تحليل الخطاب النقدي لتمثيل الذات والآخر في خطابات الرئيس السوداني المخلوع عمر البشير

تطرّفت هذه الدراسة كيفية استخدام الرئيس السوداني المخلوع عمر البشير للخطاب السياسي للحفاظ على سلطته وتعزيز هيمنته من خلال التأثير على مواقف جمهوره ومعتقداته، فيما يتعلق بالحكومة والمعارضة، وفحصت الدراسة استخدام الرئيس السابق للإستراتيجيات الأيديولوجية الخطابية في خطاباته السياسية من أجل تقدم الشعب إلى مجموعتين الأفريقي "مجموعة داخلية" ذات خصائص إيجابية بمثابة صغيره وحكبة، والتانية: "مجموعة خارجية" ذات سمات سلبية تمثلها المعارضة، كما حققت الدراسة في تأثير الانتفاضة الشعبية ضده على اختياره للإستراتيجيات الخطابية المختلفة وتكاررها وذلك من خلال مقارنة الخطاب التي ألّفها قبل الانتفاضة ضده بالفترة من 6 نوفمبر 2016 إلى 1 فبراير 2019، وقد تم اختيار الخطب الخمسة التي ألّفها البشير قبل الانتفاضة بشكل عشوائي، في حين أن تلك الخمسة التي ألّفها خلال الانتفاضة تمثل جميع الخطابات التي ألّفها خلال نفس الفترة الزمنية، لم تستخدم الدراسة مهجًا نوعيًا وكميًا لتحليل بياناتها، وبدأت الدراسة تحليل الدراسة المتبعة لل mensajes الاستراتيجي التي استخدمتها البشير بخطاباته العلنية على الإستراتيجيات الأيديولوجية الخطابية التي فضّلها تيون فان ديك وناقشها في "الخطاب الأيديولوجي". أظهرت النتائج أن الرئيس المخلوع البشير استخدم واحدًا وعشرين إستراتيجية خطابية مختلفة لتقديم مجموعة على نحو إيجابي وتمثيل المجموعة المعادية له بطريقة غير محببة. حيث أظهرت النتائج أن الرئيس السابق استخدم إستراتيجيات التخفيض، والمانعة، وتصوير الذات بشكل إيجابي، واستخدام الأفكار السلبية، وعبء دور الضحية، والاستجابة بالمرجاعيات، وتفهيم الذات الوطنية، وعرض الحقيقة، والتساؤل، والتحري، وإبراز الأفكار، واستراتيجيات الاستفادة، واستخدام حركة الصدقة الظاهرة، وضع الأفكار المشابهة، وعمل المقارنات السلبية، والسيخة من المصمومة، بالإضافة إلى سرد القصص. كما أظهرت النتائج أن الرئيس السابق أجرى بعض التغييرات على اختياره لأنواع الإستراتيجيات الخطابية المختلفة ومثدا استخدامها بخطاباته التي ألّفها قبل الثورة وأثنائها، وذلك لتفعيل المحتوى والمثا، وبأثره على الفشل والأزمات السياسية والاقتصادية التي تعاني منها البلاد.

الكلمات المفتاحة: الرئيس السوداني المخلوع، الإستراتيجيات الأيديولوجية الخطابية، المجموعة الداخلية، المجموعة الخارجية، المرجعي الإيديولوجي.

To cite this article: Tageldin, Khalid. A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Representation of Self and the Other in the Speeches of the Ousted Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir. Arab Journal for the Humanities, 41, 162, 2023, 239 -260.
Abstract

This study aims to explore how ousted Sudanese president, Omar Al-Bashir, utilized political discourse to maintain his power and bolster dominance by manipulating his audiences’ attitudes, and beliefs with regard to the government and the opposition. It explores the former president’s use of the discursive ideological strategies in his political speeches to create an ‘in-group’ with favourable characteristics and an ‘out-group’ with negative characteristics. It investigated the impact of the popular uprising against him on his choice of different strategies employed by comparing the speeches that he delivered before the uprising with those that he rendered during the revolt. The study analysed ten speeches delivered in the period from November 6, 2016, to February 1, 2019. The five speeches that he delivered before the Uprising were chosen randomly, while those that he gave during the Uprising represented all the speeches that he made during that period. The study adopted a qualitative and quantitative approach to analyzing its data. The analysis is based on the identification and calculation of the discursive ideological strategies that Teun van Dijk introduced and discussed in the Ideological Discourse; Ideology and Discourse Analysis,115-140; and Discourse and Power, 138-153 The results of the study showed that Al-Bashir used 21 discursive strategies to portray his in-group in a positive manner and to represent the opposition in a negative way. It showed that he used the strategies of mitigation, hyperbole, positive self-presentation, actor description, metaphor, negative-other presentation, negative lexicalization, victimization, authority, national self –glorification, counterfactuals, denial, warning, generalization, evidentiality, polarization, apparent honesty move, presupposition, negative comparison, irony, and telling story. It also demonstrated that the former president made changes to his choice of strategy types before and during the revolt to pacify the protesters and to avoid his government’s failure, in addition to political and economic crises.

Keywords: Ousted Sudanese president, discursive ideological strategies, in-group, out-group, ideological square.

ISSN : 1026-9576
DOI : 10.34120/0117-041-162-008

To cite this article: Tageldin, Khalid. A Critical Discourse Analysis of the Representation of Self and the Other in the Speeches of the Ousted Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir. Arab Journal for the Humanities, 41, 162, 2023, 239 -260.
1. Introduction

Political discourse plays a vital role in the expression, propagation, dissemination, and reproduction of political ideologies. The functions of this distinctive type of discourse are behind its ideological nature (van Dijk What is Political Discourse 28; van Dik Discourse and Power 14). The field of Critical Discourse Analysis assumes that those who have access to power attempt to produce discourses that serve advancing their power, ideology, cause, or agenda (Li et al. 1-5). This exploitation is based on the fact that human behaviour and social operations could be changed, and power imbalances and relations could be communicated by employing different forms of discourse (Freeden 493).

Political leaders are one of the groups that have the privilege of accessing mass media outlets that they exploit to disseminate their ideologies and world views. Authoritarian regimes’ monopoly over discourse and mass media may result in the abuse and the production of manipulative discourse. Such manipulative use of discourse occurs when those with power employ it to shape the collective social representations of the different groups (van Dijk, Discourse, Ideology 15). van Dijk defined manipulation, cognitively, as the “mind control [that] involves the interference with processes of understanding, the formation of biased mental models and social representations such as knowledge and ideologies.” (Discourse and Manipulation 360). Moreover, discourse can be employed by politicians as an instrument of domination. van Dijk (Principles 250) defined domination as “the exercise of social power by elites, institutions or groups, that results in social inequality, including political, cultural, class, ethnic, racial and gender inequality”.

The most common theme of political discourse is the division of groups in a polarized way that is usually demonstrated as ‘Us’ and ‘Them’ (Oddo 289). Therefore, political discourse is laden with this “typical polarized structure of ideologies as organized representations as Us versus Them” (van Dijk, Ideology and Discourse 179). By relying on the ‘Us’ versus ‘Them’ dichotomies, politicians promote their power and agenda, rally support, and exclude and silence opposition. Such discursive moves to categorize social groups are based on the use of one group, which is mainly the in-group, as the ‘frame of reference’ (Oktar 318), and due to the in-group bias, people end up presenting the in-group (Us) as good and the out-group (Them) as bad (Oktar). van Dijk (Ideology and Discourse 44) dubbed this dichotomy the ‘ideological square’ and it is designed to emphasize ‘Our good things and Their bad things’ and mitigate ‘Our bad things and Their good things.’ (van Dijk, Ideology and Discourse Analysis 124). The strategies utilized to implement the ‘ideological square’ are intended to develop “feelings of identification, empathy or disapproval and to effect a metonymic simplification of complex historical and institutional processes” (Fowler 15).

Political discourse can be best understood by applying Critical Discourse Analysis
(CDA) methods. Luke (97) argues that CDA is an “explicitly political inquiry into social, economic, and cultural power”. One of the goals of the CDA is to investigate the discursive strategies and structures actors use to reveal the “concepts, propositions, mental representations or networks, and the strategies of their mental manipulation in production and understanding” (van Dijk, *Ideology and Discourse* 54).

CDA attempts systematically to ‘link structures of discourse with structures of ideology.’ (van Dijk, *Ideological Discourse* 24). CDA research methods can assist in uncovering the ideologies of speakers ‘if language users explicitly or unwittingly ‘express’ their ideologies through language and communication’ (van Dijk, *Ideological Discourse* 13). The approach goes further to define the relationship between discourse structures and social structures. van Dijk assumes that: “the political analysis of discourse…attempts to relate structures of discourse with structures of society.” (Ideological Discourse 14).

Throughout his reign that spanned from June 30, 1989, to April 11, 2019, the Ousted Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir was known for his fiery speeches that are directed against the opposition, armed resistance groups, the West, and neighboring countries. Al-Bashir associates used to organize popular events and rallies for him to address current local and international issues. Organizers utilized passion, monetary incentives, and punitive measures to entice members of the Islamic groups, military and paramilitary units, government employees, students, peasants, and other underprivileged groups to join those events. As strategy to attract masses, Jihadist, nationalistic, and chauvinistic songs were played before, during, and at the end of the speeches, with Al-Bashir performing a dance to its tones at the end.

2. Literature Review

There are many studies that are concerned with the CDA of the speeches of former heads of states and politicians in the region using different methods and approaches as well as the application of van Dijk’s ideological square (*Ideology and Discourse*).

Abu Hatab studied the speeches of former presidents of Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, and Libya to describe the styles they used to establish different identities during the Arab Spring. The study investigated how the former presidents used linguistic resources to establish different identities. It found that they resorted to personal pronouns, and use of colloquial Arabic to change their former identities of the undisputed leader to that of one who is looking for people’s understanding and support.

Al Majali studied the political speeches of the ousted Tunisian, Egyptian, and Libyan presidents during the period from December 2010 to December 2012. The study analysed seven speeches using Halliday and Hasan’s framework of cohesion. The results of the study revealed that the speeches delivered during that period have different characteristics from those delivered before it. The ousted presidents used four types of lexical cohesion i.e., repetition, synonymy, collocation, and hyponymy.
Repetition was employed to achieve different goals such as threats, and synonyms were used to boost the sense of peace, safety, and growth.

Alkahtani studied the change of attitude in the last three speeches of the former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak using Martin and White’s Appraisal Framework. The speeches were analysed to detect the linguistic devices used to mark the three domains of affect, judgment, and appreciation. The results of the study showed that Mubarak’s attitude changed in the three speeches, where the first was unrealistic, the second was less emotive and more assertive, and the last was full of authoritative indicators and lacked empathy.

Masroor et al. investigated the positive self-presentation and negative other presentation in the political discourse of two Pakistani political figures on Twitter. The tweets of Maryam Nawaz and Imran Khan, about corruption allegations raised by the Panama Leaks in the period from October 2016 to December 2016 were analysed using van Dijk’s ideological discursive strategies. The study found that the politicians used many strategies to present themselves positively and the other negatively including positive self-presentation, national self-glorification, pronouns, negative other-presentation, victimization, metaphor, hyperbole, lexicalization, polarizations, number games, irony, authority, consensus, presuppositions, hard facts, and empathy.

Lahlali examined the ideological functions of repetition in the leader of the Lebanese Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah’s speeches. The results of the study revealed that Nasrallah used lexical repetition to promote his ideological and political views, religious identity, and as a unification strategy. Ajiboye examined the discursive strategies in readers’ comments to online news and its possible impact on others’ opinions and ideological views. The study analysed 201 comments to online reports of two socio-political crises that occurred in Nigeria in 2011 and 2012. The study used the 27 ideological strategies proposed by van Dijk (2004) to analyse the study data. The study showed that the readers utilized the ideological strategies of actor description, authority, evidentiality, generalisation, hyperbole, lexicalisation, polarisation, vagueness, and victimisation in their comments to influence the attitudes and judgments of other readers.

All these studies analysed the speeches and texts delivered by politicians in the area critically and applied the ideological square introduced by van Dijk in addition to different approaches and methods.

3. Aim of the Study

This study is a critical discourse analysis of the representation of self and the other in the speeches of the Ousted Sudanese President (OSP). It explores the OSP’s use of the representational forms and discursive ideological strategies in his speeches.
and how he exploits them to create “in-group” and “out-group” identities and how he portrays both. The study aims to describe the ideological strategies used in the creation of the OSP’s ‘Us’ vs. ‘Them’ dichotomy using van Dijk’s (Ideological Discourse 13-45; Ideology and Discourse Analysis 115-140; Discourse and Power 138-153) categorization. It, also, aims to find out the impact of the popular protests in the choice and frequency of discursive structures of the speeches he delivered before the popular uprising and of those that he made during the revolt.

4. Significance of the Study

Politicians can employ soft power to persuade, manipulate, and dominate people. Van Dijk states that “controlling the contexts and structures of text and talk is a first major form of the exercise of power, controlling people’s minds through such discourse is an indirect but fundamental way to reproduce dominance and hegemony.” (Critical Discourse Analysis 472).

The significance of this study arises from its focus on how the Ousted Sudanese President, Omar Al-Bashir used to exploit political speeches to bolster his power and dominance over the masses. It shows how the OSP use discourse to manipulate his audiences’ beliefs, ideologies, and attitudes towards his government and the opposition by resorting to the use of Us vs. Them dichotomy and by using discursive strategies that present the former in a positive way and the latter in an unfavourable manner.

The political discourse analysis is a new field of study that is not addressed adequately in the Arab and African contexts. The current study is a contribution to the growing body of research in the area. It is one of the first scientific endeavours to investigate Al-Bashir’s political discourse in depth using quantitative and qualitative approaches. It shows how public opinion can be shaped and influenced using the discursive practices of those in power.

This study is an application of the discursive strategies proposed by van Dijk that proves these strategies are valid in the political discourse domain regardless of the region or culture in which they are applied.

5. Methods

The study examined ten OSP’s speeches delivered in different places and at different occasions using the Sudanese Colloquial Arabic. Five speeches were made before the popular revolution in the period from November 6, 2016, to April 5, 2018, while the others were delivered during the uprising in the period from January 9, 2019, to February 1, 2019. The first group was chosen randomly from the available speeches online, while the second group consists of all the speeches given during the uprising. The videos of the speeches were downloaded from the YouTube channels of Al-Jazeera, Sudan, Kassala, Gezira, Taibah, and Ashrooq T.V channels and Sudan News
Agency (SUNA). The duration of the speeches is 2 hours, 37 minutes, and 53 seconds. Table number (1) provides detailed information about the ten speeches. The occasion of each speech is specified except for the last four, which seem to be planned hastily to pacify the popular protests.

**Table (1): Information of the Ten Speeches**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Speech No.</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Duration</th>
<th>Occasion</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before the Uprising</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Obeid, North Kordofan State</td>
<td>9:00</td>
<td>Reconquest of Hegleig</td>
<td>4/5/2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Khartoum, Khartoum State</td>
<td>20:48</td>
<td>Address to Gezira and Manaqil Farmers</td>
<td>12/12/2014</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Demazin, Blue Nile State</td>
<td>19:07</td>
<td>Reconquest of Kurmuk</td>
<td>6/11/2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Manaqil, Gezira State</td>
<td>10:35</td>
<td>Inauguration of A road</td>
<td>16/12/2016</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Obeid, North Kordofan State</td>
<td>12:00</td>
<td>Signing of Kordofan Renaissance Document</td>
<td>5/4/2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During the Uprising</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Khartoum, Khartoum State</td>
<td>14:56</td>
<td>The Peace Rally</td>
<td>9/1/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Neyala, South Darfur State</td>
<td>10:40</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>15/1/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Al-Kerida, White Nile State</td>
<td>13:07</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>25/1/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Kadogli, South Kordofan State</td>
<td>13:17</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>28/1/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Kassala, Kassala State</td>
<td>14:09</td>
<td>unspecified</td>
<td>1/2/2019</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td></td>
<td>2hr:37min:53sec</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The study adopted a qualitative and quantitative approach. It analyzed the OPS speeches using van Dijk’s strategies of ideological discursive production (*Ideological Discourse* 13-45; *Ideology and Discourse Analysis* 115-140; *Discourse and Power* 138-153). The gathered data were analyzed according to van Dijk’s discursive strategies to reveal the presence of elements of ‘the ideological square’ in the OSP’s linguistic, lexical, and rhetorical choices.

The ten speeches were downloaded and transcribed in order to find out the strategies used. The frequencies of the different strategies were calculated to decide the most salient ones. The strategies used in the two periods, before and during the uprising, were identified and calculated in order to find out the impact of the uprising on the OSP’s choice and frequency of strategies.

**6. Results and Discussion**

**6.1. The Used Strategies**

The gathered data from the ten speeches showed that the OSP used twenty-one polarization discourse structures from the strategies that were described by van Dijk to favor the in-group and derogate the out-group. It demonstrated that the former
The data of the study showed that the strategies of mitigation, hyperbole, positive self-presentation, actor description, and metaphor were used more than the other moves, while the strategies of presuppositions, negative comparisons, irony, and telling story were used the least. Table number (2) shows the types and frequencies of the discourse structures that were used by the OSP to exhibit the positive and negative evaluation of the two groups.

Table (2): The Types and Frequencies of the Polarizing Discourse Structures in the 10 speeches.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy No.</th>
<th>Strategy Type</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Hyperbole</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>Positive Self-Presentation</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>Actor Description</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>Metaphor</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Negative other Presentation</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Negative Lexicalization</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Victimization</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>National Self-Glorification</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>Counterfactuals</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>Denial</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>Warning</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Generalization</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Evidentiality</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Polarization</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Apparent Honesty Move</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Presupposition</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>Negative Comparisons</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>Irony</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>Telling Story</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The following is an analysis and a discussion of the use of the twenty-one discursive strategies that appeared in the speeches illustrated by examples from the data of the study. The examples are transliterated using the DIN 31635 standard, and then they are translated:
1-Authority

Usually, ideological speakers resort to citations from authorities to support their point of view (van Dijk, Politics, Ideology 735). The OSP presents himself and his group as a committed Islamist group by citing verses from Quran, hadiths, prayers, supplications... etc. in all his speeches. The most used citation in the ten speeches was a popular prayer made to Allah. The OSP used it in speeches number 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 10. The prayer is as follows:

*allahu akbar. allahu akbar. wa la illah ila allah muḥlisīn lahū aldīn wa laū kariha alkafirūn.*

*Allah is great. Allah is great. There is no god but Allah, to whom we are sincere in devotion, even though the unbelievers disapprove it.*

In some of his speeches, the OSP added some negative lexicalizations to the end of the prayer such as /almūnafiqūn/ the hypocrites and /almūtamardūn/ the rebels as reference to the local political opposition and armed movements to present them in a negative way.

Another recurring closing in the speeches are lines from a popular poem that is considered as a manifesto of the Muslim Brotherhood. The former president is proud of his affiliation to the group that he claimed he joined at the secondary school (Maghazi). The OSP cited the lines at the end of speeches number 1, 3, 6, 7, and 8.

*fi sabīlī illahi qumna, nabtaqi raf ʿ alliwa
mā lidunīa qad ʿamilna, nahnu liaḍīn fida
faliʿud lildīn maḍduh, aw turaq mina aldima
aw turaq minhum dīma
aw turaq kulu aldima*

*For Allah’s sake, we stood. We want to raise the banner
We did not work for the world, we are a sacrifice to the religion
Let the religion reclaim its glory or let the blood be shed from us
Or let blood shed from them
Or let all the blood be shed*

The OSP also resorted to Quran verses such as verses 61-62 from Al-Anfal that he cited in speech number 1:
If the enemy is inclined towards peace, make peace with them. And put your trust in Allah. Indeed, He "alone" is the All-Hearing, All-Knowing. But if their intention is only to deceive you, then Allah is certainly sufficient for you. He is the One Who has supported you with His help and with the believers.

The OSP also used to quote sayings of Prophet Muhammad (hadiths) in his speeches. In speech number (3), he addressed the youth who joined the rebels. Al-Bashir considered the action of the youth as desertion of Islam and quoted a hadith that encourages repentance.

The one who repents from sin is like the one who has no sin.

By quoting this hadith, Al-Bashir wanted to discourage the youth from joining the rebel groups by presenting it as a sinful action that requires repentance.

Moreover, the dictator used to resort to popular proverbs in order to present himself as a wise man who is proud of his local cultural heritage. He quoted many proverbs such as this one he included in speech number (4):

You don’t need to advise a wise man.

2-National Self-Glorification

This strategy takes the form of making positive reference to one’s own country, history, or local traditions (van Dijk, Politics, Ideology 738). The OSP used this strategy 15 times in his 10 speeches. The topics of the country’s independence, the good qualities and noble manners of the Sudanese, development projects in the country, and hosting of refugees were the most common in his speeches. For example, in speech number (1) he stated that:

This is the people that achieved the first independence in Africa, south of the desert... we contributed to liberating all of Africa. There is no African liberation movement that was not supported by or started from Sudan.

The good Sudanese morals and manners are praised frequently in Al-Bashir’s speeches. For example, in speech number six he noted that:
All the noble manners that the Prophet was sent to spread are in the people of Sudan. And these are not the words of a biased person. This is the testimony of all the peoples of the world who dealt with the Sudanese. They tell you that the Sudanese are the best people.

Moreover, in speech number (8) he referred to his government’s development projects when he reiterated that:

All the powers that are hostile to Islam, and that who are hostile towards the Arabs, the Muslims, and Sudan don’t like the stability in Sudan. They don’t like the development in Sudan.

The OSP referred to the refugees who arrived in the country in many instances such as in speech number (8), where he stated:

Sudan is a refuge for all those who want peace. The one who is frightened in his country comes to us, we secure him. The one who is hungry in his country we feed him.

3-Metaphors

Metaphors are rhetorical devices that play one of the most important roles in political discourse (Burkholder and Henry 100). Metaphors have the capacity to change the political thoughts, decisions and behaviors of both individuals and nations (Burkholder and Henry 111). The study data showed that the dictator used metaphors with positive implications to refer to his in-group and others with negative suggestions to derogate the out-groups. For example, in speech number (1) he referred to the Sudanese army using the metaphor of lions:

The lions of the 4th contingent.

He used the word /alhašarah/ ‘the insect’ to refer to the rebel group the ‘Sudan Liberation Movement North (SPLMN)’ and the word /danas/ ‘filth’ to refer to its actions in the following example from the same speech:

wa inuh rabana subhanuh wa ta’alā yuqadir anuh yatīm tāṭīr ālnīl alazraq min danas alḥašarah alīsā abiaḥ.
And Allah, glorified and exalted be He, destined that the Blue Nile be cleansed from the filth of the popular insect.

4-Positive Self-Presentation

In this type ‘the speaker emphasizes the positive characteristics of the own group’ (van Dijk, Politics, Ideology 739). The OSP employed the strategy in order to present his in-group as committed to their obligations, peace lovers, and an incarnation of the noble manners. In speech number (1) he praised his government’s commitment to the signed agreements when he noted that:

lakin niḥna aṣḥab ʿūwhud wa niḥna aṣḥab mūṭāq wa niḥna aṣḥab kilmah

But we are owners of commitment, and we are owners of covenants, and we are owners of a word.

He also bragged that they are a peace-loving group in speech number (2) that he made after the liberation of Heglig which was stormed by the South Sudan army.

iḥna nas salām.

We are peace people.

5-Victimization

The OSP used the strategy of victimization frequently; for example, in speech number (8) he was alluding to the international sanctions imposed on his government and the Israeli bombardment of a military facility in 2013, when he stated that:

daʾmu altaṭamrud. ḥarbuna. ǧazuna. qaṣafuna ǧūah alḥarṭūm. ḥaṣaruna iqtiṣādīan. ḥarbuna iqtiṣādīan.

They supported the insurgency. They fought us. They invaded us. They bombarded us in Khartoum. They economically blockaded us. They economically fought us.

He used the same strategy in speech number (4), when he discussed the arrest warrant issued to him by the International Criminal Court:

almaḥkama alqāʾinaiyah di waḥdah min alašiyya alli dairin yīrakiʿuna biha wa yīḍiluna biha.

The International Criminal Court is one of the things that they want to use to make us kneel and to humiliate us with.

6-Negative other presentation

Al-Bashir had a rich repertoire of discourse that presents the others in a negative way. In many instances, he described the opposition and rebel groups as agents of foreign intelligence services and mercenaries. In the following example, from speech number
(1), he said that:

\textit{alnas albimšu yṯalafu ma\' alḡabaha alṯūriah wa la ǧairaha dil ... 'umala wa murtazaqa.}

\textit{The people who go and ally with the Revolutionary Front [a coalition of resistance armed forces] or else... are intelligence agents and mercenaries.}

7-Apparent Honesty Move

This strategy is used to disclaim possible negative statements by giving the impression that the speaker is not hiding the truth (van Dijk, \textit{Ideological Discourse} 38). Al-Bashir used the strategy several times in his speeches, for example, in speech number (1) he pointed out that:

\textit{waḡhna alš'ab alsudani bilhaqaīq.}

\textit{We confronted the Sudanese people with the truths.}

8-Warnings

Warnings are used to ‘demonize the other’ and present him/her in a negative way (van Dijk, \textit{Ideological Discourse} 40). Al-Bashir resorted to use warnings in the speeches that coincided with military operations. In the wake of South Sudan’s attack on Heglieg, he issued vehement warnings in speech number (1):

\textit{wa niḥna shibir min baldana ma bindihu wa zaman qulnaha albimid yaduh 'ala alsudan binaqt'aha.}

\textit{We will not give a single hand’s span from our country, and we said it before, anyone who will extend his hand to Sudan we will cut it.}

In speech (1), Al-Bashir issued another warning to the Darfuri armed groups that refused to sign the Doha Peace Agreement (2011), when he said:

\textit{aldair yibṣum wa alma dair yilaqina fi almidan.}

\textit{The one who wants to mark it with a fingerprint can do so, and the one who does not want, can meet us in the battlefield.}

9-Irony

Irony is used to derogate the other (van Dijk, \textit{Politics, Ideology} 737). The OSP used irony sparsely. Throughout the corpus of the ten speeches, he used it twice in speech (1), to ridicule the head of SPLMN, Malik Agar after the government troops’ reconquest of Kurmuk town in 2011 when he pointed out that:

\textit{ana baqūl tamrud 'qar aḥsan 'maluh fi tariḥ ḥīatuh.}

\textit{I say Agar’s rebellion is the best of his deeds in the history of his life.}
10-Denial

Denials can serve the purpose of reversal of charges (van Dijk, *Discourse and Power* 140). Al-Bashir discussed the economic problem that his government faces, and acknowledged its existence, but blamed other unnamed entities as being behind it in speech number (7), he claimed that:

**wa qulna wallahi fi muškila. muškila iqtisadia wa m’ruf asbabaha.**

*We said, by God, there is a problem. Economic problem and its reasons are known.*

After the eruption of the popular protests, the regime resorted to brutal force to suppress it and killed many protesters. The OSP denied the involvement of his security organs in the violence and accused what he called ‘the vandals’ of the crime. He also accused them of destruction of public properties in speech number (8) that was aired two months before his fall:

**wa almuẖarbin ithḏuha furṣa. hum alli ḥarqū wa hum alli damaru. wa hum min dahlil almuṯahrat biktulu almuṯahrīn.**

*And the vandals took it as an opportunity. They are the ones who burnt and destroyed, and they are the ones who kill protesters from inside the protests.*

11-Mitigation

Mitigation is a form of denial that minimizes an act or its impact (van Dijk, *Discourse and Power* 142). Al-Bashir downsized the brutal suppression of the protesters by claiming that the security forces dealt with them in what he called ‘a civilized way’ in speech (6):

**altaḥīa liqūat alamn wa alšurṭa alli it’amlu mu’amla ḥaḍria m’a almuṯahrīn.**

*Salute to security and police forces who dealt with the protesters in a civilized way.*

The OSP also tried to downsize the momentum of the popular protests in his last days by saying that ‘some youth’ took to the streets to ‘express themselves’ and not to demonstrate against him in speech (8):

**marqū ba’aḍ alšabab y’biru ḵan nafsahum.**

*Some youth went out to express themselves.*

12-Negative comparison

In negative comparisons, a speaker may emphasize the bad qualities of the other group by comparing them to a negative concept or object (van Dijk, *Ideological Discourse* 39). Al-Bashir compared the rebels to mice in speech number (1), when he stated that:

**haṣrnahum zī alfīran fī qimum aljībal.**

*We besieged them like mice at the summits of the mountains.*
In the same speech he continued his attack on the leader of SPLMN, Malik Agar. He expressed his discomfort with having to deal with Agar and compared him to a festering wound on the back of a donkey when he said:

lanhu kan qaʿid liṅa zī aldabarah.
Because he was sitting to us like a festering wound on the back of a donkey.

13-Actor description
The OSP used three forms of the pronoun ‘we’ in Sudanese Colloquial Arabic which are: niḥna, iḥna, aniḥna
He employed it 48 times in his speeches. He also used the pronoun ‘I’ 9 times. Moreover, he referred to his opponents with the expression ‘those people’ 10 times and ‘people’ 4 times. Both terms were used to distance himself from the outgroup:

alnas dīl.
Those people.

Alnas
People
The OSP ridiculed the use of social media in political resistance activities. He referred to the protesters who were active on the different social media platforms by calling them ‘people of the keyboard’ and ‘people of the WhatsApp’ in speech number (10) that was the last he delivered before his fall:

ārd rūʿinaha biadam wa tirbnaha bīǧt alšūhada …ma binslimha linas alkeyboard ma binslmha linas alwahtsapp.
A land that we quenched with blood and sow with the bodies of the martyrs...we will not surrender it to the keyboard people, nor we will surrender it to the WhatsApp people.

14-Counterfactuals
The OSP used counterfactual arguments to encourage his audience to imagine what it would be like if they are in the situation of the refugees who came to the country. Also, he employed the strategy as an implicit warning of the future of the country if the protests escalated. In speech number (6) he stated that:

lau ḥaṣal likum dah ya ǧama’ah la qadar Allah ḥatmašū wain? ḥatabqū laǧyin?
If this happened to you, people, may God forbid, where would you go? Would you become refugees?
15-Generalization:

Generalization is the ‘extension of the characteristics or activities of a specific or specifiable group of people to a much more general and open-ended set’ (Teo 16). Usually, speakers tend to generalize negative qualities on all the members of an outgroup. For instance, Al-Bashir used the move in speech (2) to express his exasperation with the Southern Sudanese government when he said:

*nas ma bi‘aū aldars. ma bifihmū.*

*People who do not understand the lesson. They do not comprehend.*

Al-Bashir used to portray the opposition leaders as leading a luxurious life and staying at hotels outside of the country. In speech (4) he referred to the opposition leaders who fled the country due to his regime incursion by claiming that they ‘sold the country’ projecting the negative image of a group of mercenaries that are ready to sell themselves:

*alnas alqa‘dīn fī alfanadiq barah. hum ba‘ū albalad bīšūiat dollarat.*

*The people who are staying at the hotels abroad. They sold the country for a few dollars.*

16- Telling a story

In speech (9), Al-Bashir narrated a story about an international expert who travelled to South Kordofan as a part of a fact-finding mission investigating genocide crimes.

17-Presuppositions

Presuppositions are often used ‘to assume the truth of some propositions when such truth is not established at all’ (van Dijk, *Politics, Ideology* 739). In his blasting of the country’s opposition and rebel groups, the OSP used to portray them as an unemployed group of people who leads a lavish life and are financed by foreign governments to put hurdles in front of his government. In speech (4) he noted that:

*alnas alqa‘dīn fī alfanadiq barah wa qa‘dīn y‘labū fī altinis.*

*The people who are staying at hotels abroad and who are playing tennis.*

Moreover, in speech (8) he used the strategy to attack the international aid agencies:

*tqa‘dū fī mu‘skrat allāqyin yūgūm alḥūāqat ydūkūm būaqi akilm. ytaḡrū bikūm.*

*You would sit in the refugee camps and the Westerners would come to you and give you the remnants of their food. They would trade you.*

18-Evidentiality

The OSP employed evidentiality to bolster his denial of the involvement of his regime
in killing the protesters in speech (8). He alleged that the security forces arrested members of the rebel group Sudan Liberation Movement (al Nur), who admitted that they were involved in the killing of protesters.

\[
\text{i'trafū inh hum ūağibhum wa t'limathum wa tūğiahthum yḥṣū almuṭahrat 'ṣan yağigū alsira' wa 'ṣan yftinū.}
\]

They confessed that their duty, orders, and directions are to join the protests to inflame the conflict and to conspire.

19-Hyperboles

Al-Bashir used hyperboles frequently, for example, in speech (1), he referred to the pressure they put on the SPLMN by claiming that:

\[
n'ām 'ṣaranahum wa hazmhahum wa damrnahum.
\]

Yes we squeezed them and we defeated them and we destroyed them.

20- Negative Lexicalization

The use of negative lexicalization is evident in the speeches of the former president. In many instances he referred to the SPLM using the term /ḥšrat/ insects and the opposition leaders with the negative words /ḥūnah/, /ʿumala/ and /murtazqah/ i.e., traitors, intelligence agents, and mercenaries.

21-Polarization

Al-Bashir used to categorize people in an ingroup and outgroup as the case in speech (2), where he described his ingroup as true believers and the others as the infidels. The following examples from the speech are widely used by members of the Muslim Brotherhood and are additional indications of the OSP’s affiliation with the group.

\[
\text{qtlana fī alǧanah wa qtlahum fī alnar.}
\]

Our dead are in heaven and their dead are in hell.

\[
\text{wa Allahu mūlana wa la mūlā lahum.}
\]

And Allah is our lord, and they don’t have a lord.

6.2. The Portrayal of both groups in the OSP’s speeches

By using the different discourse strategies, Al-Bashir aimed at representing both groups in specific ways. The in-group was portrayed in a positive way and their positive qualities are highlighted. He represented them as: (a) very committed Muslims, who are affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and are defending and spreading Islam and are protected by Allah; (b) are pursuing development projects in the country; (c) are a peace-loving group, and when provoked they are patriots who defend the country and
exit victorious from battles; (d) they adhere to Sudanese traditions and noble manners, and they honour their signed agreements; (e) are hospitable and generous and welcome refugees from other countries; and (f) they protect protesters and property and when needed suppress them in 'a civilized manner'.

On the other hand, he portrayed the outgroup negatively by accentuating their unfavourable attributes. He portrayed them as: (a) infidels, non-believers, and enemies of Allah; (b) impeding the country’s development projects; (c) warmongers who lose all the battles they fight; (d) traitors, mercenaries, agents of foreign intelligence agencies, and unemployed who are financially dependent on foreign countries; (e) want to destabilize the country and send the Sudanese as refugees to other countries; and (f) killing protesters and damaged and burnt private and public property.

6.3. The Differences in the Frequencies of Discursive Structures in the Speeches:

The results of the analysis of the study data showed that there are differences between the frequencies of the discourse structures used in the speeches before the popular uprising and in those delivered during the revolution. It showed that the OSP maximized the use of certain strategies and minimized reliance on others. Table number (3) shows the differences in the frequencies of the discourse structures in the speeches used before and during the uprising.

Table (3): The Strategy Types and Frequencies in the 10 Speeches

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Speech No.</th>
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<th>Strategies</th>
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<td>US</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>US 15 13 14 9 1 18 17 5 11 3 27 10 1 4 29 14</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

The gathered data showed that there is an increase in the number of national self-glorification in the two periods, where the OSP employed the strategy twice before
the uprising and 13 times during the protests. It also, revealed that victimization was used 17 times during the uprising, while it was employed only 6 times before that. The denials increased from 2 before the uprising to 11 during it. Mitigation increased during the uprising and reached 59 times during the revolution compared to 10 before it; in addition to the increase of the number of counterfactuals from 3 to 10.

The use of negative other presentation decreased during the revolution when it was employed 14 times compared to 28 times before the revolt. The warnings were also reduced as it was resorted to 3 times during the revolution and 8 times before that. The irony was not used at all in the speeches during the uprising, while it was used twice in the period before the uprising. Negative comparisons were not issued at all during the uprising, while they were used twice before it. The actor descriptions decreased dramatically, as the OSP used the different forms of ‘we’ 41 times before the uprising and used it only 3 times during the uprising. Generalizations decreased from 7 to 1. Hyperboles denoting ‘us’ decreased from 11 to 0, and polarizations from 7 to 1.

During the protests’ period, the OSP used less negative other presentations, warnings, irony, negative comparisons, generalizations, polarizations, and hyperboles denoting ‘us’ to achieve several goals. It seems that he wanted to ease the rising tensions in the country due to the escalating economic crisis and civil unrest. The reduction of the use of these strategies could be closely associated with his desire to stop provoking protestors in such delicate times. Moreover, Al-Bashir may wanted to appear more reconciliatory and wanted to reflect the image of a just leader who keeps an equal distance from all.

On the other hand, the OSP used more instances of national self-glorification, victimization, denial, mitigation, and counterfactual during the popular protests period. The increase could be attributed to his plan to pacify the protests by highlighting factors that unite the whole nation such as its history, traditions, …etc. The use of denials and mitigations were employed to help him relieve himself and his government from the failure to run the country. The counterfactuals were used as a strategy to assist his audience to anticipate the consequences of the protests and as a warning against the destabilization of the country.

7. Conclusions

This study investigated the portrayal of the self and the other in ten speeches of the Ousted Sudanese President. It employed van Dijk’s (Ideological Discourse 13-45; Ideology and Discourse Analysis 115-140; Discourse and Power) discursive strategies to examine the OSP’s use of those strategies to represent the “in-group” and the “out-group”. Moreover, it probed the change in his choice and frequency of strategies due to the escalating revolt. The study employed a qualitative and quantitative approach to analyze its data.
The results of the study showed that Al-Bashir used 21 discursive strategies to represent his in-group in a favorable way and to portray the out-group in a negative manner. It also revealed that there is a change in the strategy types and frequencies that the former president used before and during the uprising that could be attributed to his intention to pacify the protests and to distance his government from its causes.

The current study could be replicated using other tools and approaches. Speeches from earlier periods could be studied to find out the changes that occurred to the OSP’s topics, style, and identity presentation. Al-Bashir speeches that are delivered in Modern Standard Arabic could also be incorporated or investigated separately. The researcher noticed the OSP’s spacious use of repetition, figurative language, and cohesive devices that could also be investigated.

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لجنة التأليف والتعريب والنشر

 الجامعة الكويت
 مجلس النشر العلمي

 نشأت لجنة التأليف والتعريب والنشر تحت تنفيذ مجلس النشر العلمي بجامعة الكويت في عام 1976.

* أهداف اللجنة:
1. توزيع دائرة النشر العلمي وتصدر التخصصات العلمية لأعضاء هيئة التدريس في جامعة الكويت.
2. إنشاء المكتبة الكويتية بالكتب والمؤلفات العلمية والتخصائصية واللغوية وكتب الطابع الإسلامي باللغات العربية و الأجنبية.
3. دعم وتهذيب عملية التوزيع التي تعد من الأهداف الرئيسية التي تعمق عليها الإجماع العربي.

* مهام اللجنة:
 طبع ونشر المؤلفات العلمية والدرازية والأكاديمية وكتب جامعة الكويت باللغة العربية. طبع المؤلفات باللغة العربية والإنجليزية، وترجمة المؤلفات. توزيع ونشر الأعمال العلمية. توزيع المؤلفات العلمية على_TYPED طباعات أخرى. ونشر المؤلفات في اللغة العربية في الجامعات العربية. ونشر المؤلفات في الكليات العربية. ونشر المؤلفات في الكليات العربية. ونشر المؤلفات في الكليات العربية.

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