the other social sciences will claim that the problem interests them or the theory and methodology that they freely borrow are not the exclusive property of any discipline. Why, then, should a double standard be applied to social administration?

I give the example of the political scientist who studies socialization to demonstrate how the subject matter of what would appear to be clearly defined disciplines continually expands and contracts. Does such flux suggest growth or the absence of a field of study? While I use political science as an example, simply because it is the discipline I know best, other examples can be readily drawn from psychology, economics, anthropology, and, above all, sociology. The point to be stressed is that it is the researcher's interest, what he defines as a problem, that is paramount in understanding what is happening in a discipline, not the discipline's definition of itself. And, despite claims to the contrary, there is no exclusive subject matter that separates one social science from the other. Thus, political scientists no longer focus on the tomes of constitutional law scholars but instead avidly read and attempt to apply the work of Max Weber, Emile Durkheim, Robert Merton and Talcott Parsons, all sociologists; Karl Marx, John Maynard Keynes and Gunnar Myrdal, economists; Edmund Leach, Claude Levi-Strauss and Radcliffe-Brown, anthropologists; Sigmund Freud, Abraham Maslow and Jerome Bruner, psychologists. Marshall McLuhan, a professor of English, John Platt a biophysicist, Buckminster Fuller, an engineer, are all grist for the political scientist's mill.

But it is not only subject matter that takes on a will-of-the-wisp quality; so do concepts, theories and methodologies. Social administration is faulted for lacking clearly defined concepts, highly developed theories and sophisticated methodologies. But this state of affairs exists in all the social sciences, with the exception of economics. In political science, for example, there are over 100 definitions of the state alone; there is no clear cut agreement on what is a political party. In truth, not only is there widespread disagreement over concepts, but over what politics entails. The abundance of partial theories and sets of propositions logically and empirically wanting, does not suggest intellectual industriousness, but a failure and inability to assess the merits and utility of these "theories". Likewise the multiplicity of methodologies suggest that a paradigm, deemed to be the *sine qua non* for a mature field of study, is absent. Thus most of the social sciences are suffering the same defects as those alleged to exist in social administration.

Of course, some prominent social scientists have warned against such claims. (26) Paul Lazarsfeld has written:

But sociology is not yet in the stage where it can provide safe basis for social engineering ... It took the natural sciences about 350 years between Galileo and the beginning of the industrial revolution before they had a major effect upon the history of the world. Empirical social research has a history of three or four decades. If we expect from it quick solutions to the world's greatest problems, if we demand of it nothing but immediately practical results, we will just corrupt its natural course. (27)

Unfortunately, it is not always the demands placed on the social sciences that has led to these false expectations, rather it has been the claims and expectations of social scientists themselves. Perhaps no one has recognized this fact more clearly and written more devastatingly about it than Jerome R. Ravetz. (28)

The deepest and most urgent practical problem situations are not discovered or invented; they are presented to us, frequently against our desires, by the processes of human history acting through time up to the present. The framing and solution of practical problems is at risk of encountering a multiplicity of pitfalls, so that the purposes served can turn out to be quite different from those intended ... The first common pitfall is that the objects in whose terms the inquiry is conducted are so tightly bound to a particular ideology that the con-

clusion is determined before the work begins. But if the inquiry avoids 'theory' and becomes 'empirical,' it can encounter the pitfall of simplifying its objects of inquiry to homogeneous populations defined by classes of simple data; then the complexity and contrariness of the situation, which created the problem situation in the first place, is lost from view...

It is when immature (social) sciences are enlisted for the solution of practical or technical problems that the most severe strains arise. For this engagement inevitably leads to deceptions, of self and others... A discipline which is unable to establish facts even within its closed world of controlled experience is much less capable of genuinely drawing conclusions about the problems of raw and unstable reality. Of course, a master of the field may possess a personal wisdom of its problems more which enables him to perceive the real situation and its problems more deeply than a person with no special experience; but his conclusions are derived more from his intuitive knowledge, built up informally over a long period, than from any programme of piecemeal research. Yet, there are many temptations to pretend, and to believe, that a large-scale research programme is necessary before adequate decisions can be taken on an urgent practical or technical problem ...

The growth in volume of research provides an opportunity for an expansion of the institutional apparatus, including an academic base. There soon appears a structure of postgraduate and undergraduate course, mainly vacuous in content and largely taught by a mixture of mediocrities, philosophers **manques**, and entrepreneurs. All the contradictions inherent in the teaching of immature sciences are made more acute ... 'Pseudo-science' is not the most appropriate term for such fields, for they are not essentially misconceived in the problems and objects of inquiry. But if we describe them as 'cliche-sciences' we will characterize their distinguishing feature: the genuine insights at their base, which may well be valuable in the education of students whose previous experience is utterly foreign to the area of inquiry, become reduced to cliches as teachers and researchers in the field rub them together in an attempt to produce a plausible facsimile of scientific arguments. And their conclusions too, to the extent that they are not vacuous academic jargon, will be nothing but rearrangements of the cliches that constitute the materials of the field, organized for the best performance of the political functions of a result.

Our aim is not try to discredit social science in general or a discipline, e.g., political science or sociology, in particular. Nor for that matter is it our intention to suggest social administration has a "right" to be an "immature" or "cliche" science, too. In this sense, what's good for the social science goose may not necessarily be good or desirable for the social administration gander! Rather we wish to suggest that critiques, especially from the other social sciences, challenging the status of social administration on the grounds of an ill-defined, voluminous subject matter or a paucity of concepts, theory and methodology, are misleading and, above all, not as potent as they first might appear to be.

But we wish to go a step further and argue that not only is social administration a profession and field, subject to the same vicissitudes that the other social sciences experience, but in several basic ways, social administration has been more modest in its enterprise and more faithful to the objectives of social science.

Social administration, it is sometimes forgotten, emerged "as an empirical corrective to certain forms of normative theory." (29) Its founders were not prepared to accept the tragic consequences of industrialization and urban growth as inevitable or unremedial. Instead of accepting the normative arguments such as those put forth by Thomas Malthus, (30) who claimed that the poor had no right to demand a place at "nature's might feast," these individuals sought reform through concrete actions and programs. At first philanthropic activities dominated; it soon became apparent, however, that solutions while necessary, were piecemeal and failed to come to grip adequately with the causes of such problems. For one thing, no one was certain as to how extensive a particular problem was, whether a certain section or specific segment of the population was peculiarly vulnerable to it. Moreover, in order to answer effectively the normative arguments that defended the status quo, it became increasingly necessary to demonstrate how social institutions and processes directly contributed to the introduction and maintenance of such social problems as child labour, prostitution, malnutrition, squalor, bad housing and the like. As a consequence of such activity, the intellectual orientations of social administration were firmly established by the end of the nineteenth century.

The two men usually given credit for this intellectual emphasis are Frederic Le Play and Charles Booth. Both men believed that the

only effective way to deal with human problems was through an "empirical, quantitative, policy-related method of inquiry." (31) Thus, in order to understand the impact of industrialization on working class families Le Play studied over three hundred families, in different locales and industries, throughout Europe and subsequently published a six-volume study of his findings, **Les Ouvriers Europeens**. His British counterpart, Charles Booth, a Liverpool shipowner, wrote the **Life and Labour of the People in London** (1891-1903), which was concerned in showing "the numerical relation which poverty, misery, and depravity bear to regular earnings and comparative comfort." (32) Booth's work not only led to his appointment to the Royal Commission on the Poor Law but to the subsequent revision of old-age pensions.

The work of Le Play and Booth established the tradition of empirical, policy related research. Moreover, such research based on the findings and intellectual tools of the other social sciences were not seen as an alternative to social reform and activism, but as a vital complement. Whereas the other social sciences, especially sociology, were concerned with making their disciplines scientific, concerned more with discovering social laws and separating "fact" from "value," (33) social administration was primarily dedicated to applying existing knowledge to the amelioration of social problems.

This is not to say that social administration was not overshadowed by the other social sciences or not directly influenced by them. Since so much of social administration depended on the other disciplines for theories and methods many of its assumptions and methods reflected current thinking in related disciplines. Thus, when the social sciences conceived of social problems in terms of social pathology, i.e., individual abnormalities and anomalies, the practice of social administration was seen to be **residual**, treating the individual by helping him to "adjust" to society. And while the individual was seen to be the primary problem and not social institutions, social administration nevertheless maintained that it was the "proper, legitimate function of modern industrial society (to) help individuals achieve self-fulfillment." (34) Likewise when the Great Depression shifted the focus from social pathology to social disorganization, i.e., crime, poverty, vice, depravity, mental disorder, etc., were now seen as the product conflict, change, cultural development, social institutions and processes were emphasized instead of individual failings. (35)

As a field, then, social administration has continually attempted to deal with social problems with the social science tools at its disposal. It has never taken refuge by claiming its first priority was to create an independent, scientific, value-free base of knowledge. It should be recalled that Robert S. Lynd in **Knowledge for What?** and C. Wright Mills in the **Sociological Imagination** not to long ago urged sociologists in particular and social science in general to focus their energies on "urgent public issues and insistent human troubles." (36) In this very fundamental way, social administration has been more modest and more faithful in its enterprise: the synthesizing and application of knowledge to ameliorate and to solve social problems. And in this very basic sense, social administration has been and continues to be a field of study and a profession directly involved in understanding and treating social problems.

The Multidisciplinary Nature of Social Welfare Argument

While it is nice to talk of social administration's problem-solving "mission" and the multi-dimensionality of social problems, it is nevertheless wishful thinking to believe that an interdisciplinary approach is possible. To begin with, the so-called interdisciplinary approach, i.e., "a group of persons who are trained in the use of different tools and concepts, among whom there is an organized division of labour, around a common problem with each member using his own tools, with continuous intercommunication and re-examination of postulates in terms of the limitations provided by the work of other members, and often with group responsibility for the final product," (37) is more fancy than truth. Interdisciplinary groups, given their different interests and training, soon degenerate into **multi-disciplinary** groups, who go their own ways and do their own "thing." And while it is assumed that a common problem forms the group nexus, in reality it is the lure of large grants that fires the imagination. As soon as the project is approved and the funding begins, the interdisciplinary pretense ends. Thus Jerome Ravetz, a very distinguished philosopher and historian of science, argues that such interdisciplinary projects, in their rush for money and fame, promise much but deliver very little that is useful or new.

...In response to the urgent calls for helpful research, a clever mediocrity can build an empire and attain power and prestige at the expense of those with more caution of scruples...

The graduates of courses in such cliché sciences then emerge as manpower-units with spurious qualifications for taking their places as technicians, practitioners, or experts on the growing industry of vacuous research or misconceived technical problems. In such circumstances we can speak of corruption; for there is a sufficient penumbra of uncertainty about the nature of the enterprise, that while it is not universally recognized as a straightforward racket, there is an awareness of something false about it which is best not discussed too openly. (38)

There is another very serious charge levelled against social administration's multi/interdisciplinary focus: namely, it provides the student with little depth and systematic knowledge. A motley, rag-tag collection of skills and learning are the student's intellectual diet and when he is finally "degreed," he is, more often than not, the possessor of a lot of half-baked, vulgarized ideas. He has neither breadth nor depth because he failed to receive rigorous and concentrated training. Indeed, social administration in developing the skills, knowledge, and techniques it requires for its professional mandate would do better to send its students to courses offered by the other social sciences. Why duplicate these programs when the student can get them unadulterated? Surely sociology can offer more courses on methodology, theory, social institutions, etc., than social welfare? If it is true, as is often claimed, that social administration "is a subject based on the study of the broad range of social sciences," (39) why not require students to take considerable course work from the other disciplines? Case-work training and the knowledge gained through experience can and should be taught by a social administration faculty. Is this not the most equitable and rational division of labour?

Counter-Argument

It has taken the academic community, most especially the social sciences, a very considerable length of time to realize that many of the world's most urgent and recurring problems cannot be handled, much less understood, by a piecemeal, technique. For quite some time, economists, for example, who usually see themselves at the apex of the social sciences, failed to recognize that industrial development was much more than building markets, providing credit, training managers or increasing per capita output. That social structure, political institutions and value systems often made the difference whether a country was successfully able to "takeoff." Likewise, it has taken sociologists,

political scientists and penologists, each group usually working independently of the other, a considerable amount of time to realize that our judicial and corrective systems have failed dismally in dealing with crime and imprisonment. In 1974, for example, the cost of crime and imprisonment in the United States reached a staggering \$90 billion. Not included in this figure were the \$360 million dollars lost in taxes, since prisoners are not wage earners, or the \$540 million dollars given in welfare payments to prisoner's families. To add insult to injury, it is currently estimated that 80 percent of the prisoners are repeaters. (40)

The need for interdisciplinary research and task forces was not simply the result of greed or status mania, but the outcome of our increasing inability to wrestle with serious and persistent social problems. It was not the lure of the boondoggle that encouraged an interdisciplinary perspective, but the threat of disaster. To be sure, there were and are the academic, entrepreneurs and opportunists, but what made their ventures "successful" was the growing recognition that collective rather than individual disciplinary efforts were necessary given the magnitude and multi-dimensionality of social problems. That no one discipline could comprehend, much less cope with, the intricacies of many of our urgent social problems becomes clear when we look at Table 1. (41)

Thus, there was and continues to be an urgent demand for interdisciplinary research and training. This, however, does not deny that many of these programs, both public and private, are hastily conceived or unbelievably pretentious. (42) They are. But there is no intrinsic reason why they must be so. Just as there are good and bad undergraduate and graduate programs, highly competent and exceedingly mediocre academics, so too, are there good and bad interdisciplinary efforts and programs. They must be judged on their performance, **not apriori**. And this leads us directly to the second criticism: interdisciplinary programs in the end disintegrate into multidisciplinary debacles.

Again there is no reason, in principle, to assume that interdisciplinary endeavours must inevitably lead to intellectual chaos. Nor for that matter is there any reason to assume that people trained in and members of the same discipline will automatically cooperate and work effectively. In the end the success or failure of any intellectual undertaking depends on the personalities involved, the organization and

TABLE 1
CLASSIFICATION OF PROBLEMS AND CRISES BY ESTIMATED
TIME AND INTENSITY (WORLD)

Grade		Estimated Crisis Intensity numbers affected times degree of effect)	(if no major effort at anticipatory solution) Estimated Time to Crisis →	
		1-5 Years	5-20 Years	20-50 Years
1. 10^{10}	Total Annihilation	Nuclear or RCBW Excalation	Nuclear or RCBW Excalation	(Solved or Dead)
2. 10^9	Great Destruction or Change (Physical, Bio- logical, or Political)	(too soon)	Famines Eco-balance Development Failures Local Wars Rich-Poor Gap	Economic Structure and Political Theory Population and Eco-balance Patterns of Living Universal Education Communications- Integration Management of World Integra- tive Philosophy
3. 10^8	Widespread Almost Unbearable Tension	Administrative Management Need for Parti- cipation Group and Race Conflict Poverty-Rising Expectations Environmental Degradation	Poverty Pollution Race Wars Political Rigidity Strong Dictator ships	
4. 10^7	Large-Scale Distress	Transportation Diseases Loss of old cultures	Housing Education Independence of Big Powers Communications Gap	?
5. 10^6	Tension Producing	Regional Organi- zation Water Supplies	?	?
6.	Other Problems — Important, but Adequately Researched	Technical Develop- ment Design Intelligent Monetary Design		
7.	Exaggerated Dangers and Hopes			Eugenics Melting of Ice Caps
8.	Non Crisis Problems Being "Overstudied"	Man in Space Most Basic Science		

leadership of the group. Equally important is the problem under investigation. Practical problems, i.e., situations in which there is an awareness that something is wrong, but there is no clear conception of how to correct it, create the greatest strain. In the phases of such problem solving, "definition, information and argument, analysis and decision, execution and control," (43) there are many legitimate areas for disagreement. Technical problems, i.e., those that require the application of existing knowledge, (44) not surprisingly, usually encounter much less difficulty given the nature of the task. But, to repeat, it is the nature of the problem rather than the academic composition of the group that is of singular importance. Thus, it is much harder to deal with race relations (i.e., a practical problem) than with sending men into space (a technical problem).

Lastly, we now turn our attention to the charge that social administration should send students to other social sciences for interdisciplinary training rather than tackle the job itself. While few will deny that given the nature and scope of the problems that social administration deals with, a faculty trained in the other social science disciplines is essential. Why then should they not be permitted to teach their specialties, reflecting, of course, the special needs, emphasis and experience of social administration? Put another way, few argue that the Department of Mathematics should have the sole responsibility for teaching statistics. Psychologists and sociologists have long recognized that such training in statistics, unless tailored to the specific needs and concerns of their disciplines, is often unhelpful. Why, then, should this be different for social administration?

In truth, by sending students to other departments for their social science training or by sharing staff, a multidisciplinary rather than an interdisciplinary focus is encouraged and reinforced. Integration becomes more difficult, rivalry between disciplines are intensified. Instead of examining things from a holistic perspective, such emphasis ensures the maintenance of the status quo: viewing problems from a disciplinary perspective. Yehezkel Dror, a longtime advocate of interdisciplinary programs in teaching, research and professional activities, has observed: (45)

The required diversity of the faculty (in social administration) ... aggravates a problem made difficult by the youth of (social administration) namely, in how far should the program have a full-time faculty of

its own and/or share teachers with other, already established departments. A well-known difficulty with faculty members shared between a new, interdisciplinary endeavor and ... well established discipline(s) and department(s) is the tendency of such faculty members to orient themselves mainly to their well-established disciplines and departments. As a result, their innovative contributions to the interdisciplinary endeavor are minimized and the program is reduced to a multi-disciplinary one. Therefore, a distinct faculty in (social administration) is required. The school should be large enough to include the main relevant disciplines, to teach the basic core courses and, in particular, to prepare and supervise ... workshops.

The Professionalism of Social Administration's Graduates

The Argument

Briefly, there are some critics who believe that social administration is a breeding ground for activists. That more than anything else, the program politicizes people and exalts activism. Simple solutions and rhetoric are the intellectual menu; dogmatic, self-righteous "quackery" in the classroom the consequence. The product that is eventually turned out rates high on glibness and moral outrage but low on "know how."

Not only is social administration chastised for its political aggressiveness but ironically, it is criticized for its political passivity. Ralph M. Kramer, for example, has written: (46)

Professional orientations and organizational restrictions on methodology determine the range and content of issues so that only those issues can be selected that are amenable to the educational methods and techniques open to the professional—namely, those which are ameliorative and nonpolitical, do not lead to conflict, and do not require the use of pressure tactics. At the same time, the consensual and informational strategies employed are a consequence of the relatively noncontroversial and marginal issues selected for group action, which are a reflection of the interests of the sponsor.

Thus, the more things change, the more they remain the same. Social administration does not challenge the status quo, it does not attempt to go to the heart of problems, but simply acts as a "safety-valve."

The Counter-Argument

Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said that "all ideas incite," and ideas about the "human condition," especially with regard to causes and ways of dealing with them, are perhaps most inciteful. It has taken the social sciences quite some time to realize that false a dichotomy exists between fact and value, (47) that society, social programs, policies and problems reflect competing, conflicting values and interests. More often than not, as Nigel Harris has noted, debates over "scientific value relativism," despite academic claims to the contrary, are attempts by one group to impose its values, its goals, its beliefs on another,

The **ideologist** (that is the person with whom the speaker disagrees) is **dogmatic** (loyal to his beliefs), **doctrinaire** (uncomprising, clear), **rigid** (principled), aggressive (keen, enthusiastic), **Messianic** (hopeful of a final solution), **apocalyptic** (fears a coming disaster), **totalitarian** (beliefs are coherently unified and relatively comprehensive), **brain-washed** (persuaded), **devoted to myth and illusion** (believes what he believes), and so on.

On the other hand, the **realist** (that is, the speaker or those with whom he agrees) is **flexible** (unprincipled), **pragmatic** (narrow conservative), **cautious** (cowardly), pursues rational interests (empty of vision), **does not look further ahead than is justified by the evidence** (aimless, unprepared), and so on. (48)

Such charges of social administration's failure to be dispassionate are neither surprising nor damning. Being concerned with social problems and public policy, about conditions that many deem to be destructive, immoral and inequitable, controversy over objective conditions and subjective evaluations are inevitable and healthy. In dealing with social problems, from causes, effects and possible solutions, values and goals must clash. In the end, what is crucial is how social administration both as a profession and field of study justifies its philosophical and social approaches and values. (49)

Now let us turn to the charge that social administration encourages passivity and essentially supports the status quo. This, in my opinion, is a much more serious criticism. Professional integrity and craftsmanship are the product of an on-going elaborate interplay of

forces, often very inchoate and contradictory. Where one fits into the scheme of things, the choices one makes and where the "buck" stops, are part and parcel of experience, of reflection and personal values. If there is a lesson of history, it is "that everything has its price, everything is a tradeoff. One must try to understand what the options are and then choose to the extent one is able." (50)

As a practitioner, the student of social administration is caught in a tug-of-war. His agency has certain priorities and his clients have certain needs. Often these two are at variance not only with one another but with his appraisal of what should be done. To illustrate the point, let us take community development and resident participation as our example. What should be the degree of resident participation? There are at least seven possible options, each one of which arrogates power to one group at the expense of another. (51)

Option 1: The organization makes a plan and announces it. The community is convened for information purposes; compliance is expected.

Option 2: The organization tries to promote a plan and seeks to develop the support which will facilitate acceptance or give sufficient sanction to the plan so that administrative compliance can be expected.

Option 3: The organization presents a plan and invites questions. It is prepared to modify the plan only if absolutely necessary.

Option 4: The organization presents a tentative plan subject to change and invites recommendations from those affected. It expects to change the plan at least slightly and perhaps even substantially.

Option 5: The organization presents a **problem** to the community and seeks suggestions. It hopes to join forces with the community and make joint decisions regarding the plan.

Option 6: The organization identifies and presents a problem to the community. It defines the limits of possible action and asks the community to make a series of decisions which can be embodied in a plan which it will accept.

Option 7: The organization asks the **community** to identify the problem and to make all of the key decisions regarding goals and means. It is willing to help the community at each step to accomplish its own

goals, even to the extent of giving the community administrative control of the program.

Under what conditions should any or all of the options be considered or selected? Unfortunately, there is no hard and fast rule; different situations and problems require, one might argue, different options. One, of course, may **a priori** decide that there is only one acceptable, legitimate method; the rest smack of elitism and reflect the gospel of the status quo. But is this a professional or political judgment? Are the choices so black and white that one now becomes either part of the problem or part of the solution?

Clearly one cannot invoke magical rule of thumb. The teaching of social administration, however, must not avoid such problems. It must sensitize the student, confront him with the issues and obstacles. Above all, there must be a full and frank examination of the "Idols of the Profession." (52) The student must first delve into the **Idols of the Tribe**, i.e., the modes of perception and perspectives common to social administration. While they are not final, they are the basic starting point. This is where our professional images, identities, meanings and rationales begin. He must also seriously explore the **Idols of the Cave**, i.e., specialization and application. What do we know? How reliable is our knowledge? Likewise the student must confront the **Idols of the Market Place**, i.e.; the cliches, rhetoric and neologisms that become substitutes for ideas and thinking. Students must be acquainted with the tyranny of words and the debasement of ideas. Lastly, social administration must focus on the **Idols of the Theater**, i.e., the tendency of organizations and individuals to place survival and self aggrandizement above all other goals. Here a heavy concentration of administrative theory and practice and political processes is essential.

To be sure, all of this is easier said than done. Who, after all, wants poorly trained and inept social workers and planners? And this brings us to the final section of the paper, the role of the social sciences in the development of social administration. In the discussion that follows, we shall be dealing with three questions :

- 1) How should Social Administration be taught?
- 2) How should it be practiced?
- 3) What goals should it pursue?

III

It is not my intention to present a fully developed and detailed program for teaching social administration. Rather I propose to suggest some areas that in my experience appear to be inadequately represented in the curriculum of social administration. Before beginning, however, I should like to emphasize that I am not simply suggesting the wholesale incorporation of courses from other disciplines. As stated earlier, I am opposed to indiscriminate borrowings or course sharing with other disciplines. Rather in the brief discussion that follows, I am simply arguing that the multidimensionality of human, cultural, sociological and technological problems and issues requires more extended training in the social sciences than has hitherto been the case, especially in graduate training.

One of the most glaring absences in social administration is our indifference to history. Students lack historical perspective and often see social problems as *de novo*. There is no knowledge of how problems have been defined or what attempts have been made to deal with them. Society is understood as the here and now and all too often the immediacy of events overshadows the "lessons" of history. Yet there are very compelling reasons for students to study the history of social administration and social problems. An historical examination of the nature and course of selected topics enables us:

1. to set baselines against which to judge present conditions and practices,
2. to evaluate theories of causation and process,
3. to anticipate the effects of certain programs and policies.

Let me give an example. Suppose a student is studying community development and is trying to assess the effectiveness of violence and group protest. Historically, he can look at the problem in the following manner: (53)

A. Characteristics of Violence and Violent Societies

1. **Relative levels and types of group protest and violence.** To what extent does group violence in contemporary Canada resemble the

past? Are there similarities and differences in form, intensity and extent?

2. **What groups are engaged in violent forms of protest?** Are there groups where violence is rare and others where it is chronic?

3. **Settings of Violence.** Are there any identifiable cultural attitudes or beliefs discernible for violent or non violent activities? Are there particular socio-economic patterns or political arrangements? Does overcrowding lead to social breakdown? Are some ethnic groups more willing to rely on violent forms of protest regardless of socio-economic conditions?

B. Causes, Processes and Consequences of Violent Forms of Protest

1. **Motives for Group Protest and Violence.** Opposition to particular governments and governmental policies? Demands for socio-economic equality? Demands for 'spaces' of freedom; to manage one's own affairs? Or the protection of a community/class against the threats of other groups? Under what conditions have such motives found the conventional political processes helpful and responsive? And when has violence been used?

2. **Social Sources of the Impetus to Group Violence.** Which factors are most important in prodding groups to action? Is it new ideologies? New interpretations of traditional beliefs? Unfulfilled promises of improvement? Or improving conditions of other groups in which one's group does not share? Or perhaps it is the actual or threatened deterioration in the conditions of life?

3. **The Consequences of Violent Group Actions.** Under what circumstances has the employment of violence achieved the objective of social change? And under what circumstances has the use of violence thwarted/defeated the purposes of those who employed it? That is, have repressive measures rather than reform been the consequence?

4. **The Effects of Forceful Repression on Group Violence.** What kinds of repressive techniques techniques and activities contribute to "law and order" in the short run, but make it possible for remedial action to be taken, rather than intensifying existing opposition?

5. The Effects of Concessions and Reforms in Response to Group Violence. Are there conditions that reward violence and encourage its recurrent use? Can we distinguish concessions which are temporary and designed to "narcotize" and those which provide discontented people with the means to attain their goals? For example? What effect has the dole and work programs had?

Such an historical perspective has the virtue of informing the student about the sources, levels and consequences of violence as a form of social protest and change. It better enables him to identify and understand our own national experiences and legacies and, equally important, contributes to the fashioning of policies, programs and tactics reflecting these experiences and legacies. Ironically, while there is a readiness to admit to cultural diversity, there is an insensitivity and indifference to the historical dimension. Like Topsy, things just happen. The distinguished French historian, Fernand Braudel, thinks otherwise. (54) He has written:

..... (W)hen I think of the individual, I am always inclined to see him imprisoned in a destiny in which he himself has little hand, fixed in a landscape in which the infinite perspectives of the long term stretch into the distance both behind him and before. In historical analysis as I see it, rightly or wrongly, the long run always wins in the end.

Another area that has received scarce attention in the curricula of social administration is philosophy. Much emphasis has been given to professional ethics but too little attention has been paid to value choices, value implications, value consistencies and costs, the behavioral foundations of value commitments and the gulf between the "is" and the "ought." (55) Students desperately lack the conceptual clarity needed for the understanding of society and social problems. Concepts like authority, responsibility, motive, fact, liberty, equality, social control, conformity, value and justice, crucial in any study and comprehension of society, are indiscriminately and contradictorily used. And it is precisely here that a focused but concentrated training in social philosophy is crucial. Without rigorous training in social philosophy, the student regardless of his noble intentions, is unable to confront in-depth strategies for bringing about social change. What are the implications, ethical, conceptual, value, in selecting any of the change strategic enumerated in Table 2 ?

TABLE 2
TYPOLGY OF CHANGE STRATEGIES

Coercive strategies (a)	Nonmutual goal setting and one-sided deliberativeness.
Normative strategies (a)	Compliance achieved through the issuance of directives based on values internalized as proper and legitimate.
Utilitarian strategies (a)	Control over the allocation of resources serving as rewards and punishments.
Empirical-rational strategies (b)	Provision of rational justification for action
Normative-reeducative strategies (b)	Change of attitudes, values, skills, and significant relationships.
Power-coercive strategies (b)	Application of moral, economic and political resources to achieve change.
Power strategies (c)	Use and/or threat of force
Power strategies (c)	Bias in the structuring and presentation of a message; use of reasoning, urging, inducement based on rational and/or emotional appeals.
Reeducative Strategies (c)	Communication of fact and relearning through affective and cognitive change.
Individual change strategies (d)	Use of change among individuals as a means toward social or organizational change.
Data-based strategies (d)	Collecting and presenting data to initiate problem-solving activity and to provide a basis in which to root decision.

Organizational development (d)	Creating a supportive climate or culture for organizational change.
Violence and coercive strategies (d)	Actions designed to inflict personal injury or property damage.
Nonviolence and direct action strategies (d)	Attempts to change attitudes and/or behavior.
Manipulation (e)	A deliberate act of changing either the structure of the alternatives in the environment or personal qualities affecting choice without the knowledge of the person involved.
Persuasion (e)	Interpersonal influence in which one person tries to change the attitude or behavior of another by means of argument, reasoning, or, in certain cases, structured listening.
Facilitation (e)	Increase the ease with which an individual or group can implement their choice or satisfy their desires.

- (a) Garth N. Jones, **Planned Organizational Change**, New York: Praeger, 1969.
- (b) Robert Chin and Kenneth Benne, "General Strategies for Effective Changes in Human Systems." In W.G. Bennis, K.D. Benne, and R. Chin (eds.), **The Planning of Change**, New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969.
- (c) Gerald Zaltman, Philip Kotler, and Ira Kaufman, **Creating Social Change**, New York: Nolt, Rinehart & Winston, 1972
- (d) Harvey A. Hornstein et al, **Social Intervention: A Behavioral Science Approach**, New York: Free Press, 1971.
- (e) Donald Warwick, "Ethical Issues in Social Intervention," working paper, 1972, York University.

(Source: Gerald Zaltman).

Lastly, social administration should enlarge its offerings in Anthropology, Administrative Theory and Practice, Political Processes and Behaviour and Empirical Analysis and Policy Planning and Evaluation. More attention must be given to anthropological materials in order to acquaint students with the diversity and complexity of norms, practices, customs, beliefs, traditions and symbols within and between societies. Unfortunately, it is easily forgotten that a society's "culture" is not a biological or instinctual process. It is a total, shared learning process that prescribes and proscribes behaviour. It is a psychological or mental process, subtle but all pervasive. As members of a society or a subgroup within a society, we interact with images of individuals, objects and institutions. That is, our actions are based on identities, meanings, cues and expectations that we give to our interactions with individuals, groups, objects and institutions. Robert Musil, for example, notes: (56)

The inhabitant of a country has at least nine characters: an occupational character, a national character, a civic character, a class character, a geographical character, a sex character, a conscious character, and an unconscious character, and perhaps a private character as well. He combines them all in himself, but they dissolve by these trickling streams which they flow into and leave again to join other little streams and fill another channel. This is why every inhabitant of the earth has a tenth character as well, which is nothing more nor less than a passive fantasy of unfilled spaces. It permits man everything except one thing: to take seriously what his nine or more other characters do and what happens to them. In other words, then, it forbids him precisely that which would fulfill him.

How men cope and define their problems, the "streams and the channels" that reinforce or undermine social continuity, the psychological images and functions of institutions, and the intensity, extensiveness and congruence of values, norms, practices, are areas that anthropologists have long explored. More concretely, the tremendous cultural variety within societies, e.g., minority and ethnic groups, and between and among societies are patronizingly disregarded by literary intellectuals secular prophets and students (and practitioners) who prefer to generalize from personal experience. Instead of comprehending problems and effectively fostering change, cynicism, contempt and preservation of the status quo are the usual by-products. And it is precisely in this area that Anthropol-

logy along with emphasis in empirical analysis and evaluation has a special role to play. Both can provide the student with the following intellectual assets. (57)

1. The specification of possible areas of field work as the researcher leans upon the educated perspective of his predecessors to guide him to important and significant areas of investigation.

2. The criticism of field work while doing it. Alternative perspectives in theory yield alternative perspectives in field observation.

3. The discovery of the limitations of one's original statement of the problem; the continuous study of new data compels new formulations of the problem.

4. The discovery of the limitations of one's own theory by its continuous confrontation with empirical observation.

5. The discovery of new dimensions of the problem.

6. The reconstruction of one's problem, field work, and past theory into a further limited and discrete theory to handle the problem. Such a theory is not final nor general but adequate only to the specific problem in the specific field. However, this type of theoretical solution, in turn, provides raw materials for other research posing new problems, and these new problems as they are studied by other investigators in other settings contribute to the continuous cultivation of new theories.

Finally, it is my firm conviction that social administration needs heavy doses of Empirical Research, Analysis and Evaluation, Political Behaviour and Processes and of Administrative Theory and Practice. Indeed, these areas appear to be a very vital core of any social administration program. Social administration is not simply a field and a profession concerned with curing or treating the consequences and effects of social problems. It is and must be preventative and programs. This warrant requires us to know how and why social problems occur and in what manner. In essence, we are returning to the founding fathers of social administration who recognized that philanthropy and altruism were not substitutes for learning and knowledge. We therefore must encourage our students through the quantitative and empirical study and evaluation to develop the following skills:

1. Good quantitative judgment for the criticism and design of quantitative studies of social problems.

2. A sensitivity to the ethical and technical problems involved when doing applied research.

3. Familiarity with the research methods needed for the effective study of social problems.

4. Elegance and clarity in presenting and communicating the results of quantitative studies.

5. The ability to assess and design social indicators and in forecasting alternative futures. Here the emphasis is on initiative, novelty and social inventiveness.

Likewise, our emphasis on the political is part and parcel of the real world that social administration must function in. This is a basic requirement if the student not only wishes to study and recommend policy solutions but to plan and implement such solutions, be he a case worker or social planner. To corrupt an old political aphorism, "politics is the mother's milk" of social life. And those who do not know or understand the rules of the game, the sensitive points and forces at play, are doomed to become disillusioned "dropouts" or callous bureaucrats. In both cases impotence and cynicism are the inevitable and destructive by-products. In sum, the study of politics tailored, of course, to the goals and objectives of social administration, can help us understand and influence, "who gets what, when and how."

Lastly, the same reasons account for the greater concentration on Administrative Theory and Practice. The planning, policies and programs that social administrators design are shaped by and in turn shape the means used to implement them. Without administrative skill and experience, social administration will have to "reconcile itself to the role of a gnat trying to drive a tiger by buzzing around its ears. The crucial fallacy in this point of view is the failure to recognize that, in the absence of a skilled tiger tamer, neither beast will go anywhere in particular — and it is the gnat that loses any sense of direction." (58) In short, the context of implementation is no less important than the contexts of problem discovery and planning and policy justification. There is a fundamental symbiotic relationship between the two. But there is another problem that is equally deceptive and destructive. This is that administrative techniques and training are generalizable and that perhaps a separate faculty or school can teach it. That is, while planning

and policy-making may indeed demand social administrative expertise, such, however, is not the case with regard to administrative methods and the design and management of delivery systems. (59) Such arguments simply fly in the face of hard learned and costly experience. In truth, it is similar to the constitution-makers of the first half of this century who simply designed constitutions for countries without any heed to or awareness of basic cultural and social conditions. Not surprisingly, the British modeled constitutions of Nigeria and Egypt proved to be disastrous. And the Weimar Republic whose constitution reflected the most advanced legal thinking of the day contributed to the rise of Adolf Hitler. There are indeed divisions of labour as there are **genera** and **species**. Very few of us, however, would go to a general surgeon to have open heart surgery performed. Then why should it be presumed that there are immutable, universal laws governing administration? Here there is absolutely no substitute for the on-the-job experience and expertise that the specialist in social administration has vis-a-vis his subject matter and organizational milieu.

The Goals and Practice of Social Administration

The goal of social administration and the manner in which it should be taught and practiced has, in my opinion, been brilliantly, powerfully and succinctly set forth by Kenneth Burke. Burke has written:

Critical and imaginative works are answers to questions posed by the situation in which they arose. They are not merely answers, they are strategic answers. Stylized answers. For there is a difference in style of strategy, if one says 'yes' in tonalities that imply 'thank God!' or in tonalities that imply 'alas!' So I should propose an initial working distinction between 'strategies' and 'situations' whereby we think of ... any work of critical or imaginative case... as the adopting of various strategies for the encompassing of situations. These strategies size up the situations, name their structure and outstanding ingredients, and name them in a way that contains an attitude toward them.

This point of view does not, by any means, vow us to personal or historical subjectivism. The situations are real; the strategies for handling them have public content: in so far as situations overlap from individual to individual, or from one historical period to another, the strategies possess universal relevance.

Note that Burke is concerned about learning, developing and applying strategies to real, concrete situations. He does not exalt novelty nor eschew orthodoxy. Nor does he renounce innovation or exploration. What is overriding for Burke and for this writer is that social administration, if it is to be faithful to its goal of providing and applying strategies for the resolution and prevention of social problems, must require that its students and practitioners become acquainted with the body of accepted social scientific knowledge. This body must be tailored to the needs of social administration and therefore can be expected to be modified in the light of the scope, nature and experience involved and gleaned in confronting social problems. Of equal importance, is the requirement that both students and practitioners of social administration have the ability to bring social scientific knowledge and techniques to bear on social problems and processes. We must, in short, not only study **strategies** but **apply** them as well. And only the diversity, depth and broadness provided by the social sciences and supplied by a rigorous, integrated program and curriculum offers us the possibility of attaining these twin objectives. Social administration has a choice: it can serve as an auxiliary tool for dealing with social problems or it can, on the basis of experience, contemplation, research and the mastering of the accepted body of social scientific knowledge, move from an interdisciplinary enterprise to a supradiscipline one. Regardless which choice is made, social administration cannot escape its social scientific heritage, dependence or responsibility. For those who place action above strategy, empathy above intellectual comprehension, I think it prudent to end with John M. Keynes' observation:

... The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back.

FOOTNOTES

1. For purposes of brevity, I shall use these terms interchangeable. Some, of course, may protest that social administration is much narrower in scope than social welfare. But as we have defined it, social administration is concerned with theory and practice, learning and application.
2. The definition is by Professor D. V. Donnison and is cited in W. D. Burrell, et al, *Social Administration: Readings in Applied Social Science* (Harmondsworth, Penguin Books Ltd., 1973), p. 9.
3. It has been very common to view social problems as social pathology, value-conflicts, social disorganization, deviant behaviour and social reactions. For a historical and theoretical discussion, see Edwin M. Lemert, "Social Problems," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, (New York: The MacMillan Co., and The Free Press, 1968), Vol. 14, pp. 452-459.
4. The quote is from R. M. Titmuss and has been altered. Titmuss wrote that "The Social Services... can no longer be considered as 'things apart'; as phenomena of marginal interest, like looking out of the window on a train journey. They are part of the journey itself. They are an integral part of industrialization," cited in Borrell, *op. cit.*, p. 255.
5. According to Henry W. Riecken, "There are about 110,000 active social scientists in the United States — if 'social science' is defined to include anthropology, economics, geography, history, political science, psychology and statistics. About 60 per cent of them are engaged in university teaching research and service... By far the most numerous psychologists and economists — about 30,000 of the former and 25,000 of the latter. There are perhaps 18,000 historians, 15,000 political scientists, and 12,000 sociologists. The other disciplines collectively number somewhat less than 10,000 members ... It is perhaps of incidental interest to note that ... academic institutions (approximately 150 Ph.D. granting universities organized into 650 disciplinary departments known as the 'social sciences') produce currently about 4000 doctoral degrees a year and that this number is expected to rise to almost 7,500 by 1975.

Henry W. Riecken, "The Federal Government and Social Science Policy in the United States," in A. B. Cherns, et al, *Social Science and Government Policies and Problems*, (London: Tavistock Publications Ltd., 1972), p. 175.

6. Needless to say, different authors, reflecting various historical logical and cultural traditions include and exclude different descriptions from the list of social sciences, thus, Edwin R. A. Seligman in "What are the Social Sciences?" *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1937) Considered Political Science, Economics, History, Jurisprudence, Penology, Sociology, Social Work, Ethics, Philosophy and Psychology as Social Sciences (pp. 3-7). In the more recent *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: the MacMillan Co., 1968), the social sciences are seen as being comprised of the following disciplines: Anthropology, Economics, Geography, History, Law, Political Sciences, Psychiatry, Psychology, Sociology and Statistics, (pp. XIX-XXII).
7. Ward opposed the "laissez-faire" sociology of Herbert Spencer and W. G. Summer. He wrote *Applied Sociology: A Treatise on the Conscious Improvement of Society by Society*, (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1906) to bring "applied sociology" to the attention of his academic confreres.
8. For a very brief but enlightening discussion, see Scott Gordon *Social Science and Modern Man* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970), pp. 3-16.
9. Daniel Lerner, ed., *The Human Meaning of Social Sciences* (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1969 ed.), Chapters 1-3.
10. Robert S. Lynd, *Knowledge For What?* (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1964, ed.), p. 114.
11. Most of the following discussion and categorization are based on Lee Rainwater, *Social Problems and Public Policy* and *Inequality and Justice* (Chicago: Aldine Publishing Co., 1974), pp. 7-11.
12. *Ibid*, 8-9.
13. Michael Polanyi, *Personal Knowledge Towards a Post-Critical Philosophy*. (New York: Harper and Row, Publisher, 1962), pp. 54-5.
14. Rainwater, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

15. Quentin Gibson, "Facts and Values," in W. D. Burrell, *et al*, *Social Administration: Readings in Applied Social Sciences* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books Ltd., 1973), pp. 307-320. See also Arnold.
16. Cited in Thomas D. Watts, "Value Problems in the Quest for Sanction in Social Planning," *Kansas Journal of Sociology*, Vol. IX, No. 1, Spring 1973, p. 32. Also see Gunnar Myrdal, "How Scientific are the Social Sciences," *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 28, No. 4, 1972, pp. 151-170.
17. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution*, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).
18. *Ibid.*, X, 6, 10, 23-24, 37. Also see D. Shapere, "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions," *The Philosophical Review*, Vol. LXXIII, 1964, pp. 383-94.
19. Modified from Harold Lasswell, "The Policy Sciences," *The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: The Mac-Millan Co., 1968), p. 181.
20. See Harry H. Eckstein, The Concept "Political Systems: A Review and Revision," (New York: American Science Association Annual Meeting, September 4-7, 1963), p. 4 and *passim*.
21. Burrell, *op. cit.*, Part I, pp. 9-65.
22. Cited in Irving Weissman, *Social Welfare Policy and Services in Social Work Education*, (New York: Council on Social Work Education, 1959), Vol. XII, p. 23.
23. *Ibid*, 12.
24. This is a modification of the definition of health developed by the World Health Organization. *Ibid*, 30.
25. Alex Inkeles, "The Subject Matter of Sociology," in Burrell, *op. cit.*, p. 70.
26. One of the most thoughtful discussions in C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959). Also see Maurice Stein and Arthur Vidich, *Sociology on Trial* (Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963).
27. Quoted in Jerome R. Ravetz, *Scientific Knowledge and Its Social Problems* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), p. 385.

28. *Ibid*, 355, 384-5.
29. Pinker, in Burrell, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
30. Malthus wrote:
"A man who is born into a world already possessed, if he cannot get subsistence from his parents on whom he has a just demand, and if the society does not want his labour, has no claim of right to the smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has no business to be where he is. At nature's mighty feast there is no vacant cover for him. She tells him to be gone and will quickly execute her own orders, if he does not work upon the compassion of some of her guests. If these guests get up and make room for him, other intruders immediately appear"

Reverend Thomas R. Malthus, *An Essay in the Principle of Population* (London: J. Johnson, 1803), Chapter VI, p. 531.
31. Lerner, *op. cit.*, 19.
32. *Ibid.*, 20.
33. See Maurice Natanson, ed., *Philosophy of the Social Sciences: A Reader* (New York: Random House, 1963).
34. Weissman, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
35. Edwin M. Lemert, "Social Problems," *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968), Vol. 14, pp. 452-59.
36. Mills, *op. cit.*, p. 21. This is not to say that there have not been nor are there no strong differences of opinion within social administration. But in social administration the controversy has been essentially over how to treat social problems, e.g., microscopically, macroscopically, residually, etc., and not over whether the provision for social problems should be social administration's *raison d'être*.
37. Anthony R. Stone, "The Interdisciplinary Research Team," in the *Journal of Applied Behavioral Science*, Vol. 5, No. 3, 1969, p. 357.
38. Ravetz, *op. cit.*, p. 384.
39. Birrell. *op. cit.*, p. 9.
40. "Wraparound," *Harper's*, Vol. 250, No. 1498, March 1975, p. 9.

41. John R. Platt, *Perception and Change: Projections for Survival* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1970), pp. 168-9. Also see Joseph P. Martino, "Science Indicators: Charting the Progress of Research," *The Futurist*, Vol. IX, No. 1, February 1975, pp. 44-48.
42. Ravetz, *op. cit.*, Part IV. Also see Irving Louis Horowitz, *Foundations of Political Sociology*, (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1972), Chapters 16-20.
43. Ravetz, *op. cit.*, p. 340.
44. *Ibid*, 321-25.
45. Yehezkel Dror, "Teaching of Policy Sciences: Design for a University Doctorate Program," *Social Sciences Information*, Vol. 9, No. 2, April 1970, pp. 115-16.
46. Ralph M. Kramer, "The Influence of Sponsorship, Professionalism and the Civic Culture on the Theory and Practice of Community Development," *International Review of Community Development*, No. 25-26, Spring 1971, pp. 222-23.
47. W. G. Runciman, *A Critique of Max Weber's Philosophy of Social Sciences*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972).
48. Nigel Harris, *Beliefs in Society*, (Harmondsworth: Pelican Books, 1971), p. 26.
49. Duncan MacRae, Jr., "Scientific Communication, Ethical Argument and Public Policy," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 65, No. , pp. 38-50.
50. Peter L. Berger, "The Liberal as Fall Guy," in *Don't Just Do Something*, (Santa Barbara: The Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, 1972), p. 76.
51. Kramer, *op. cit.*, pp. 223-24.
52. I am using the categories adopted by Robert A. Nisbet, "Sociology as an Art Form, in Stein and Vidich, *op. cit.*, pp. 158-9.
53. I am closely following the argument and problems presented by Ted Gurr and Hugh D. Graham, *Historical and Comparative Perspectives on Violence in America: Themes for Consideration in Comparative and Historical Essays*, (Working paper presented to the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, n.d.), pp. 1-6.

54. Cited by J. H. Elliott in "Mediterranean Mysteries: A Review of Fernand Braudel's 'The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II,' Vol. 1, *The New York Review*, May 3, 1973, p. 27.
- Barrington Moore, Jr., in his *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), p. 460 has written: "Historical generalizations are not immutable laws like those of physics: the course of history reflects mainly an effort to escape the bounds imposed by previous conditions expressed in such generalizations."
55. Thomas McPherson, *Social Philosophy* (London: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1970).
- Yehezkel Dror, "Prolegomena to Policy Sciences," *Policy Sciences*, Vol. I (1970), pp. 135-150.
56. Cited in Ralf Dahrendorf, *Essays in the Theory of Society*, (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968), pp. 74-75.
57. Stein and Vidich, *op. cit.*, p. 168.
58. Harry G. Johnson, "The Consequence of Keynes," *Times Literary Supplement*, No. 3, 805, February 7, 1975, p. 10.
59. Those advocating "Policy Sciences" are especially guilty of this oversimplification. For some idea of the administrative complexity and expertise involved in social administration; see Kramer, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-36.
-

الادارة الاجتماعية والتغير الاجتماعي

د . جويل بريجر

النقاش حول الادارة الاجتماعية يكاد لا ينقطع . والباحث هنا معنى اساسا بالانتقادات المثارة حول الموضوع من الزاوية المهنية الاكاديمية . اما الاسئلة الاساسية التي تثيرها وتناقشها الدراسة فهي :

١ — هل الادارة الاجتماعية حقل واضح المعالم ، وله اطار نظري متكامل ؟

٢ — هل يجب ان يدرس ؟ واذا كان الجواب بالايجاب ، هل يجب ان يكون التركيز على البحث التجريبي (الامبريقي) ، ام على بناء النظرية ام على كليهما ؟

٣ — كيف يجب ان يمارس ؟

٤ — ما هي اهدافه ، وهل يجب ان يقوم بدمج عدة حقول دراسة معا ؟

والخلاصة هي ان الادارة الاجتماعية لها حرية الاختيار . فهي يمكن ان تخدم كأداة مساعدة لحل مشاكل اجتماعية ، تماما مثلما يمكنها التحول الى علم واسع متكامل .