

IBN KHALDUN AND KARL MARX : ON ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL INTERPRETATION OF HISTORY

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Abstract

In this paper history is conceived of as social change. Nevertheless, history and sociology remain two separate disciplines.

Ibn Khaldun and Marx preserve sociology as a generalising science although they make use of historical changes. They make a dialectical synthesis of sociology and history and follow up the interrelation of social changes (economic and non-economic) and historical changes.

This paper uses textual criticism to clarify Marx's close system of thought which is often labelled as economic determinism and to show that although there is ultimate economic determinism in this theory, it remains a multicausal theory. Marx often implicitly admits that ideas do eventually develop an autonomy of their own and affect the material activity of men.

Ibn Khaldun also gives a predominant — though not exclusive — position to the economic factor in history. But he also admits (e.g. ASABIYA is a non-economic factor. So are morals, religion, authority and the condition of science).

Ideational elements are, therefore, not less important than economic elements. But Ibn Khaldun and Marx lay more emphasis on the economic elements.

Concerning the relation of man to labour Ibn Khaldun emphasises the significance of incentive whereas Marx concentrates on the communal aspect of labour.

Both thinkers seem more determinists than promoters of free will. Ibn Khaldun relegates the individual to a secondary place

in historical development. Marx sees the individual as product of history and social conditions, but he is free to make choices.

Ibn Khaldun and Marx believe in historical evolution. But to Ibn Khaldun evolution is cyclic, whereas to Marx it is linear and progressive. To both, however, evolution is dialectical. It stems from the conflict which, to Ibn Khaldun, is a conflict between desert people (Badu) and those of urban areas (Hadar). Marx sees conflict as class struggle. This paper prefers the term historical materialism to the term dialectical materialism, and echoes Marx's admonition that "we should ascend from earth to heaven" rather than "descend from heaven to earth."

The relationship between history and sociology has long been subject to controversy. In this paper history is conceived of as a series of changing events and in this sense, is social change. This theme has important implications for social theory. As C. Wright Mills argued, "the general problem of a theory of history cannot be separated from the general problem of a theory of social structure". (1) However, history is still construed by some to be an ideographic discipline which differs from sociology, a nomothetic discipline (2). This tends to justify, with a few notable exceptions (3), mutually exclusive scholarship within two separate disciplines.

An adequate solution to the dilemma of how to preserve sociology as a generalizing science taking into account historical variations in society is suggested in the work of Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) and Karl Marx (4). In their writings we can find a dialectical synthesis between history and what we now know as sociology, which incorporates the aspects of change. By dialectical we mean that their approach to the study of human social activity "grasps things and their images, ideas, essentially in their interconnection" (5). As Marx and Ibn Khaldun proceed inductively in making socio-historic generalizations, they avoid some of the limitations experienced by functionalism (6). This unique conception of social science can be understood better if we sketch their work as to (1) the dialectical interpretation of the role of economic and non-economic factors in history; and (2) the nature of historical change. From their study of these phenomena Marx and Ibn Khaldun provide us (1) with the rudiments of an empirical-dialectical methodology; (2) with the beginnings of a theory of society and the manner in which it changes; and thus (3) with a unique conception of historical sociology.

Economic Interpretation of History

The best known and yet most often misunderstood aspect of Marx's work is his economic interpretation of history. He is often labelled as an economic determinist and, as such, having a closed system of thought. To clarify this we must engage in some textual criticism. Consider the following three commonly quoted passages from Marx. Each passage is divided into two parts: the first (A) reflecting an emphasis on economic determinism, the second (B) an emphasis on the free will activity of men as they make their history.

- I. A. The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organization of these individuals and their consequent relation to the rest of nature.
B. . . . The writings of history must always set out from these natural bases and their modification in the course of history through the action of man (7).
- II. A. In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and independent of their will relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness.
B. The mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life process in general. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their being, but on the contrary, their social being determines their consciousness (8).
- III. A. The production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness, is at first directly interwoven with the material activity and the material intercourse of men, the language of real life. Conceiving, thinking, the mental intercourse of men, appear at this stage as the direct efflux of their material behavior.
B. . . . Men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc. . . . real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definite development of their productive forces and of the intercourse corresponding to these, up to its furthest forms. Consciousness can never be anything else than conscious existence, and the existence of men is their actual life-process (9).

In statement II (A) Marx especially appears as a strict economic determinist. Yet in II (B) he uses the word "conditions" and then in the next sentence "determines". Each alters the causal direction implied. Even when Marx says that social being determines consciousness, social being is not made synonymous with economic existence. In the statements below we can see the sociological element in Marx's thought :

By social we understand the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, in what manner and to what end. It follows from this that a certain mode of production, or industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and their mode of co-operation is itself a "productive force" (10).

We have to juxtapose these opposing ideas of determinism and free will and see them in their dialectical relationship to one another, Joachim Israel sums up this crucial Marxian thesis as follows :

Man is certainly a product of social, especially economic, conditions, but it is man himself who creates and changes these conditions. There exists a dialectic interplay, seen in a historical perspective, between man as active, self-creating subject, and man as an object of the conditions he creates (11).

Marx was not careful enough in his choice of words; at times his polemic carried him away from the dynamics of history he was trying to convey into what seemed to be a single-factor determinism. In a letter to Joseph Bloch, in 1890, Engels writes that

. . . According to the materialist conception of history, the ultimately determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real life. More than this neither Marx nor I have ever asserted. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic element is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, senseless phrase (12).

The use of political, juridical, religious, and other variables as explanatory ones is evident in historical monographs written by Marx such as the 18th Brumaire and The Class Struggles in France. Merton has pointed out that if we convert Marx's statement that religion is the "opiate of the people" into a statement of neutral fact, then we can see that "systems of religion do affect behavior, that they are not merely epiphenomena but partially independent determinants of behavior" (13). Similarly when Marx says that "the ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas" (14), he is clearly recognizing that ideas can rule. However, these ideas do arise from

the economic interests of the ruling elite. There is no apparent contradiction in saying that ideational variables influence the course of history, even though they did arise from concrete material conditions. This issue goes back to the metaphysical roots of science with Aristotle's exposition of material cause as an object of scientific inquiry, as distinguished from the Platonic theory of ideas. This is what Marx is doing when he observes :

Once the ruling ideas have been separated from the ruling individuals and, above all, from the relationships which result from a given stage of the mode of production, and in this way the conclusion has been reached that history is always under the sway of ideas, it is very easy to abstract from these various ideas "the idea" (die Idee) etc., as the dominant force in history, and thus to understand all these separate ideas and concepts as "forms of self-determination" on the part of the concept developing in history (15).

In looking at statement III (A) above, this awareness on the part of Marx of the tendency for ideas to eventually develop an autonomy of their own in the face of change is communicated in his use of such terms as "at first" and "at this stage" when speaking of how conceptions appear to be directly related to the material activity of men. We agree then with the Needleman and Needleman's statement, with regard to Marx's work, that although "there is ultimate economic determinism, the theory is a multi-causal one" (16).

Ibn Khaldun also gave a predominant, though not exclusive, position to the economic factor in history. Heinrich Simon points out that "the intellectual activity of man, the arts and sciences, his moral attitudes and behavior, life style and taste, standard of living and customs are defined by Ibn Khaldun through the kind and degree of production" (17). We find evidence for this in Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah.

It should be known that the differences among people are the result of the different ways in which they make their living. Social organization enables them to start with the simple necessities of life, before they go on to the conveniences and luxuries. . . Those who live by agriculture or animal husbandry cannot avoid the call of the desert, because it alone offers the wide field acres, pastures for animals, and other things that the settled areas do not offer. It is therefore necessary for them to restrict themselves to the desert. Their social organization and cooperation for the needs of life and civilization, such as food, shelter, and warmth, do not take them beyond the bare subsistence level,

because of their inability to provide for anything beyond those things. Subsequent improvement of their conditions and acquisition of more wealth and comfort than they need, cause them to rest and take it easy. Then, they cooperate for things beyond the bare necessities. They use more food and clothes and take pride in them. They build large houses, and lay out towns and cities for protection. This is followed by an increase in comfort and ease, which leads to formation of the most developed luxury customs . . . Here, now, we have the sedentary people. "Sedentary people" means the inhabitants of cities and countries, some of which adopt the crafts as their way of making a living, while others adopt commerce. They earn more and live more comfortably than Bedouins, because they live on a level beyond the level of bare necessity, and their way of making a living corresponds to their wealth (18).

The badu, or Bedouins, are the primitive and tough people, while the hadar are the sedentary, or civilized people. The transition from desert to city life is one from badawa to hadara. Although these economic exigencies are given such a prominent place in the Muqaddimah non-economic factors are not excluded from exerting an influence on society. Ibn Khaldun attached great importance to asabiyya (19) as an historical force although interdependent with other phenomena such as religion, royal authority (mulk), morals, science, and economic organization itself, asabiyya is a major independent variable in the development of human societies. In contrast to Simon, Ayad, and Issawi (20) who see economic materialism as the most important explanatory element in Ibn Khaldun's work, White views asabiyya (group solidarity) as "at once the power motive of the historical process and the principle which, when discovered, explains the process" (21). However these two positions can be juxtaposed as we did with Marx in order to see the essentially dialectical relationship between social solidarity and changes in social structure. The effects of asabiyya are numerous. For one, it is the basis of mulk or royal authority, which is necessary for its restraining influence on man (22). It is through group solidarity that the Bedouin tribes are able to survive the harsh desert life. (23). When asabiyya has declined in a dynasty, its downfall is all but inevitable: "The dynasty can be founded and established only with the help of group feeling. There must be a major group feeling uniting all the groups subordinate to it" (24). Religion is another important element in society; a dynasty based on religious law is more likely to have wide power and extensive authority as religion "does away with mutual jealousy

and envy among people'. . and causes concentration upon the truth." But religion cannot fully materialize without asabiyya as every mass undertaking by necessity requires group feeling (25).

Asabiyya is not unrelated to the economic structure of society. Rabie (26) considers it to be one of several phenomena whose characteristics and development are effects of the prevailing mode of living in a culture and by the transition from the more primitive Bedouin culture (27) to the more civilized life of the sedentary peoples. But at the same time asabiyya is the "vehicle or instrument of transition" of this change because of its unifying power over the desert tribes, giving them greater cohesion and strength over the decadent city dwellers (28). Even though religion, and more generally, group solidarity, are essential elements of Ibn Khaldun's description of social organization, according to Rabie socio-economic reasoning and materialistic interpretation of cultural events they are two basic methodological assumptions of Ibn Khaldun (29). There is a dialectical interplay between economic and cultural elements of social solidarity :

No abstract polarization of cause and effect can be found in his study of asabiyya in the two environments. While primitive and vigorous asabiyya, with all its peculiarities, is an effect of the way of living under badawa, it acts in due time as the principal cause of changing this very way of living to a completely different one under hadara (30).

Ideational elements definitely have an autonomy in history as conceptualized by Ibn Khaldun. Compare the following statement of his to Marx's position on the place of "ruling ideas" in history: "The widely accepted reason for changes in institutions and customs is the fact that the customs of each race depend on the customs of its rulers. As the proverb says: The common people follow the religion of the ruler" (31). Although seeing the dialectical interplay between ideas and material substratum, both Ibn Khaldun and Marx tended to emphasize the latter more. Some of the specific ways in which they dealt with economic variables, especially with the role of labor in social relations, are worth pursuing here. For example, Ibn Khaldun regards labor as the foundation of human society and of all values and discusses profit as value realized from human labor. He also shows how a person earns and acquires capital in terms strikingly similar to the economists of the eighteenth and nineteenth century (32). To Ibn Khaldun "men persist only with the help of property". To take property away is an injustice which ruins civilization; people have no incentive to co-operate with one another and thus live in

apathy (33). Marx's views on labor are expressed poignantly in the following passage :

Indeed, labor, life-activity, productive life itself, appears in the first place merely as a means of satisfying a need — the need to maintain physical existence. Yet the productive life is the life of the species. It is life-engendering life. The whole character of a species — its species character — is contained in the character of its life-activity; and free, conscious activity is man's species character. Life itself appears only as a means to life. . . . The object of labor, is, therefore, the objectification of man's species life: for he duplicates himself not only as in consciousness, intellectually, but also actively in reality, and therefore he contemplates himself in a world that he created (34).

Despite this more philosophical emphasis placed on labor by Marx, there is no contradiction here with the views of Ibn Khaldun on the same subject. They also both express disdain for forced labour (35) and monopolies. (36) The reasons for this are quite different though. Marx believes that man is estranged from labor in a system where private property dominates because the only true relationship to one's work is in the form of communal labor. To Ibn Khaldun man can only be estranged if his incentive for gain is destroyed, because all men are self-seeking: "Every man tries to get things; in this all men are alike". (37) There is no explicit concept of alienation, no depiction of the enslaving power of the market — he is describing the fourteenth century beginning of capitalism. But Marx also described man as beset by the "furies of private interest". (38) Without the futuristic point of reference when communism brings "the complete return of man to himself as a social (i.e., human) being" (39), Marx's conceptual elements bear a remarkable similarity to Ibn Khaldun's.

The emphasis placed on economic variables, (40) notwithstanding the modifications necessitated by consideration of non-economic ones, tends to make Ibn Khaldun and Marx seem more like determinists than promoters of free will. The role of the individual in history is a theme worth following up as it involves the question of the extent to which the individual is chained to or free from economic circumstances and historical inevitability. We have seen how, in the words of Schaff, "in the Marxist view, man is the maker of history not as a nomad of utterly unconditioned free will, which belongs in the realm of philosophical phantasy, but as a product of history and so as a real, socially conditioned psychophysical individual who makes certain choices" (41). Ibn Khaldun, on the contrary, has been

criticized for his "inability to come to grips with the individual human personality in history" (42). He "regards individual efforts completely useless in this respect" (43). Indeed, the Muqaddimah laboriously traces the rise and fall of a myriad dynasties and groups in history. By stressing the importance of asabiyya or group solidarity in the change from one dynasty to another, it appears as if Ibn Khaldun does relegate the individual to a secondary place in historical development. Interpreting this in terms of the realism-nominalism distinction, Ibn Khaldun would seem to be classified as a realist, in contradistinction to the apparent nominalism of Marx. This would place Ibn Khaldun in Durkheim's mode of sociology. However, both Ibn Khaldun and Karl Marx achieved a synthesis of realism and nominalism which reflects the dynamic, dialectical character of their sociology. For Ibn Khaldun, the impetus for change in society, although depending on asabiyya (group solidarity) and the transition from badawa (desert life) to hadara (urban life), rests also on a psychological basis as the nomads yearn for what the civilized societies possess (44). Similarly, in The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 Marx says, "Above all, we must avoid postulating 'Society' again as an abstraction vis a vis the individual. The individual is the social being" (pp. 137-138). On closer examination Marx's conception of the relationship between the individual and society appears to be a synthesis similar to that of Simmel: (45)

Social activity and social mind exist by no means only in the form of some directly communal activity and directly communal mind, although communal activity and communal mind — i.e., activity and mind which are manifested and directly revealed in real association with other men — will occur wherever such a direct expression of sociability stems from the true character of the activity's content and is adequate to its nature (46).

Marx seems to acknowledge the existence of a social mind, but is unsure of its place in capitalist society in which man is alienated from the community by this social consciousness as an abstraction, and not as a living community (47).

A deeper understanding of these fluid relationships among social phenomena is possible when we grasp the dialectical nature of Ibn Khaldun's and Karl Marx's approach to historical change in the following section.

Nature of Historical Change

In the preceding section we have seen, in the words of Roberto Michels, that Ibn Khaldun "insisted on the essential thesis that dif-

ferences in customs and institutions depend on the various ways in which man procures for himself the means of subsistence" (48). Changes in history are in part the changes that take place in the transition from the badawa to the hadara mode of living. Similarly, Marx believed that "any change arising in the productive forces of men necessarily effects a change in their relations of production" (49). The root of these changes in the productive base is conflict. For Ibn Khaldun this conflict often rests on a psychological basis as the nomads dislike the urbanites for what they possess. Marx was not unaware of this clash between agrarian and non-agrarian groups: "The greatest division of material and mental labor is the separation of town and country. The antagonism between town and country begins with the transition from barbarism to civilization, from tribe to state, from locality to nation, and runs through the whole history of civilization to the present day" (50). He goes on to say that "the great uprisings of the Middle Ages all radiated from the country" (51).

For Ibn Khaldun and Karl Marx, however, there is a macro-level of socio-historic change which is fundamentally a dialectical movement from one stage to another. They only differ in that Marx sees the movement progressing toward communist society, (52) whereas Ibn Khaldun sees a cyclical rise and fall of dynasties. To Ibn Khaldun there are five stages of dynasties :

The first stage is that of success, the overthrow of all opposition, and appropriation of royal authority from the preceding dynasty. In this stage, the ruler serves as model to his people by the manner in which he acquires glory, collects taxes, defends property, and provides military protection. . . . The second stage is the one in which the ruler gains complete control over his people, claims royal authority all for himself, excluding them, and prevents them from trying to have a share in it. . . .

The third stage is one of leisure and tranquility in which the fruits of royal authority are enjoyed . . . acquisition of property, creation of lasting monuments, and fame . . . This stage is the last during which the ruler is in complete authority. . . .

The fourth stage is one of contentment and peacefulness. . . .

The fifth stage is one of waste and squandering . . . (the ruler) ruins the foundation his ancestors had laid and tears down what they had built up. In this stage, the dynasty is seized by senility and the chronic disease from which it can hardly ever rid itself, for which it can find no cure, and, eventually, it is destroyed (53).

In another section of the Muqaddimah, Ibn Khaldun compares the life spans of dynasties to those of individuals. These stages describes how the desert attitudes of toughness and savagery change in the second generation to humble subservience and luxury mindedness under royal authority. In the third generation the period of desert life is forgotten, and as luxury reaches its peak, group feeling disappears. In the fourth generation ancestral prestige is destroyed, and the cycle begins again as other desert tribes overthrow the corrupt society (54).

In this way the history of human society involves in an eternal cycle: Human society is in an eternal up and down movement, it develops and completes itself not into something higher and better, but into something different which comprises the old and the new at the same time. The dialectics that view the nature of the world as movement, but not as a purposeful development —opposite forces do not neutralize each other, the total movement is static — are characteristics of the time in which Ibn Khaldun composed his work (55).

On the contrary, Marx conceives of society as passing through successive evolutionary stages: "In broad outlines we can designate the Asiatic, the ancient, the feudal, and the modern bourgeois modes of production as so many epochs in the progress of economic formation of society" (56). The first stage is that of primitive communism and is discussed at length by Engels in his *Origin of the Family*. The second deals with slavery in ancient Greece and Rome, the third with medieval feudalism — Ibn Khaldun's era. This is the period of the great cash between town and country.

Ibn Khaldun stood on the threshold of state-capitalist society, and this has been expressed in his economic theory. Marx had the advantage of living at the apex of capitalist civilization when he could look in retrospect at the period in which Ibn Khaldun lived. But on the other hand, the notion of evolution is not entirely absent from the Muqaddimah, as a general shift toward sedentary civilization could be detected.

The limitation placed on Ibn Khaldun's study of history is, in the words of Toynbee, "the axiom that all historical thought is inevitably relative to the particular circumstances of the thinker's own time and place" (57). The same can be said of Marx when we observe the failure of many of his predictions to come true. But Marx's work is evolutionary in another sense: history is the progressive transformation of human nature, with full human freedom its end (58). Freedom "consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature

which is founded on knowledge of natural necessity; it is therefore necessarily a product of historical development" (59).

Aside from their outlook on historical evolution, Marx and Ibn Khaldun both set forth a conception of historical change characterized by conflict and one which is dialectical in nature: each successive stage arises from the conflicting contradictions of the previous one. Although Ibn Khaldun's conception of change is the cyclical rise and fall of dynasties in contrast to the more evolutionary postulates of Marx, to both these men these changes in stages are essentially dialectical. Their statements are fully congruent with one another. Because of his appearance in the nineteenth century, Marx was confident to say that "the history of all hitherto existing society has been the history of the class struggle" (60). Ibn Khaldun was more circumscribed in limiting his notion of conflict to one between the desert people and those in urban areas. Their dialectic does not rest on a reified metaphysical principle, but is rooted in actual historic relations. Historical materialism is a better term to use than dialectical materialism, but as we have seen, this term can also be misleading in the light of the dialectical relationship between productive and non-productive factors in history (61). Confusion exists over this because when we abstract from particular historical events and posit the dialectic as a scientific reality it often seems as if it has been made into a hypostasized reality. We have to remember Marx's admonition that "in direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven" (62).

Conclusion

The dialectic which Ibn Khaldun and Karl Marx saw operating in history is nothing more than an historical generalization based on empirical observations. In his observation, especially of the Arab world, Ibn Khaldun described the conflict between nomadic peoples and the more civilized sedentary peoples in the context of a continual change of power as in a cyclical rise and fall of dynasties. Four centuries later Marx observed the inner dynamics of different social classes as they created systems which in turn became the source of their downfall. Marx looked at men "in their actual empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions" (63). In addition to this both men rejected a narrow cause and effect determinism in the relationship between the material and ideational elements in history in favor of a dialectical sociology. For these reasons they provided the foundation long ago for an empirical-dialectical

methodology which has not been developed into its fullest possibilities in sociology.

In addition to methodology Ibn Khaldun and Karl Marx have provided us with the beginnings of a theory of society and the manner in which it changes. In the Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (64). Marx indicates a central theme of his work. He proposes to study the "abstract characteristics of society, taking into account their historical aspects." At the highest level of generality of scientific theory, that of general ideas about the structure of theory and the nature of causality, this historical sociology has many advantages. The fact that many of his predictions failed to come true bolster rather than detract from this definition. That is, had Marx lived on into the twentieth century he would have had to take note of historical changes taking place which would modify his theory of society, recognizing that theoretical propositions are open to later refinement or alteration. A refutation at the level of prediction does not mean a refutation of Marx's theory up to the highest level of generality. Stinchcombe (65) notes that there are different levels of generality and each must be considered separately. Marx's work has not been emphasized enough by American sociologists partly because some of his predictions failed to come true, giving rise to the belief that his work was unscientific or ideological. But as Bottomore points out, "the general inclination of Marx's work, when it is traced from his earlier to his later writings, is clearly away from the philosophy of history and towards a scientific theory of society, in the precise sense of a body of general laws and detailed empirical statements". (66)

After defining history as "information about human social organization", Ibn Khaldun goes on to say that "discussion of the general conditions of regions, races, and periods constitutes the historian's foundation" (67). This clearly refers to the generalizing aspect of science. As Nour concludes :

Altogether, it is a credit to Ibn Khaldun that he tried to study society in all its phases, perceiving the universal processes behind the particular events and seeking generalizations fitting societies of different times and places. If we conceive sociology as the effort to generalize from observed facts on the behaviour of men in society, with a view to more accurate and more complete comprehension of the associative life of man, both in its static and dynamic aspects, then we are justified in speaking of Ibn Khaldun as a sociologist (68).

Another student of his work, Schmidt, points out that "when Ibn

Khaldun speaks of science ('ilm), he does not mean knowledge in the rough, but that certain and systematized knowledge which to us is science — not Wissen, but Wissenschaft" (69).

Thus, in the work of Karl Marx and Ibn Khaldun there is no real bifurcation into or incongruency of theory and method which is the basis of difficulties and the object of concern to many today.

FOOTNOTES

1. The **Sociological Imagination** (Lodon : Oxford University Press, 1959), p. 47.
2. See, for example, Neil J. Smelser, "Sociology and the Other Social Sciences", in P. F. Lazarsfeld et al (ed.), **The Uses of Sociology** (New York: Basic Books, 1967); Franz Adler, "The Basic Difficulty of Historical Sociology", **Sociological Quarterly**, 2 (January, 1961); and Werner J. Cahnman and Alvin Boskoff (eds.), **Sociology and History: Theory and Research** (New Yor : The Free Press, 1964).
3. See, for example, Crane Brinton, **The Anatomy of Revolution** (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1952); and Barrington Moore, Jr., **Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World**. (Boston : Beacon Press, 1966).
4. Nell J. Smelser has come closest to utilizing historical materials within a functionalist framework in his study of the Lancashire cotton industry. However, as the subtitle of his book indicates, it is an application of theory to the study of this industry. See his book, **Social Change in the Industrial Revolution: An Application of theory to the Lancashire Cotton Industry, 1770-1840** (London : Routledge and Paul 1959).
5. This is the definition used by Frederick Engles in **Anti-Duehring**, (New York: International Publishers, 1939) p. 29. Throughout the paper we employ the usual convention of treating Marx and Engles as the same person, especially as the latter deferred to Marx throughout his intellectual career.
6. The attempt to equate functionalism with Marxism (Robert Merton, **On Theoretical Sociology**, New York: The Free Press, 1967; Alfred G. Meyer, **Marxism: The Unity of Theory and Practice: A Critical Essay**, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954; Kingsley Davis, "The Myth of Functional Analysis as a Special Method in Sociology and Anthropology", **American Sociological Review**, 24 (December, 1959), pp. 757-772; and Arthur Stinchombe, **Constructing Social Theories**, New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), as well as the attempt to posit a "conflict functionalism" (Lewis Coser, **The Functions of Social Conflict**, New York : The Free Press, 1956) are seen here as misleading. In one

sense functionalism can be defined so broadly that it can actually cover almost any kind of scientific endeavor, as Kingsley Davis did. However, this appears to be a way of avoiding or negating the differences involved between functional and dialectical sociology by appealing to a higher, more embracing system. This is resonant with another great system-builder, Hegel, and his idea of the Absolute in which all contradictions will be resolved, and stands in direct opposition to the Marxian approach. Meyer himself equates the dialectic with concreteness. Functionalism may be considered as a reified approach to the study of social phenomena. (See Joachim Israel, *Alienation from Marx to Modern Sociology*, Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971, p. 328; Peter Berger and Stanley Pullberg, "Reification and the Sociological Critique of Consciousness", *History and Theory*, 4, 1965, p. 196), that is, it views society as the independent, variable or objective reality, with emphasis on institutions and social structure as components of Society. Functionalism may refer to the emphasis on integration of parts into wholes, that is, the interdependence of parts. This makes Functionalism an equilibrium approach. Marx and Ibn Khaldun, however, proceed from a dialectical synthesis of sociological and psychological assumptions and avoid this fallacy. Thus, functional and dialectical sociology are not mutually exclusive methodological approaches, but differ as to the level of critique on which they operate. For more orthodox critiques of the logic of functionalism, see N. J. Demerutis, III, and R. A. Peterson, *Systems, Change and Conflict: A Reader on Contemporary Sociological Theory and the Debate on Functionalism* (New York: The Free Press, 1967); and Wsevolod W. Isajiw *Causation and Functionalism in Sociology* (New York: Schocken Book, 1968).

7. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, *The German Ideology* (New York: International Publishers, 1947), p. 7.
8. Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*. In *Marx and Engels, Selected Notes* (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1962), p. 362.
9. Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, pp. 13-14.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
11. Israel, *op. cit.*, p. 68.
12. "Letters on Historical Materialism", in Lewis S. Feuer (ed.), *Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels* (New York: Anchor Books, 1959), p. 397. Engels' explicit modification of historical materialism in four letters in 1890 is not without its critics. Bober concludes his discussion of the letters by saying: "The general impression which these letters make, in common with all the other evidence

bearing on the problem, comes to the familiar formula that while institutions and ideas have a part in history, their influence is of such a subordinate character that social events and changes are explicable mainly in terms of economics". See M. M. Bober, *Karl Marx's Interpretation of History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950), p. 310. Similarly, Mayo says: "So we have an apparent retreat from the earlier strict determinism, a denial that the economic is the sole determining factor — whatever that may mean — and are told that only 'ultimately', 'basically', 'on the whole', or 'in the last instance' does the economic foundation determine the superstructure and the course of history. There is a frequent use of such vague terms in Marxist literature". Henry B. Mayo, *Introduction to Marxist Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 77.

13. Merton, *op. cit.*, pp. 98-99.
14. Marx and Engles, *The German Ideology*, p. 39.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
16. Martin Needleman and Carolyn Needleman, "Marx and the Problem of Causation", *Science and Society*, 33 (Summer, 1969), pp. 322-339. By multi-causal here is not meant "a causal pluralism in which everything could be traced to a virtually infinite multiplicity of effective causes". Meyer, *op. cit.*, p. 28. Rather it refers to a dialectical interplay of causes and effects, which can be explicitly defined. The reader is referred back to footnote 6.
17. Heinrich Simon, *Ibn Khalduns Wissenschaft von der Menschlichen Kultur* (Leipzig: Veb Otto Harrassowitz, 1959), p. 78.
18. Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimh: An Introduction to History*, trans. from the Arabic by Franz Rosenthal (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), Vol. I, pp. 249-250.
19. **Asabiyya** is one of the most important basic concepts in Ibn Khaldun's Work. It has been translated as "esprit de corps", "famille", "parti", "tribal consciousness", "blood relationship", "feeling of unity", group mind, "collective consciousness", "group feeling", "group loyalty", "group adhesion", and "group solidarity". The last, group solidarity, closest to the original term. **Asabiyya** is a social bond that can be used to measuer the strength and stability of social groupings. It is not confined to **badawa**, or desert life, as some writers believe (e.g., Mohamed Abdel Monem Nour, "Ibn Khaldun as an Arab Social Thinker", *A'mal Mah- rajan Ibn Khaldun*, Cairo, pp. 84-119), although it is stronger among desert people than among ruralites and urbanites. **Asabiyya**, furthermore, is not confined to Arab people: "Ibn Khaldun identifies the **asabiyya** of many (ancient) peoples, even the non-Islamic, Persians, Jews, Greeks,

- Romans, Turks". Edouard Will, "Comptes Rendus Critiques", *Revue Historique* (October-December, 1970), pp. 441-448.
20. Simon, *op. cit.* M. Kamil Ayad, *Die Geschichts and Gesellschaftslehre Ibn Khalduns* (Stuttgart u. Berlin, 1930), p. 105, p. 105; and Charles Issawi, *An Arab Philosophy of History* (London: John Murray, 1950), p. 17.
 21. Hayden V. White "Ibn Khaldun in World Philosophy of History", *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. 2, pp. 118-119. See also Muhammad Abdullah Enan, *Ibn Khaldun: His Life and Work* (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1944), p. 114.
 22. Ibn Khaldun, *The Muqaddimah*, Vol. I, pp. 60, 84, 91, 313, 380-381; Vol. II, p. 137.
 23. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 261.
 24. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, p. 119. However, this disintegration can be postponed as the ruling dynasty may for a while dispense with group feeling, and retain control over the populace with its money and soldiers; but eventually 'senility' does overtake the dynasty and it falls (Vol. II, pp. 118-124).
 25. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 320, 322.
 26. Muhammad Mahmoud Rabie, *The Political Theory of Ibn Khaldun* (Leiden, E. J. Brill, 1967), p. 51.
 27. Including backwoods' Villages. See Gaston Bouthoul, *Ibn Khaldun: Sa Philosophie Sociale* (Paris: Librairie Orientaliste Paul Geuthner, 1930), pp. 63-64; and P. A. Sorokin et al, *A Systematic Source Book in Rural Sociology*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1930), Vol. I.
 28. Ibn Khaldun, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 52. In this sense *asabiyya* is directly analogous to Marx's concept of class consciousness, in which wage workers become aware of their historical revolutionary mission and make the transition from a *Klasse an sich* (Class-in-itself) to a *Klasse fuer sich* (class-for-itself), or the proletariat (see Coser, *op. cit.* p. 48; Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, pp. 58-59; Dahrendorf, *op. cit.*, p. 25). Only one student of Ibn Khaldun, Lewin (In Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 50) has interpreted *asabiyya* as a superstructure phenomenon, and was taken to task by Ayad (*op. cit.*) who viewed *asabiyya* more as an interdependent variable. In the context of this paper, neither of these interpolations would be correct as they both miss the essential point of the dialectic interplay between these phenomena.
 29. Rabie, *op. cit.*, p. 33.
 30. Ibn Khaldun, *op. cit.* Vol. I, p. 54. Also pp. 42, 160. See also Rabie, *op. cit.*, p. 230; Joseph J. Spengler, "Economic Thought of Islam: Ibn Khaldun", *Comparative Studies and History*, Vol. 6, (1963-1964), pp. 290-292, 294-295; Issawi, *op. cit.*, p. 17; George Sarton, *Introduction to the*

- History of Science** (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins Co., 1948), Vol. III, p. 1171; Muhsin Mahdi, **Ibn Khaldun's Philosophy of History** (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1957), p. 268; Milmi Zia Ulken, "Ibn Khaldun: Initiateur de la Sociologie," **A'mal Mahrajan Ibn Khaldun** (Cairo), p. 29; and H. K. Sherwani, **Studies in Muslim Political Thought and Administration** (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1963), pp. 187-188, 196.
31. Ibn Khaldun, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 58.
 32. *Ibid.*, Vol. II, pp. 311-317. For an excellent study of Ibn Khaldun's views on the organization of economic activity see M. A. Nash'at, "Ibn Khaldun: Pioneer Economist", **L'Egypte Contemporaine**, Vol. 35 (Cairo), pp. 377-490. See also Simon, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-98; and Issawi's translation of segments of the **Muqaddimah** pertaining to economics (*op. cit.*, pp. 71-86).
 33. Ibn Khaldun, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, pp. 103-109.
 34. Karl Marx, **The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844** (New York: International Publishers, 1964), pp. 113-114.
 35. *Ibid.*, p. 111, and Ibn Khaldun, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 84-85.
 36. For Ibn Khaldun's view see Nash'at, *op. cit.*, pp. 393-394; for Marx, "Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation", in **Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels**, pp. 164-167.
 37. Ibn Khaldun, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 311. Ibn Khaldun's views, including those on private property, are based on extensive observations as a result of his socio-political position.
 38. Marx, **Basic Writings on Politics and Philosophy**, p. 137.
 39. Marx, **The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844**, p. 135.
 40. According to Michels, Ibn Khaldun "may have been the earliest scientific exponent of the economic concept of history". Roberto Michels, **First Lectures in Political Sociology** (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1965), p. 10. Ulken (*op. cit.*, p. 30) believes that Ibn Khaldun "is an early forerunner of Karl Marx because it was he who stressed the importance of economic factors." And Rabie (*op. cit.*, p. 47) emphasizes that Ibn Khaldun "had not been preceded by any thinker of any political creed or religion who had ever treated, in such a scientific way, the interaction of economic factors and societal phenomena".
 41. Adam Schaff, **Marxism and the Human Individual** (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 150. Gouldner has even equated the "voluntarism" of early Marx to that of the early work of Talcott Parsons. Alvin Gouldner, **The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology** (New York: Basic Sociology, 1970), pp. 185-195.
 42. White, *op. cit.*, p. 115.

43. Ali H. Wardi, "A Sociological Analysis of Ibn Khaldun's Theory: A study in the Sociology of knowledge" (Austin: University of Texas-Dissertation, 1950), p. 109. See also p. 279.
44. See R. Chambliss, **Social Thought** (New York: Dryden Press, 1954), p. 308.
45. Georg Simmel, **The Sociology of Georg Simmel**, trans. and edited by Kurt H. Wolf (New York: The Free Press, 1950), pp. 26-29.
46. Marx, **The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844**, p. 137.
47. In Marx's own words: "My general consciousness is only the theoretical shape of that which the living shape is the real community, the social fabric, although at the present day general consciousness is an abstraction from real life and confronts it with hostility". Emphasis removed. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
48. Michels, *op. cit.*, p. 10.
49. Karl Marx, **The Poverty of Philosophy** (London, 1910), p. 133.
50. Marx and Engels, **The German Ideology**, p. 43.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 46.
52. However, Venable dissents from this view: "Always they speak of classless socialism as the next stage, not the final stage of history, and everywhere they imply and frequently explicitly assert, the impossibility of any social or historical finality". Vernon Venable, **Human Nature: The Marxian View** (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945), p. 174.
53. Ibn Khaldun, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, pp. 353-355.
54. *Ibid.*, Vol. I, pp. 343-346. A medieval Islamic group, Ikhwan al-Safa, had a somewhat similar view on the growth and the "gradual" decline of the state. See Fuad Baali, **Social and Ethical Philosophy of Ikhwan al-Safa** (Baghdad: Ma'arif Press, 1958), p. 61.
55. Simon, *op. cit.*, p. 64.
56. Preface to **A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy**, p. 363.
57. Arnold J. Toynbee, **A Study of History** (London: Oxford University Press, 1935). Vol. III, p. 516.
58. Joseph O'Malley, "History and Man's 'Nature' in Marx", **Review of Politics**, Vol. 28 (October, 1966), p. 516.
59. Engels, **Anti-Duehring**, p. 125.
60. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, **The Communist Manifesto** (New York: International Publishers, 1964), p. 57.
61. Israel (*op. cit.*, p. 91) points out that dialectical materialism is concerned with problems of epistemology; historical materialism with sociological-economic problems seen in a historical perspective.
62. Marx and Engels, **The German Ideology**, p. 14.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 15.

64. In T. B. Bottomore (ed.) **Kar Marx, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy** (New York : McGraw-Hill, 1956), p. 17.
65. Stinchcombe, *op. cit.*, p. 53.
66. T. B. Bottomore, "Karl Marx: Sociologist or Marxist?" **Science and Society**, Vol. 30 (Winter, 1966), p. 15.
67. Ibn Khaldun, *op. cit.*, Vol. I, p. 63. Ibn Khaldun criticized the tradition-bound historians who "disregarded the changes in conditions and in the customs of nations and races that the passing of time had brought about". (Vol I, p. 9).
68. Mohamed Abdel Monem Nour, "**An Analytical Study of the Sociological Thought of Ibn Khaldun**", (Lexington : University of Kentucky-Dissertation, 1953), p. 248. Similar views were expressed by Simon, *op. cit.*, **Historian, Sociologist, and Philosopher** (New York : Columbia University Press, 1930), pp. 27-28; Robert Flint, **History of the Philosophy of History** (New York : Charles Scribner and Sons, 1894), p. 161; Howard Becker and H. E. Barnes, **Social Thought from Lore to Science** (New York : Dover Publications, 1961), Vol. I, pp. 266, 269; Sati al-Husri, **Studies on Ibn Khaldun's Muqaddimah** (Cairo: Dar al-Maarif, 1953) p. 235; Ali A. W. Wafi, **Abdul Rahman Ibn Khaldun** (Cairo : Maktabat Misr, 1962), p. 205; Sorokin et al., *op. cit.*, p. 54; Ulken *op. cit.*, p. 29; Bouthoul, *op. cit.*, p. 21; and T. Hussein, **Etude Analytique et Critique de la Philosophie Sociale D'Ibn Khaldun** (Faculte des lettres de L'Universite de Paris-Dissertation 1917), pp. 58-59.
69. Schmidt, *op. cit.*, p. 21.