The military’s media integration policies in the new war paradigm: The British armed forces as a model

Abdunasser A. Al-Abri(1)

Abstract

Objectives: This study investigated the evolving relationship between the military and media in modern warfare and its implications on military media management policies. It aimed to answer the research question: How does the British armed forces integrate war correspondents into the country’s war effort in accordance with the new wars paradigm? Method: Employing Grounded Theory, the study meticulously scrutinized current protocols used to integrate media into the British Armed Forces’ war campaign. It involved unstructured interviews with British army officials and seasoned war correspondents from reputable British media establishments such as the BBC, The Guardian, and The Herald, between 2016 and 2018. Further, military documents related to media organization in warring situations were thoroughly scrutinized. Results: The study’s findings revealed that the military and media hold specific interests and agendas related to armed conflicts, which may impact the power of media in educating people about war’s reality. Conclusion: This study concludes that the rise of new wars and digital social networks have disrupted the military-media relationship and that coordination and collective work are necessary in the new form of war. An integration system can bring the military and media together in a respectful relationship.

Keywords: integration system, war paradigm, media operations, revolution in military affairs [RMA].

(1) Senior Directing Staff at National Defense College, Sultanate of Oman, E-mail: anabri25@hotmail.com
السياسات العسكرية في دمج وسائل الإعلام في نموذج الحروب الجديدة: 
القوات المسلحة البريطانية نموذجاً

عبدالناصر بن أحمد العبري (1)

ملخص

الأهداف: حثت هذه الدراسة في العلاقة المتغيرة بين المؤسسة العسكرية ووسائل الإعلام في الحرب الحديثة ولهذا اتفقنا عليها على سياسات إدارة الإعلام العسكري. وهدفت إلى الإجابة عن السؤال البحثي: كيف تدمج القوات المسلحة البريطانية المرسلين الحربيين في الجهود الحربية للدولة وفقًا لنموذج الحروب الجديدة؟ المنهج:

استندت هذه الدراسة إلى المفاهيم النظرية المتجردة في تحليل سياسات القوات المسلحة البريطانية في دمج وسائل الإعلام في الحملات العسكرية. استخدم البحث المنهج النموذجي باستخدام آداة المقابلة غير المبقية مع عينة مختارة من الضباط العسكريين البريطانيين إلى جانب عينة من المراسلين الحربيين المحترفين الذين متعاونون بعض وسائل الإعلام البريطانية الشهيرة: كشبكة الإذاعة البريطانية، وصحيفة الجارديان، وصحيفة هيرالد وذلك في الفترة من 2016 إلى 2018. كما خلّل عدد من الوثائق العسكرية التي أصدرتها وزارة الدفاع البريطانية ذات الصلة بالتنظيم الإعلامي في الحروب. النتائج: كشفت نتائج الدراسة أن كلنا المؤسسات الإعلامية والعسكرية تحتفظ بأجندة وصالح محدد تتعلق بمسار النزعات بشكل قد يؤثر على قوة الإعلام في توجيه الناس بواقع الحرب. الخاتمة: توصلت الدراسة إلى أن نظام الإدماج الذي تسعى القوات المسلحة إلى تحقيقه يجب أن يعمل على إشراك وسائل الإعلام في مراحل صياغة السياسات، مما يتيح مزيدًا من التنسيق القائم على الاحترام المتبادل والعمل بشكل جماعي في النموذج الجديد للحروب. كما خلّلت الدراسة إلى أن تطور:


الاستشهاد بهذه المقالة انظر ص.430.
الحروب الجديدة وانتشار الشبكات الاجتماعية الرقمية قد زعزع العلاقات العسكرية الإعلامية في نموذج الحروب الجديدة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الإدماج، نموذج الحروب الجديدة، العمليات الإعلامية، الثورة في الشؤون العسكرية.
Introduction

The military and the media have engaged in different types of contested relationships in armed conflicts. The term integration operationalises throughout this study to measure the degree of tension present in the military-media relationship and conflict management in a "new war" context. The logic of "new war" emerged after the end of the Cold War to describe the changes in the environment of armed conflicts among other features of the 21st century such as globalisation, new communication technologies, and the collapse of the Soviet Union (Kaldor, 2013; Smith, 2003; Suganami, 2002).

This study intends to analyse the shifting dynamics of the relationship between the military and the media in the new forms of warfare, considering the implications of these dynamics for the military’s media management policies. This argument has two aspects: 1) the relations between media and wars have been disrupted by a dramatic transition in the conditions of warfare since the post-Cold War era that wars are remote, digitized, lacking a geographical centre, and involving multiple actors; and 2) although the embedded system secured war reporters to the frontline, the ubiquity of digital media as a key part of warfare has fundamentally shifted the balances of power in terms of information control and warfare conduct.

This study further explored the centralised UK military’s media operation in conjunction with implications of the post-embedding system, which has resulted in a new form of relations between the military and traditional and online media in today’s conflicts. The case study method of qualitative research had been used for this study to investigate how war reporters have been integrated by the UK military into the complexity of the new model of war, in situations where they are not answerable to the same socio-political structures as they used to be in conventional conflicts.

The importance of the case study is that it helps us gain a greater understanding of the complex issue of the unstable, volatile, and changing relationship between the British Forces and the media in today’s conflicts. In particular, the case study offers a range of tools to
be used on the subject to capture a range of perspectives. I chose the UK Military as a case study because the UK stands has a historical context of political and war journalism that ensures safeguarding journalistic freedom and liberal values (Fraser, 2017; Jackson et al., 2018; Viner, 2017), however, there has often been a censorship on conflict reporting. The UK Ministry of Defense [MoD] has developed several doctrines to identify the strength and opportunities of its military media policies such as Media Operations and The Green Book to secure the UK’s national strategy and protect the security of military operations. Therefore, this study intends to answer the following question: How have new tactics been devised by the military to incorporate journalism into the war effort while minimising disruptive forms of reporting? Based on original interviews with professionals in the UK Armed Forces and some of the leading journalists in the field of war reporting in the British media, such as those from The BBC, The Guardian, and Channel 4, the findings of this study point out the implications of the integration system for current and future practices. The perspective of the Grounded Theory was employed to capture emerging themes and define conceptual terms. For this research, the terms "media", "press", and "journalism" are used interchangeably to make the content easy to understand.

This study seeks to contribute to the existing body of knowledge with respect to media and wars literature. The findings of this study will help both military and media policymakers to develop an authentic assessment of the military-media relationship in the new model of wars to support collective work in a contested military space and make the reportage of war compatible with the evolving military’s media management policies.

**Literature Review**

The media often operate in a complex environment in times of war. The wealth of literature on media and conflict studies offers a critical assessment of the role of media in war, concerning its influence, whether positive or negative, whether the press is war -or peace-oriented, the hierarchy of influence, and professionalism (Cohen, 1994;
Galtung, 2002; Larson, 1988; Lynch & McGoldrick, 2003; Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2014; Norris, 2016; O’Heffenan, 1991; Rees, 2001). Galtung (2002) indicates that the media could either serve as a key actor by fuelling violence when it picks a side during conflicts or staying as independent as possible. On the one hand, the media can play a positive role in conflicts when performing as a watchdog for the public in mediating, collecting, and monitoring the government’s behaviour and policies (Cohen, 1994; Larson, 1988; O’Heffenan, 1991; Rees, 2001). However, a primary threat to media pluralism is the issue of media monopoly beside the commercial and entertainment elements of media productions (Peruko, 2013). Here, the media can be seen as a passive player, falling into the hands of the government’s monopoly. Herman & Chomsky (1998) argue that the news is filtered by money and power, so that elites can sustain control via maintaining their economic and political interests and increase profits (Gilboa, 2005). Thus, the media "serve mainly as a supportive arm of the state and dominant elites, focusing heavily on themes serviceable to them, and debating and exposing within accepted frames of reference" (Herman, 1993, p.25, cited in Gilboa, 2005). Therefore, the government acts as the primary source of propaganda materials, having the ability to set the agenda, because of its advantageous position to monopolise information sources.

Liberal theorists have attributed to a responsible and independent press the function of a safeguard for freedom of expression, vital to the process of democracy (Althaus et al., 1996; Barnett & Townend, 2015; Deuze, 2005; Norris, 2008). On this view, the role of journalists in democratic societies is crucial for practising real journalism without restrictions (Deuze, 2005). Deuze (2005) indicates that free journalism must protect free speech and the right "for people to know" all the available information about an armed conflict. He insists that journalists must enjoy editorial autonomy and freedom in order to be impartial, fair, and credible within a liberal political system that ensures stability and fairness in their work (Deuze, 2005). In contrast, the authoritarian view, for instance, rejects the idea of a free press and believes that the primary
role of the press is to serve the established power rather than work for the public interest (Ward, 2014).

The media is often acknowledged as a valuable source of information, both in times of peace and in times of war, and it is a platform that leaders or elites take into consideration when making decisions (Naveh, 2002). Dandeker (2000) suggests that media-state-military relations must be built on mutual trust and not be subjected to manipulation by any side. Indeed, whether war journalists are attached to military units or deployed independently, it seems that the classic concept of Media Operations [Media Ops] is being disrupted in the digital age (Corner, 2018; Livingstone & Lunt, 2014; Maltby, 2014). The Joint Doctrine Publication 3-45.1(2007, pp.1-2) defines Media Ops as "that line of activity developed to ensure timely, accurate and effective provision [through the media] of Public Information [P Info] and implementation of Public Relations [PR] policy within the operational environment whilst maintaining Operations Security".

Threats to today’s journalism come in various forms as an industry and as a profession. Thus, war correspondents on the front line have to challenge the state’s censorship and control. The relationship between politicians, military generals, and war reporters has broken down since the Cold War because of global changes in world politics, globalisation, and a revolution in military affairs (Boylan, 2011; Corner, 2018; Jensen, 2014; Livingstone & Lunt, 2014; Maltby, 2012a; Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2014; Rid, 2007). It is argued that a new type of war has been practised in 21st century conflicts in comparison to the classic concept of conventional war. The new forms of war are being commercialised, documented, broadcast, and mobilised under the gaze of the traditional and new media (Cottle, 2009; Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2015; Kaldor, 2007; Maltby, 2012b; Smith, 2007).

Information is always recognized as an asset in wars. Developments in communications and information technologies have emerged as a result of the relationship between media and war, a relationship that has shaped a new form of wars (Baudrillard, 1995; Chadwick, 2013; Hoskins and O’Loughlin, 2015; Virilio & Lotringer, 2000). McLuhan’s
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terms of "global village" and "the medium is the message" had sparked the thinking of the effect of dominant communications technologies, especially television, on cultural and political life (Levinson, 2000). Since Baudrillard (1929-2007) developed his theory entitled "The Gulf War did not take place in 1991", the world has been concerned about the changes in the war paradigm, including the relationship between war and the media in the post-Cold War era. The importance of Baudrillard’s theoretical work stems from his central claim that the Gulf War is a "non-war" or "virtual war" that was marked by the uncertainty of real-time coverage, the lack of credible news and the struggle of exercising full control over information (Baudrillard, 1995).

Each modern military force has developed an approach to deal with the media in times of war. It has been argued that war reporters struggle with their dissatisfaction about the way the military has handled information in the frontline as they experience much tension and have sceptical relations with the military (Maltby, 2012a). Reviewing the military’s media policies in US combat operations forced the Pentagon to accelerate introducing a "pooling system" in the First Gulf War in 1991, and an "embedded programme" in the Iraq War in 2003. Steuck (1992) pointed out that the "pooling system" organised by the coalition forces to facilitate journalists access in the First Gulf War in 1991 failed to build trust between the military and the media, particularly around logistical problems, censorship, briefing delays, and access difficulties. The US military decided to fix this tension between the military and the media by offering more incentives for war reporters to integrate the media into war planning by attaching them into military forces, known later as the embedded system.

The concept of "embedded journalism" characterised a new dimension of military-media collaboration, particularly during a time of war and peace-building operations; however, embedded journalism was not a post-Cold War invention. Some researchers argue that it can be traced back to the First World War; nonetheless, embedded journalism became more important during the war against Iraq in 2003, as more than 3000 journalists registered to cover the war, of
whom over 500 were attached to coalition forces (Tumber & Palmer, 2004, pp.1-2). Research by Al-Abri (2020) revealed that the embedding system offered more chances for embedded reporters during the Iraq War of 2003 to access classified information compared to independent journalists who preferred to deploy on their own.

The British government had prior experience in embedding journalists in their naval fleets during the Falklands War in 1982, having adopted a new strategy of cooperating with journalists - unlike the American government’s unsuccessful dealings with the American media during the Vietnam War (1955-1975). Media planning was used effectively by the British government under the term "operational security", which gave the military the right to delay and censor information, and conduct deception operations (Tumber & Palmer, 2004b, p.1-2). The Task Force Group selected the journalists who would embark on the naval fleet; even the British MoD was worried about the negative impact of transmitted images from the battlefield, which might harm the troops and their families (Tumber & Palmer, 2004a).

The emergence of competitive digital news networks has closed the gap between politicians and people through many social networking sites, such as Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and web blogs (Kuhn & Nielsen, 2014). Senior politicians engage with either the media or the public through their personal and official accounts. Askerov (2020) indicates that the war journalism model often gives more attention to stories that perpetuate conflict. In contrast, the peace journalism model struggles with bringing a positive impact on the provision of truthful information in order to make a constructive contribution to peace-building (Saleh et al., 2020). In fact, the media - whether radio, television, internet, press, or social media - have become constitutive of war rather than acting as a mediator. In Cottle’s terms (2009) "war is being conducted in and through the news media as well as being communicated by it. This is a mediatised world" [italics in the original] (cp.110). Hoskins and Loughlinb (2015) employ the term "arrested war" to describe the involvement of the media in creating symbolic events that
are designed to influence politics and global crises; the world has passed through two other phases in the last two decades: the broadcast and defused phases. The broadcast phase is defined by the idea of a CNN effect in which Western satellite television and global audio-visual each was reinforced through the military’s media operations (Hoskins & OB, 2013). However, 9/11 and its aftermath in the War on Terror [WOT] allowed for the emergence of Hoskins and O’Louhglin’s second phase: "diffused war" (2010). Diffused war refers to "a new paradigm of war in which the meditization of war makes possible more diffuse causal relationship between action and effects, creating greater uncertainty for policymakers in the conduct of war" (Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2013, p.3).

The key argument that I am drawing from the previous media and war literature is the growing concern regarding the shifting nature of mutual military-media relations - concerning the transformation in both military affairs and war reporting in terms of intent and execution. Tracing the interplay of the challenges of military media management strategies and journalists’ reflections on their experiences in war zones will require paying more attention to the broad context of media-government relations, the international relations system, and the framework of media doctrines. Traditionally, as the secrecy of operations shapes successful warfare, governments expected a high degree of support and compliance from the media during periods of tension with other states or non-state actors, while the military enjoyed its monopoly over the stream of information by imposing a set of guidelines to restrict journalists’ movements on the frontline, and enforcing censorship over their content.

Interpreting the implications of the military-media relationship models will help to design an analytical framework that will enable us to examine the friction within journalism and war relationship in spaces of democratisation that widely promote notions of diversity, the plurality of information, and multiplicity of voices (Barnett & Townend, 2015). My analytical framework will consider development in the UK’s military media doctrines since the 2003 Iraq War, focusing on the critical elements of the war paradigm and the integration system that
need further investigation. Furthermore, the extensive reading of the literature has helped the researcher to address the research problem, research objectives and research methodology, which will be outlined in the following sections.

**Research Problem**

Reporting conflict goes beyond classic journalism, in which the journalists are subject to different types of control by the military. Nevertheless, digital developments have opened new opportunities for both the media and the military to develop new tactics to incorporate the media into the war effort, however, they also pose challenges for the work of journalists. This study seeks to contribute to fill a gap in the academic literature, by combining and contrasting the perspectives of war correspondents and professionals at the UK MoD. This enables us to understand how the military and the media have responded to the developments in the war paradigm and information and communication technologies. Based on the research problem, this study aims to achieve the following objectives:

1. Provide a critical analysis of the structural relationship between the military and the media in times of war by addressing the UK’s military practices in managing and incorporating journalism into the war effort as a case study.

2. Reflect war journalists’ views in reporting complex, unstable, and changeable armed conflicts.

3. Draw academic insights from qualitative research, in order to maximise the depth of data collected to describe the lived experiences of journalists and military media staff in reporting contemporary wars.

4. Develop an analytical framework related to the media-military perspective on the massive developments in military affairs, global governance, and digitalisation in terms of their impact on the role of media in conflicts.
Methodology

This study employs a qualitative research methodology to investigate how the military and the media have adapted to the changes of the new war paradigm in the 21st century. A qualitative approach has been applied to media research to emphasise the unique experiences of war journalists across cultures and synergies with other professionals (Scannell, 2006). I will engage with the research question through the lens of grounded theory. Corbin and Strauss (1990) state that grounded theory is a research method used to collect and analyse emerging data that is derived inductively through the process of studying the social phenomenon. Charmaz (2014) indicates that "we construct our grounded theories through our past and present involvements and interactions with people, perspectives and research practice" (p.17).

This study used an intensive semi-structured interviews to document the participants' experiences, found in Appendix A. These helped to achieve a depth of mutual interactive understanding. The interviewees were chosen based on correspondence with the UK MoD and some media corporations, which suggested a few people based on their status and experience. Because of the difficulties with locating people engaged directly with the production and execution of the media policies for operations at war, as most had moved or were retired, a snowball sampling technique was applied to recruit other participants. The interviews were conducted between November 2017 and February 2018 during the researcher’s preparation of his doctoral thesis at the University of Glasgow, Scotland. Each interview lasted for 30 minutes to one hour. Ethical approval was obtained from the Research Ethics Committee- University of Glasgow.

Coding is the primary method of analysis in Grounded Theory. It clarifies "the ongoing process of assigning conceptual labels to different data segments to identify themes, patterns, processes and relationships" (Gilbert, 2008, p.87). Coding entails a combination of constant comparative methods and researcher engagements to discover the relationship between emergent themes and lived experience (Charmaz, 2014, p.321). In fact, interpreting meaning and actions by employing
thematic coding and sensitising concepts can help to pinpoint the common threads that exist throughout a set of interviews (Bowen, 2009). To do so, the researcher outlined a framework for understanding the shifting dynamics of the military-media relationship. The aim is to investigate how authority is practised and who has taken control. Table 1 and Table 2 demonstrate the friction in the military-media relationship in two dimensions: the war paradigm and the strategic context. Then, the main concepts were broken down into more specific categories that allow a comparison to be made between the competitive actors in war reportage: the military, mainstream media, and social media. The implications of the military’s tactics for contemporary and future engagements will be illustrated and flashed out.

To obtain reliable data from both sides of the military-media relationship, nine interviews were conducted with military officers and media personnel. The journalists in my study were engaged with the UK’s military Armed Forces as war reporters in covering crises, particularly in the Middle East. Additionally, it was vital to speak to some senior officers in the British Armed Forces who served in different conflicts and directly contacted local and international media at the frontline.

**Reporting War in A Contested Military Space**

The term "New War" has become prevalent in media and war studies over the last two decades. The strategic execution of the military campaign in contemporary wars is to be understood by reference to the paradigm of the "old war", and the shift to the "new war" school of thought (Kaldor, 2007). Kaldor (2013, p.vi) defines "New War" as that organised violence involves a "networks of state and non-state actors, and most violence is directed against civilians". This definition includes a few key characteristics that distinguish "new war" from "old war". In fact, organised violence has replaced traditional forms of inter-state conflict (Kaldor, 2007; Smith, 2007). Steven Pinker claims that the number of inter-state wars has decreased, while intra-state conflicts have become more frequent (Medynskyi, 2015). A common criticism of the "new war" argument is that many
features of new wars can be found in old wars. Chojnacki (2006 as cited in Kaldor, 2013, p.5) argues that the term "new wars" is "methodologically problematic because the criteria for identifying "new" wars are highly arbitrary, difficult to reproduce inter-subjectively, and difficult to reconcile with conflict theory". Even so, some new elements can be recognised in contemporary conflicts. For example, old wars were fought to achieve geopolitical interests in particular territories through military means, and they were financed almost entirely by legitimate states (Kaldor, 2007). However, new wars are associated with the rise of new communications technologies, and they are fought in order to defend identities (ethnic, religious or tribal) and political interests. Furthermore, the new wars are financed by different means, such as private finance, the taxation of humanitarian aid, and by illegal activities such as cybercrime, terrorism, piracy, kidnapping, and the smuggling of oil, drugs, people, etc. (Kaldor, 2013).

I argue that the term "new war" provides three main thrusts of criticism of the practices of war journalism and the military’s media policies. Firstly, the military struggles to integrate the media into the war effort due to the growing challenges of controlling the information space during today’s conflicts. Here, the researcher questions the impact that Media Ops have, and how this has become one of the core challenges in the "new war paradigm" where the military lost full control over the information space after the Iraq War of 2003 (Merrin, 2018). Secondly, the increasing centrality of Information Operations [Info Ops] compared to the decentralisation of war actors has an impact on how wars are being reported and perceived. The institutional role of embedded reporters provides insights into war reporting regarding the loss of journalists’ autonomy, the policy of denying access to the frontline, and a lack of diverse accounts because of censorship. Finally, the difficulty of bearing eyewitness in a complex hybrid media ecology can destroy the credibility of war reporting as
information becomes a weapon for influence and disinformation. The idea that there is no need for embedded journalists because war can be captured either by soldiers or by the military’s media teams themselves has affected war reporters’ role of reporting the truth.

Results

In what follows, the results of my analysis will be demonstrated in two parts: war paradigm and the integration policy.

War Paradigm

It would be impossible to incorporate all of the warfare concepts into this analysis, which interlinks media with the developments in military thinking about recent conflicts. Therefore, I will limit the scope of this study to investigate the fractured state/military-media relationship in the 21st century. To do so I will consider developments in the war paradigm, information technology, and organisational structure. From a military perspective, information is a substantial asset in today’s wars. Information has to be cautiously exploited when the military incorporates traditional and social media into their war efforts (Rid, 2007; UKMoD, 2018a). For journalists at the frontline who confronted a top-down military culture; ideological clashes, disinformation and multi-sourced materials are examples of the day-to-day challenges they experienced during the post-embedded system (Kellner, 2008; Risso, 2017). Table 1 summarises the first theme of my findings: the war paradigm. The aim is to illustrate the emergent issues in the military-media relationship that have overlapped with the changing paradigms in the new war. The war paradigm gives different indications of communications between the military and the media on the counterinsurgency model that operates in a mixture of industrial warfare and a modified version of insurgency operations (JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 2013; 2018).
The military's media integration policies in the new war paradigm.

Table 1
Friction in the Military-Media Relationship in "New War" Paradigm

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Themes (Counter Insurgency Operations)</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Military (Media Management Strategies)</th>
<th>Mainstream Media (Print and Broadcast)</th>
<th>Social Media (UGC Content)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War Paradigm</td>
<td>Main goals</td>
<td>The key goal of the armed forces in the new war is to break the enemy's well as information is the prime asset to the campaign planners. There can be no compromise over the security of operations, but there should be flexibility to provide sensitive information to achieve the desired goals.</td>
<td>The potential goal of the mainstream media is to inform the public about military business by educating them about war and its implications as credible sources. Breaking news is essential for commercial purposes, but it does not mean violating operational security and national interest. It is based on a &quot;one to many&quot; approach, which is vulnerable in a time of war to the influence of states, political parties or insurgents' militia.</td>
<td>UGC is a platform for political, economic, social, and entertainment potential, which offers accessible content and effective communications capable of reaching a global audience. Content is based on a &quot;many to many&quot; approach that is created by either firms or individuals. However, it is vulnerable to commercialisation, disinformation, fake news, trolling, and violence.</td>
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Cont. Table 1
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<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td></td>
<td>Imposing denial of access policy by holding control over media movements (pooling system, embedded program) and by applying restrictions to broadcasting. The military exploits the traditional and social media for the integration process, campaign planning, counter adversary information operations, and for gaining the support of politicians, allies, and the public.</td>
<td>On the one hand, the embedded journalists negotiate their roles on the frontline to gain more access and to fulfill their obligation to strive for the &quot;right for the public to know&quot;.</td>
<td>On the other hand, unilateral journalism is another way to observe the conflict from non-military viewpoints.</td>
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cconcern for traditional and online media is to gain access to information and to enjoy freedom in telling the story, with massive assistance from new communications technologies and the revolution in internet, satellite, and mobile applications (Jensen, 2014). The implications of centralised CCS have weakened the role of journalistic work because of security challenges and the strategic goal of the state to maintain public support. Angus Taverner, who was Staff Officer (SO1) Director of News (Policy and Plans) in the UK Ministry of Defense (MOD) from 2000 to 2004 stresses that public attitudes towards military actions are crucial to UK military planners:

I think we recognised that maintaining public support for operations in the UK was crucial. Political leaders give us (the military) direction often got a lot of what they understood about what is going on from the media, and we need it for own benefit to be able to deliver the operations we are trying to deliver. Therefore, how we engaged with the civilian audience in places like Iraq or places like Afghanistan, was becoming very important to us, and that again was a matter of military engagements (Interview by telephone, 13th February 2018).

Taverner’s interpretation reveals the importance of understanding the changes in contemporary conflicts. The shifting in warfare paradigms has led to the development of new versions of military doctrines that can deal with the local, regional, and international audiences, and the emergent war actors (UKMoD, 2014). In fact, this scope of changes in the war paradigm stresses that single states are not capable on their own of countering global organised violence, as the objectives of the combatants in the developed format of classical guerrilla warfare is to capture the will of both the adversaries and the people in the territory of operation (Smith, 2006). Because insurgents aim to weaken the legitimacy of the government in order to gain political power and claim their control over certain areas, Counter-Insurgency Operations (COINS), Media Ops, and Info Ops provide a framework for the media at strategic, operational, and tactical levels to assist with countering the insurgents’ narrative and propaganda (JDP
3-45.1, 2007; JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 2013). At this point, the media are tasked by the military doctrines with taking the battle into living rooms all over the world, through virtual spaces on the internet and social media. The main goal is to inform the public about the military business by educating them about war and its implications as credible sources (JDP 3-45.1, 2007). However, the media may not be capable of supporting the military campaign’s objectives when there is uncertainty about the involvement of their own forces in overseas conflicts. Lindsey Hilsum, editor of Channel 4 News programme that is produced by the Independent Television News [ITN], has covered many of the major conflicts of the past two decades, including Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the uprisings in Egypt, Bahrain, and Libya. She has reported extensively from Iran, Zimbabwe, and China and she claims that the nature of warfare has changed, therefore Western involvement in foreign wars has changed as well. Wars have become this remote thing event involving drones, air strikes, and the use of Special Forces. She said:

We as journalists find ourselves less and less able to cover what our own forces are doing, or the forces from our own country. Our job as journalists is to inform the population, the citizens. And I think we’re not doing that. So in many ways I think that’s the biggest challenge we face (Interview by telephone, 13th March 2017).

Locations that have dominated the news of violence in the last two decades, such as Libya, Gaza, Yemen, Crimea, Iraq, and Syria, are recent examples of places where war journalists were unable to access information in areas lacking a clear frontline. Because of frontline challenges, the idea of broadcasting from hotels in Baghdad, Mosul, Kabul, and Damascus is not really accepted by the viewers, while other actors, such as local producers, creators of the User Generated Content (UGCs), and extremist groups, easily accessed social media and the mainstream media as well (Cockburn, 2013; Hoskins & O’Loughlin, 2010). Gabriel Gatehouse of the BBC was attached to Kurdish forces in the Battle of Mosul in 2016. He insisted that it would be impossible for UK forces to run an embedding system as it did in the Iraq War in 2003. He said:
The most serious challenges are to gain access to the ground and get an accurate representation of what is going on the ground. The involvement of the British military on the ground has been very minimal and mostly covert, and that’s the reason we don’t have an embedding program. But I should also say that straight military embedded journalism, which I have done several times, would be very limited in this scope (Interview by telephone, 22nd November 2016).

From the military perspective, breaking news is essential for commercial purposes, but it does not mean violating operational security or national interest (JDP 3-45.1, 2007). The military has acknowledged the shifting in the media reporting, specifically in the new form of warfare- "War Amongst the People" - because the narrative dimensions of war have gained more value in the eyes of combat commanders than their physical dimensions (Patrikarakos, 2017). As such, the military’s media doctrines consider the new media as an effective tool to promote strategic communications and to engage with significant audiences at the operational and tactical level (Maltby et al. 2015). The military guidelines leaflet clearly warned servicemen and women of the potential risks of breaching operations security by sharing locations, giving sensitive information, posting fake content or stealing someone’s content (The MoD, 2012). Failure to act in accordance with acceptable behaviour would result in disciplinary action. Tony Cramp, a retired military officer who works for Shell Aircraft in Netherlands, highlighted the potential risk of social media to operations and troops, especially when dealing with non-sourced materials at the tactical level, which may affect troops’ morale and target planning;

What you are saying is effectively warfare through the media. Then if you look at the military, is there a risk, are there threats? Absolutely, whether it’s the use of social media by your own troops or staff and the risk of information getting out, all of them being affected by what they read and hear in social media, which can be used as a means by your enemy (Interview by telephone, 11th February 2018).
As such, can media-military cooperation ever be achieved? And what are the implications for current and future practice?

The Integration Policy

Civil-military integration [CMI] has become an essential element in defence and security doctrines. The aim of CMI within the context of Integrated Action Doctrine is to collaborate with the instruments of national power to achieve the national goals, taking into account the rapidly changing security, economic, social and global systems (HM Government, 2015). The Land Operations Doctrine (UK Army, 2017, p. 4-1) defines integration as "the application of the full range of lethal and non-lethal capabilities to change and maintain the understanding and behaviour of audiences to achieve a successful outcome". Maintaining the high level of security of operations and securing troop morale are, more than ever in the past, an obstacle to the military’s attempt to engage the media with the war effort (Risso, 2017). In contrast, the media often do not want to be constrained by the military, which tries to control the flow of information in the war zone (Merrin, 2018; Rid, 2007).

The British Armed Forces has employed several tactics for engaging with the media at the frontline. The denial of access policy was applied during the Falklands War, under which war reporters were subjected to direct control from the military (Risso, 2017). During the First Gulf War of 1991, the coalition forces introduced the "pooling system" to communicate with the international media, in which war reporters were accredited exclusive deployment with the tasked group forces, and during the Iraq War of 2003 the embedded system secured war reporters’ access to the combat troops. The consequences of these three tactics for contemporary British Military practices have affected the role of the media in reporting wars. For example, the post-Iraq War witnessed more severe restrictions on journalism practices, including limited access to some covert operations that took the form of irregular warfare such as counterterrorism, cyber warfare, and counterinsurgency operations.
Understanding target audience is vital for the success of operational campaigns and for preserving troops’ morale when they are exposed to news that is being fed through traditional and social media. This is especially so when the combat takes place in remote territories, either amongst the people or in a theatre of war (UK Army, 2017; USNCS, 2011). Therefore, how many choices does the military have over how to incorporate the media into the new forms of war? Table 2 summarises the second theme of my findings: the integration context.

Table 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Themes (Counter Insurgency Operations)</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Military (Media Management Strategies)</th>
<th>Mainstream Media (Print and Broadcast)</th>
<th>Social Media (UGC’s Content)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Integration Context</td>
<td>Audiences</td>
<td>The media are used as a means to influence public opinion, secure defence spending, and support foreign policy. Media Operations target five distinct groups: UK citizens; international citizens; joint regional operations; joint local operations; and their troops.</td>
<td>The mainstream media target local, regional and international audiences. It falls into two schools of thought: a) continues to have a strong influence over political decision making, and b) acts as a tool of government communications and security strategies.</td>
<td>Social networks are based on web-based services. Individuals and firms reinforce their relationship for socialisation and commercialisation. State and non-state actors have repositioned themselves in either public/security websites or hidden applications for spreading information intelligence, ideas, ideology, and propaganda.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Cont. Table 2**  
*The Strategic Context in the "New War" Paradigm*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main Themes (Counter Insurgency Operations)</th>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Military (Media Management Strategies)</th>
<th>Mainstream Media (Print and Broadcast)</th>
<th>Social Media (UGC’s Content)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Integration Context</td>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>Rigid culture aims to protect national security and promote stability and solidarity.</td>
<td>Flexible to meet emerging challenges in war zones.</td>
<td>Borders are illuminated to spread news/information/visual materials or to debunk disinformation in order to enhance media literacy programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalistic Values</td>
<td>Relyable information with a set of values and codes of conduct. However, there is a thin line between information and propaganda, as run by information operations.</td>
<td>Credible and reliable information when evidence supports the news and attempts to be impartial. However, pro-opposition tends to rely on the internet and social platforms for their news.</td>
<td>Interactivity in online discussions offers the online community the ability to both expand on mainstream media stories and create new stories.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The nature of an insurgency requires a different approach and a different mindset from previous forms of warfare. Insurgents usually adopt an irregular approach to dealing with trained and qualified combatants by utilizing decentralised mission commands, usually because they lack sufficient resources (JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 2013). In COIN, staff must unify their message, reinforce credibility through their actions and assess the environment operations [EO]
approach, which includes "realistic, achievable objectives, and properly aligns ends, ways, and means" (JP 3-24, Counterinsurgency, 2013, p. xii). Failure to integrate media into the operations and secure journalistic access to the frontline can be damaging to combat efforts and allow insurgents to gain an advantage. The doctrine stresses the military’s obligation to provide audiences with authentic and accurate information about military business. In new war, the state is more concerned with projecting a positive image about its foreign policy to win public trust and mobilise forces in its own interests (Curran & Seaton, 2003). Accordingly, governments, especially the US, struggled after the Cold War to invest in soft power to promote public diplomacy; there is a thin line between propaganda and information (Nye, 2010). Nye (2008) defines soft power as the "ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country’s soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies(p.94)". Tim Purbrick, an Army Reserves staff officer in the Concepts Branch at Army HQ, recognised the importance of connecting with the UK audiences; he saw it as a national obligation, and a means for promotion and recruitment purposes:

We have probably quite bravely distributed that obligation to connect with audiences to our own people, so we’ve taken a little faith- we’ve trusted our people that they are permitted to do that kind of engagement with the local audience and troops (Interview, London, 7th Feb 2018).

Although military culture seems to be rigid in not accepting non-military personnel into the war theatre, it has proven that it can change its old-fashioned style into an approachable method when it feels that the national image of the military is in danger. In fact, the military’s primary job is to protect the country, so it is culturally oriented to value the secrecy of information. Publishing unauthorised information may be regarded as a direct threat to the operational security from military commanders’. Thus, censorship over the work of war reporters has witnessed an increase. On the other side, the media
often seeks exciting scoops and fresh news considering the freedom of information as a valuable asset in reporting wars.

A good example of how the military has shifted its mindset with regard to its relations with the media was the process of integrating war reporters into the operational environment, particularly from the period 1983 to 2003 (Rid, 2007). The embedding system has helped both the military and the media to achieve some of their goals, despite the fact that journalists tried to resist information control by different means. Journalists legally agreed to accept the rules of engagement set by the military during the Iraq War, yet this interactive relationship caused tension and disagreement among journalists while deployed with military units. Jonathan Beale, the BBC’s defence correspondent since 2017, spent two years as the BBC’s Brussels correspondent as well as covering the 2006 mid-term elections in the US and the Guantanamo military commissions in 2009. Beale explained why the embedded programme had a significant effect on freedom of speech during a war:

I think the problem with embedded journalism is if you’re with the British or Americans, you have to abide by strict rules. Which for example, they will ask to see your material for operational security reasons, to make sure that you don’t compromise [their troops]. The British make you sign something called The Green Book (Interview, London, 3rd November 2016).

The UK MoD issued general guidance in The Green Book, which enables attached journalists to report on operations. The first version was published in 1958. The latest version published in 2013 engaged British media outlets in the process of its production (JSP 580, 2013)(1). Interestingly, this policy treats war correspondents as civilians who are not allowed to carry arms when attached to British forces (JSP 580, 2013). Although the document stated that correspondents are free to

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(1) As stated in The Green Book, this document is the result of "continuing dialogue between the MoD and media organisations and representatives and takes account of lessons learned from past and current operations".
look for information in the area of operations, "they have to submit all press materials including written scripts, voice items, video recordings, and photographs related to combat activities for security checking before broadcast" (JSP 580, 2013, p.12). Caroline Wyatt of the BBC argued:

Because you sign The Green Book, you say, "we agree to embed" and as a result of that agreement, we agreed to abide by the rules that are set down by the military, which means that they have the right to see something before it’s broadcast. They won’t necessarily change it, but they have the right to see it, to make sure that we don’t compromise security (Interview, London, 3rd November 2016).

The proliferation of the internet and social media has altered the structure of the relationships between the military and the media in an era of globalisation and technology. Military doctrines emphasise the structure and the quality of the CCS (network approach, mission command, and an effects-based approach) in order to preserve dominance over all the dimensions of the battlespace: in the air, on land, at sea, in space, and in the information environment. The British Army’s Land Operations Doctrine (2017) indicates the impact that the proliferation of information has had on the public’s perceptions of military activity. The public are being influenced by different active players, including the national media, allies, and adversaries. At this juncture, the military is eager "to build a form of trust among social networks to acknowledge both formal and informal information that provides a safeguard either to the troops or military activities, in order to achieve desired goals" (UKMoD, 2014, p.35).

The Media Ops document has little to say about how to affect public opinion about an adversary, or their allies. However, it is held that all means can be legitimised when used to influence an enemy’s political and military leadership, armed forces and their people. This is critical when the adversary can use insurgent methods, and are capable of using sophisticated information and communications to target local and international audiences (Jensen, 2014). One of the British military’s tactics to reach local people was to approach news channels
that could be classified as the mouthpiece for terrorist groups or British adversaries, such as Al-Jazeera. Non-Western mainstream media, such as Al-Jazeera and other Arab satellite channels, have provided an alternative perspective to the military operation in the Iraq War of 2003, and have expanded the news agenda for other crises in the Middle East (Bessaiso, 2010). Both US and UK militaries have shown less engagement with Arab reporters during the Iraq War in an attempt to win Arab’s hearts and minds and hoping to conduct a surgically clean war. Arab reporters were excluded from embedding either with US or UK troops and were denied access to the daily briefings (Mackinlay, 2006). The only Arab media representative who was welcomed by the UK forces as an embedded reporter was the former British soldier, Alex Gardiner, who worked for Abu Dhabi TV. Al-Jazeera channel received most of America’s attention because the journalists, particularly on the talk show programmes, enabled the voices of extremists and insurgents to reach a wider audience in the Arab world (Mackinlay, 2006). This evidence is why Al-Jazeera was considered to be an enemy station in the eyes of the US administration. Despite the fact that American forces bombed Al-Jazeera offices in both Baghdad and Kabul, killed and arrested its staff (Taylor, 2002), the British military approached Al-Jazeera to deliver their messages to Iraqi citizens in Basra. Tim Purbrick, an Army Reserve staff officer, provided an example where such an approach was used to engage the transnational broadcaster such as Al-Jazeera, instead of local media that operated in Basra in post-conflict Iraq:

When I was in Iraq in 2007 as the head of media operations - I was only there for only a very short time - it was very obvious we couldn’t engage with the local media, because if they printed any story in the media that remotely reflected our view, and the view of the allied forces in Iraq, then those journalists would be taken and killed. However, we identified that there was an excellent route to engage with the local people by Al-Jazeera, so I put an Arabic-speaking press officer down to the Doha Media Village, and he appeared as a guest of the week on Al-Jazeera. I did it on a useful platform because Al-Jazeera is very well covered in south-
eastern Iraq, and you’re able to get messages out to the people in Basra (Interview, London, 7th February 2018).

Purbrick’s interpretation of the method used to reach local people means that the British forces have employed distinctive tactics to engage with the media and its audiences. Utilising transnational media appears to be a sensible method from the perspective of the Media Ops team as long as it achieves combat objectives.

Each component in today’s conflicts within the form of a new war is vulnerable to the emerging threat of the weaponised narrative in post-factual politics. Responding to the high levels of investments of some developed and undeveloped countries such as the United States, Israel, Russia, China, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain in funding cyber troops to manipulate public opinion, the UK Armed Forces created the 77th Brigade in April 2015. This can operate collectively with all services to shape the war narrative and combat disinformation (Bradshaw, 2017; UKARMY, 2018)\(^2\). The 77th Brigade is "an agent of change; through targeted Information Activity and Outreach we contribute to the success of military objectives in support of Commanders, whilst reducing the cost in casualties and resources" (UKARMY, 2018, p.1). The establishment of the 77th Brigade is partially the result of the lessons drawn from counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, hybrid operations in Ukraine, and the war against ISIS (MacAskill, 2015). Another important factor in its establishment was the shift from a small unit like the Directorate of Defence Communications [DDC] to a comprehensive information system [the 77th Brigade] as a way to improve digital communications. This was seen as important as a way to engage with and monitor the risk of a smart, dynamic, and evolved information environment (UK MoD, 2019). The primary concern of Steven Jolly, the Director of Defence Communications at the UK MoD from 2015-2016 - currently

\(^2\) The primary task of the 77th Brigade is to "challenge the difficulties of modern warfare using non-lethal engagement and legitimate non-military levers as a means to adopt behaviours of the opposing forces and adversaries" (Army.mod, 2018)
the Executive Director of World Services at M&C Saatchi (an international advertising agency network) - was to ensure that the military acknowledged changes in the media ecology, i.e., the shift from the hands of traditional media to decentralised networks of individuals and social media. He said:

I think the media has never been more important than it is in times of war, but that does not necessarily mean we are talking about the traditional media. So, I think that the ubiquity of smartphones and of the ability to record everyday events has fundamentally changed the balance and power between those who manage and disseminate the news, and those who are the subjects of the news (Interview, London, 7th November 2017).

Steven Jolly’s argument considers the role of the new media in today’s warfare to be a significant factor in influencing public opinion, compared to the classic role of the traditional media in conventional warfare. Steven also argued that the new technologies have given more power to those who control the flow of news in the new type of warfare. Accordingly, military media documents outline a set of rules to manage the media and audiences, and to make them behave and act in accordance with established operational goals (UKARMY, 2018).

In short, integration is certainly achievable at a lower level by moving down the chain of command and authority. The structure of authority defines the type of relationship inside an established organisation and between other actors. The top-down hierarchal style of the CCSs present in a military organisation gives authority to the central command to exercise control over multiple actors, including the media, both domestically and on the frontline. Hall (1991, as cited in Brogan 2006) indicates that organisational values are found in "the efforts of the actors, the judgment criteria of the decision-makers, and the participation and perception of the stakeholders, and obedience is accepted as being in service of a common goal" (p.41). In fact, the military has to distinguish between multiple actors whose participation is important to the success of the mission, and those who have less
involvement but nevertheless have a consistent relationship with the troops and feel they are entitled to be fully integrated (JDP 3-70, 2008).

Implications for the Military-Media Integration

The outcomes of this analysis have shown the military’s limitations with regard to engaging the media in their new war, considering implications for both policies and practices. Firstly, the ultimate purpose of any combat operation is to achieve the strategic combat objectives by ensuring the development of the command-and-control system [CCS], which provides safeguards for the military operation and the troops. The critical shift in military thinking from full censorship during the Falklands War, when a denial-of-access policy was imposed over the media, to an operational engagement during the Gulf War and the Iraq War, has helped defence planners and policymakers to take advantage of the new opportunities presented by the revolution in information and communications technology. For example, in the 77th Brigade, a comprehensive information system that can engage and monitor the risk of the independent global media is dedicated to fighting wars with information on digital networks and social media (UK MoD, 2019). Therefore, the concept of integration has evolved to include traditional and online media as the warfare over information itself has changed in the digital era.

A key conceptual lesson taken from my analysis is that the military, the traditional media, and the new media each have their own unique cultural frame of reference that includes values, perspectives, practices, and mind-sets. This frame of reference is constantly evolving, interacting, conflicting, and reforming in the form of new war. When I interviewed the military personnel, they pointed out that the command-and-control system has to be fully integrated with the media campaign in order to secure the process of handling the media during wars. Therefore, the elimination of the risk of uncontrollable and unmanageable media reportage can only be achieved if journalism becomes part of the military command-and-control structure. Currently, the media are used as a means of influencing targeted audiences, protecting national security and supporting foreign policy. Restrict-
tions have been applied (the pooling system in the Gulf War of 1991 and an embedded programme in the Iraq War of 2003) to limit casualties and to manage the flow of information, which had to be consistent with the official narrative of the government and its allies. The gap between people’s understanding of military commitments and operational reality can confuse audiences when strategic communication by the military is lost, and the military media performance lacks accountability and rationality (Boylan, 2011). Educating war journalists about the military’s operational objectives, facilitating their mission with fewer restrictions on gathering information and ensuring their safety can repair the damage posed by the absence of a comprehensive CCS during an armed conflict.

**Conclusion**

This study attempted to conceptualise the dynamic relationship between the military and the media in the form of new types of warfare in the British context. Interviewees and document analysis have revealed the influence of the media on shaping people’s perceptions about military business in times of war. The idea of integration is not new in military culture. It is part of the defence management system that the British armed forces are frequently reviewing in order to keep pace with the changes in the art of war (JDP 3-45.1, 2007). These processes need to be shifted to a jointness in organising war effort, either within services or between other governmental organs, including the media and the people.

The embedded system was a desirable method that the British military employed in order to engage with the media during traditional conflicts, considering its significant role as an instrument of war (Payne, 2005). Controlling the flow of information has been one of the military objectives during recent conflicts, from the Falklands War to the First Gulf War to Afghanistan and the Iraq Wars. However, this has been challenged in the digital era. It seems that the military and the media hold specific agenda and interests with regard to the course of armed conflicts in ways that may underpin the power of the media as an agent of enlightenment in educating people about the "real war".
My findings agree with those of Maltby (2007; 2012a) and Nohrstedt and Ottosen (2014), who find that the military’s culture demands collectivity and is hierarchical in structure. Its values have been formed around identity, discipline and security, and it is influenced by the revolution in military affairs (RMA). However, the military has shown the ability to interact, to some extent, with people of different cultures - for instance, the local and international embedded war reporters. This includes providing information, protection, training, and logistical services that would be difficult for independent journalists to attain during the war by themselves. These include recording air bombardments, deploying with the fleet, and attending the daily briefing.

In contrast, war journalists often work in a competitive and contested environment, fighting each other for scoops, operating in a decentralised relationship with editors, and oriented on journalistic autonomy but striving for recognition (Nohrstedt & Ottosen, 2014). Indeed, the rise of communications technologies has offered both the military and the mainstream media the opportunity to seek out alternative methods for communicating the war such as war blogging, but it has also brought additional challenges regarding structural and functional aspects.

What is clear from this study is that the form of this new war provides media industry with significant challenges in the digital age; traditional models of embedding with troops are being replaced with other forms of collaboration between media outlets and war actors with input from user-generated content (UGC). Although the use of the internet and social media as a source for news has increased (Price, 2015), military doctrines have addressed the risks of the proliferation of free and unverified news that can damage the security of operations. Today’s wars are more likely to take the form of a non-conventional style where insurgents aim to weaken the legitimacy of the current government so as to seize political power, such as the case of ISIS (Smith, 2007). If the UK military were to succeed in its ambitions to control the flow of information, it would need to engage with the media at either strategic or tactical levels.
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The military’s media integration policies in the new war paradigm....


## Appendix A

### List of interviewees

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
<th>Date of the interview</th>
<th>Place</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Caroline Wyatt</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>3 November 2016</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jonathan Beale</td>
<td>Defence correspondent, BBC</td>
<td>3 November 2016</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lindsey Hilsum</td>
<td>Channel 4</td>
<td>13 March 2017</td>
<td>Telephone Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabriel Gate-house</td>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>22 November 2016</td>
<td>Telephone Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tim Purbrick</td>
<td>Army Reserve staff officer in the Concepts Branch at Army HQ</td>
<td>7 February 2018</td>
<td>Telephone Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steven Jolly</td>
<td>Executive Director, World Services M&amp;C Saatchi. The Ex-Director of Defence Communications</td>
<td>7 July 2017</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angus Taverner</td>
<td>Staff Officer 1 (SO1) Director News (Policy and Plans) in the UK MoD</td>
<td>13 February 2018</td>
<td>Telephone Interview</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>David Richards</td>
<td>The former Chief of the Defence Staff</td>
<td>7 February 2018</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tony Cramp</td>
<td>VP Aircraft, Shell Aircraft, The Netherlands</td>
<td>11 February 2018</td>
<td>London</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Dr. Abdulnasser A. Al-Abri, Ph.D. in Media and Cultural Policies, University of Glasgow, Scotland, 2020. Director of Economic and Media Studies at the National Defence College, Ministry of Defence in the Sultanate of Oman. Research Interests: Journalistic practices in managing armed conflicts, military media relations, and the role of new media in shaping the mental image of institutions and individuals. Rehabilitation and Training of Cadres Specialized in Media, Political, Strategic and Economic Studies and Implemented with a Specialized Team in the Project of Establishing and Planning Academic and Training Curricula and Programs Specialized in Rehabilitating Leaders, Managers and Businessmen on Strategic Planning, Leadership, Decision-making and Crisis Management within Scenarios and Case studies concerned with the security of the Arab Gulf and defence and geopolitical issues regional and international.

Email: anabri25@hotmail.com

To cite: