

Charismatic Leadership, Mass Media and Political Mobilization in Egypt: The Nasserist Era

Asad Abdul-Rahman
Department of Politics
Kuwait University

(ABSTRACT)

President Jamal Abdul-Nasser of Egypt was successful in leading his country from one level of modernization to a higher one. His means to that success were many. In this paper, however, both research and analysis have been focused in an attempt at revealing one of these means, namely, the interaction between the mass media and his charismatic leadership. Nasser's type of leadership has been treated as one of the major variables that influenced and has been, in turn, influenced by his articulate use of mass media. That variable, however, has been carried in a manner not to overshadow other equally important ones. In fact, it has been maintained, in this paper, that the Egyptian and the wider Arab societal context, the new political order, the charismatic leadership of Nasser as well as the new Egyptian mass media had always been in multi-interactional relations which finally shaped them into what they had become. The last three factors were Nasser's three dimensional vehicle for the mobilization process which was inevitable for the transformation of the Egyptian and the wider Arab culture into a more modern one.

The main body of the paper consists of four parts:

In part one, both the nature of Nasser's charismatic Leadership and its interactions with the new Egyptian mass media are discussed. In part two, the Egyptian (and wider Arab) societal contexts as well as the new Egyptian political system are treated in so far as they affected the country's mass media. In part three, the two major characteristics of Nasser' mass media are delineated and analyzed. These two characteristics are first, the deliberate expansion of mass

media and second, the controlled and highly determined downward aspect of Egyptian communications system. Finally a rather brief reformulation of the basic remarks pertaining to Nasser's use of mass media and its various interactions, together with an attempt at drawing more analytical conclusions are included in part four.

I. Introduction:

The challenge of modernization is a universal one. The urgency of meeting this challenge has been felt more strongly in the newly emerging countries. Both meagre resources and lack of the necessary 'know-how' in these countries aggravated the originally agonizing aspect inherent in the very nature of modernization. Moreover, modernization is an open-ended process. Additional efforts are always needed, no matter how great the efforts made at modernizing a certain country. This is due to the fact that the highest end of the modernization process lies somewhere in the circle of infinity. So do the aspirations of human beings. Whenever some aspirations of a certain era are achieved through moving to a higher level of modernization, human nature tends to develop new aspirations and so on and so forth.

At Nasser's advent to power in 1952 Egypt had been experiencing modernization for 150 years.¹ In fact, Nasser came to power at a stage where the Egyptian society had been seriously 'diffracted' by the effects of modernization. His stage was the 'taking off' stage. Nasser was successful in leading his country from one level of modernization to a higher one. His means to that success were many. In this paper, however, both research and analysis have been focused in an attempt at revealing one of these means, namely, the interaction between the mass media and his charismatic leadership. Nasser's type of leadership has been treated as one of the major variables that influenced and was, in turn, influenced by his articulate use of mass media. That variable, however, has been treated in a manner not to overshadow other equally important ones. In fact, it has been maintained, in this paper, that the Egyptian and the wider Arab societal context, the new political order, the charismatic leadership of Nasser as well as the new Egyptian mass media had always been in a multi-interactive relations which finally shaped them into what they had become. The last three factors were Nasser's three-dimensional vehicle for the mobilization process which was inevitable for the transformation of the Egyptian and the wider Arab culture into a more modern one.

The main body of this paper consists of four parts:

In part one, both the nature of Nasser's charismatic leadership and its interactions with the new Egyptian mass media are discussed. In part two, the Egyptian (and wider Arab) societal contexts as well as the new Egyptian political system are treated in so far as they affected the country's mass media. In part three, the two major characteristics of Nasser's mass media are delineated and analyzed. These two characteristics are first, the deliberate expansion of mass media and second, the controlled and highly deterministic downward aspect of the Egyptian communications system. Finally a rather brief reformulation of the basic remarks pertaining to Nasser's use of mass media and its various interactions, together with an attempt at drawing some analytical conclusions are included in part four.

II. Charismatic Leadership in the Arab World

Max Weber was the first to give the term 'charisma' its modern meaning. The term referred to "an extraordinary quality of a person" regardless of whether it is "actual, alleged or presumed". Moreover, the term entails the 'proving' of the extraordinary quality "through the welfare of the governed."¹ The new concept of 'charisma', however, emphasizes "a fourfold relationship between leaders, followers, circumstances, and goals".² Whether taken in its original sense or in the modern one, the term applies to Nasser's leadership.

A. The Charismatic Leadership of Nasser

To be sure, however, Nasser spent his first years under either direct or indirect attacks from the Egyptian people and the Arabs at large. His policies were viewed with great suspicion from most of those active in Arab politics.² Though his relentless crusade against imperialism and the Baghdad Pact (in 1954 and 1955 respectively) favourably shaped his image in the minds of the Arab masses,³ it was only in July, 1956, that Nasser made his historical charismatic breakthrough. The breakthrough did not only bring Nasser into the minds of the Egyptians and other Arabs, it let him into their hearts as well. In Alexandria, July 1956, Nasser delivered his famous speech in which he announced the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. The Arab people found their long-awaited hero on that particular day. The sequence of events (mainly the Tripartite Attack of 1956 and its aftermath) enforced Nasser's new position and added the final touches to his would-be unchallenged leadership of the Arab world. In 1956/57, in fact, the demarcation line between Nasser the-strong-figure of a military *coup d'état* and Nasser the-number-one leader of

the Arab world was drawn. In that year Nasser entered history and emerged as a potent figure in international politics.

The talents of Nasser for leadership, enhanced by circumstances, resulted in a wide range of followers who enabled him to effectively pursue his, and in many cases, the masses's goals. His "attributes" were "unusual" by Egyptian standards. He was "a dedicated nationalist" ready and "willing to endure personal enmity in his quest to develop the country".⁴ Nasser was "a man of words and actions, emotions and purpose",⁵ and was able to read what was "written on the hearts of the Arab peoples".⁶

The new strength of Nasser derived from various personal and societal sources. Firstly, Nasser's "seriousness, honesty and dedication were some of his strong points". "Neither the riches nor the women of the whole world can seduce him. All that he wants is glory for his nation and for himself", so said one of the ex-vice presidents of the United Arab Republic.⁶ Contrary to what happened in many Asian, African and Latin American countries, Nasser's group (the Free Officers) were not "enriched during their years in office."⁷ The Free Officers' "basic honesty and devotion to duty provided a constant contrast with vivid memories of the court circle and the behavior of King Farouk's officials and (constituted) one of the most important sources of popular support".⁸ In fact, Nasser and family stayed in the same modest residence they were in before July 23, 1952. For full appreciation of the influence of this last fact on the Arab masses one has to realize that this 'little thing' meant quite a lot to these masses. Secondly, the fact that Nasser was the first to challenge "Western supremacy" in the Middle East won him the "reputation as an infallible leader, at home in Egypt and abroad in the Arab world",⁹ and in other areas. Thirdly, the "sensitivity to insult"¹⁰ inherent in the "hot blooded Arabs"¹¹ helped to popularize Nasser's "favourite theme" about "restoring dignity to the Arabs".¹² In fact, the "too-much-personal-nature"¹² of Nasser made him take international political rebuffs as acts against his and the Arabs' dignity".¹³ This attitude on Nasser's side greatly appealed to the Arab masses, and consequently, brought them closer to him. Fourthly, the fact that Nasser was "a superlative pragmatist"¹⁴ gave him a wide manoeuvring margin which enabled him to effectively exploit international politics for more benefits to his people¹⁴ which, in turn, gained him additional popularity. Fifthly, Nasser's style of oratory which reached the peoples' hearts"¹⁵ was the means by which he kept *relatively close and continuous face-to-face contacts* with a very broad base of Egyptians and other Arabs. In fact, Nasser's "speeches and actions (did) strike a responsive chord in the

hearts of his people".¹⁶ Finally, and perhaps more important than any other factor was the ability of Nasser in power politics.

The fact that Nasser excelled in this particular art of politics distinguished, for example, his 'charisma' from that of Sukarno of Indonesia, Nkrumah of Ghana and Ben Bella of Algeria. For all purposes, Nasser did not allow his popularity, which was in the final analysis nothing but 'light weaponry' to deceive him or to blind his eyes from observing and controlling the 'heavy weaponry' (the army, the security forces and the militant organized groups) which are the only final guarantee for both security and maintaining power. His first and foremost attention had always been given to the purpose of securing the utmost loyalty of the army and the security forces. In fact, the first five years of his rule were solely spent in achieving that goal. The Egyptian armed forces finally rested in the hands of Abdul-Hakim Amer, Nasser's life-long friend and brother-in-law. Nevertheless, El-raï (the Boss), as the Arab masses liked to call Nasser, always kept a close eye at the army.

To be sure, the early years of the revolution were not the only years that witnessed purges against potential rivals. Purging was, in fact, a day-to-day process. As the years passed by, however, these purges were handled in a more intelligent, tacit and discreet manner. In more concrete terms, the officers whose loyalties were in doubt were either transferred to administrative jobs inside or outside the army, sent to join embassies abroad or were given retirement pensions. Even after the June war in 1967, the first move that Nasser made was the reconsolidation of his position with the Army.¹⁷ In brief, Nasser's "charismatic leadership and organizational control have kept the reins of politics and government in his hands without any serious challenges or defections in Egypt since the removal of Nagib. Even in defeat, in the Suez in 1956 or in Syria in 1961, (or in June war in 1967) his popularity has been great enough to carry him through the crisis, and his political skill inventive enough¹⁷ to make reversals give birth to renewed energy or sudden advantage".¹⁸

Contrary to Anderson, Mehden and Young's general observation about Afro-Asian and Latin American countries, Nasser's humiliating defeat in the June War led to neither "violence (nor) a *coup d'état*".¹⁹ In fact, when Nasser resigned his office on the very day following the defeat, millions of Egyptians and other Arabs, in a hysterical burst of emotions, forgot the defeat, marched into day-and-night demonstrations and finally forced Nasser back to the presidency. It is paradoxical that Nasser who came to power because of King Farouk's

defeat in the Palestine war of 1948²⁰ was, in contrast, able to consolidate his already shaken power despite, if not because of, his own defeat in the June War of 1967. It is more paradoxical, however, to notice that Nasser's charisma which carried him through the defeat of 1967 was the same charisma that he acquired in an earlier military defeat, in 1956.

All things being said, the critical question that comes forth and needs an answer is the following: If the "source" of charisma, as Weber resolved, stems from the leader's ability to 'prove' his charismatic quality "through miracles, *through victories*²⁰ and other successes",²¹ how do we explain Nasser's charisma which he won in his military defeat of 1956 and which he kept and enforced in his second military defeat of 1967?

B. The Interaction Between Mass Media and Charismatic Leadership In Egypt

From the very outset it should be emphasized that if the paradox proves anything it proves the "irrational" element inherent in any charisma.²² In other words, history has known several cases in which the masses of certain countries at certain times, put their absolute faith in a leader who, in turn, enforced his already great popularity and vested it in mobilizing the masses and directing them towards prescribed goals and actions. To this, Nasser's role among the Arab masses was no exception.

The mass media subsystem erected by Nasser was his major tool in winning him the charismatic attributes with which he was associated since 1956. Though it is true that the personal talents of Nasser contributed to his charisma, it is more of a truth, however, to maintain that his more decisive talent was reflected in his early realization that mass media has always played a very important role in modern politics and societies.²² Again, notwithstanding the role played by circumstances in shaping Nasser's charisma, it is more important to realize that without the mass media, the circumstances, by themselves, could not have borne any significant weight or contributed any salient influence. In fact, many leaders in many cases have let some incidents pass without capitalizing on them for more popularity for themselves or their achievements. For a better appreciation of what has been mentioned above and, foremost, for a better understanding of the role played by the mass media in creating Nasser's charisma in 1956, it is to be recalled that, as early as 1952, Nasser envisaged a leading role for Egypt in "three circles", namely,

the Arab, the African and the Islamic. As to the Arab circle, Nasser wrote:

For some reason it seems to me that within the Arab circle there is a role, wandering aimlessly in search of a hero. And I do not know why it seems to me that this role, exhausted by its wanderings, has at last settled down, tired and weary, near the borders of our country and is beckoning to us to move, to take up its lines, to put on its costume, since no one else is qualified to play it.²³

Nasser was consistent with his own convictions from the very beginning, and consequently, assumed the responsibility of providing the Arab world with its 'long-awaited' hero. It goes without mentioning that Nasser found no one better than himself to play that role. Naturally enough, such a role was never welcomed, in fact it was resisted by the other Arab governing elites. The masses were Nasser's hope and goal. To reach them, he had to resort to mass media. Both the printed word and the Egyptian-produced films²³, however, were to be excluded because of the preventive restrictions (Law of Censorship of Publication) imposed by the Arab governing elites to ensure that their masses were kept away from being influenced by the relatively very radical ideas preached by Nasser. The gamble of Nasser, therefore, had to be limited to but one of the then components of mass media, namely, the radio.²⁴ The radio, moreover, was of special importance because of the low level of literacy in the Arab world.

The "new communication strategy" of Nasser showed as early as 1953 in "the burst of activity given, under his guidance,²⁴ to the 'Voice of the Arabs' and to the 'Arab News Agency'".²⁵ The influence of any mass media, however, does not solely depend on the quantity of ideas disseminated or the number of hours in which these ideas are transmitted. More decisive is the appeal, the content as well as the relevance that these ideas and transmissions have. In fact, the very influential transmission of the Egyptian radio was due to the fact that it hit the then most popular theme among the Arab masses, namely, attacking imperialism.²⁶ The state-controlled broadcasting service (E.S.B.) has always been "charged with vibrant opinions" which aimed at keeping the nationalist feelings" in a continuous state of high excitement."²⁷ Moreover the new leaders have always been in favour of paying "far higher wages" to those who ranked best in the art of manipulating that particular medium.²⁸

In brief, "political agitation" among the Arab masses became one of the "hallmarks" of the Egyptian policy.²⁹ The 'Voice of the Arabs', the 1953 "half-hour program" of the Egyptian home services, was

extended to almost eight hours daily. "Nasser was becoming committed to a crusade in the name of Arab nationalism",³⁰ The 'Voice of the Arabs' has become the "chief anti-imperialism transmission" from the Middle East.³¹ In consequence, all those opposed to "Cairo-dictated policies were castigated" as traitors.³² Nasser was in the process of forcing his way to the Arab political-stage. The would-be charismatic leader was waiting for the necessary suitable "circumstances"³³ which eventually came in the Tripartite Attack in November, 1956.

C. The Role of the Mass Media in the Making of Charisma in Egypt

The many-sided tactic of Nasser for mobilizing the Egyptian and other Arab masses during the Suez Canal Crisis was a real piece of communications' art. The famous 'May you (i.e. the Western imperialists) choke to death on your fury'³⁴ which Nasser declared in the equally famous Alexandria speech in 1956 prior to the Tripartite Attack; the incredible continuous sensational transmission of fiery slogans from the 'Voice of the Arabs' as well as the various speeches delivered by Nasser at the Islamic mosques in Cairo, during the Attack; the tireless campaign against imperialism, the unceasing glorification of Egyptian sacrifice (especially Port Said city), the towering gratitude and glorification of the Arab support³⁴ extended to the Egyptian cause and the continuous popularization of the 'Major Victory' achieved against the two great powers (England and France) and Israel, after the Attack, all resulted in a very wide Arab absolute faith in Nasser and his leadership. The great political victory³⁴ achieved by Nasser completely outweighed the Egyptian military defeat. Not a single Arab, in fact, expected an Egyptian military victory in such an unbalanced confrontation. The mere fact that Egypt resisted the overwhelming military invasion for more than a week was, unto itself, a victory in the Arab eyes.

The already well-developed Egyptian mass media cultivated all the above mentioned explanations, pretexts and justifications. It went on to a continuous process of hammering into the Arab mind all the well-prepared versions and ideas about the Great Victory. No chance was left for anyone to doubt that what really happened was a great victory. Whether the victory was "actual, alleged or presumed" was a minor point. The manner in which the Arab masses took the event was of more and incomparable importance. To these masses, thanks to the Egyptian mass media, the 1956 war was a historical Arab victory directly associated with Nasser and fully attributed to his leadership. Consequently, Nasser became the only source of guidance³⁵ as far as

the Arabs were concerned. The infallibility of his leadership became almost an article of faith.

In brief, since 1956 Nasser had always met the "traditional need" of the Arabs for "an autocratic leader". He exercised "an almost mystical sway over them".³⁶ Nasser became the unchallenged "idol of the great mass of the Arab world."³⁷ The Arab peoples never agreed on anything as they agreed on Nasser.³⁸ They had always wanted Nasser "to remain as their leader and would have been appalled if anything happened to him."³⁹ The "hysteria" that hung over the Arab world when Nasser died in late September, 1970, reflected the degree to which the Arab masses were appalled³⁹ and provided culminating evidence of his charisma.

III. The Arab Societal Background

The experience of the Suez Canal crisis made the already communication-conscious Nasser far more "conscious of the importance of mass media."⁴⁰ What the experience showed was that the effective manipulation of the Egyptian mass media helped in "skilfully obliterating"⁴¹ the military defeat, magnifying the political achievement and, perhaps more important, mobilizing and rallying the Arab masses around Nasser. The new leader who committed himself to the liberation and progress of the Arab nation was, however, far from being "content to ride aimlessly on the wave of popularity". In fact, he wanted to "harness and channel"⁴² that popularity to effectively achieve the goals he envisioned. Nevertheless, it was impossible for Nasser to harness his popularity without first, remaining in power and second, keeping up to the expectations of the masses. This meant that Nasser had to continue his policies of fighting imperialism, on the one hand, and to proceed in implementing a development program, on the other. He could not have done that, however, without inviting the hostilities of both foreign imperialist powers and Egyptian (and other Arab) traditional elites.⁴³ Again, to confront these threats Nasser had to first, establish a new strong and authoritarian political order to guarantee his position in power and to mobilize the Egyptian masses;⁴⁴ and thereto second, establish a strong mass media system. This last factor was very essential because it was the means by which Nasser could harness and channel his popularity and ideas, consequently, mobilize the Arab masses for both building the country and confronting the inevitable counterattacks of the "imperialists and their lackeys, the (Arab) feudal lords and politicians".⁴⁵

Since these two devices, namely, the new political order of Nasser

and his new mass media were the two chief vehicles employed in mobilizing the Arab masses and because the new political order greatly affected, in fact, shaped, the new mass media and was, in turn, greatly affected by it, we turn now to briefly discussing both of them. The discussion of the broader Egyptian and other Arab societal context in which both the political system and the mass media operated needs to be, however, our starting point.

A. The Egyptian and Wider Arab Societal Context

Egypt has always been considered one of the world's "most densely populated countries". Almost all Egyptians live in "less than five per cent of the total land area".⁴⁶ This has made the country more susceptible "to organization and social communication" on the one hand, and has made the Egyptians more "amenable" to a strong central government control, on the other.⁴⁷

Secondly, in contrast with the majority of developing countries,⁴⁸ Egypt has a relatively high level of both linguistic and racial homogeneity.⁴⁹ In fact, the Egyptian population is "highly homogenous"⁵⁰ and the phenomenon of "subnationalism" is very marginal.⁵¹ The impact of this, whether on communications processes, political activities or national integration, will be discussed later.

Thirdly, the Islamic religion "remains a strong force in Egypt". Its influences are highly felt in both villages and towns.⁵² Some of the religious traditions have handicapped both the modernization process in general, and the modern ideas disseminated through the mass media, in particular. However, the Islamic legacy has another encouraging aspect. The Arab's "responsiveness to sacredness" did not die. It sought "new objects".⁵³ The charismatic leadership which has always been vital for both the mobilization and the modernization⁵⁴ of developing countries, was the Arabs "new object".⁵⁵

Fourthly, the fact that more than 80 percent of the Egyptians are illiterate,⁵⁶ has greatly affected and shaped both the methods and the contents of mass media. Finally, some observers believe that the "emotional nature" of the Arabs⁵⁷ made them definitely more vulnerable and, perhaps more susceptible, to mass media influences than the Europeans or the North Americans.

It remains of great importance to notice that the majority of these factors are operational in a broader Arab context as they are operational in the particular Egyptian context.

B. The New Egyptian Political System

The political order created by Nasser, like the other general features of the Egyptian society, has been very decisive in both molding and shaping the country's mass media. In fact, it is safe to conclude that the present Egyptian mass media is both a reflection and a product of the new Nasserite political system. This is why a brief discussion of the new (after 1952) political order is vital.

Judged by Huntington's three yardsticks of political modernization,⁵⁸ pre-revolution Egypt (1952) is considered to be a politically modernized country. It had a state bureaucracy (in fact the oldest bureaucracy in the world),⁵⁹ a standing army as well as a very old taxation system.⁶⁰ In other words, the structures of the society were differentiated. Again, the seventeen-party-Egypt of 1952⁶¹ satisfied the second conditional clause stipulated by Huntington, namely, political participation. The only drawback in the old Egyptian political system, as far as political modernization was concerned, was the fact that the 'rationalization of authority' issue was no longer strong. In fact, the disintegrating authority of King Farouk enabled Nasser to step onto the Egyptian political stage on July 23, 1952. However, five difficult years (1952-1957)⁶² had to elapse before Nasser was able to erect the basis for the new authority. By the end of this power-consolidating period the new leader became popular enough to assume a new authority in both Egypt and the Arab world. Internally, Nasser proved to be very capable in power politics. He managed to emerge from the many-sided political conflicts and competitions as the infallible leader of Egypt.⁶³ Thereafter, collective leadership was supplanted and replaced by "personal rule".⁶⁴ Moreover, the efforts of Nasser at wielding the loyalty of the Arab masses in 1953⁶⁵ and 1954⁶⁶ gave its fruits in late 1956. In 1957 Nasser "filled the role of the long-awaited Arab hero",⁶⁷ and became the outspoken leader of the great majority of the Arab masses everywhere.

That rationale of the new Egyptian political system was intelligently revealed by Daniel Lerner. In Lerner's words:

"Nasser has gone the way of *total*⁶⁷ *politization*, the distinctive mark of totalitarianism in our century. Wielding inadequate power to enact rapidly *their grand designs*, such leaders have yoked all values to their quest *for more power*. Nasser has perceived how the 'dark and ominous' mass, which so depressed him when it had to be served, *can be made to serve him-and through him*, so runs the rationale, ultimately serves its own 'higher ends'.⁶⁸

The society that Nasser built was military in its essence. His leadership was to a large extent based on "the continued loyalty of the armed forces and the internal security system."⁶⁹ The "Army" constituted the backbone of the new Egyptian political system and extended its influence to almost every aspect of national life.⁷⁰ Men who were originally military officers filled most of the key posts in culture, radio, television and the press services.⁷¹

Again, the "elaborate secret police apparatus"⁷² contributed much to the stability of the new political order. However, the invisibility of the secret police, the competence of the military officers and their ability to communicate with the masses as well as "their apparent seriousness of purpose helped them further to impress the public favorably".⁷³

Both Nasser and his group envisaged themselves "as the embodiment of the national idea".⁷⁴ Pressed by their own convictions and the aspirations of the masses, the new leaders embarked on a policy of modernization. The modernization process initiated by the new Egyptian leadership was, in Apter's words, carried out "from above". The country's "power and prestige hierarchy" was reorganized "on the basis of the functional significance of roles and organizations in the modernizing process".⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the various attempts at establishing a mass political organization (the Liberation Rally,⁷⁶ the National Union and the Arab Socialist Union in 1953, 1957 and 1961 respectively) reaped nothing but failure.⁷⁷ In fact, these 'organizations' have been termed "only a popularistic sop to the masses, deceiving them into thinking that they participate in the matters of state."⁷⁸ These attempts were doomed to failure from the very outset. The National Union, for example, was reduced to an official department of the government. It is expressive to notice that in its three year lifetime, the Union passed 502 resolutions "calling" on the government to continue its policies."⁷⁹

This is a clear mainfestaion of the hierarchical authority that results from any imposed 'from above' modernization.⁸⁰ The awareness of the leaders of the unstable character of the 'military oligarchy' led them to intelligently adopt a policy of separating themselves from the Army. They established themselves as part of the "professional or political status elite."⁸¹

All that being done, Nasser began the process of displacing what Lindsay called the "operative ideals."⁸² of the old regime and went on replacing them with new ones. More important, the new leader did away with what we may call the old "operative institutions" and

introduced new ones of his own instead. Democracy, for example, gave way to either 'directed' or 'controlled' democracy. The "inherent paradox"⁸³ of such concepts was never admitted or recognized by the new regime. Again, both the idea of parliamentary government and political parties were sacrificed in the name of national unity.⁸⁴

Even the well-established and grass-rooted old interpretations of Islamic religion were replaced by new modern ones.⁸⁵ The counterelites, moreover, were "condemned to silence"⁸⁶ and were subjected to what came to be known in Egypt as the "policy of isolation."⁸⁷

Furthermore, the new body of ideas was raised to the status of a "political religion".⁸⁸ The major justification given for that was the necessity for achieving quick development. This new religion was, in turn, employed to serve the purposes of modernization. "Conflict (was) not only bad but also counterrevolutionary. Ideas not only (were) dangerous.... but they also (represented) an unscientific vintage wherever they (ran) counter to those of the regime".⁸⁹ In brief, the new operative ideals became "order, unity, and work".⁹⁰

All sectors of potential power in Egypt were controlled or, as the regime likes to call it, were 'coordinated'. Workers were 'reorganized' in one official union under the surveillance of the Minister of Social and Labour Affairs. The peasants were to join the official cooperatives.⁹⁰ The three National Assemblies were especially designed and tailored to provide the regime "with a transmission belt for conveying the latest slogans of the revolution".⁹¹ They were nothing more than "rubber-stamps".⁹² Moreover, the old bureaucracy was surpassed by a new one which was under the direct control of the 'civilianized' officers.⁹³ The new leaders seemed to "have never dropped the military view that orders are to be obeyed by subordinates without discussion".⁹⁴ The whole society was reconstructed in a manner that all threads of power ended in the hands of the military, and, more specifically, in the hands of Nasser. In brief, every aspect of Egyptian life had to rotate in a predetermined orbit and always around one centre: Nasser.

To sum up, what really happened in Egypt was, in Apter's terminologies, a "sacred-collectivity model".⁹⁵ The new regime aimed at a 'mobilization system'⁹⁶ which resulted in a neomercantilist' society.⁹⁷ The new political order represented "the new puritanism" where "progress" was "its faith, industrialization its vision" and "harmony its goal".⁹⁸

IV. The New Egyptian Mass Media Subsystem

The new Egyptian mass media subsystem had inevitably to develop along the lines set by the newly established political order. The Egyptian mass media has been an exact reflection of the wider system in which it has operated. The following are the major features of the new media.

A. A Deliberate Expansion of the Egyptian Mass Media

Communications grow in response to both endogenous as well as exogenous factors. However, it is generally accepted that the size and content of communications reflect the degree of development in a particular society.⁹⁹ "Historically, mass media growth has been a concomitant of economic and social development."¹⁰⁰ A rise in literacy and educational levels, in particular, contributes to the emergence of an effective mass media. Nevertheless, mass media subsystems in some countries have undergone extensive growth mainly in response to the deliberate initiatives of the concerned political elites.¹⁰¹ As a matter of fact, the political leaders in the majority of developing countries consider mass media as an instrument for both "enhancing national unity" and "shaping and encouraging modernization".¹⁰² Moreover, the mass media serve the purposes of collective indoctrination and "community building".¹⁰³ In Latin America, for example, the political leaders used mass media to brainwash their subjects.¹⁰⁴ Viewed in this context Egypt is not an exception.

The relatively extensive economic and social development induced by the new Egyptian regime resulted in a strong growth impetus to their communications. Internally, Nasser used the mass media "to achieve national consensus without unduly raising public demands for full participation".¹⁰⁵ Externally, the mass media was Nasser's first and only bridge to the Arab masses. "The tireless clamour of Cairo" against British colonialism in the Arab world, was one major factor that paved the road for Nasser to become the unchallenged leader in the area. It is almost definite that communication networks meant to Nasser "a power structure"¹⁰⁶ and a great "secondary political socializer".¹⁰⁷ For all purposes, the new leader attempted at making full use of it.

On May 24, 1960, the Egyptian Press, the oldest in the Arab world,¹⁰⁸ was 'organized' in a manner that its ownership was "vested in the National Union", the then only official political organization.¹⁰⁹

The 'organization' of the press was justified on the basis that it had never attempted to confront the problems of society in the past and it had become 'sensationalist' and lacking contact with both reality and the "everyday life" of the masses. Abdul-Malek, however, believes that the real reason for the regimes encroachment on the press lies in the growing tension and distrust between the government and the press.¹¹⁰ In brief, the attitude of Nasser towards the press resulted in making it "a willing tool for his shifting propaganda tactics".¹¹¹ Moreover, the other "impersonal media",¹¹² namely, films, were employed to serve the new regime. In fact, the Egyptian produced films were quite influential among both the peasants in the countryside, and the workers in the urban centers.¹¹³ The rise in the total 'consumption' of films is reflected in the more than 100% rise in the number of those attending cinemas in the period 1950-1956.¹¹⁴ This, in turn, reflects the conscious attempt, on the part of the new leaders, to expand the Egyptian mass media. Since 1952, in fact, the Egyptian mass media has undergone extensive expansion. In the early fifties Egypt had some half a million radio receivers.¹¹⁵ The number has risen to 3,500,000 and 4,275,000 radio receivers in 1965¹¹⁶ and 1968¹¹⁷ respectively. Again, while there was no television service till July, 1960,¹¹⁸ the number of television sets reached half a million in 1968.¹¹⁹ Moreover, in January, 1969, the Egyptian government adopted the French Secam colour television system.¹²⁰ The transmission hours in telecasting have risen from 10 hours a day to 22 hours between 1960/61 and 1965/66. Two stations in Luxor and Aswan were established to make sure that the service covered the whole country. On the other hand, the broadcasting service which used to transmit 15 hours a day in 1951/52 lengthened its transmission to a total of 146 hours a day in 1965/66. The regime, moreover, proved intelligent enough to see that the reasons that caused the decline in the numbers of Egyptian dailies and weeklies are the same reasons that raised the number of radio receivers. In fact, the rise in the number of radio receivers was mainly due to the policy of the new leaders. The fact that Nasser was dedicated to both socially mobilizing and politically indoctrinating the Arab masses¹²¹ made him resort to the mass media vehicle least affected by the low literacy rate which has always characterized the Arab world. The radio "has proved to be a major weapon against illiteracy"¹²² To reach the average Egyptian, nothing was more effective than the radio.¹²³ Again, the Arab masses and other Afro-Asian peoples who counted much in the strategies of Nasser were best reached by radio. In fact, it was inconceivable that Nasser could have reached these masses by any other means. The reasons for this were: the high rate of illiteracy in these countries, the limited circulation of printed word, and the various restrictions imposed on

the masses by the concerned governing elites. These restrictions aimed at keeping the masses out of Nasser's circle of influence. All these barriers, however, were of no real value mainly because of the special powers of the radio services. In Nasser's words:

It is true that most of our people are illiterate. But politically that counts for less than it did twenty years ago... Radio had changed everything... Today people in the most remote villages (and areas) hear of what is happening everywhere and form their opinions. Leaders cannot govern as they once did. We live in a new world.¹²⁴

The function of this particular instrument of mass media has been facilitated by the fact that the Egyptians have always been "avid and regular listeners".¹²⁵ The Arab masses, on the other hand, opted "to be attentive" to the media of Nasser because they were ready to accept what their charismatic leader wanted to say.¹²⁶ Moreover, the fact that Egypt under Nasser started to manufacture and produce radio receivers and television sets made it easier for the masses to provide themselves with this equipment, consequently, more communication.¹²⁷ Again, it is to be noticed that the real influence of radio as a medium has been multiplied by the fact that Egyptians, other Afro-Asians and Latin Americans are accustomed to gathering around and listening to the radio "in local cafés and coffee shops".¹²⁸

The effective usage of the radio medium by Nasser had by no means been limited to the Egyptian people. The requirements of his assumed leadership of the Arab world as well as his partial leadership of the Afro-Asians necessitated that his radio programs reach wider masses. The linguistic barriers have been done away with through the Foreign Services of the U.A.R. Broadcasting Corporation.

These services transmitted programs in the following languages: Arabic, Indonesian, Malay, Thai, Bengal, English, Urdu, Sudanese dialects, Swahili, Amharic, Somali, Kurdish, Turkish, Persian, French, German, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish and Hebrew. In Sedar and Greenberg's words:

"Radio Cairo has become the most influential channel of communications in the Afro-Asian periphery. In the international war of air waves, Nasser has overtaken the United States in the amount of global hours of broadcasting. Cairo is second only to the Soviet Union, and the United States has now dropped to third."¹²⁹

In brief, the mass media of Nasser "had an undeniable appeal".¹³⁰ An

Egyptian editorial used to threaten the stability of other Arab governments.¹³¹ An attack by Nasser on any other Arab ruler meant trouble to that ruler either on the very same day¹³¹ or the following one. Moreover, the articles of M.H. Hykal in **Al-Ahram**, though with a rather limited circulation¹³¹ used to shake the stability of other Arab governments¹³¹ solely because Hykal was always known to be very close to Nasser. This reveals the very strong interaction if not the almost organic unity between the charismatic leadership of Nasser and the Egyptian mass media.

B. Controlled and Highly Deterministic Downward Communications

The nature of the new political system discussed earlier made government control over the networks of mass media inevitable. The fact that the governing elite could not afford to tolerate criticism coming from outside its rank and file necessitated the tightening of controls "over many channels of communication". In fact, "the most immediate target of increased control (was) the mass media".¹³² This was one reason for the new Egyptian leaders to exercise control over the mass media in the country. As a matter of fact, the methods of control first used by Nasser were "effective if indirect".¹³³ However, in May, 1960, the new encroachment of the government on the freedom of mass media resulted in the nationalization of the press. In fact, the Egyptian press together with more modern mass media vehicles were made "an arm of the state propaganda machine".¹³⁴ Moreover, it had always been assumed that the mass media were to support the government "wholeheartedly on certain matters such as foreign* policy and the form of government".¹³⁵

A second reason for these controls was the fact that the Egyptian leaders were trapped in what Lerner called the "vicious circle" of poverty. In more concrete terms, the aspirations of the new leaders were found to be incompatible with the meagre resources at their disposal. The only means, however, for ameliorating the situation and bridging the gap was through controlling the "flow of public communication". This helped the Egyptian governing elite to control the 'output' of communications and "to convey its own image of the national future".¹³⁶ In fact, the state-controlled broadcasting service operated "on the basis that news-without-views (was) a waste of radio time".¹³⁷ Moreover, the press and other state financed publications were all placed "under the auspices" of the Ministry of Culture. This guaranteed the full control of the regime over both the size and content of information disseminated. Again, a "professional class of communicators"¹³⁸ was trained and employed by the government. Those communicators were "able and diligent propagandists of the

revolution".¹³⁹ Consequently, Nasser used this "all-powerful weapon"¹⁴⁰ of mass media "to castigate" all those who dared to oppose "Cairo-dictated policies" as "traitors to Arab nationalism".¹⁴¹ In contrast with this overflow of downward communications, however, the Egyptian mass media were very secretive, for example, in matters pertaining to the differences among the governing elite. In such cases, neither the officials hinted at nor did the press mention any of these differences.¹⁴² Such an attitude on the part of the press was in harmony with one of Almond and Powell's conclusions whereby mass media structures, in transitional societies, tend to "disseminate only that information permitted and ordered by the top elite".¹⁴³ Moreover, the masses were not "allowed to inform themselves on a whole range of state matters".¹⁴⁴ Again, this sounds in harmony with the majority of the transitional communication system where the volume of flow of information is uneven. "In such systems" much information (remained) covert and latent, and it (was) consequently difficult to make political estimates accurately and quickly".¹⁴⁵

The semi-authoritarian political system erected by Nasser did not insulate the governing elite from the masses. This was mainly due to the charismatic leadership of Nasser, the intelligent manipulation of mass media and the achievements of the regime. The authoritarian political system, nevertheless, resulted in a decline of "certain types of communication up the hierarchy... coupled with an increase in total communication down the hierarchy".¹⁴⁶ This fact was intelligently delineated by Daniel Lerner. In his excellent study Lerner revealed the "disproportionate growth of 'production' over 'consumption' in the (Egyptian) mass media".¹⁴⁷ Again, this observation matches with the general remark of Almond concerning the imbalance between 'output' and 'input' of messages in transitional societies.¹⁴⁸ In fact, this found its best manifestation in the Egyptian rural areas. Other than the indirect radio and television services "the only direct link between the regime in Cairo and the peasants"¹⁴⁹ was the official cooperatives which the peasants joined. In all of these cases, however, the peasants were like 'receptive units', consequently, "no 'feedback' from the village level".¹⁵⁰ In brief, it is safe to conclude that what really developed in Egypt was what Lerner called the "participant style". In such systems the 'frequency' of one-sided (i.e. downward) communications, rather than the 'quality' of participation, was more emphasized.¹⁵¹

CONCLUSIONS

The attempt of Nasser at leading Egypt to a higher stage of modernization necessitated major adjustments in the Egyptian political culture.¹⁵² In fact, great emphasis was placed on generating a modern culture.¹⁵³ 'Nasserism' as a modern political movement represents the result of these adjustments.¹⁵⁴ The new mobilizing political order was the vehicle used by Nasser for both mobilizing his nation and inducing the required 'conversion' in the political culture.¹⁵⁵ Again, the hierarchical organization of authority in the new political system allowed Nasser to control the inevitable and dangerous changes affected by the mobilization and modernization processes.¹⁵⁶ The ability of Nasser to prevent the Egyptian 150 years process of modernization from 'slipping back' was, according to Apter, "one major achievement" of the regime.¹⁵⁷

A. Some Major Features of the New Egyptian Mass Media

The nature of the new political system, however, resulted in a communications subsystem where the downward flow of information, in contrast with the upward one, tended to be maximized.¹⁵⁸ In consequence, the new Egyptian communication subsystem was first characterized by its propensity to be both highly deterministic and operating 'from below' with a low volume of information.¹⁵⁹ Secondly, the new Egyptian leaders proved to be highly conscious of the importance of mass media for the effective implementation of their plans. This resulted in the deliberate establishment of a very strong¹⁵⁹ Egyptian communications subsystem mainly upon an initiative from the governing elite. Such a phenomenon was in contrast with what Fagen considered as a historical trend in communications growth.¹⁶⁰ Thirdly, the new mass media were the major instruments in creating, enhancing and channelling the charismatic leadership of Nasser. In fact, the popularity of Nasser was both a cause and a product of his effective mass media. The media served that purpose by either popularizing the real 'outputs' of the regime, convincing the masses of the existence of imaginative achievements or promising them future accomplishments. Fourthly, the highly influential speeches of Nasser, whether addressed directly to huge mass rallies or simultaneously transmitted to the Arab people, helped further the already existing face-to-face communications.¹⁶¹ The importance of charisma in any mass media transmissions is clearly manifested in the fact that "among many traditional peoples there is a strong tendency to appraise the reliability of various media mainly on the basis of the strength of their personal relationship with the source of information".¹⁶² Fifthly, the

'solidarity parties'¹⁶² of Nasser were an additional enforcement to the necessary face-to-face communications.¹⁶³ Again, the importance of the solidarity parties is fully appreciated once it is realized that communications is a two-step process. It is first transmitted to 'opinion leaders' who, in turn, transmit it to the masses.¹⁶⁴ Moreover, the above mentioned face-to-face communications are far more effective than the indirect media in creating the "attitude set" essential for any modernization process.¹⁶⁵

B. Some Major Drawbacks in the New Egyptian Mass Media

Notwithstanding the strong impact of the new Egyptian mass media in mobilizing the Arab people, the communications subsystem of Nasser was far from achieving all of its goals. This was mainly due to:

1. The groups "most hopefully regarded as the target of communications are often least to be in the audience".¹⁶⁶ This explains the failure of Nasser in converting the influential Muslim Brothers or their supporters, inside and outside Egypt, to his ideas and policies.¹⁶⁷ Other manifestations of the same fact are the failures of the regime in gaining to its side both the Egyptian intellectuals ("the Crisis of the Intellectuals")¹⁶⁸ and the various minorities inside and outside Egypt.¹⁶⁸

2. The Egyptian mass media was not fully effective partly because it was far from being completely supported by all available and operating networks of informal communications.¹⁶⁹ Except for the followers of Nasser (the Nasserites) all counter communities, elites and groups were active in fighting the new ideas of the regime as well as spreading counter information.¹⁷⁰ The effects of the counter campaign were multiplied by the fact that "Nasserism" was modern and radical, consequently, invited the hostilities of all traditional powers in the Arab world. In fact, many traditional primary groups "intervened" between the mass media of Nasser on the one hand, and the Arab masses on the other, with the eventual outcome of minimizing the actual influences of the media.¹⁷¹

3. Since any mass media is usually dependent on achievement for its effectiveness and, because it tends to raise the levels of aspirations and expectations without a corresponding rise in the levels of achievement, the first outruns the latter, consequently, frustrations spread.¹⁷² To this, the new Egyptian regime was no exception. Manifestations of such frustrations were noticed by Mansfield as early as 1965¹⁷³ Yet clearer and more acute frustrations spread since the debacle of June, 1967. This, however, was both partially natural and

expected because, by raising the level of aspirations, Nasser also "raised the standards of performance by which his regime (was) judged".¹⁷⁴

4. Mass media is mainly a means of "enforcement of the status quo" rather than an agent of change.¹⁷⁵ This limited the 'conversion' influences of Nasser's media and made it fall short from fully achieving its goals. In fact, one major shortcoming of both the Egyptian mobilization system and the communications subsystems stemmed from their inability to "raise the level of national accomplishment toward the goals".¹⁷⁶ The failure of Nasser to create a real political party was an expression of the above mentioned fact. Moreover, the millions of "Nasserites" in the Arab world constituted a very loose and ineffective movement. Again, this was mainly due to lack of "proper communication channels"¹⁷⁷ necessary for effective mobilization between groups.

5. Finally, one of the major drawbacks in the Egyptian communications subsystem is its partial incompatibility with the newly created authoritarian political order. Notwithstanding the fact that the new political system helped much in furthering the processes of mobilization and modernization¹⁷⁸ and despite the continuous attempts¹⁷⁸ of Nasser at raising what Mosel called the "sense of self-potency",¹⁷⁹ the authoritarian nature of the political system made all the decision-making power the privilege of the governing elite and the governing elite alone.¹⁷⁹ Consequently, the 'revolution of communications' that Nasser initiated was never capable of being totally channelled into a 'revolution of participation'. Again, this was due to Nasser's 'from above' modernization effort, his imbalanced communications subsystem which was characterized by a "disproportionate growth of 'production' over 'consumption' in the mass media" as well as the minimal feedback from below.¹⁸⁰

C. Concluding Remarks

The new communications subsystem introduced by Nasser was much more comprehensive than those employed by any of the developing countries. In fact, the Egyptian foreign radio services are second to none but to that of the Soviet Union (as shown in section B-II). Structurally, however, the Egyptian communications process has, like other transitional societies a + bifurcated and fragmental nature". It employed both modern and face-to-face media.¹⁸¹ As a matter of fact, the five types of communications structures,¹⁸¹ outlined by Almond and Powell, as well as the three functions of the

communications process,¹⁸¹ described by Laswell, are all exemplified in the new Egyptian communications subsystem.

More important was the fact that the Egyptian mass media, under the personal guidance of Nasser,¹⁸² proved to have implemented "a subtle and understanding approach". The new ideas were "related to old symbols", consequently, "more readily accepted".¹⁸³ The old, anti-modernization interpretations of Islam, for example, were tacitly handled rather than overtly attacked. In fact, Nasser succeeded "in making himself the Number One Voice of Arab Islam", consequently, "temporarily stilled" the influences of both the Muslim Brothers and the Communists.¹⁸⁴ Nasser, himself, was occasionally referred to as the new Saladin, the great Arab and Islamic hero. Socialism, again, was made to originate with the Prophet Mohammed and his immediate successors, the four righteous califs.

The convincing power of the new Egyptian media stemmed from the charismatic leadership of Nasser which was mainly and originally the creation of the media itself. The charisma of Nasser, however, is not to be separated from either his declared goals which largely appealed to the Arab masses or his achievements which, again, were greatly magnified by the mass media.

The various interactions among the new political system, the charismatic leadership and the mass media resulted in "an equilibrium between information and coercion", and consequently, achieved "maximum efficiency and authority".¹⁸⁵ The personality of Nasser, "as reflected through Cairo's Voice of the Arabs", was the "most impressive unifying force" among both the Egyptians and the majority of Arab peoples.¹⁸⁶ Moreover, "loyalty and affection" for Nasser led to an "extraordinary stability",¹⁸⁶ in Egypt.¹⁸⁷

In brief, the leadership talents of Nasser as well as his early awareness of the vitality of mass media in contemporary politics won him the popularity of a charismatic leader. Again, the inherent swaying characteristics of his special brand of leadership was, in turn, employed to enhance the already won popularity and to foster the media itself. Moreover, the resulting strong media was used once more to harness and channel his popularity. This brought about the required mobilization which either prompted some achievements or resulted in some failures. In such cases the media was re-employed either to magnify the achievements or obliterate the defeats as the case may be. The eventual outcome was more popularity, or at least, less frustration. In fact, this ever-active dialectical relationship between the charisma of Nasser on the one hand and the controlled strong mass

media, on the other hand, had always resulted in either winning Nasser more popularity or in containing and controlling public disappointments or frustrations. Consequently, the mass media had always been capable, together with Nasser's popularity, in carrying the Egyptian leader through the various crises he was confronted with. In such crises, Nasser used to capitalize on "the broad base of popular support" that he has had.¹⁸⁸ All factors being mentioned, it is of vital importance to reiterate that, had it not been for the strong semi-authoritarian political order which Nasser built, the Egyptian modernization process would not have continued its progress without serious breakdowns. However, it is to be noticed again that had it not been for Nasser's charisma, his strong mass media and the regime's achievements, the above mentioned semi-authoritarian political system would not have been tolerated by the masses.

To conclude, it can be safely assumed that the Egyptian mass media has helped further the integration of the Egyptian society whether that meant national, territorial, value, elite-mass or cultural integrations. Nevertheless, whether the charismatic leadership of Nasser has been "routinized"¹⁸⁹ or not is a question to be answered by the future and the future alone. This, in no way, however, denies that the era of the 'Boss' has been one of the major hallmarks of Arab modern history.

NOTES

1. This refers to the process of modernization initiated by both foreign penetration (French and British) and the policies of Mohammed Ali Pasha later. For more details, consult: Anouar Abdel-Malek, **Egypt: Military Society** (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), pp. 4 - 19; and Patrick O'Brien, **The Revolution in Egypt's Economic System** (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), pp. 1 - 67.
- 1.a H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (eds.), **From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), PP. 295-96.
2. Dankwart A. Rustow, **A World of Nations: Problems of Political Modernization** (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967), P. 152.
- 2.a 'This is particularly clear from the then Communists, Wafdists, Baathists and Arab nationalists' attitudes toward Nasser.
3. Patrick Seale, **The Struggle for Syria** (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 196 and 249.

4. Keith Wheelock, **Nasser's New Egypt** (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960), pp. 37-45.
 5. William Zartman, **Governments and Politics in Northern Africa** (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 113.
 6. **Ibid.**, p. 124.
 - 6.a An interview with Mr. Akram El-Hourani in Beirut in early 1969.
 7. Charles D. Cremeans, **The Arabs and the World** (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 34.
 8. **Ibid.**
- J.C. Hurewitz, **Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension** (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 129; and Wheelock, **op. cit.**, p. 225.
10. Cremeans, **op. cit.**, p. 35.
 11. Irving Sedar and Harold J. Greenberg, **Behind the Egyptian Sphinx** (New York: Chilton Company, 1960), p. 99.
 12. Cremeans, **Loc. cit.**; and Zartman, **Op. cit.**, P. 111.
 - 12.a This was assured in interviews with several Arab officials and ex-officials who were very close to Nasser.
 13. Cremeans, **Loc. Cit.**
 14. Hurewitz, **Op. Cit.**, p. 144.; and in Eliezer Beer, **Army Officers in Arab Politics and Society** (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1970), p. 398.
 - 14.a Being one of the top spokesmen of the 'Nonaligned Camp' or the 'Positive Neutrality Camp' made each of the other two major competing camps try to gain Nasser to this side or the other through all kinds of aids and assistance to Egypt.
 15. Peter Mansfield, **Nasser's Egypt** (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965), P. 209.; and in Beer, **op. cit.**, p. 374.
 16. Zartman, **op. cit.**, p. 123.
 17. Anouar Abdel-Malek, "The Crisis in Nasser's Egypt", in Irene L. Gendzier (ed.), **A Middle East Reader** (New York: Pegasus, 1969), p. 143.
 - 17.a Emphasis is of my own.
 18. Zartman, **op. cit.**, p. 106.
 19. Charles W. Anderson, Fred R. Von der Mehden and Crawford Young, **Issues of Political Development** (Englewood, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967), p. 140.
 20. **Ibid.**
 - 20.a Emphasis is of my own.
 21. Gerth and Mills, **op. cit.**, p. 296.
 22. **Ibid.**
 - 22.a The following statistics attest to the above mentioned fact.

Growth of Media Consumption (in Egypt)

	1950	1956
Total Daily Newspaper Circulation	350,000	500,000
Total Licensed Receivers	238,000	405,000
Total Cinema Attendance	42,000,000	86,000,000

As cited by Daniel Lerner, **The Passing of Traditional Society** (New York: Collier-MacMillan Limited, 1964), p. 248.

23. Gamal Abdul Nasser, **Egypt's Liberation: The Philosophy of the Revolution** (Washington, D.C.: Public Affairs Press, 1956), pp. 87-88.
- 23.a Egypt at that time was the only Arab film-producing country.
24. Lucian W. Pye (ed.), **Communication and Political Development** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 234.
- 24.a The emphasis is of my own.
25. Lerner, **op. cit.**, pp. 248-249.
26. Seale, **op. cit.**, p. 249.
27. Lerner, **op. cit.**, p. 249.
28. P.J. Vatikiotis, **The Egyptian Army in Politics** (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961), pp. 253-254.
29. Wheelock, **op. cit.**, p. 224.
30. **Ibid.**
31. Seale, **op. cit.**, p. 196.
32. **Ibid.**, p. 225.
33. Rustow, **Loc. Cit.**
34. Laurence W. Martin (ed.), **Neutralism and Nonalignment** (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), p. 111.
- 34.a The blowing up of the oil pipe-lines by the Syrian workers, the various Arab demonstrations in support of Egypt and the death of the Syrian pilot (Jole Jammal) in battlefield in Egypt.
- 34.b The withdrawal of the British, the French and the Israeli troops from Egypt under the U.S.A., the U.S.S.R. and the world public opinion pressures.
35. Cremeans, **op. cit.**, p.
36. Sedar and Greenberg, **Loc. cit.**
37. Mansfield, **op. cit.**, p. 60.
38. Zartman, **op. cit.**, pp. 123-124.
39. Mansfield, **op. cit.**, p. 209.
- 39.a See the November 1970 issues of **Time**, **Newsweek**, and **Life** magazines.
40. Vatikiotis, **op. cit.**, p. 253.
41. Beeri, **op. cit.**, p. 384.
2. Zartman, **op. cit.**, p. 123.

43. Samuel Huntington, **Political Order in Changing Societies** (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968), p. 126; and in Cremeans, **op. cit.**, pp. 89-90.
44. Huntington, **op. cit.**, p.
45. Zartman, **op. cit.**, p. 111.
46. Hurewitz, **op. cit.**, p. 135.
47. Zartman, **op. cit.**, p. 113.
48. Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, **Comparative Politics** (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 173.
49. Leonard Binder, **The Ideological Revolution in the Middle East** (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1964), p. 19.
50. Maurice Harari, **Governments and Politics of the Middle East** (Englewood Cliffs: N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), p. 164.
51. Anderson and others, **op. cit.**, pp. 9 - 10.
52. P.J. Vatikiotis, **The Modern History of Egypt** (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), p. 441.
53. As cited in Manfred Halpern, **The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 273.
54. Huntington, **op. cit.**, p. 102.
55. Halpern, **Loc. Cit.**
56. Zartman, **op. cit.**, p. 17.
57. Sedar and Greenberg, **Loc. Cit.**
58. Huntington, **op. cit.**, p. 93.
59. Mohammed H. Hykal, "About Bureaucracy", **Al-Ahram** (The Pyramids) newspaper, No. 4, Column 6., December, 1964.
60. Huntington, **op. cit.**, p. 95.
61. Zartman, **op. cit.**, p. 114.
62. Hurewitz, **op. cit.**, pp. 128-129.
63. Wheelock, **op. cit.**, pp. 37-45.
64. Hurewitz, **op. cit.**, pp. 37-45.
65. Wheelock, **op. cit.**, p. 224.
66. Seale, **3op. cit.**, p. 196.
67. Mansfield, **op. cit.**, p. 76.
- 67.a Emphasis of my own, throughout.
68. Lerner, **op. cit.**, p. 248.
69. Hurewitz, **Loc. Cit.**
70. Sedar, **op. cit.**, p. 98.
71. Anouer Abdel-Malek, "The Crisis in Nasser's Egypt," in Gendzier (ed.), **op. cit.**, pp. 137-138.
72. Mansfield, **op. cit.**, p. 211.
73. Vatikiotis, **The Egyptian Army in Politics**, p. 258.
74. G.E. Von Grunebaum, **Modern Islam: The Search For Cultural Identity** (New York: Vintage Books, 1964), p. 267.

75. David E. Apter, **The Politics of Modernization** (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 139.
76. Halpern, **op. cit.**, pp. 308-309.
77. Rustow, **op. cit.**, p. 203; and Halpern, **op. cit.**, p. 273.
78. Zartman, **Loc. Cit.**
79. **Ibid.**
80. Apter, **op. cit.**, p. 140.
81. **Ibid.**, pp. 143 and 406.
82. A.D. Lindsay, **The Modern Democratic State** (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 48-49.
83. Don Peretz, "In Search of a Doctrine: A Study of the Ideology of the Egyptian Revolution" in Gendzier (ed.), **op. cit.**, p. 120.
84. **Ibid.**
85. Zartman, **op. cit.**, p. 112.
86. Richard R. Fagen, **Politics and Communication** (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 116.
87. George Haddad, **Revolutions and Military Rule in the Middle East** (New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1965), p. 203; and in Zartman, **Loc. Cit.**
88. David E. Apter, "Political Religion in the New Nations," in Clifford Geertz (ed.), **Old Societies and New States** (London: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), p. 78.
89. **Ibid.**
90. **Ibid.**, p. 125.
91. Hurewitz, **op. cit.**, p. 134.
92. **Time Magazine.**
93. Anouar Abdel-Malek, **Egypt: Military Society** (New York: Random House, 1968), p. xix.
94. Mansfield, **op. cit.**, pp. 210-211.
95. Apter, **The Politics of Modernization**, p. 32.
96. **Ibid.**, p. 372.
97. **Ibid.**, p. 37.
98. Apter, "Political Religion in the New Nations", in Geretz, **Loc. Cit.**
99. Wilbur Schramm, "Communication Development and the Development Process", in Lucian W. Pye (ed.), **Communications and Political Development** (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), pp. 34.35.
100. Fagen, **op. cit.**, p. 118-119.
101. Fagen, **op. cit.**, p. 119.
102. Almond and Powell, **op. cit.**, p. 174.
103. Pye (ed.), **Communication and Political Development**, p. 124.
104. John J. Johnson (ed.), **The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries** (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962) p. 120.

105. Lerner, **op. cit.**, p. 251.
106. Lerner, **op. cit.**, p. 245.
107. James N. Mosel, "**Communication Patterns and Political Socialization in Transitional Thailand**", in pye (ed.), **op. cit.**, p. 184.
108. Vatikiotis, **The Modern History of Egypt**, p. 165.
109. Abdel-Malek, **Egypt: Military Society**, pp. 146.147.
110. **Ibid.**, p. 147.
111. Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (ed.) **The Politics of the Developing Areas** (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 444.
112. Daniel Lerner, "Communications and Social Mobilization", in Jason B. Finkle and Richard W. Gable (ed.), **Political Development and Social Change** (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), p. 196.
113. Lerner, **The Passing of Traditional Society**, pp. 232 and 236.
114. **Ibid.**, p. 254.
115. Cremeans, **op. cit.**, p. 84.
116. Europa Publications, **The Middle East and North Africa: 1966-1967** (Thirteenth Edition), p. 766.
117. Europa Publications, **The Middle East and North Africa: 1969-1970** (16th Edition), p. 827.
118. Zartman, **op. cit.**, p. 116.
119. **Ibid.**
120. **Ibid.**
121. Zartman, **Loc. Cit.**
122. **Ibid.**
123. Vatikiotis, **The Egyptian Army in Politics**, p. 253.
124. As cited by Daniel Lerner, "Toward a Communication Theory of Modernization", in Lucian pye (ed.), **Communication and Political Development** (Princeton: Princeton University, 1963), p. 344.
125. Zartman, **Loc. Cit.**
126. Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, **Political Socialization** (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969), p. 196.
127. Hurewitz, **op. cit.**, p. 135.
128. Sedar and Greenberg, **op. cit.**, p. 98; and in Almond and Coleman (Ed.), **op. cit.**, p. 422.
129. Sedar and Greenberg, **Loc. Cit.**
130. Wheelock, **op. cit.**, p. 225.
131. Binder, **op. cit.**, p. 265.
- 131.a The speeches of Nasser used to be transmitted to the Arab world spontaneously.

- 131.b Other than the Egyptian press it is a well-known fact that Nasser either controlled or greatly influenced many newspapers and magazines in the Arab world. His influence and control were either through financial subsidies or voluntary of political commitment. (The Arab Nationalist Movement and the Communists later on). This has been very clear in Lebanon which is the most influential centre as far as the press is concerned. Examples of this: The influence or control of Nasser over **Al-Anwar**, **Al-Muharir**, **Al-Nida**, **Al-Anba**, **Al-Siyarah** and **Sout**. **El-Droubah** dailies, and **Al-Hawadeth**, **Kol-Shai**, **Al-Houriyah**, **Al-Akhbar** and **El-Sayyad** weeklies.
- 131.c Hykal's article "I Accuse", for example, shook the Baathist regime in Syria in May, 1963.
132. Fagen, **op. cit.**, p. 116.
133. Peretz, **op. cit.**, p. 121, and in Vatikiotis, **The Egyptian Army in Politics**, p. 254.
134. Vatikiotis, **The Modern History of Egypt**, p. 167.
135. Peretz, **Loc. Cit.**
136. Lerner, **The Passing of Traditional Society**, p. 215.
137. **Ibid.** p. 234.
138. Lucian W. Pye, **Aspects of Political Development** (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966), p. 163.
139. Zartman, **op. cit.**, p. 117.
140. Sedar and Greenberg, **op. cit.**, p. 98.
141. Wheelock, **op. cit.**, p. 224.
142. Mansfield, **op. cit.**, p. 210.
143. Almond and Powell, **op. cit.**, p. 171.
144. Mansfield, **op. cit.**, p. 211.
145. Almond and Coleman (ed.), **op. cit.**, p. 51.
146. Fagen, **op. cit.**, p. 116.
147. Lerner, **The Passing of Traditional Society**, p. 251.
148. Almond and Coleman, **op. cit.**, pp. 51-52.; and in Tareq Y. Ismael, **Government and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East** (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1970), p. 120.
149. Peretz, **Loc. Cit.**
150. Lucian W. Pye, "Transitional Politics and Party Systems", in Finkle and Gable (ed.), **op. cit.**, p. 523; and in Almond and Coleman, **op. cit.**, p. 51.
151. Lerner, "Communications and Social Modernization", in Finkle and Gable (ed.), **op. cit.**, p. 197.
152. Pye (ed.), **op. cit.**, p. 125.
153. Abdul-Kader Hatem, "Culture in the Construction of Our New

- Society", **Egyptian Political Science Review**, No. 20, November, 1962.
154. W. Khalidi, "Political Trends in the Fertile Crescent", in Walter Z. Laqueur (ed.), **The Middle East in Transition** (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958), pp. 125-126; and in Ismael, **op. cit.**, pp. 321-324.; and in Abdel-Malek, **Egypt: Military Society**, p. x.; and in George Lenczowski, "The Objects and Methods of Nasserism," in Jack, H. Thompson and Robert D. Rischauer (ed.), **Modernization of the Arab World** (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1966), pp. 197-198.; and in Hisham Sharabi, **Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World** (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1966), p. 96.
 155. Apter, **The Politics of Modernization**, p. 40.
 156. C.E. Black, **The Dynamics of Modernization**, (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), pp. 26-34; and in Huntington, **op. cit.**, p. 41.
 157. Apter, **op. cit.**, p. 47.
 158. Fagem **op. cit.**, p. 116.
 159. Apter, **op. cit.**, p. 41.
 - 159.a Leonard Binder wrote: "Among the Arab states, it is well understood that an Egyptian editorial will threaten the stability of the Jordanian government," **op. cit.**, p. 265.
 160. Fagen, **op. cit.**, pp. 118-119.
 161. Lerner, **The Passing of Traditional Society**, p. 55.
 162. Pye (ed.), **op. cit.**, p. 25.
 - 162.a Examples of that: The Liberation Rally, the National Union, the Arab Socialist Union, the three General Assemblies, the Labour Union, the Student Union, the Youth Organization, the Women Union, the Peasants Cooperatives and more important, the mass media.
 163. Apter, **op. cit.**, p. 360.
 164. Dawson and Prewitt, **op. cit.**, pp. 133-134 and 197-198.
 165. Ithiel de Sola Pool, 'Communication and Development', in Myron Weiner (ed.), **Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth** (New York: Basic Books, 1966), pp. 101-102.; and in Mosel, "Communication Patterns and Political Socialization in Transitional Thailand", in Pye (ed.), **op. cit.**, p. 203.
 166. Elihu Katz and Paul F. Lazarsfeld, **Personal Influence** (New York: The Free Press, 1955), pp. 21-22.
 167. Vatikiotis, **The Modern History of Egypt**, p. 441.
 168. Abdul-Malek, **Egypt: Military Society**, pp. xxxvii and 189-193.
 - 168.a The important Coptic minority in Egypt and the Christian minorities in Lebanon, for example.
 169. Pye (ed.), **op. cit.**, pp. 9-10.
 170. Dawson and Prewitt, **op. cit.**, pp. 134 and 199.

171. Lerner, **The Passing of Traditional Society**, p. 251.
172. Lerner, "Toward a Communication Theory of Modernization", in Pye (ed.), **op. cit.**, pp. 244-245.
173. Mansfield, **op. cit.**, p. 76.
174. Lerner, **The Passing of Traditional Society**, p. 216.
175. V.O. Key, **Public Opinion and American Democracy** (New York: Knopf, 1961), p. 396.; and in Dawson and Prewitt, **op. cit.**, pp. 198-199.
176. Schram, "Communication Development and the Development Process", in Pye (ed.), **op. cit.**, pp. 36-37.
177. Ismael, **op. cit.**, p. 349.
178. Huntington, **op. cit.**, pp. 137-138.
- 178.a An example on that is the famous slogan of Nasser: "The new generation is the future, and the future is the new generation", in Vatikiotis, **The Egyptian Army in Politics**, p. 252.
179. Mosel, "Communication Patterns in Transitional Thailand", in Pye (ed.), **op. cit.**, p. 222.
- 179.a The essence of Nasser's regime, according to Abdul-Malek, was: "Collaborate with them, absorb them, but at all costs keep all decision-making power in **our** hands", in Abdul-Malek, **Egypt: Military Society**.
180. Lerner, **The Passing of Traditional Society**, p. 251.
181. Pye (ed.) **op. cit.**, pp. 24-27.
- 181.a There are: The informal face-to-face contacts, the traditional social structures, the political 'output' structures, the political 'input' structures and the mass media - Almond and Powell, **op. cit.**, p. 167.
- 181.b These are: Surveillance, correlation and transmission-lasswell, "The Structure and Function of Communication in Society", in Pye (ed.) **op. cit.**, p. 130.
182. Cremeans, **op. cit.**, p. 37.
183. Pye (ed.) **op. cit.**, p. 127.
184. "Nasser has put us Arabs on the map again", so said one of the Arab intellectuals interviewed by Cremeans, **op. cit.**, pp. 75-76.
185. Apter, **op. cit.**, p. 40.
186. Lerner, **The Passing of Traditional Society**, p. 216.
- 186.a This, however, led to the instability of Arab traditional governing elites.
187. Mansfield, **op. cit.**, p. 209.
188. Myron Weiner, "Political Integration and Political Development", in Claude E. Welch (ed.), **Political Modernization** (Belmont: Wadsworth Publication Company, 1967), pp. 153-164.
189. Halpern, **op. cit.**, p. 285.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A - Books

Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics.
Statistical Handbook of the United Arab Republic: 1952-1966. Cairo:
C.A.P.M.S., 1967.

Cremeans, C.D. **The Arabs and the World.** New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1963.

Dawson, R.E. and K. Prewitt, **Political Socialization.**
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1969.

Europa, **The Middle East and North Africa: 1966-1967.**
London: Europa Publications, Thirteenth Edition.

Europa, **The Middle East and North Africa: 1969-1970.**
London Europa Publications, Sixteenth Edition.

Fagen, R.R. **Politics and Communications.** Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1966.

Finkle, J.D. and R.W. Gable (ed.). **Political Development
and Social Change.** New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966.

Geertz, C. (ed.) **Old Societies and New States.** London: the
Free Press of Glencoe, 1963.

Gendzier, I.D. (ed.) **A Middle East Reader.** New York:
Pegasus, 1969.

Gerth, H.H. and C. Wright Mills (ed.) **From Max Weber:
Essays in Sociology.** New York: Oxford University Press, 1946.

Graunebaum, G.E.V. **Modern Islam: The Search for
Cultural Identity.** New York: Vintage Books, 1964.

Hadad, C. **Revolution and Military Rule in the Middle East.**
New York: Robert Speller and Sons, 1965.

Halpern, M. **The Politics of Social Change in the Middle
East and North Africa.** Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969.

Harari, M. **Governments and Politics of the Middle east.**
Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-hall, 1962.

Huntington, S. **Political Order in Changing Society.** New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.

Hurewitz, J.C. **Middle East Politics: The Military Dimension.** New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.

Ismael, T.Y. **Governments and Politics of the Contemporary Middle East.** Homewood, Ill, The Dorsey Press, 1970.

Johnson, J.J. (ed.) **The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries.** Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962.

Katz, E. and P.F. Lazarsfeld, **Personal Influence.** New York: The Free Press, 1955.

Key, V.O. **Public Opinion and American Democracy,** New York: Knopf, 1961.

Laqueur, W.Z. (ed.) **The Middle East in Transition.** New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1958.

Lerner, D. **The Passing of Traditional Society.** New York: Collier-MacMillan, 1964.

Lindsay, A.D. **The Modern Democratic State.** New York: Oxford University Press, 1969.

Mansfield P. **Nasser's Egypt.** Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1965.

Martin, L.K. (ed.) **Neutralism and Nonalignment.** New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.

Pye, D.W. (ed.) **Communication and Political Development.** Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968.

.....**Aspects of Political Development.** Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966.

Rustow, D.A. **A World of Nations: Problems and Political Modernization.** Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1967.

Sharabi, H. **Nationalism and Revolution in the Arab World.** New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1966.

Sale, P. **The Struggle for Syria,** London: Oxford University Press, 1965.

Sedar I. and H.J. Greenber. **Behind the Egyptian Sphinx.** New York: Chilton Company, 1960.

Thompson, J.H. and R.D. Reischauer. (ed.) **Modernization of the Arab World**. New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1966.

Vatikiotis, P.J. **The Egyptian Army in Politics**. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1961.

.....**The Modern History of Egypt**. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969.

Wolch, C.E. (ed.) **Political Modernization**. Belmont: Vadsworth Publication Company, 1967.

Wheelock, K. **Nasser's New Egypt**. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960.

Weiner, M. (ed.), **Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth**. New York: Basic Books, 1966.

Zartman, W. **Governments and Politics in Northern Africa**. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965.

B - Articles

Abu-Al-Fadl, A. "Public Opinion Survey of the Arab Socialist Union", **Al-Talia** (The Vanguard), in Arabic (Cairo: January, 1966), tra. U.S. Department of Commerce, Publ. No. JPRS 34032, February, 1966.

Ahmed, M.S. "Problems of the Formation of the Political Cadre As Revealed by the Various Socialist Experiments", **Al-Talia** (The Vanguard), in Arabic. (Cairo: December, 1965), tra. U.S. Department of Commerce, Publ. No. JPRS 33963, February, 1966.

Al-Said, M. "Higher State Organization in the United Arab Republic", **Al-Idarah** (The Administration), in Arabic, (Cairo: April, 1970), tra. U.S. Department of Commerce, Publ. No. JRPS 7406, May, 1970.

Hatem, A. "Culture in the Construction of Our New Society", **Egyptian Political Science Review**, No. 20, November, 1962.

Hykal, M.H. "About Bureaucracy", **Al-ahram** (The Pyramids), in Arabic, No. 4, Column G, December, 1964.

Iskander, D.N. "Preparation and Education of the Cadre of the Political Machinery", **Al-Talia** (The Vanguard), in Arabic (Cairo:

December, 1965), tra. U.S. Department of Commerce, Publ. No. JPRS 33963, February, 1966.

Kamel, M. "Political Leadership and Organizational Relations Within the Socialist Union", **Al-Talia** (The Vanguard), in Arabic (Cairo: December 1965), tra. U.S. Department of Commerce, Publ. no. JPRS 33962, February, 1966.

Muhyi ad-Din, K. "Battle of Winning World Public Opinion", **Al - Talia** (The Vanguard), in Arabic (Cairo: November, 1969), tra. U.S. Department of Commerce, Publ. No. JPRS 11490, December, 1969.

Nakhleh, E.A. "The Arab Socialist Union: A Political Organization in the Service of Revolution", **The Arab World**, Vol. XVI., No. 5-6, May-June, 1970.

Rab El-Nabi, M. "Problems of the Socialist Union in the Rural Areas", **Al-Talia** (The Vanguard), in Arabic (Cairo: May, 1965), tra. U.S. Department of Commerce, Publ. No. JPRS 30465, June 1965.

Salih, A. "Minister Discusses Youth, Press and Politics", **Al-Tullab** (The Students), in Arabic (Cairo: April, 1969), tra. U.S. Department of Commerce, Publ. No. JPRS 48004, May, 1969.

Zahri, K. "Bureaucracy and Mass Democracy", **Al-Musawwar** (The Pictorial), in Arabic (Cairo: April, 1965), tra. U.S. Department of Commerce, Publ., No. JPRS 30667, June 1965.

Anonymous. "Training of Communications Specialists", **"Al-Jumhuriyah** (The Republic), in Arabic (Cairo: January, 1966), tra. U.S. Department of Commerce, Publ. No. 34761, March 1966.

..... "Transportation and Communications are Major Problems for the Governorate of Suhaj", **Al-Ahram**, (The Pyramids), in Arabic, (Cairo: April, 1967), tra. U.S. Department of Commerce, Publ. No. JPRS 41134, May, 1967.

..... "Ali Sabri Discusses National Mobilization", **Al-Akhbar** (The News), in Arabic (Cairo: March, 1968), tra. U.S. Department of Commerce, Publ. No. 47936, April, 1969.