

**INTER-REGIONAL INTERACTION:
AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE
STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS**

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After the failure of U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger to break the Middle East impasse in March 1975, a high level State Department source made the following statement:

Perhaps the big lesson to be learned from this failure, combined with reverses in Southeast Asia is that the United States has been trying to do too much. We have tried to be the peace makers in the Middle East while keeping the Russians at arm's length, and we have tried through our allies to keep the communists at bay in (Southeast Asia) . Perhaps the United States must accept the reality that in 1975 American power and influence cannot achieve the kinds of things it did 20 years ago.¹

There is more than helpless resignation in this statement. It goes beyond the mere recognition of new realities in the world today. It implies that changes, of global dimensions, have given rise to a new environment in world politics where traditional tools for policy implementation seem increasingly inadequate to solve major international problems. Equally, existing conceptual frameworks of analysis of the international system do not seem very useful in understanding these problems or helpful in their solution. The world is passing through a transitional period where established norms are reversed in almost every international interaction. And new patterns and rules in world politics appear sometimes so novel as to drive familiar conceptualizations of the international system into serious crises of relevance.²

Yet, these new patterns and rules are not easily identified with any measure of accuracy.³ Therefore, any effort to conceive a more adequate framework of analysis would likely face the same kind of pitfalls inherent

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in previous frameworks. A more adequate framework would differ only in its focus, and would depend, to a large extent, on the angle from which the international system is observed.

But whether the new patterns of world politics are clearly formalized or are still in the process of taking shape, tentative explanations must be explored. In particular, there is a pressing need to answer questions such as these: What are the new constraints that place such serious inhibitions upon the power and influence of the United States and other power centers of the types the "high level source" alluded to? What implications do they have for the international system and particularly for world order? What type of responses are contemplated by traditional power centers to mitigate the effect of the new patterns and rules? What accommodations and adjustments are being made by them without losing their high status in the world? What kind of framework can be devised to answer these questions in some systematic manner so as to facilitate the task of students of world politics and policy makers?

Before attempting to answer these questions it is useful to start with some introductory notes on the element of time as a central concept in any discussion of the dynamics of the international system. In a perceptive remark made in the late 1940's Barbara Ward reminded her readers that "Roman civilization took centuries to decline and fall, but Western Europe's nineteenth-century apex and its apparent downfall in the twentieth are separated by barely seventy years."⁴

It is hardly a novelty to say that in one single generation, particularly since the end of World War Two, the world has undergone changes that could have otherwise taken centuries to occur. Yet, conceptualizations of the international system often do not seem to account for this phenomenon adequately. For example, never before in the history of mankind has there existed such a large number of independent sovereign states, interacting freely and co-existing in an orderly fashion, yet differing from each other in many respects. Also, the age of empires seems to have run its course and it is unlikely that it will be repeated in future international relations.⁵ Yet, analyses of world politics are still strongly attached to the concept of empire. The classifications of the international system as bipolar, multipolar, etc., are but conceptualizations of hegemonial power of global dimensions, having the concept of empire somewhere in the back of the mind.

The changes that have been taking place in the international environment were originally the result of the advance of technology, particularly communications technology, that has spread awareness throughout the world. Modern technology was cast from a European nucleus of nations affected by the Industrial Revolution. It was, therefore, the dynamism of the Western developed societies that initiated change in the international environment. But once the process of change was set in motion it became irreversible, and soon the initiators lost control of its direction. After the international environment became impregnated with the seeds of change it was only a matter of time until the environment would begin to affect its originators, thus culminating in altering the established rules and patterns of world politics.

The shape and the direction of these patterns are determined by a number of factors. First, there is the increase of the number of active actors in the system, a movement that has been growing steadily since the end of World War Two. Their presence and activities in the international arena have created a new environment of politics. Second, the new actors have been using different tools for manipulation, such as energy, resources, etc., and taking advantage of their numerical strength in international forums to achieve their objectives.⁶ Naturally, these new tools would re-define the familiar components of capabilities in the new environment. And third, the new environment is determined by the way these tools are used in the system. Therefore, it is the process of change and the conduct of relations that become of crucial importance. The results of such a process are new patterns of interaction among states on global as well as on regional levels.

This paper will attempt to develop a conceptual framework, or a model, for the analysis of an international system that accomodates these changes in the international environment and points to new patterns of interactions currently evolving in world politics.

The Inter-regional Interaction Model

Interactions among states fall into one of three patterns: (1) Interactions within the region, or intra-regional; (2) interactions outside the region, or extra-regional; (3) interactions between regions, or inter-regional. The basic argument of this model is that the last category of interaction is the pattern most rapidly developing in the contemporary inter-

national system, and that a focus on this pattern would provide better understanding of the process of world politics.

In defining a region nothing could be added to the various definitions attempted by a number of students.⁷ Without going into detail in commenting on the various approaches followed in defining a region, or citing major characteristics,⁸ it is sufficient to say that the use of the concept rather than any particular criteria or approach is what matters in this discussion. Regions or regional subsystems are generally "areas of the world which contain geographical proximate states, forming in their foreign affairs, mutually interrelated units."⁹ This general definition stresses the elements of proximity and similarity of foreign affairs, having as bases some common historical, economic and cultural links. In this regard, a regional subsystem refers to state members in one region, rather than to states from different regions who form a subsystem in certain functional areas. Therefore, the members of OPEC, for example, form a subsystem for the purpose of coordinating oil policies, but not a regional subsystem since they belong to different regions. On the other hand, the members of OAPEC, or the Arab OPEC, constitute a regional subsystem because of their geographical proximity and their common historical, economic, and cultural bonds. Also, a regional subsystem is loosely defined to include any group of states in any major regional area. Therefore, Asia, Africa, and Latin America which are major regions of the world, encompass various regional subsystems.¹⁰

It is useful to expand on the concept of regional subsystem and why it is an appropriate unit of analysis in the study of the international system today.

First, the emphasis on regional subsystem, as a unit of analysis seems increasingly more representative of the actual operation of the international system. This focus has been the result of the increasing interest in the past two decades in studies of integration and international organizations where the regional subsystem is often used as a central operative unit. John Burton goes even as far as to say that "a concept of system interacting is more realistic than a concept of states interacting."¹¹

Second, the emphasis on subsystem leads quite naturally, to incorporate a larger number of actors in the system. Models of bipolarity, multipolarity or bloc systems seem to be exclusive, Western-bound conceptualizations that accommodate only traditional and powerful actors.

A framework of analysis that accounts for France, China, or for that matter Japan, as major actors or blocs, and neglects at the same time large regional subsystems in Asia, Latin America, or Africa, is nothing less than misrepresentation of reality. Traditional categorization could have been applicable in the past when these areas were tied with the bonds of colonialism to European power centers and could, therefore, be easily considered as parts of these powers, or simply discount them as if they did not exist. But this is no longer possible. Considering the large resources and potentialities of the new independent states, and the important roles they play in international forums, conceptualizations that focus on only two or more actors in the system are largely rendered "inoperative".

Third, the subsystem approach is more in line with the identity problem in world politics, and in tune with the actors' perceptions of their roles in the regional as well as in the global environment. For example, the Western European Common Market states perceive themselves as a unit, partially in economic terms, but equally and more importantly in political terms, vis-a-vis the two super-powers or other regional groupings in the world. So do other states within their regional subsystems. Various regional subsystems in Africa, Asia, and Latin America, perceive themselves as distinctive units, of unique features, playing special roles in world politics. They do not perceive themselves as allies (some say clients) of any specific power formation whether bipolar, multipolar, or bloc. Furthermore, the spirit of the Third World movement has created an image of peculiar political, economic, social, and cultural problems that form a common denominator for a large number of regional subsystems, and has helped to define their status and identity in the world.

Fourth, the focus on regional subsystems makes it possible to raise certain substantive issues in some realistic and specific contexts. The interests of states differ significantly from one region of the world to another, and so does their definition of major substantive issues. Since the international system is shaped by the type of interests and issues raised in it the focus on regional subsystem enables the analyst to concentrate on those issues that are most important in any particular regional subsystem, and consequently, makes it easier to understand its behavior. This problem was hardly raised in previous models, except in vague terms, and even then reflected the exclusive interests of those powerful actors in the system. "The politics of affluence" of Europe, concerned with such issues as nuclear weapons and security, is certainly not the type of problem

encountered in less developed nations, often concerned with basic economic needs. For the last category, UNCTAD is more important than the Conference on European Security.

Fifth, a closely related fact is that the subsystem approach can accommodate the type of analysis that distinguishes between northern and southern interests and makes cross-cutting political, economic, and cultural categorizations possible. Patterns and levels of development can be better discernible, isolated, and analysed within the larger configuration of the developed/developing dichotomy. In particular, the subsystem approach is most suited to analyse the increasing tendency of advanced northern regional subsystems to deal horizontally among themselves, on one level and on certain issues, and vertically with less developed, southern subsystems, on another level and over certain different issues. It also makes it possible to analyze the patterns of interaction among southern regional subsystems, and between these as one group on one side and the northern regional subsystems as another group on the other side.

Sixth, the concept of world order, based on certain values that promote stability can be accommodated better within a framework of regional subsystems.. For example, Falk and Mendlovitz cite five world order values as bases for a stable world: (1) minimization of violence, (2) maximization of social and economic welfare, (3) maximization of social and political justice, (4) maximization of ecological balance, and (5) maximization of participation in authority processes.¹² While some of these values are realizable on both national and global scales, the extent of application and the meaning of some others often vary from one regional subsystem to another. There is no homogeneous standard of what constitutes an acceptable level of social and economic welfare, or social and political justice. This is so simply because the definition of these values is bound by differing political, economic, and cultural determinants that vary from one regional subsystem to another. In each the level of development, the prevailing interests, and the objectives sought define the context within which these values are perceived and formulated. Therefore, the pursuit of stability for its own sake does not necessarily have an attraction in certain regional subsystems. In fact, the reversal of established norms and relationships, and with them stability, might be the overriding concern. In sum, it is often the kind of world order that matters, not world order in itself.

Seventh, the regional subsystem approach provides "handles" for

operationalization in that the management of the complex problems could be carried out across regional subsystems vertically and horizontally. Categorization of issues on different axes of alliance becomes a more manageable task. In this approach it is necessary to be specific in defining the problem or designing for it an appropriate solution. It forces the analyst to turn away from theoretical and highly abstract conceptualizations, difficult to operationalize, and toward clearer and more realistic vision of the issue at hand.

And finally, the regional subsystem approach recognizes the diversity of political cultures in the world, and in this it is an improvement over traditional models that seem to lump together various heterogeneous regional subsystems in large constellations of power along some presumed ideological lines. In a sense, this is a break away from a "melting pot" theory of politics applied on a global level. This view stresses the distinctive features of politics as we move from one region of the world to another. It emphasizes the cultural dimensions of politics.¹³ This shift of focus would certainly force an intellectual movement away from a narrow Eurocentric conception of world politics and world order, and toward a more cosmopolitan conception that deals with substantive issues from a wider perspective.

However, the analysis of the international system on a regional subsystemic level would not have been possible without the growth of certain objective conditions in the world during the last two decades. Foremost among them is the demise of colonialism, even though not yet complete. The end of political dependence of a large number of states on their former colonial powers has helped to define the boundaries of subsystems. The new independent states were freed from their former relationships as subordinates to extra-regional powers and were able to become genuine actors in their own regional subsystems. This has not only expanded the participation of the new states in the international system, but has also created a new environment where interaction among states has taken different patterns.

Two ideas here deserve further elaboration since they are central to the theme of this discussion. First, the participation of new actors in the international system has rendered the familiar conceptualizations of the system inadequate; and second, the new environment has created new patterns of interaction in world politics.

As long as the traditional actors were the only ones to account for in the international system, conceptual frameworks were easy to operate within certain basic notions of stability and world order. The structure of the system could basically remain stable and the system's behavior could be highly predictable. To be sure, significant changes could take place so as to affect drastically the balance between major actors. But since the actors were few, basically of similar cultural background, and the tools used for manipulation were identical, they followed agreed upon processes to affect change. None of the actors was interested in, or capable of, doing otherwise. Therefore, the system could take any form of the structural varieties offered by Morton Kaplan and others. In essence, that meant changing roles in an international system dominated by a number of actors, relatively homogeneous, geographically, historically, and culturally. Even the rise of communism did not disturb the familiar operation of the system since, in the words of Barbara Ward, "Communism was Marx's amalgam of German philosophy, French politics, and British economics,"¹⁴ and therefore, shared with the West all basic characteristics. Kaplan's futuristic models that foresee the participation of non-European actors, whether nations, supra-national organizations, or transnational actors are cast in a European operational mold and are, therefore, only variations of the same Western disposition.

Traditional models of the system cannot, therefore, accommodate the new actors without undergoing some major structural changes. To put it differently, the addition of new actors to the international system does not only alter the system quantitatively, but also changes its behavioral patterns qualitatively. There is no guarantee that the new actors will play the game of international politics the way the European actors did, or that they will use the same tools. To account for the new actors numerically, without considering the wider implications of their participation on the nature of the system, would leave out essential elements which are, in fact, the ingredients of a new international environment. This requires the formalization of new frameworks, more fitting to the new environment. The regional subsystem approach is one effort in this direction.

The second point to be stressed is derived from the first. In the new environment, marked by the participation of new actors, patterns of interaction have taken different forms. During the period of hegemonial European and American power in Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the peoples and governments of these subordinate subsystems interacted ex-

clusively with their dominant patrons. There was little or no direct interaction between these subordinate subsystems, even though relations between them existed before the advance of colonialism. The mutual ignorance of these regions about each other can be seen as a function of their having slipped back into oblivion as European advances in technology and power made Europe the center of the modern world. So, for the last few centuries these regions looked toward the European nations and interacted with them, or through them, exclusively. The European nations monopolized the means of transfer of goods and knowledge between all regions of the world and enforced a system of controlled communication through a hegemonial land and sea power. They became the "gate keepers", so to speak, through which all knowledge was filtered and passed on to others at their will. Colonialism, therefore, served not only as an efficient system for exploitation, but also as a device that cut deep trenches between major geographical areas and centers of old civilizations.

The new environment has allowed drastic changes in this situation. States of various regional subsystems are increasingly coming into contact with each other. The United Nations and other international forums have served as meeting places for the new actors and have helped to reintroduce them to each other, even though for a while relations remained stagnant. The shadow of power of the former colonizers was effective, to a point, in keeping these states apart through various forms of economic and political pressure. But finally "the dam broke" and "the flood" of various patterns of interaction between them followed.¹⁵ The similarity of their demands upon the international system has brought about closer communication between them and broadened the spheres of their relations. New patterns of interaction have emerged on state and regional levels.

The inter-regional interaction model accounts for one more objective condition in the international system; that is, the perception of the actors of major issues in world politics. Two phenomena are to be noted here particularly: (1) the polarization of regional subsystems over substantive issues, and (2) the interdependent nature of the issues involved.

The issues of economic development, energy, raw materials, technology transfer, environment, food and population are no longer the concern of a few. Solutions to these problems cannot be achieved except by multi-lateral agreements, and here is where the problem lies. There is a wide range of divergent opinion about these problems and their solutions, defined in terms of economic, social, and geographical variables. Polariz-

ation takes place and often regional subsystems express specific stands on these issues, representing coherent sets of values, and presenting solutions best fitted to their interests.

Ian Baldwin, Jr. provides an illustration of the perception problem.¹⁶ The World Order Models Project was designed to discuss various changes that could be brought about by the decade 1990's, including the question "should radical system change occur or can a preferred world order be achieved with slight modification of present trends and institutions?" Baldwin reports that the problem of war prevention was the overriding objective of the project but "world order was almost immediately expanded, particularly at the insistence of Latin American, Indian, and African scholars to include economic welfare and social justice." The Latin American team asserted that world order was a matter of egalitarianism in the international system because

neither lasting world peace nor worldwide economic welfare and social justice are achievable until all the peoples of the world become equal participants in making those decisions that affect their own destinies.¹⁷

Baldwin reports that the Indian team stressed the need for radical changes in the distribution of the world's resources. On the other hand, the West German team, expressing the feeling of West Europeans, perceived world order in terms of security. In contrast, the North American team was concerned with the ecological crisis.¹⁸

The disparity in perception between various regional subsystems makes the analysis of issues on a subsystemic level mandatory. Such analysis would reveal how different regional subsystems perceive, define and operate their preferences in the global picture. A dichotomy of perceptions will most likely develop into two major alliances of regional subsystems, namely, north and south.

The second issue that makes inter-regional interaction a developing phenomenon is related to the nature of global interdependence in the world today. The contemporary international system is increasingly viewed in the light of what has become known as "the management of interdependence". A configuration of the international system must account for the various parties involved in negotiating "planetary bargain,... a collection of parallel bargains of such matters as food, population, energy,

environment, money, investment and security.”¹⁹ In pressing this point, Charles W. Yost, a perceptive and life long diplomat, says:

no longer can a rich man's club, even of old and new rich together, make the decisions for everyone and expect them to be carried out. Whether or not the U.S. finds the “third world” congenial, it is going to have to take it into account and deal with it just as it has with Russia and China.²⁰

The actors in the international system are increasingly identified with their regional subsystems on substantive issues. Polarization among regional subsystems becomes important because it represents an effective tool for maximization of values. In an interdependent world, the vulnerability of states increases. Therefore, they try to tip the balance in their favor by forming economic and political alliances, total or partial. The alliance increases the state's capability, and provides it with a better bargaining position. Since the positions of states vary in the international hierarchy (defined in terms of military strength, resources, population, etc.) the tendency of those states who share common values and interests is to present themselves in one front vis-a-vis other groupings of shared values and interests. Normally states find affinity and affiliation with those states in the same regional subsystem.

Examples of these patterns of interaction can increasingly be found to support this thesis. The polarization of interests in the energy field has driven the Western Europeans to negotiate with the Arab oil producing countries in one front. The proposals put forth by the United States for common Western strategies have stirred up a controversy simply because the Western Europeans have felt that their interests and perceptions of the problem differed from those of the United States. Another example could be the negotiations between the European Economic Community representing the Western European subsystem, and the League of Arab States, representing the Middle Eastern subsystem. A third example could be drawn from the inter-American system. Increasingly, a clear distinction is being made between the north and the south American subsystems, defined in terms of economic interests, levels of development, and cultural differences. Views over such issues as Cuba, the terms of trade, the limits of territorial sea, and even the position of the United States toward Panama are clearly polarized along the lines of the southern and northern hemispheric subsystems.

However, the regional interaction patterns do not only run vertically between northern and southern subsystems. There is an increasing tendency toward horizontal inter-regional interaction as well. theories of dependency have long provided prognoses of the ailing state of development in the Third World. In practical terms, the remedy is to end "all forms of dependence,"²¹ by diversifying and expanding the political and economic ties of the developing nations with larger units. Disappointed at the failure of development strategies tailored for them by the industrialized nations, southern developing regions are beginning to interact horizontally among themselves in various areas. However, the patterns of horizontal interaction complement those patterns of vertical interaction. Such a situation can be seen in the newly emerging relationship between the Latin American and Middle Eastern regional subsystems, for example, where both depend on northern subsystems for technology, while expanding their relations in the areas of capital investment, the exchange of energy, raw materials and finished goods.

Horizontal interaction is also increasingly taking place among northern advanced subsystems. The attempt at coordination of economic policy in the Western world is one example. The conclusion of a treaty on European security in 1975 is another. In fact, the whole issue of detente can be perceived as a practical step on the part of the northern, more advanced subsystems, to consolidate their ranks over worldwide issues. Detente, defined as an attempt at integration of power between the northern subsystems can, it is hoped, stand the pressure of the emerging forces of the southern subsystems. Here, the interest seems to be in cooperating in the security field before moving to wider functional areas such as resources, technology and environment.

C o n c l u s i o n

In this model the patterns of regional interaction and their nature have been emphasized rather than the behavior of single states in the international system. As it happens, this corresponds to the new perspective on the study of international relations as perceived by John W. Burton and his associates. In their outline for the study of world society they assert that:

no progress can be made in the study of any level of behavior
unless there is description and explanation of relationships;

how they evolve, how they are learned, what patterns emerge, and why there is observance and deviance from them.²²

The attempt to develop an inter-regional interaction model for the analysis of the international system falls within this perspective. It focuses on the new objective conditions in the world today that give rise to new patterns of interaction, and suggests the study of these patterns on regional subsystemic levels in such a way as to correspond to the expressed economic, political and cultural preferences in each regional subsystem. If the concept of world order (defined in terms of stability, security, justice, etc.) would mean anything to a wider audience in the international system, it must accommodate the demands of the various regional subsystems of the world. Also, a smooth functioning of the complex nets of relationships in an increasingly interdependent world would require the fulfillment of the various perceptions of the issues involved by regional groupings. Therefore, the study of the international system, or for that matter, world society, would have to be issue-oriented. In this framework, relationships tend to be polarized along various axes of interests, representing the peculiar demands of regional groupings. In an international system marked by interdependence, the planetary bargaining process, which seems to be the only way to avert serious clashes of interests, would have to take into account broad geographical representations. Increasingly, the states of one region are coming to present their demands as a united front in order to upgrade their interests, and to maintain a strong bargaining position. There are signs, as indicated, that inter-regional interaction patterns are developing in this direction.

If the purpose of theory is to describe and explain, then the model can fulfill such tasks. If the purpose of theory is to predict, then maybe we should wait. The model explains the objective conditions that make up the present international environment, and acknowledges the complex relationships. It also describes trends and patterns, and provides adequate reasoning for them. Prediction, however, remains a matter of hunches which, if the analysis carried out is correct, might turn out to be true.

FOOTNOTES

1. "U.S. Reappraising Basic Strategies," *Christian Science Monitor*, March 25, 1975, p. 1.
2. Abdul Aziz Said, ed., *Theory of International Relations; The Crisis of Relevance*, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., : Prentice-Hall, 1968).
3. Professor A.A. Fatouros has observed that "There is great feeling today that the pre-existing structures and processes are changing, but there is no clear indication of these directions of change or the features of the new processes and structure." "Participation of the 'New' States in the International Legal Order structure," Chapter 7, *The Future of the International Legal Order, Trends and Patterns*, Vol. 1. ed., Richard A. Falk and Cyril E. Black, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1969), p. 356.
4. *The West at Bay*. (New York: W.W. Norton and Co., Inc., 1948), p. 10.
5. Karl W. Deutsch and J. David Singer perceive the possibility of empire in the long-run. They maintain that "if the possibility of states perishing is small, but larger than zero, and the probability of substantial new powers arising is zero... then the model will predict a diminishing number of effective contenders, leading eventually to a Two-power world or the survival of a single power". "Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability", *World Politics*, Vol. 16, no.3 (April, 1964), p. 405.
6. *Foreign Broadcast Information Service*, Vol. 5, no. 23 (November 29, 1973), p. T1.
7. See in particular Leonard Binder, "The Middle East Subordinate International System," *World Politics*, Vol. 10, (April, 1958), pp. 408-29; Larry Bowman, "The Subordinate State System of Southern Africa," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 12, (September, 1968), pp. 231-62; Michael Brecher, "International Relations and Asian Studies: The Subordinate State System of Asia," *World Politics*, Vol. 15, (January, 1963), pp. 213-35; and *The New States of Asia*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1963); George Modelski, "International Relations and

Area Studies," *International Relations*, (London), Vol. 2, (April, 1961), pp. 143-55; Roland Yalem, *Regionalism and World Order*, (Washington, D.C. : Public Affairs Press, 1965); Bruce M. Russett, *International Regions and the International System: A Study in Political Ecology*, (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1967); William I. Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System in International Relations," *International Organization*, Vol. 21, (Summer, 1967), pp. 545-64; Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, *The International Politics of Regions*, (New Jersey: Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1970); and Richard A. Falk and Saul L. Mendlovitz, eds., *Regional Politics and World Order*, (San Francisco, California: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1973).

8. See the interesting debate between Oran R. Young and Bruce M. Russett on the latter's methodology in deliniating regions: Oran R. Young, "Professor Russett: Industrious Tailor to a Naked Emperor," *World Politics*, Vol. 21, (April, 1969), pp. 486-511; and Bruce M. Russett, "The Young Science of International Politics". *World Politics*, Vol. 22, (October, 1969), pp. 87-94.
9. Louis J. Cantori and Steven L. Spiegel, "The International Relations of Regions," *Polity*, Vol. 2, no. 4, 1970, pp. 397-425. This quote is from the reprinted article in *Regional Politics and World Order*, eds., Falk and Mendlovitz, p. 335.
10. I am indebted to Professor Larry Wadsworth for drawing my attention to the need for making this distinction.
11. John W. Burton, A.J.R. Groom, C.R. Michell and A.V.S. de Revek, *The Study of World Society: A London Perspective*, International Studies Association, Occasional Paper No. 1, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh, 1974, p. 6.
12. *Regional Politics*, p. 1.
13. I am indebted to Professor Abdul Aziz Said for the concept of cultural politics. Originally he developed this theme to warn against possible errors in systematic analysis of international politics.
14. *The West at Bay* (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1948), p. 9.
15. Robert Gregg used these two expressions to indicate the admission of "forty-odd new states" to the United Nations in 1960's. "U.N. Economic Social, and Technical Activities", Chapter 7, *The United Nations. Past.*

Present, and Future, ed., James Barros (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 234.

16. "Thinking about a New World Order for the Decade of the 1990's", *War/Peace Report*, Vol. 10, No. 1, (January, 1970), pp. 3-8.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
19. The definition is by Harlan Cleveland, Director of International Affairs for the Aspen Institute, Quoted by Charles W. Yost, "Managing the World Economy", *Christian Science Monitor*, June 15, 1975, p. 27.
20. *Ibid.*
21. The expression is by Salvador Allende, former President of Chile, in an interview with *Review of International Affairs*, (Belgrade), Vol. 24, no. 563, (September 20, 1973), p. 2.
22. *The Study of World Society*, p. 8.

العلاقات بين المجموعات الإقليمية :

طريقة بديلة لدراسة العلاقات الدولية

د. فهمي الصدي

يتناول هذا البحث بالنقد النماذج التقليدية لتحليل النظام الدولي ، وي طرح نموذج العلاقات بين المجموعات الإقليمية كظاهرة بدأت تتبلور في السنوات الأخيرة . وحجة هذا البحث أن النموذج المطروح يعتبر أكثر فائدة في تحليل التغيرات التي طرأت على النظام الدولي منذ مطلع السبعينات بعد بروز كتلة الدول النامية وتجمع مصالحها في كتلات إقليمية مختلفة . أن هذا النموذج يساعد على فهم التفاعلات التي تتم في كل كتلة إقليمية واحد ، أو بين هذه الكتلات من جهة ، وبينها كمجموعة واحدة تتفاوض مع مجموعة من الكتلات من جهة أخرى .

أن مثل هذا التصور النظري يمكن أن يجد له تعبيرا في المفاوضات التي تتم بين مجموعات إقليمية ، مثل الحوار العربي - الأوربي . أو بين عدد من المجموعات الإقليمية كحوار الشمال والجنوب .

الفكرة الرئيسية في هذا البحث اذن تؤكد على أن التصورات النظرية السابقة للنظام الدولي كالنظام القطبي الثنائي أو النظام المتعدد الاقطاب ، قاصرة عن تحليل النظام الدولي في ضوء المعطيات الجديدة ، وأن الحاجة تدعو الى الخروج من نطاق هذه التصورات التقليدية التي تركز على مفهوم السيادة الغربية بشكل أو بآخر الى تصور نظري جديد أكثر انطباقا مع الظروف الدولية الراهنة .