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Hamas' Media Discourse in the Government

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Hamas' Media Discourse in the Government

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- 3 - A chapter published in a book entitled Palestinian Perspective. The chapter is entitled "Freedom of expression in Palestine: Reality and future challenges". (1999).
- 4 - Two chapters in a book entitled Population Communication, published by An-Najah National University in co-operation with UNFPA. The first chapter is entitled "The concept of population communication", and the second "Obstacles on population communication". (2004).
- 5 - "The use of Internet by the student of journalism at An-Najah National University in developing their journalistic abilities". To appear in Journal of Humanities, the Islamic University in Gaza, Palestine, 2012.

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Abstract

In recent years, international attention has become increasingly focused on Hamas, as a nascent and increasingly influential Palestinian political movement. Hamas has historically charted a path of political and ideological resistance to the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian Territories as a central platform of its agenda. As such, it has refused political settlement, since its members consider that an occupied nation has the right to chose all forms of resistance against its occupier.

International interest increased in Hamas after it won the legislative elections for the Palestinian Authority in 2006. This is the same Authority that signed the Oslo Agreement with Israel in 1993, and one which chose political settlement as a means to resolve the conflict. As such, when Hamas formed the Tenth Government, a very complex situation was created, that is: A Palestinian Authority Government was formed whose charter was based on rejecting the very agreement that created it for the purpose of ending the conflict by peaceful means.

Many political commentators concluded that Hamas would change its approach after being elected, and that it would become more politically moderate. Many also thought that Hamas would accept the existence of Israel, thus abandoning an agenda of continued political resistance, and would instead opt for political settlement. None of these things have happened. Hamas has instead insisted on its traditional political positions, which some regard as the bases for recent and ongoing crises in the Palestinian political arena.

At the same time, many writers, politicians, and media observers have reported that a discernible discursive shift has occurred both in relation to Hamas operations as a movement and as the national government. Some have characterized the shift as a deliberate signal from Hamas to the Western countries, especially the United States and Israel, that Hamas is now a political force that cannot be ignored in any efforts to solve the Palestine-Israel conflict.

In this study, I examine certain discursive strategies used by Hamas Government's representatives as they are reported in the media. Central findings from this analysis include the presence of overlap between discourses of the movement and the Government, and a relative flexibility in the Government's discourse compared to that of the movement. I argue

that the Hamas Government has had only limited success in adopting a discourse appropriate for its status as a “government”. Finally, I contend that the Government does not have sufficient discursive space to develop as a government due to the enormous political pressures and challenges it currently faces.

Introduction

In his *Media Encyclopedia*, Muhammad Muneer Hijab (2003) defines "discourse" as an "expression of ideas with words." He further describes the notion of media discourse, as "a collection of meanings and ideas expressed by the subjects in a newspaper through various journalistic arts". The same reference refers to "journalistic discourse" or "media discourse" more specifically as "a collection of mental images the creator of the media message is keen to include according to his/her language preferences and cognitive experience by which he or she measures speech."⁽¹⁾ According to *Media Dictionary and Mass Communication* by James Watson, "the analysis of discourses is central to the study of media, which is essentially about how TEXTS are encoded and how the MEANING of those texts, operating within and influenced by contexts, is decoded".⁽²⁾

The research presented in this paper is not intended to judge political positions, ideologies, or policies adopted by certain parties. Instead, I discuss the journalistic choices of expressions and terms used in reporting about Hamas. The research focuses on the broad debate that took place after Hamas entered the legislative elections in 2006 where a large number of politicians and educated elite debated the possibility of a dramatic change in Hamas' political positions in a way that can be read via media discourse. As it is well known, Hamas opposed the Oslo agreement and refused to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Palestinian Authority, primarily because Hamas members felt that it undermined claims for Palestinian statehood. Nevertheless, in 2005, Hamas officials decided to participate in the election process, and won the elections in 2006. This research intends to examine the ways in which media discourses around the time of Hamas election reflected changes in its stance from being in opposition to being a part of the political system of the Palestinian Authority. The research presented here appears to confirm that when Hamas formed the tenth Palestinian Government, it started to present itself as the Government of the Palestinian Authority. In discursive terms, this shift is evident through an examination of the ways in which the media reported Hamas handling of different issues in

accordance with its official title as the Government, rather than as a movement. Studies have been undertaken which examine media discourses about Hamas as a movement. However, as far as I am aware, none has investigated how the media have reported Hamas as a Government.

Research by Zeyad Othman and Ghazi Bani Oudeh has analyzed the media discourse of Fatah and Hamas movements, and the performance of the Palestinian media specifically regarding the internal Palestinian issues. The researchers concluded that the media played the role of an inciter and was used as a tool in the conflict between the two movements.⁽³⁾ In an unpublished Master's thesis by Moeen Koa titled "Hamas' Communicative Message: Strategy, Tactic, Channels, and Efficiency," the researcher discussed the public relations of Hamas to win the legislative elections, and the religious discourse that influenced its media discourse. Koa focused on Hamas' unrealistic discourse, and on attacking other factions.⁽⁴⁾ In a study by the Initiative for Global Dialogue and Democracy (MIFTAH) about the performance of Palestine TV, which belongs to the Palestinian Presidency, and that of Al-Aqsa TV, which belongs to Hamas, the focus was on the incitement role of the media discourses in the internal Palestinian affairs. Researchers recommended reforming these influential media institutions in accordance with media professionalism and national interest.⁽⁵⁾

In analyzing media discourses, this study utilizes a descriptive method, that is to say, a qualitative analysis of the content. In other words, by analyzing media content in this research, it is aimed to shed light on the stances of the Hamas Government, and the way it expressed those stances, towards various issues, among which the Fatah movement and the Palestinian Authority. It is believed that the discourse reflects the whether there was a change in the view points of Hamas towards such issues, taking into consideration the social context within which the discourses circulate. Moreover, in an effort to explain the reasons behind, and the circumstances of, such discourses, I conducted a number of interviews with three different personalities directly connected to the media discourse of the Hamas' Government.

This study surveyed Hamas' statements, both as a Government and as a movement, since the forming of the tenth Government through

May, 2008. I collected original texts of such statements from the Prime Minister's office in Gaza, in addition to a number of statements published in the media, especially on the Internet, namely, the website for *Alhayah Aljadidah*, for ease of browsing its pages. Samples of the texts related to the subject of this study were chosen and used in the analysis, in accordance with the requirements of the qualitative analysis. I believe that anyone who follows the Palestinian cause, especially the statements and positions of Hamas, can understand its media discourse as that of a Palestinian Islamic resistance movement. In other words, firstly, Hamas adopts "resistance" as a strategic choice in opposing the occupation, according to what the movement has asserted repeatedly, and that it does not espouse politics or negotiations to settle the Palestinian issue, at least as of now in the light of the prevailing political conditions. Secondly, Hamas adopts the Islamic ideology as a way of life and a framework that defines its actions. This, of course, controls its political positions and its dealings with the various parties and the way it views events.⁽⁶⁾ Thirdly, Hamas is a domestic, 'Palestinian' movement that operates within this framework. For this reason, Hamas has maintained a distance from internal Arab matters declaring its positions not being subject to any outside interference. It is very important to separate what Hamas does from the agendas of Islamic movements, or some Arab countries like Iran or Syria.⁽⁷⁾ It is important to understand these three pillars which represent the framework in which Hamas operates in order to understand its media discourse and the changes affecting this discourse according to the different phases the movement undergoes, which may repeat in the future.

Hamas' media discourse appeared as if it had undergone some changes after it won the legislative elections on January 25, 2006, and as it formed the Tenth Government. Perhaps interest in this movement which adopts resistance as a strategic choice against the occupation, had increased as a natural response to its ascension to power pursuant to its election win, not because of an essential change in its positions and so in its media discourse,⁽⁸⁾ where Hamas suddenly became under the microscope and its media discourse became the subject of controversy locally, regionally, and internationally. This situation raised an important question for Hamas to answer clearly and frankly: Would it continue to define itself in terms of well established discourses defining

their political stance? Or would it adopt a new one? And would the new discourse dictate a change in its political positions? Or simply a leeway allowed by political flexibility that does not affect the principal positions?

It is important to look at Hamas' ability to distinguish between the discourse of the movement and that of the Government it formed. This distinction is very important because traditionally Hamas' discourse represents the movement only. It does not represent other factions nor does it speak for the people.⁽⁹⁾ On the other hand, the Government's position is supposed to represent the people, the political system and the PA's policies, or at least, the positions that represent the Palestinian majority and its national interest.

Needless to say, there are a number of governments that mix between positions of the parties and those of the governments they form. This clearly indicates the tight control parties exercise on the governments they form by not giving them the freedom to administer the state in a manner that does not fully comply with the parties' vision or without their direct supervision. This does not necessarily mean that is the case in Palestine. What is important here is the focus on Hamas' ability to distinguish between the discourse that represents the movement and the one that represents the government formed by Hamas, which is supposed to represent all Palestinians.

This study poses a number of questions for Hamas to ponder in the future. Such ideas are concerned with its media discourse, and more specifically with the government it formed. The study also suggests approaches for future research dealing with this subject, such as analyzing the opinions of the audiences who receive and react to this discourse in different ways. People's opinions and directions are considered important indications of the success or failure of the discourse.

Hamas and its Government had to deal with many issues based on its ideology, its vision and its political agenda. This research discusses aspects of its discourse related to the following issues:

- 1 - Fatah and the Palestinian Presidency.
- 2 - The internal situation in the West Bank after the military resolution.
- 3 - The internal situation in Gaza after the military resolution.

- 4 - The peace process.
- 5 - The relationship with Israel.
- 6 - The relationship with the United States.
- 7 - The relationship with the European Union.
- 8 - The relationship with Arab countries.

To understand how this research deals with the above aspects, the following questions are posed:

- 1 - Did the Hamas Government media discourse represent the entire Palestinian people? Or was it primarily influenced by the movement? And to what extent was it influenced?
- 2 - What is the extent of the overlap between Hamas' (as a movement) discourse and that of its Government?
- 3 - How did Hamas Government deal with the peace process which created the Palestinian Authority?
- 4 - Was Hamas able to reconcile the PA and resistance in its Government's media discourse?
- 5 - How balanced was the media discourse of Hamas' Government towards Fatah and Hamas as movements?
- 6 - What was the discourse adopted by Hamas' Government towards the United States and Israel? Towards the European Union? And how flexible was it in its discourse towards the countries that helped lay the siege against its Government and isolate it internationally?

The hypotheses of the study

To further understand the nature of Hamas Government discourse, this research puts forward the following hypotheses:

- a - Hamas was not able to separate the movement's discourse from that of the Government. Thus, the Government's discourse was a repeat of the movement's, where the Government sometimes spoke representing the movement, and the movement sometimes spoke representing the Government.
- b - Hamas Government's attitude was hostile to the Palestinian Presidency and Fatah due to the conflict that ensued after its election victory in 2006.
- c - Hamas Government's media discourse did not show any flexibility towards the peace process due to its umbilical connection to Hamas the movement and its political positions.
- d - Hamas Government's media discourse towards Israel and the United States was hostile and it did not reflect any kind of diplomacy.
- e - Hamas Government's media discourse towards the European Union was more balanced due to the EU's sympathy with the Palestinian people. However, this discourse was not free of criticism due to the EU's participation role in the siege against the Government.
- f - Hamas Government's media discourse was reactive rather than proactive as a natural response to the siege and targeting the movement after its election victory.
- g - Hamas Government's media discourse towards Arab countries was measured, in keeping with the discourse Hamas, the movement, maintained in its foreign policy.
- h - Hamas' Government adopted a justification discourse regarding the events in Gaza while its discourse towards the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank was hostile due to the events taking place there.

In arriving at these hypotheses, I relied on the following givens:

- 1 - For the first time, Hamas participated in the Palestinian Authority, whether the legislature or the government. This means lack of prior experience in that field. This also means that the overlap between the positions of the movement and the Government was expected, and that separation between the two discourses was not easy.
- 2 - Hamas' positions were based on a religious ideology that cannot be easily changed, as its charter reveals. This controlled its relationships, especially with Israel. It also controlled the policies of the Government it formed.
- 3 - Hamas' Government was subjected to a stifling siege and political isolation. Such a political reality constitutes pressure that will lead to influencing its political positions and media discourse.
- 4 - Hamas is a Palestinian resistance movement and it draws its policies towards other countries from that perspective. This means that its relationships with other countries are determined by those countries policies toward the Palestinian issue, and how they perceive the principle of resistance against the Israeli occupation, which was reflected in its Government's discourse.

Fatah and the Palestinian Presidency

Hamas' legislative elections victory constituted a watershed in its relationship with the Palestinian Presidency and Fatah, where Hamas rise to power was a clear threat to Fatah's power and its continuation to lead the Palestinian people. Despite the fact that such a relationship did not undergo any problems in the beginning, tensions escalated until they peaked during the military confrontations in Gaza in June 2007, which led to Hamas' total military control of the Gaza Strip. These developments were accompanied by sharp discourse by both parties. In this study, I do not compare the two discourses of Fatah and Hamas, but rather analyze the discourse of Hamas' Government in an attempt to evaluate it, citing some examples of it. Future studies should investigate Fatah's discourse in the same period for the purpose of assessing the discourse of this rival party of Hamas.

To begin with, it is important to note the existence of a number of examples of Hamas' discourse that clearly indicate it was dealing with the Palestinian Presidency as if it was still in opposition.⁽¹⁰⁾ An overlap was clearly present in the discourse of Hamas the movement and its Government. There are justifications for that, the least of which is that Hamas was not able to easily transform from opposition to being in power, and the most obvious explanation is that the Palestinian Presidency had usurped many of the Government's authorities.

In Hamas movement's discourse, we see that Khaled Mish'al, Chairman of the Political Bureau, had waged a sharp attack against the Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in the period predating forming Hamas Government, accusing him of seeking to undermine the Government by usurping its authorities.⁽¹¹⁾ Immediately, in an attempt to separate Hamas' discourse from that of its Government, Dr. Naser Edeen Alsha'er, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Education, said that "Khaled Mish'al, Chairman of the Political Bureau of Hamas, represents Hamas, the movement, not the Government, and that there is a clear separation between the two." Alsha'er added that the Government had its own obligations, explaining that Mish'al's speech did not necessarily represent the Government. In a statement characterized by

calm, Alsha'er called for restraint and working together. He called upon all parties to restrain their statements, explaining the daunting tasks, the overwhelming occupation, and the international siege. Alsha'er rejected all statements and counter statements, calling all Palestinians to abandon such tactics and focus on the big Palestinian concerns.⁽¹²⁾

Dr. Ghazi Hamad explained the difference between the discourses of Hamas and its Government, saying that "In respect to the relationship with the President, Hamas' discourse was at times somewhat acute, while we, in the Government, maintained a good relationship with the Presidency."⁽¹³⁾

The relationship with Fatah and the Palestinian Presidency was subject to ongoing political developments in the Palestinian arena. No doubt that the difficulties Hamas faced after forming the Government, especially the confrontation with the Presidency, were reflected in its media discourse. The Government was drawn into the media quarrel with Fatah whenever accusations were exchanged. Dr. Ghazi Hamad responded to what the spokesman for Fatah's parliamentary bloc, Azzam Al-Ahmad, when the latter criticized a speech by Prime Minister Ismael Haneyeh, saying: "It is regrettable that Representative Al-Ahmad issues statements designed to create negative atmosphere, that are full of accusations, cynicism, and transgressions without any rights to do so. Such language was not helpful for national reconciliation, narrowing the gap in viewpoints, or promoting dialogue."⁽¹⁴⁾ Despite being calm, this response went beyond the usual political quarrel. Dr. Hamad explained that there were times when he had to respond to statements and accusations by leaders in the Fatah movement.⁽¹⁵⁾ This attitude was reiterated by the Prime Minister, Ismael Haneyeh, commenting on a speech by President Mahmoud Abbas, saying: "President Abbas' speech was not a unifying one, rather it was inciting, cynical, and underestimating the steadfastness and resistance of the great, heroic Palestinian people, that we bow in respect for its resistance, martyrs, sacrifices, and pains, for its long, and great history, and for this people inside and in the Diaspora, which is a cause of pride for the Arab and Muslim nation, and all freedom-loving people in the world."⁽¹⁶⁾

However, this was not always the case of the Hamas discourse towards Fatah and the Presidency, as it was sometimes characterized by

calm and reconciliation. In response to news published in the Israeli newspaper *Ma'arif* that Hamas wanted to assassinate Abu Mazen, Adnan Asfour, one of Hamas' officials said that "President Abbas is the president of the Palestinian Authority. He is well respected by all our people. Hamas deals with him as an elected President despite our differences with him in some issues."⁽¹⁷⁾

Hamas Government's discourse revealed a weak position to the Abu Mazens Presidency when he started depriving it of its authority. In a statement issued by the office of the Prime Minister, we find the premiership calling for "the 'concerned parties' to disburse the 100 million dollars received from the Israeli Government in accordance with the Palestinian needs and priorities, especially to pay the salaries of security services."⁽¹⁸⁾ A speech that includes such terms as 'calling for', and 'appealing to', clearly indicates that such government does not have the necessary authorities making it not much different from being in the opposition. Similarly, the Prime Minister criticized the Palestinian Presidency and the security forces belonging to it in the context of political wrangling resulting from withdrawing the Government's authorities. In a statement, the Prime Minister said that "the security forces that belong to the Presidency have no authority to be involved in internal security..," and that its presence in the streets of Gaza "undermines the duties of the Ministry of Interior." He stressed that "the Ministry of Interior must be granted the authorities specified in the Constitution."⁽¹⁹⁾

After that, especially after the political division, the Government's statements indicated some sort of a confrontation with the Presidency. This, of course, is directly related to the divided Palestinian realities, politically and geographically. Typically, such confrontations occur behind the scenes, where the dangers of their effect on public opinion are very clear. Additionally, such statements might be acceptable from a movement, but not from a government. The harsh level of rhetoric of the discourse addressed towards the Presidency is evident. In a statement, the ousted Government in Gaza "condemned the positions of President Abbas in normalizing relations with the Israeli occupation for free."⁽²⁰⁾ Such rhetoric clearly shows that Hamas Government acts as an opposition front rather than being the real ruler. Using such acute approach towards the President of the Palestinian Authority represents

the depth of the crisis between Hamas and Fatah, as a consequence of the internal strife.

This discourse coincides with that of Hamas, the movement. Fowzi Barhoum, spokesman for Hams said: "The Olmert-Abbas meetings are nothing but a game and a waste of time. It is ordered by the US to buy more time to keep the Palestinian and international public opinion busy with such futile meetings to pass surrendering agendas planned and implemented by the American Administration and the Israeli Occupation within the framework of establishing the Jewish state on the usurped Palestinian lands and canceling all rights of the Palestinian people."⁽²¹⁾

The ousted Government repeated this sharp criticism of the Presidency a few days later, responding to the Presidents statements that there were ongoing communications between Hamas and Israel. The ousted Government expressed "amazement and condemnation of the statements made by President Mahmoud Abbas claims about communications between the Government and the Israeli occupation. We assert that we have never had any communication with the Israeli side regarding the political or living conditions areas. Such statements come in the context of a cover-up of the futile meetings with Olmert and Barak against the backdrop of the blood of our people."⁽²²⁾ This indicates that the Government was accusing President Abbas of defaming it.

The condemnations and statements such as "the futile meetings with Olmert and Barak against the backdrop of the blood of our people" implies a high degree of escalation in the discourse, even though Hamas considers that it was Abbas who started the escalation by accusing it of having contacts with Israel. Statements of condemnations for President Abbas did not come after the military resolution in Gaza; rather, it represented Hamas' approach to anything that went against the principle of resistance, even during the reign of Hamas' Government. A statement by the Information Office of Hamas attacking President Abbas' criticism of the rockets fired in Gaza towards the Israeli territories, said that: "we in Hamas, are amazed at this demand [to stop the rocket attacks], which neglects the daily Israeli massacres against the Palestinian people. It further portrays the crisis created by the Israeli occupation as if its a crisis of missiles fired by the resistance factions, when it comes as a means to defend Gaza. We had wished that the President would ask the factions to

unite to resist the continuing Zionist onslaught, instead of asking to stop the missiles."⁽²³⁾ The positions of the ousted Government continued, where it accused President Abu Mazen of the responsibility for closing Rafah Terminal. It said that he aimed at pressuring the people in Gaza to achieve political goals. A statement by the ousted Government asserted "the need to consolidate all national efforts to pressure President Abbas to permit opening Rafah Terminal, especially since the majority of them indicate Abu Mazen's desire to continue closing the Terminal to pressure people and to blackmail them to achieve political gains in his conflict with Hamas."⁽²⁴⁾

In another context, we find the ousted Government accusing other officials in the Palestinian Authority, such as Yaser Abed Rabbo, of seeking to "undermine the sincere efforts to end the internal crisis. These people try to add to the crisis and incite the discord within the ranks of our people, in coordination with the American and Israeli efforts to prevent any internal Palestinian convergence." It named Abed Rabbo as one of the Palestinian leaderships who "insists on meeting and befriending the Israeli occupation and sells illusions to our people about the negotiations, while he even rejects dialogue among the people."⁽²⁵⁾

The media war between Hamas and Fatah escalated after the military resolution to the point that the Government in Gaza announced its intention to present documents that would incriminate senior officials in the Palestinian Authority for their role in corruption. A statement issued by the ousted Government indicated that "the caretaker Government (in Gaza) was in the process of compiling documents, that incriminate some officials and senior figures within the Palestinian Authority, especially within the leadership of the security forces, who are accused of usurping properties and lands belonging to the Palestinian people. Consequently, legal measures and arrangements will be taken to present these documents to the proper legal authorities to begin pursuing these people to retrieve monies and properties that belong to the Palestinian people."⁽²⁶⁾

Despite what could be described as negative discourse coming from the Hamas Government towards the Presidency of the PA, it is noteworthy to point out that there were times of what could be characterized as positive rhetoric calling for national unity. A statement

on the Eid festival called upon "the media to concentrate on points of agreement, and to stay away from contentious issues, and to instill a spirit of unity within the Palestinian body which was ravaged by internal strife that the Israeli media tries to incite. Media reconciliation and stopping incitement is the first step towards political and comprehensive national reconciliation. The Government hopes that this festival will be a true unity festival embodied by our people to confront those who incite division and discord, and those who resent national harmony and a consensus with which we confront the occupation, its plans, aggressions, and terrorism."⁽²⁷⁾

In its early days, the Government appeared as it should be, representing the whole Palestinian people through its unbiased discourse. Prime Minister, Ismael Haneyeh, called upon leaders in "Fatah" and "Hamas" to take a leadership role and end the incidents, stressing that "the Government will not permit a civil war or any internal Palestinian strife, as it will take the responsibility to end the tension."⁽²⁸⁾

With respect to the Government's position towards the discourse, especially as it relates to the internal affairs, Minister of Information, Dr. Yousef Rizqah said in a statement in front of the Legislative Council that "the Government is concerned about the freedom of press, as we reject threats, intellectual terrorism, and the language of incitement and mistrust."⁽²⁹⁾ This is considered a balanced discourse that represents a non-biased Government, notwithstanding the occasional Government's violating some of these standards. The spokesman for Hamas' Government commented on this approach stating that he and the Government eschew political quarrels between Hamas and Fatah, and deal with the subject in a rational, and objective way to bring together the viewpoints, and express the Government's policies in a balanced manner.⁽³⁰⁾ In sum, Dr. Ghazi Hamad explained some of the sharp statements against the Presidency and Fatah by saying: "Regretfully, the Tenth Government's media discourse was characterized by tension, incitement, confrontation, and reactions..." because of the "internal pressure" which created "the usage of sharp terms and media discourse."⁽³¹⁾

The media discourse regarding the internal matters on the West Bank

The Hamas Government's discourse towards the West Bank emerged after the Hamas take-over in Gaza. Thereafter, the ousted Government delved into the conditions on the West Bank and Gaza in its media statements. Needless to say, many excesses occurred on both sides, which left the door wide open for Fatah and Hamas to criticize each other, and to cite such excesses in the media quarrel and accusations. One can see that the media quarrel was not born with the military resolution; rather, it predated it since the formation of what came to be known as "Hamas' Government." Before the military resolution, the Government criticized decisions of the Palestinian President regarding hirings new employees. A Government statement read as follows: "Office of the Prime Minister is amazed at the timing and the manner in which the Office of the Presidency reinstated hiring decisions made by the Office of the Prime Minister. We are treating this matter with great amazement as it comes at unprecedented charged times between the Presidency and the Premiership about the political situation and the national unity Government, which makes us question the timing and the manner in which this subject was presented to the media where the current Government did not hire more than 150 people in all ministries, many of whom were on contracts pending assignment."⁽³²⁾ This indicates the depth of the crisis between the Presidency and the Government, and the feeling by the Government that it holds no sway, despite its legitimacy both politically and legally. It also indicates that differences were not solved behind the scenes, which forced the Government to come out in public to express these differences.

The same discourse continued after the military resolution, in an amplified fashion, where the same policies continued whether those of the Hamas Government or the Palestinian Presidency. Hamas accused Abu Mazen and the Government of Salam Fayyadh of pursuing a policy of employment deprivation, where "the government expresses its rejection of the return of employment based political affiliation by the Ramallah

Government and the return of what has been called the security clearance as a condition for employment, which translates into depriving anyone not affiliated with Fatah or the average citizen who has no political affiliation of a job in the education sector or any other position within the official institution"⁽³³⁾ In a sharp tone, the Government Committee for Communication and Journalists' Support condemned in a press release what it called "the PA's assailing of journalists in Hebron. It accused Fatah of lying about the questioning of a Palestine TV employee since the matter was not related to his job as a journalist and he was never placed under arrest."⁽³⁴⁾ In other words, Hamas discourse focused on the West Bank because the PA lost control in Gaza. The West Bank became the only territory under the PA. Hamas discourse continued with its critical approach towards the PA's ruling of the West Bank.

The media discourse regarding the internal affairs in Gaza

The discourse about Gaza's internal affairs was characterized by accusations that the security forces belonging to the Palestinian Presidency were behind the internal fighting and that the Government and Hamas were keen to provide security. The same discourse was also characterized by mixing between the authorities of the Government and those of Hamas. Despite the Government's attempts to appear as neutral mediating between Hamas and Fatah, the prevailing discourse was mainly critical of the Presidency, Fatah, and the security forces.

In the Government's attempts to play the role of a mediator, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Interior and National Security Forces, Khalid Abu Hilal, said that "Interior Minister Sa'eed Seyam had asked Hamas to turn over the suspects in the killing of a brigadier in the Intelligence Service who was killed few days earlier north of Gaza." In a press conference held in Gaza City, Abu Hilal added that "Minister Seyam asked Hamas to turn over the suspects to the Security Forces. Similarly, he had asked Fatah to turn over the killers of Dr. Abu 'Ajweh'." Abu Hilal explained that "security in the West Bank and Gaza will not prevail until both factions cooperate and lift the cover off anyone committing crimes in the Palestinian arena," dismissing the notion that the killings of the officers within the Security Forces was a conflict over positions within the Interior Ministry and stressing that past conflicts were between a political faction and a Security Force, not a conflict between the Security Forces and the Interior Ministry. Abu Hilal expressed hope that this page will be turned and that peace and stability will prevail in the Palestinian arena.⁽³⁵⁾ This kind of media discourse proves that the Government tried to present a balanced, unbiased discourse that is representative of the entire Palestinian people. However, it seems there were many other factors that prevented this from happening and led to the political and military polarizations in the camps of Hamas and Fatah, the Government or the Presidency. This led

to the Government's hostile discourse towards the Presidency, Fatah, and the Security Forces in Gaza's events.

In a speech by the ousted Prime Minister Ismael Haniyeh after the military resolution, he said that "the current Government (the ousted Government in Gaza) will continue to discharge its duties. I call upon my brethren in Hamas to declare a general amnesty and to protect the lives of citizens. All Security Forces (belonging to the ousted Government) must work to impose security and order in Gaza as an integral part of the Palestinian territories." In the same speech, Haniyeh said that the ousted Government started "dialogues with President Mahmoud Abbas and commanders of the Security Forces, but that there were always certain individuals headed by Rasheed Abu Shbak, Palestinian Internal Security chief, seeking to disrupt the Government's duties." Haniyeh accused "the Presidential Guards, National Security Forces, and Fatah Executives of carrying out the most heinous crimes against Palestinian citizens, and tampering with the national security, which required the intervention of members of Hamas and Al-Qassam Brigades."⁽³⁶⁾

The ousted government laid the blame for the sufferings in Gaza on President Abu Mazen and the government of Salam Fayyad which dismissed the employees and hinted at dismissing security forces personnel working for the ousted government. It accused them of being behind the resulting social and security complications in Gaza. In a statement, the ousted government said: "The Government discussed the latest presidential decrees regarding amendments to the election laws and the dismissal of a number of employees working for the Government's different ministries and institutions; it also discussed the injustices done to these employees. The Government considers these decisions as illegal and threatening to the social fabric of the Palestinian society. Furthermore, the Government condemns the bargaining with security forces personnel by the Ramallah government to instigate protests and chaos in exchange for their salaries."⁽³⁷⁾

In an attempt to clarify the position of the Government and its measures to counter the security breakdown prior to the military resolution, the researcher finds its tone was very sharp against those who stood behind the events. In a statement by the ousted government "it

decided to open an investigation into this crime (the attempted assassination of the Prime Minister) and pursuing the criminals to bring them to justice. Likewise, the Government will continue the earnest investigation into the crime of killing the three children and their driver, as well as the crime of the assassination of Judge Bassam Alfara" The statement included a reference to the Government's boycott of a speech by President Abu Mazen, in a strong indication, albeit indirect, to the Security Forces and the Presidency's responsibility for those events, where "the Government decided to reject the invitation of the ministers to attend the speech of President Mahmoud Abbas, 'Abu Mazen', tomorrow, in protest of the tragic and bloody events."⁽³⁸⁾

The Government escalated the tone of its discourse against those whom it called "killers" and "subverters," without referring to their ties with Fatah or to President Abu Mazen, or the Government of Salam Fayyad. The Government praised the efforts of its Security Forces in finding the "criminals." In another statement, the Government said that "it discussed at length the security conditions in Gaza, especially after some saboteurs began placing explosives at different places in Gaza with the aim of destroying the stability of Gaza and the killing of Rami Ayyad. The Government reviewed the earnest steps pursued to apprehend the killers and bring them to justice. The Government also praised the efforts of the Palestinian Police in apprehending the perpetrators of crimes and explosions where they will be dealt with in accordance with the law and the court's decisions."⁽³⁹⁾

This discourse was a repeat of previous warnings against "riots," referring to Fatah's call to hold prayers in open spaces in challenge of the ousted Government. The discourse also rejected strikes, especially in the health sector describing it as a "crime." Accordingly, the Government said that it was going "to take all steps necessary to protect the lives of its citizens and uphold public order in Gaza according to the law. The Government assured all factions to exercise their political freedoms without allowing anyone to riot or destroy private or public property. The Government reiterated its commitment to prevent political prayers that go beyond the goal of prayers to that of subversion and create discord among our people The Government warned against catastrophic

consequences of the 'strikes' in the health sector, at a time when our people are being subject to a grotesque Israeli aggression. The Government considered any failure to provide health services to patients and the injured a crime, in every sense of the word, and that the Government will do what is dictated by its duty and the public interest to save the lives of patients and the injured. The Government will not permit anyone to promote political agenda at the expense of the Palestinian people."⁽⁴⁰⁾

The ousted Government said that its decisions and measures were to guarantee "the protection of public property" and "preserving freedoms" within the law. In a statement released by the Interior Ministry, the ousted Government said that it issued "orders to the Security Forces to protect public property, preserve the political freedoms, abide by political and media freedoms, abide by the judicial authority, prohibit politically motivated arrests, abide by arrest procedures, affirm human rights during arrest and detention, allow rights groups to visit detainees, and emphasize the legal accountability of anyone who violates these rules, etc., in accordance with the rules governing the Security Forces and the law."⁽⁴¹⁾

This discourse came to justify the measures undertaken by the ousted Government and to stress that it was working to control the situation after the fighting that prevailed before the military resolution in June 2007. For this, the Government sought to affirm that the situation was stable and that rumors of political differences among the leadership of Hamas were false. It called on the media "to be accurate and avoid publishing lies to create confusion in the Palestinian arena. The Government vehemently denies any differences between Prime Minister Ismael Haniyeh and Dr. Mahmoud Alzahhar, former Foreign Minister. It further said that the news published earlier about consequences of differences is nothing but fabrications and baseless lies."⁽⁴²⁾

Later, the ousted Government began to praise the role of Executive Force in establishing security and, with a 7,000 members, covering an area used to be covered by some 70,000 members, which was appreciated as it serves the national interest and takes into consideration never going back to the security breakdown conditions. The Government also recognizes that there were some partial excesses that were being pursued

by the leadership of the Executive Force and the Ministry of Interior, and that measures are being taken to correct the excesses and deal with offenders. The Executive Force will be open to self-accountability, knowing that there were many who committed massacres, violated people, and looted funds, and did not stop at any limits in front of God, and were not brought to accountability."⁽⁴³⁾

In a major step that was part of the exchange of counter steps between Hamas and Fatah, the ousted Government dissolved the Preventive Security Service in Gaza. The announcement of this measure was part of the media war between the two sides, since the preventive security was a vital apparatus for the PA security, and such a measure was to show Hamas challenge to the PA presidency, not mentioning increasing the role of the Police force that was being directed by the Executive Force which belonged to the ousted Government. In a statement of the ousted Government, there were a number of decisions, among which was that to "dissolve the Preventive Security Service in Gaza, giving the opportunity to its members to join the Police Force."⁽⁴⁴⁾

The ousted Government continued to clarify the issue of stability in Gaza through a series of statements and press releases about the relationship between the Government and the people. A statement issued by the Government said that "a high-level delegation headed by MP Dr. Mahmoud Alzahhar, visited the Orthodox Church in Gaza City. The delegation included the Health Minister Dr. Basem Na'eem, Government Spokesperson Taher Alnoono, and Islamic Resistance Movement Hamas' Spokesperson Fawzi Barhoom.

The delegation met with the Patriarch of the Orthodox Church and a number of dignitaries in the Christian community where they discussed a number of issues of mutual interest; affirmed the strength of the relations between Muslims and Christians in Palestine, especially in Gaza; between the Government and Hamas and the Christian community and considering all to make up the one Palestinian people."⁽⁴⁵⁾ This was a clear affirmation in Hamas' discourse about the stability of Gaza under this Government, and the harmony between the Government and the people, taking into consideration the importance of mentioning the Christian community in the statement which signaled that the relationship with the Christian community is good as it should be with the

Muslims. In sum, Hamas Government discourse during this period relentlessly tried to insist that Gaza enjoys stability, thanks to Hamas Government and its efforts, but accused that the PA was trying to undermine such security and stability, and it blamed the PA for any instability.

The peace process media discourse

The position of Hamas and the ousted Government regarding the peace process has not changed: It is the total rejection to negotiations under power imbalance which will not lead, from their perspective, to any results in favor of the Palestinian people. The dramatic change, which perhaps neither Israel nor the United States or the European Union noticed, was what was stipulated in the Mecca Agreement which authorized President Abu Mazen, as Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, to negotiate with Israel and to present any agreement reached for referendum by the Palestinian people. This authorization, it appears, depended on national consensus which provides the cover for negotiations according to the political balance within the Palestinian arena and according to an agenda agreed by all political Palestinian power centers. This indicates that Hamas does not want negotiations managed solely by President Abu Mazen and Fatah.

At the beginning of Hamas' government we find a slight change in its position regarding the relations with Israel and in its discourse regarding the peace process, while maintaining its position regarding the negotiations. In a press conference held at the seat of the Government after a cabinet meeting, Prime Minister Ismael Haniyeh stated that "the ministers do not object to any communication with the Israeli side to deal with day to day life, commercial, and labor issue for the Palestinian people." He added that "there is a problem with political negotiations within a political framework. At the same time, we wait to study any offer presented to us."⁽⁴⁶⁾

A form of conflict appeared in the statements issued by Hamas' Government when then Foreign Minister Mahmoud Alzahar said in a statement to the Times of London, which was published by Al-Hayaht Al-Jadeeda on April 8, 2006, that "Hamas is ready to discuss the concept of a two-state solution which recognizes Israel's right to exist after clarifications from the Quartet in this respect, and that Hamas may resort to some sort of referendum to finalize its position." The conflict appeared in the reactions where deputy Prime Minister Naser Eddin Alsha'er denied the Times reports stressing that Hamas will not commit to such a

drastic change and risks losing popular support. At the same time, Cabinet Spokesperson Ghazi Hamad commented that the issue is not on the agenda for the meeting between President Mahmoud Abbas and Prime Minister Ismael Haneh. The Israeli side rejected these statements when former Prime Minister Shimon Peres commented on the Times saying that "Alzahr's statement used double language,"⁽⁴⁷⁾ in a clear reference to the conflicting signals.

Hamas was quick to reiterate its known position from recognizing Israel or the peace process. Khalid Mish'al said that "the pressures aim at controlling our political positions. They want us to recognize Israel and give up our people's rights and give up the resistance. This, indeed, was the goal of the American and Israeli pressure, but Hamas will never surrender to their pressure, and will never recognize Israel, and will never give up the rights of the Palestinian people." He added "The American and European positions are immoral and inhuman. They are punishing the people for choosing democracy, but the Palestinian people will never surrender."⁽⁴⁸⁾ At another instant, however, Khalid Mish'al said that "Hamas will reciprocate any Israeli steps towards peace if Israel agreed on withdrawing from all the lands occupied since 1967 and recognized the Palestinian rights."⁽⁴⁹⁾

Similarly, the Government showed flexibility when Spokesperson Ghazi Hamad said that "there is an ongoing discussion of more than one option, including the establishment of a Palestinian state on the lands occupied since 1967. We, too, are not opposed to negotiations once its usefulness is evaluated but we are proposing a final settlement in one package, not in stages." He added that "we are in power now, and he who has his hands in fire is not like he who has his hands in water. The positions must be explained to the people."⁽⁵⁰⁾ At another instance, Hamad denied reports in the Israeli Army Radio which quoted him as saying that Hamas "accepts signed agreements." Hamad stressed that what he said was that Hamas was abiding by the agreement with the President and Fatah that Hamas will respect the agreements signed by Palestine Liberation organization and the Israeli Government," explaining that "respect" is not "recognition."⁽⁵¹⁾

It is clear that Hamas' Government, and Hamas, the movement, seek to arrive at a discourse acceptable to the outside world without

compromising its original position. It was clear that there has been some confusion in its position. To explain, Hamas, the movement, maintained a steady position, while Hamas, the Government, showed some degree of flexibility on different occasions, but did not depart from the movement's framework. However, this flexibility did not amount to a degree by which new political moves were made. For this reason, the peace process remained frozen.

The conflicting discourse of the ousted Government, which was rather confusing, could be regarded as a positive indication that the Government realized (or at least a number of its ministers) that the discourse related to the peace process must reach a delicate balancing point between the positions of Hamas, as a resistance movement, and the Palestinian Authority's commitment to the negotiations, which is naturally a very complicated matter. The ousted Government considers that the issue of negotiations has been decided in the National Accord Document and the Mecca Agreement, where the Palestinian President has been authorized to conduct the negotiations and refer to the people in the event of an agreement, as explained earlier.

In a statement, Dr. Ghazi Hamad explained the Government's position well where he said: "Negotiations with the Occupation are a means that is not rejected as a matter of principle, nor as a matter of law or as a matter of patriotism." He added, in a tone representing Hamas, the movement, not the Government, "Hamas does not object to negotiations with the Israeli Occupation as long as it showed readiness to end the occupation of our lands occupied in 1967, the establishment of a Palestinian state on that land with Jerusalem as the capital for that state, and recognized the refugees' right of return." He then added, "Negotiations do not mean recognizing the legitimacy of the occupier." As for the reason Hamas shunned negotiations in the past, Hamad attributed that to "Fatah's futile experience negotiating with the Israeli Occupation which did not lead to anything meaningful, and that a conviction that the negotiations will lead to tangible result must exist as a precondition for Hamas to enter any negotiations," explaining that the right of return, ending the occupation of the lands occupied since 1967, and establishing the Palestinian State are outlines that are not subject to negotiations." Hamad said that "he always advocated combining resistance with political negotiations to recover one's rights." He added

that he believes in the necessity to combine resistance and politics, and that neither one is capable of resolving the Palestinian issue, and that they must be combined in balance and in a manner that one complements the other.⁽⁵²⁾ This statement is considered the definitive explanation of the Government's position, and that of Hamas, regarding the media discourse and the negotiations and relationship with Israel. Negotiations between the Palestinian Authority and Israel accelerated soon after the military resolution took place in Gaza. It gave the impression that the Hamas' Government and the National Unity Government were the reason for the stalled peace process and not reaching a negotiated settlement.

In the following two examples, I note the similarity between the discourse of the Hamas Government before and after the military resolution. In asserting its position, the Government rejected negotiations. In a statement by Prime Minister Ismael Haneyeh in Tehran, he said: "We will never recognize the Zionist entity (Israel). We will never give up our Jihad (the struggle dictated by our religious duty) until the liberation of Al-Quds (Jerusalem) and the Palestinian lands because we have been entrusted with this land," adding that "by laying siege against us, Arrogance and Zionism want us to accept the pillaging of our lands, cease our struggle and resistance, and abide by agreements signed earlier with the Zionist entity."⁽⁵³⁾

The same position was repeated after the Gaza events in 2007, where the Government rejected negotiations because they were taking place in a state of internal Palestinian division, lack of national consensus, and under a "great imbalance" of power. Furthermore, the Government rejected negotiations calling them "futile" and pointed to the importance of "national consensus". It said that negotiations were being conducted "unilaterally" under "American and Israeli hegemony." The Government expressed its concern and suspicion of the accelerating steps in the meetings between Palestinian and Israeli officials to reach what was called "final status" agreement. It also asserted that "any agreement reached in this unilateral way without meeting the minimum requirements of our national rights, does not represent our people. Furthermore, officials warned against exploiting the state of internal division to embark on futile negotiations or to sign weak agreements contrary to the national consensus. The view was that such a situation

would increase American and Israeli hegemony, thus harming the Palestinian cause and its national interest. Especially worrying, in this regard, is the view that the situation would lead to forming negotiation teams known to have given up some of the Palestinian rights in past negotiations, especially the right of return in Geneva, which indicates dangerous intentions and results that are not even close to representing our people."⁽⁵⁴⁾

I have already pointed earlier to statements of the ousted Government in Gaza, in the context of President Abu Mazen and Fatah, in which the Government considered the negotiations conducted by the Palestinian Authority unacceptable as they are giving up the Palestinian rights. Hamas did not recognize the authority of President Abu Mazen or the Palestinian Authority to carry out these negotiations, describing them as "extortions." In a later statement, "the Government discussed the Israeli attempts to extort certain parties of the Palestinian people in every possible way to make concessions before and at the upcoming Fall Meeting (Annapolis). The Government asserts that the Palestinian people will not abide by any agreement or declaration of principles reached by Palestinian negotiators. It, further, stressed the fact that they do not represent the Palestinian people."⁽⁵⁵⁾

This discourse corresponds to the discourse of Hamas, as a movement. Sami Abu Zuhri, Hamas' Spokesperson in Gaza said: "Hamas looks very dangerously upon these meetings (between the Palestinian President Abu Mazen and the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert) because they provided the Israeli occupation with a cover to continue its crimes, and prepared for neutralizing the Palestinian cause through political agreements with the Occupation at the expense of unalienable rights. We warn against continuing this dialogue, because the Ramallah regime does not have the authority to conduct negotiations in the name of the people and at the expense of the people's national rights. Instead, Abbas must try to break the siege, not welcome those who kill our people and participate in this siege."⁽⁵⁶⁾

The conclusion that can be drawn from the above lines is that Hamas, the movement, did not change towards the peace process and the negotiation between the Palestinian Authority and the Israelis. On the other hand, Hamas the Government tried, to a certain extent, to show off

some kind of flexibility concerning the peace process. However, this Governments stance was shackled by the principles of the Hamas movement.

The media discourse towards Israel

Hamas has consistently considered resistance as a strategic choice that cannot be waived. The problem for Hamas has been to balance resistance with being in power after it won the legislative elections in 2006. By winning the elections, a new door opened for Hamas to move away from the position of being a resistance move toward the recognition of Israel, as a precondition for staying in power, in order for the Quartet to open up to Hamas. Hamas, however, chose resistance while insisting upon remaining in power, which led to serious consequences in the Palestinian arena. Israel started to escalate its measures against Hamas and the Palestinian people as a whole to include a total siege throughout the reign of the Hamas Government in 2006, and even the National Unity Government in early 2007. The siege continues against the Hamas-controlled Gaza to the date of this writing.

We clearly see the mixing between the discourse of the Government formed by Hamas and the discourse of Hamas as a Palestinian political faction, and the discursive conflict between them. This was expressed in a number of statements to the media. In the following example, the Spokesperson for the Government expressing Hamas' position about the ceasefire, or the "calming," and on the second day the Spokesperson for Hamas denies his movement's interest in the subject. A report in the *Alhaya Aljadeedah*, based on a statement made to the Israeli Radio in Hebrew by the Spokesperson for the Government, Ghazi Hamad, was reported as saying that "Hamas is willing to accept ceasefire anytime, any place, if Israel stops its attacks against Gaza."⁽⁵⁷⁾ It was clear that this statement represents the position of the Government, not Hamas. On the second day, a spokesperson for Hamas, the movement, Sami Abu Zuhri, said "we are not interested in any initiatives" stipulating that Israel stops its aggression against Gaza as a precondition, adding that the offer announced by the Government Spokesperson Ghazai Hamad represented the Government, not Hamas.⁽⁵⁸⁾

After the military operation of Hamas by which it captured an Israeli soldier, Jil'ad Shalit, Prime Minister Ismael Haneyeh said that "the only way to resolve the crisis created by capturing the soldier is

through political means and indirect negotiations, pointing out that the Israeli military escalation will only lead the Palestinian people to being steady-fast and defiant."⁽⁵⁹⁾ In fact, the Government refused to condemn the capture. Instead, it provided political cover for this operation, which was unprecedented in the policies of the Palestinian Authority. However, it appears that the Government found it necessary to contain the situation through diplomatic means to stop the Israeli escalation that followed the capture of the soldier. In a press conference held by Deputy Prime Minister, Naser Eddin Alshaer, and the Secretary General of the Presidency, Altayeb Abdulraheem, called for "taking the excuses away from the Israeli Government to wage an all-out war on our people under the pretext of saving the Israeli soldier. They stressed that the national interest requires treating the soldier well; not harming him, and releasing him, hoping that this step would stop the accelerated deterioration and Israeli escalation in order to strike the national agenda." Similarly, in a press conference, a Government spokesperson, Ghazi Hamad, appealed in Arabic, English, and Hebrew (using the three languages), to the resistance factions holding the soldier to protect his life and not harm him."⁽⁶⁰⁾ In this way, the Government sought to deal with the events as a Government, not as a faction. But it did not condemn capturing the soldier, nor did it call for his release (though the Deputy Prime Minister called once for his release, but that was not considered as the position of the Government); rather, it called for resolving the issue through a prisoner exchange.⁽⁶¹⁾ What is interesting is that the press conference joined the Deputy Prime Minister and the Secretary General of the Presidency, and was considered an indication of a conciliatory approach by Hamas with the presidency.

In the next example, the Hamas Government commended the resistance, something the Palestinian populace was not used to before Hamas' win, nor would it have been accepted to the United States or its allies. The Government's statement reads as follows: "This day in year 2000 marks the spark that ignited the Second Intifada, 'AlAqsa Intifada', where the Palestinian people declared their adoption of the choice of resistance and steadfastness. In its great march of giving in those blessed years, our people had passed many milestones, like Camp David and others, which laid the foundation for strength and originality to the agenda of change, and resistance, which this Government had adopted as

well as the great majority of the people in the latest legislature elections. We are renewing our commitment to the resistance that united all factions throughout the years of Intifada and our people had chosen in the legislative elections."⁽⁶²⁾ Another example of the Hamas Government's admiration for political resistance was the statement it issued praising "the great leaders that had fallen on the path to freedom and independence, of whom we mention the late President Yaser Arafat, Shiekh Ahmad Yaseen, and the two leaders Khaleel Alwazeer and Salah Khalaf, Dr. Abdulaziz Alrantisi, Ibrahim Almaqadmeh, Abu Ali Mustafa, Abu Alabbas, and others who became lighthouses towards liberation."⁽⁶³⁾

When Israel decided to consider Gaza an enemy entity on 6/14/2007, Hamas did not appear to be concerned with this decision. This is because Hamas always considered its relationship with Israel to be one of animosity, and that resistance is the only language available to deal with the occupation. Taher Alnoono, Spokesperson for the Palestinian Government, stated in response to the Israeli decision considering Gaza an enemy "entity" that: "the Palestinian [Hamas] Government did not see anything new in that decision because the Israeli occupation had always dealt with the Palestinian people as an enemy, and that Israel had been conducting killings, assassinations, invasions, and arrests on a daily basis for tens of years."⁽⁶⁴⁾

Despite these clear positions in respect to the relationship with Israel, the ousted Government, however, showed some degree of pragmatism in its discourse regarding the relationship with Israel, where it called for "avoiding shelling the crossings in the interest of the Palestinian people, especially in the month of Ramadan, and in the interest of the commercial activities to preserve security and stability in Gaza."⁽⁶⁵⁾ This position was reiterated in another statement where the Government "stressed the necessity to keep the crossings away from the resistance activities for the interest of citizens who benefit from the commercial activity through these crossings."⁽⁶⁶⁾ This indicates that such discourses represent a steady position regarding resistance and the relationship with the Israeli occupation, while seeking to create a balance between resistance and the harm that may befall the Palestinian citizens due to it. Moreover, Hamas did not object to any contact with Israel in a non-political context, as mentioned earlier. Dr. Sameer Abu Aisheh,

Planning Minister and acting Finance Minister said that he does not object to meeting his Israeli counterpart Abraham Hirschen to discuss financial matters, saying "I do not object to meeting my Israeli counterpart Finance Minister, and there is no problem in meeting with him to discuss financial and planning issues," adding that "Finance Minister Omar Abdul Razzaq, who is now in the Israeli prison, had declared that position prior to his arrest." He denied the existence of any meetings with Israeli officials, declining to explain whether such meetings would constitute recognition of Israel.⁽⁶⁷⁾

The most important development in the relationship with Israel and the stand from resistance was expressed by Ghazi Hamad, the Premiership's Spokesperson, where he denied that "Hamas' goal was the destruction of the state of Israel, but it was ending the occupation" and "when that is achieved there would not be any fierce resistance. However, a solution like that is not anywhere on the horizon. Hamas does not have any problems with Jews, nor is it fighting against any religion, but we are fighting against the occupation, and this is what the world does not understand. They think that we just want to kill civilians." He then reiterated what the Palestinian Prime Minister had said earlier about establishing a Palestinian state on land occupied since 1967, that "the problem is occupation, not recognizing Israel." Answering a question whether Hamas accepts the conditions of the Quartet, he said: "Previous Palestinian governments had accepted the conditions of the Quartet. What was the result? And assuming we do accept these conditions, what will happen next?"⁽⁶⁸⁾ Even though this statement represents the highest degree of pragmatism by Hamas' Government, it appears that it comes in a series of attempts by a number of officials in Hamas' Government to establish a media discourse and a distinctive style representing another face of Hamas that discursively moves it away from merely being regarded as political resistance movement or terrorism, according to the dominant Israeli and Western descriptions, to become Hamas, the "Government," and Hamas, the "political authority." But as important, serious, practical, and far-sighted as it was, Hamas' attempts to fashion such a media discourse was not successful, and Hamas was not able to make a breakthrough in international attitudes due to Israeli, American, and Western preconditions, in addition to negative Arab attitudes and

domestic complications that mounted during the period of Hamas' Government.

The problem with the discourse of Hamas' Government towards Israel lies in the difficulty it had in reconciling resistance as a strategic choice, and dealing with Israel under whose control the Palestinian Authority lives. For this reason, Ghazi Hamad's justification for the Government defense of the resistance does not work in discursive terms, when he stated: "Our general discourse is compatible with the nature of the movement, because the Government was the protector of the resistance."⁽⁶⁹⁾ It appears that this discourse stems from a clear strategy of Hamas, and that the Government must advocate and provide cover for the resistance, which represented the election program for the Change and Reform Bloc affiliated with Hamas.⁽⁷⁰⁾

Hamas shares some of the responsibility for its inability to address the international community, including Israel. Former deputy Prime Minister Dr. Naser Eddin Alshaer stressed that "the Government's relationship with Israel was characterized by an absolute self-isolation despite the fact that the Government depends entirely on its relationships with America and Israel,"⁽⁷¹⁾ in a clear reference that the Hamas-led Government did not have in its vision any contact with Israel. For this reason, the statements by the acting Finance Minister, and before that the Finance Minister himself, and the Spokesperson for the Prime Minister's office, all represent a clear breakthrough of that policy, and an important development in the media discourse in relations towards Israel, that was possible to develop and test Hamas' Government ability to deal with its political environment.

The Hamas Government's position was clear in the Prime Minister Hanyyehs speech in Tehran during his visit to Iran in December 2006, which we mentioned earlier, where he said that "Hamas will never recognize Israel and will continue fighting against it until the 'liberation' of Al-Quds (Jerusalem)...," and he also said "we will never recognize the Zionist regime (...) and will not stop our Jihad (struggle) until the complete liberation of Al-Quds and the Palestinian territories, and the return of the Palestinian Diaspora."⁽⁷²⁾ It is clear that this speech embodies Hamas' principal position towards Israel as a movement, not the Government. It is also clear that the speech was largely influenced by

the context of the visit to Iran which was being accused of harboring the Palestinian resistance and supporting Hamas. Commenting on this kind of discourse, Taher Alnoono, spokesperson for the ousted Government said, "We considered ourselves a resistance Government for a people who chose resistance. We said that resistance is not just a rifle, a bullet, or a missile. It is a culture. A culture of resistance and confrontation of the Israeli occupation",⁽⁷³⁾ in a clear reference to the Government's discourse that in many cases matches that of the movement, and confirmation of the Change and Reform Bloc election program.

As for the media discourse towards Israel, Alnoono said that "one cannot trust the occupation, and our media discourse will not court it while it occupies our land, wages a media campaign against us, and continues its policy of killings and terrorism against us. Our position did not and will not change. Our position towards occupation is clear; we are not going to be deluded by its pretentious deceitful media, nor by its violent and barbaric ways. We know its [occupation] policies well and we confront them."⁽⁷⁴⁾

The media discourse towards the United States

Hamas' Government media discourse towards the United States was neither measured nor flexible. Rather, it was somewhat sharp, as expected, due to the special relationship between the United States and Israel, and the US's policy towards the Palestinian cause, in addition to the US's extremist policy against Hamas. The "formal" discourse of the Hamas' Government could only originate from governments which are hostile to the United States, but not from those whose existence is under threat because of their hostility to the USA, as was the case with Syria.

An example of such discourse was the statement by Hamas movement against David Walsh, the US Assistant Secretary of State for the near east, who was quoted in some media outlets as saying that there might be a connection between Hamas and Alqaeda. A Hamas' official perceived such a statement as hostile, and responded by saying that "while we deny any connection with Alqa'eda, we consider this media campaign to come within the context of a political, economic and media campaign led by the US for the benefit of, and on the incitement of, the Zionist regime. This campaign aims at laying siege against the Palestinian people and its elected Government." He added, "this campaign comes against the backdrop of Hamas' success in breaking the siege through the official and popular Arab and Islamic response against the siege; the American Administration is trying to stand against our people, and against the beginning of an initial international response."⁽⁷⁵⁾ He added that the American claims come contrary to what the world has known about Hamas and its policies for the past two decades, which limits its resistance against the Israeli occupation on Palestinian soil. He called on the American Administration "to cease such measures which can only lead to a worsening of its image in the area and internationally, and to deal pragmatically and positively with Hamas that, by its programs and performance, won the confidence of the whole Palestinian people."⁽⁷⁶⁾ Hamas not only denied having any relations with Al-Qaeda, but also accused the US of being biased to Israel and waging a campaign against the Palestinian people. Moreover, based on the above statement by the Hamas official, it can be concluded that the connection between Hamas

the movement and the Government is clear, where Hamas considers the American accusations about Al Qaeda was aimed at the Hamas Government as a further step in the siege.

Commenting on a visit by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to the West Bank and her meetings with officials from the Palestinian Authority after the military resolution, Fawzi Barhoom, spokesperson for Hamas in Gaza, said: "We do not welcome such visits and meetings. We do not pin hopes that such meetings will support our rights; rather, these meetings are always ominous signs for the Palestinian people, especially since Rice considers Gaza Strip and Hamas an enemy entity, and reiterated the American agenda to support the Israeli occupation's security. It is also the initiator of the program to remove Hamas and ignite a civil war in Palestine."⁽⁷⁷⁾ This has been the discourse Hamas, the movement, has adopted towards the United States. As for the discourse of Hamas, the Government, it was not much different; in fact, it was an extension of the former discourse. Prime Minister Ismael Haneyeh said that, "there is an undeclared order to bring down the Government, and the Americans are leading this order." He added, "The Americans driving this policy had failed so far."⁽⁷⁸⁾ Commenting on Condoleezza Rice's visit to the Palestinian territories, spokesman of Hamas Government Dr. Ghazi Hamad's tone was sharp, perhaps eschewing diplomatic tone when he said that Rice's visit was "one of the most dangerous visits to the area because there is a political and security plot being cooked to strike the national agenda and the Palestinian internal harmony."⁽⁷⁹⁾

Statements like "a political and security plot" imply direct accusations of the American Administration of plotting against the Palestinian people. Despite the fact that this might, indeed, be the conviction of many Palestinians, especially in Hamas and those opposed to the policies of the United States, and despite the presence of many indications to support this conviction, Hamas' discourse against the United States should not be as "hostile" as it was because the governments discourse should be a diplomatic one. Additionally, this discourse drew a question on whether this really represented the *movement's* policy towards the United States, considering the US not to be its direct enemy, and that it is not at war with the United States. Most significantly, this was the statement of the Government's spokesperson which is not supposed to be representative of a movement, but

rather of a political authority. In other words, Palestinian people realize well that the United States declared policy is pro-Israel; meanwhile, it is well known that hostile stands against the United States may elicit a high political price where such tone of address could be interpreted as a defiance and a threat to its interests. For this reason, countries resort to diplomatic discourse which could reflect ability for political maneuvering towards the policies of the United States.

Hamas' sharp tone against the United States continued after the military resolution. The ousted Government accused the United States of being behind hindering the dialogue between Hamas and Fatah. The United States did not hide its rejection to this kind of dialogue, especially if it leads to a return of Hamas to power. At the same time, Palestinian President Abu Mazen put forth preconditions for a dialogue with Hamas that did not include the United States acquiescence to such a dialogue. In a written statement, the ousted Government said that "America is drawing a red line against a dialogue with Hamas, and that letters from the White House arrive officially warning that the closer he gets to Hamas, the farther away America and Israel are going to be, in addition to punishing him. This explains the absolute rejection of President Abu Mazen to a dialogue with Hamas."⁽⁸⁰⁾ In other words, Hamas Government thinks that the Palestinian president can have any dialogue with Hamas without the consent of the US administration, and that explains Hamas Government harsh discourse towards the US in this regard. The Hamas Governments position towards the United States was not just a passing one, but rather expressed by Dr. Ghazi Hamad, spokesperson for the Government who confirmed that by saying: "We spoke more than one time about using dialogue with the United States and the Quartet, and we offered our position that we are not against the American people; rather, we are against the American policy."⁽⁸¹⁾ Taher Alnoono, spokesperson for the ousted Government commented about this kind of discourse asserting that this discourse reflects a deliberate policy towards the United States saying: "These countries (as the United States) declared hostility toward us. Thus, our media discourse came as a natural response to these countries' stands and to fend against their media campaigns."⁽⁸²⁾

To conclude, the Hamas Government's discourse towards the US revealed some unjustified hostility, where it should be more diplomatic

and show more tolerance towards the American foreign policy, since it is the weak party in this policy process. The Governments policy should have contained the American bias towards Israel by having more diplomatic discourse.

The media discourse towards the European Union

The European Union did not enjoy much attention in Hamas' discourse, perhaps because Hamas realized that the European Union's role comes second to that of the United States. It called for establishing diplomatic relationships, helping to lift the siege, and taking independent stand from that of the United States. In its efforts to establish relations with Europe, Hamas' Government adopted a more friendly media discourse that was characterized by courtesy and a calm tone. Prime Minister Ismael Haneyeh, for example, called Italian Premier Romano Prodi and congratulated him on winning the parliamentary elections in April 2006, "expressing his gratitude to the political stand from the Palestinian Government, and calling upon the European countries to respect the Palestinian people's democratic choice."⁽⁸³⁾ Hamas' Government was looking forward to establishing diplomatic relations with European countries to break the siege, considering that the European stand towards Hamas was less hostile than that of the United States. Hamas repeatedly asserted that meetings took place between its leadership and European officials, which was categorically denied by European governments. Hamas, the Government and the movement, declared the existence of such meetings in their discourse, perhaps to encourage European countries to establish overt communication and to assure the Palestinian people that the siege is not as tight as Israel and the United States want it to be. Foreign Minister Mahmoud Alzahrar announced that he met European officials, among whom was a foreign minister, during his tour of Arab Countries to bring financial support. Alzahrar said: "In my visit I met a consul of one European major country during a large meeting with the people; I also met a foreign minister of another European country, and established some communication with more than one European country." However, he refused to disclose the identity of the officials or the minister he met.⁽⁸⁴⁾ Hamas' Spokesperson Sami Abu Zuhri stressed that members of the movement conducted discussions with French officials prior to forming the Government. He added that "France realizes the necessity to reevaluate European positions toward Hamas, and that France promised to play a role with the European countries in that respect."⁽⁸⁵⁾

Hamas' Government discourse showed that it was pleased with the initial communication initiated by some European countries, despite the difficulties accompanying such relations. In the following example, Dr. Ahmad Yousef, Political advisor to Palestinian Prime Minister, stressed that his Government is ready for a dialogue with Europe and to continue meetings with European officials. Earlier, Dr. Yousef was accused of signing a document with the Europeans stipulating the establishment of a provisional Palestinian state. In a press conference, Dr. Yousef denied that, explaining that "the ideas presented in the document in question were purely European formulations and that the document was not discussed within the Movement or the Government as it was never ratified. He then explained that Hamas Government was ready to conduct dialogues with the European community since it ascended to power, as it is ready to conduct similar dialogues with the international community. He also said that a number of meetings were held with European officials at different levels to discuss the truce and Hamas' political vision."⁽⁸⁶⁾ This statement demonstrates that there were European attempts to make a breakthrough in Hamas' position and contribute to a political breakthrough after the dangerous consequences created by Hamas' win in the legislative elections.

As for the declared positions of the European Union, the Hamas Government sharply criticized the EU's announcement of stopping aid to the Government. Prime Minister Ismael Haneyeh "regretted stopping aid to the Palestinian people," considering that "a green light for the occupation to carry on its aggression and collective punishment of the Palestinian people for exercising its democratic choice." He added that "it is clear that the goal is to bring the Palestinian people to its knees and tighten the noose on its elected Government."⁽⁸⁷⁾

Hamas' (the movement) discourse was much sharper against the European Union where it accused it of interfering in the internal conflict between Hamas and Fatah. In a statement by Hamas' (the movement) spokesperson Sami Abu Zuhri, he said that "the ceremony organized by the European Union for the so-called re-qualifying the security forces, is a natural image of the involvement of international third parties in the internal Palestinian conflict. The international community that is spending money to train and arm Palestinian factions to weaken Hamas and the resistance, should be spending that money for economic

development instead."⁽⁸⁸⁾ After announcing the National Unity Government, European Union countries chose to deal with non-Hamas ministers only, which caused the Government to criticize that policy. In a meeting of the ministers (of which Hamas made up the majority) the Government rejected "the European Union's selective policy in dealing with ministers in the Palestinian Authority."⁽⁸⁹⁾

Despite the selective policy of the EU countries, on another issue, Hamas the movement tried to be more positive in its criticism of the European Union by encouraging them to take practical steps towards lifting the siege on Gaza. In a statement, a Hamas spokesperson Sami Abu Zuhri said: "We call upon the European Union not to stop at just calling for lifting the siege, but rather to apply political and practical pressure on Israel to lift it," while he "welcomed the European Parliament's call for the Zionists to lift the siege against Gaza." Fawzi Barhoum, Spokesperson for Hamas, said that "Hamas values this call by the European Parliament and thinks that it represents the positive growing move within the European system for lifting the siege against Gaza, and ending the suffering of the Palestinian people caused by the Zionist aggression."⁽⁹⁰⁾ But this tone actually expressed sharp criticism of the European Union in a clear hint to its inability to play an effective role in the events taking place in Palestine.

Another Hamas spokesperson, Ghazi Hamad, said in an exclusive interview for this research, that "the Government was more interested in the European Union because it has a large role, and was a big player, especially that it is part of the Quartet, adding that the European Union has good positions at times, while at other times it was strict." However, Hamad believes that the Government's discourse led European countries to show better understanding of Hamas and its Government, where some of these countries established direct and indirect contact with Hamas' Government.⁽⁹¹⁾

The media discourse towards Arab countries

The ousted Government showed balanced positions and expression of the degree of its "performance" (as a government) towards Arab relations. It stressed the importance of those relations; valued the position of some countries; "stressed the robustness of the Palestinian Arab relations; called for strengthening communication with Arab and Islamic countries."⁽⁹²⁾ At the same time, however, the ousted Government addressed some countries through media statements, which is disrespectful for countries which share mutual respect. In international relations protocols, such countries communicate through diplomatic channels instead. An example of such a case was the Hamas Governments statement that discussed the "Fall Conference (Annapolis Conference) and the news that talked about secret negotiations, where the Government warned against using the Fall Conference as a new door through which more concessions are made by the negotiators, or for more normalization of relations with Israel. For this reason, we call upon our Arab brethren not to venture into this dark tunnel; especially we call upon the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia not to participate in this conference."⁽⁹³⁾

Contrary to the Government's balanced position, Hamas' positions (the movement) were sharper towards some Arab countries, especially Egypt, regarding the deal to provide Israel with natural gas at lower than production cost. A spokesperson for the Hamas movement in Gaza, Fawzi Barhoum, said: "The Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas, stresses that the continuation of some vital Arab countries to provide the Israeli occupation with fuel and gas, at cost, and even sometime for free, which is used in the planes, tanks, and Israeli vehicles that kill and slaughter of our Palestinian people, and the fact that these countries are not taking practical decisions to break the siege against Gaza, is a serious crime victimizing one and one half million people, the majority of whom are children, elderly, and students. For this reason, we demand that those countries that have regrettably normalized relations with Israel reevaluate their unbalance of policies in dealing with the Palestinian cause, and that they break the cycle of American and Israeli

dependence, and that they take more balanced positions matching the sufferings of the Palestinian people, and that they take an immediate and urgent decision to save the situation in Gaza before it is too late."⁽⁹⁴⁾

The Government found itself in a position where it had to comment on reports of the involvement of some Arab countries in the internal conflict included accusing "Arab third parties" without naming them, with interfering in this conflict. Prime Minister Ismael Haneyeh waged media attacks against some "unnamed" Arab countries for arming certain factions. He called at a Friday sermon the Arab countries to approach all parties in the Palestinian arena without bias, and not to bring in arms to certain factions.⁽⁹⁵⁾ It is clear that the media attacks did not name a specific country, but rather was general, so as to keep good relations with Arab countries. This was explicitly declared by Dr. Ghazi Hamad, a Government spokesperson, who said that the Government's discourse relied on a policy that is "interested in good relations with all Arab countries, and that we do not interfere in any Arab matters, and that we will never operate under the umbrella of any country, even if it was a non-Arab country like Iran. We tried to stay away from alliances and disputes."⁽⁹⁶⁾ Regardless of the extent of Hamas' success in maintaining good ties with Arab countries, its discourse did not offend any of them, and did not contribute to tensions with them.

Spokesperson for the ousted Government, Taher Alnoono, explained this kind of discourse. He said that the Government adopted a position based on three pillars in its relations with the Arab countries; "First: Never interfere in the internal affairs of these countries; Second: maintain a balanced relationship with them; and Third: Revive relations with countries that either had previous relationships severed or non-existent, like Kuwait."⁽⁹⁷⁾ This means that the Hamas Government did not have much of a choice in dealing with the Arab countries, that according to Hamas' charter, is the second circle which falls between the Palestinian circle and the Islamic circle in the conflict with Israel.⁽⁹⁸⁾

It must be said that Hamas' discourse towards Arab countries sought to maintain its principal positions, where it was known that the Arab countries were pressing Hamas' Government to accept the Arab initiative. Hamas' Government, and even the movement, was compelled to declare its position from that initiative. Prime Minister Ismael

Haneyah said that "the Arab initiative has some problems, where it has within its folds recognizing Israel. We have said: We will not recognize Israel."⁽⁹⁹⁾ According to Naser Eddin Alsha'er, Hamas Government's deputy Prime Minister, the Arab initiative is the door through which entry to the official political Arab system is possible. Alsha'er affirmed that the Arab political system repeatedly signaled to Hamas the need to accept the Arab initiative as a first step to joining the political Arab system in order to move ahead with addressing more complex issues, especially the siege that America, Israel, and the Western countries imposed against Hamas' Government."⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

Conclusions

This research essentially dealt with the discourse of the Hamas-formed Government in an attempt to characterize this discourse, and to determine similarities and differences with that of Hamas, as a Palestinian Islamic resistance movement. I sought to concentrate on the basic elements of the Palestinian issue that are important for all Palestinians. The research relied on a descriptive approach which analyzes content in qualitative terms, examining Hamas discourse (as a government and as a movement) concerning the above issues (Fateh and the Palestinian Presidency; the internal situation in the West Bank after the military resolution; the internal situation in Gaza after the military resolution; the peace process; the relationship with Israel, with the USA, with the European Union, and with the Arab countries). As such, the research has not sought to examine the quantity of coverage, instead focusing on the meaning of media discourses in circulation. I also sought to give context to these media discourses through exclusive interviews with leading officials in Hamas' Government.

The research offers several important conclusions, most important of which is that Hamas (as a movement) did not have a clear vision about its media discourse after its 2006 legislative win. One example is that when it issued statements calling for Arab countries to break the siege, when such statements should have been sent through diplomatic channels, as the protocols demand. In another example, the Hamas Government harshly commented on the US policy in the Middle East, accusing it of being biased to the Israeli side, and conspiring against the Palestinian cause. This kind of practice had significant results, some of which are:

- 1 - Hamas Governments positions echoed those of its movement, noting the difference in the sharpness of their tone.
- 2 - Overlapping statements of spokespersons of Hamas' Government and the movement without showing clear boundaries between them.⁽¹⁰¹⁾

- 3 - Weakness in the tone of Hamas Government towards the presidency after suspending a number of its authorities by the president.
- 4 - The "opposition" tone that Hamas used prior to winning continued even after forming the Government. To explain, the Prime Minister, Ismail Haniyeh, used terms such as “call for” and “appeal to”, when asking president Abbas to pay salaries to the public employees. Such discourse, as was mentioned, is uncommon between the government and the president, whereas it is so between the opposition and the government.
- 5 - Hamas Governments tone towards Israel and the United States was sharp, as it considered them to be enemy countries. But this tone was somewhat modulated towards the European Union which (according to Hamas) established unofficial contacts with it. However, this did not stop Hamas from sharply criticizing the Union for stopping aid to the Government and participating in the siege against Gaza.
- 6 - Radical positions and sharp tones overshadowed Hamas (both the government and the movement) discourse, when flexibility was needed to gain friends on Arab and international levels. To name one example, the Hamas government Prime Minister, Ismail Haniyeh, accused Arab countries of inflaming the Palestinian internal conflict by supporting and arming some factions against others.

Among the results that cannot be ignored was the repeated attempts by Government spokespersons and some ministers to adopt a balanced discourse that represents the Government's independence and control of its own decisions, shying away from declared positions of Hamas the movement. Despite all of that, the international community did not pick up these signals; nor did it encourage them. Rather, it demanded a fundamental change in Hamas political positions as both a Movement and a Government, especially on the subject of recognizing Israel, accepting international agreements, and renouncing violence.

For this reason, I note that the tone of some of the Government's positions was sharp, in response to its perceptions about the lack of responsiveness from the world governments to its political aims. I also

note that the media discourse after the split between Gaza and the West Bank became much more pointed when the Hamas Government and the people in Gaza were under an air-tight siege, mitigating against the establishment of direct and overt diplomatic channels with the rest of the world.

Based on this study, I would conclude that the Hamas Governments discourse revealed no clear vision in dealing with the fundamental issues mentioned above - locally, regionally, and internationally. Hamas (the movement) lack of political experience led to its distance from the international community and undermined its claims to be a vital player in the region as a government. Hamas (the government) discourse failed to appeal to the Arab countries, even though it was not as hostile to the Arab world as it was towards the USA and Europe.

Recommendations

This study suggests a number of recommendations that may contribute to developing the media performance, and help deal with changes in the Palestinian arena.

It is important to mention that the Hamas Government's media discourse comes within the context of the developing events in the Palestinian arena, which may have the heaviest influence over this discourse, and determines the frameworks in which this discourse is presented.

Despite that, it is possible to come up with a number of recommendations that could be used for guidance towards a realistic media discourse that maintains the identity of the movement, and deals with political changes, while keeping in mind the domestic and foreign players.

These recommendations are as follows:

- 1 - First, there is a need to distinguish between movements that win elections and the governments formed by such movements. Consequently, we must separate the media discourse that represents all the people from that which represents a group of people. It is not realistic to subject the government to the bureaucracy of the movement, or to its limited vision, which is reflected in the media discourse of the government that gives it a wider margin to maneuver, especially in its domestic and foreign relations. However, this does not deprive the movement of the right to put a general framework within which the government can move, according to its election agenda. It is important to mention that the government receives authorization from the movement through the parliament which is dominated by members of the movement.
- 2 - Government discourses are usually characterized by a high degree of diplomacy. Perhaps this requires training in the political and diplomatic work. For this reason, any new government needs to

know the political language to deal with others, especially the media.

- 3 - "Discourse's diplomacy" (which means following the international protocols in the diplomatic relations between those who represent their governments) is supposed to be more evident in dealing with the Palestinian presidency and other political forces in the arena. There is a need to distinguish between Hamas' discourse and that of the Government. The Government's discourse must not be involved in political infighting; rather, it should use meaningful signals. Of course, there is a difference between the presidency's agenda and that of the Government formed by Hamas. There are also a number of legal issues raised. The law did not make clear the distinct areas of authority for the President and those of the Government. This has led to much confusion and, at times, political collision when the two agendas differ. However, the Government's place in law is different from that of the faction's position.
- 4 - When an opposition party wins an election it becomes the decision maker, and opposition discourse ends. The winning party does not "call for" or "appeal to" the authority, because it is the authority. It should appear that the decision maker issues orders, not calling for orders to be issued.
- 5 - Avoiding the use of overly emotive discourses and opting, instead, for those which are more measured and dealing with events in a calm, calculated manner. It is well known that the Palestinian factions deal with developing events, especially the American and Israeli policies, in highly emotional ways, sometimes with clear justification. However, the role of the government is to deal with such events in measured and balanced ways. It is understandable that political factions threaten to retaliate for Israeli military actions, but this is not understood when this kind of threat originates from the Government that does not have an army, nor does it have any real authority.
- 6 - Defining terms used that matches the Government as a political authority working within an international political system dictates a certain type of diplomacy in the discourse. Similarly, strong terms

could intensify internal strife. Terms such as "killers", "saboteurs", or "conspiring" may need further scrutiny by the Government to make sure that these are the appropriate terms, since they are highly emotive and may be regarded by some as inflammatory. For this reason, spokespersons in many countries use such terms as "threatening the security of the citizens", "offenses against the citizens", and so forth, considering that the Government represents citizens, not in the context of political infighting.

- 7 - Moving from reaction to action and from negative justification to positive justification method. It is well known that reaction affirms the action itself in the minds of the people and that the justification method weakens the government and puts it in a defensive position where it is forced to justify its own actions. This, however, does not mean that the government should not explain the reasons behind certain decisions or measures.
- 8 - Diplomacy in dealing with the peace process. The Palestinian Government (whether Hamas' or Fatah's Governments) stands somewhere between the movement's and the PA's positions from the peace process. A delicate balance must be established in this regard. For this reason, the Government's rejection of the peace process may be unacceptable from a political standpoint, where it is possible to accept the reasons that prevent the resumption of negotiations with Israel. This conclusion becomes clearer if we were to take into consideration the green light granted by the National Accord Document and the Mecca Agreement to President Mahmoud Abbas to move forward with negotiations with Israel, the negotiations being the responsibility of the Palestine Liberation Organization.
- 9 - Limiting conflicting statements within the Government, while allowing a certain degree of differences in opinion that represents the positions of officials.⁽¹⁰²⁾
- 10 - Resistance discourse does not correspond to the nature of any Palestinian Government, given that such governments have no sovereignty and do not have the options of the resistance. Resistance is the prerogative of factions, whereas Government's options are limited to managing the political, economic, and social

aspects. In international politics, governments do not practice resistance; they can give support to resistance forces indirectly in most of the cases. For this reason, it is important to separate the government from the movement, and one cannot speak for the other.

- 11 - Peculiar to the Palestinian case, it is assumed that there should be a unified media discourse regarding the peace process, even if it was a Hamas affiliated government, that does not shut the door for dialogue with the whole world, especially the United States, Europe, and Arab countries. This media discourse requires that the door be kept half-open regarding the Government's vision of the conflict with Israel. It is well known that Western countries deal in a confrontational manner with movements described as "fundamentalist", which are accused in the Western culture of being "deadlocked", and "closed-minded."
- 12 - The weight of addressing Western and Arab governments, as well as international community, and urging them to understand the circumstances surrounding Hamas government's discourse is no less important than the above-mentioned recommendations. This discourse, the researcher has concluded, was the result of two factors; the first: self caused, and is represented in the nature of Hamas, its vision, ideology, and political agenda, which constituted the background for this type of discourse. The second, which is objective, is the complex circumstances the Government went through, which included domestic and foreign pressures, that regionally and internationally, rejected the legislative elections results that Hamas won. These circumstances compelled Hamas and its Government to adopt a discourse based on reactions and self-defense, and to have the feeling that flexibility in the discourse did not produce any loosening in the Arab and Western positions.⁽¹⁰³⁾

The international community did not help in developing the discourse of Hamas, nor of its Government. Rather, it helped forcing this discourse to the intractability. It also led to the movement losing any hope of the international community accepting the results of the elections. For this reason, the discourse was directed to the Palestinian

population which realizes the nature of the movement and its goals. In other words, Hamas was forced to bet on the Palestinian people and its constituents more than betting on the international community that closed all doors in its face, imposed a siege against it, and did everything possible to foil its experience in governance.

Notes

- 1 - Hjab, Muneer, (2003), Page 1135-1138, Also in the same encyclopedia by Binvest that the discourse is "Every uttering or writing that expresses a specific point of view of the speaker or writer. It is assumed to influence the listener or reader, taking into consideration the context of the totality of the circumstances and practices." Similar definitions were also listed in the Political Dictionary by Dr. Waddah Zaytoun, Page 162/163, Dar Osama, Amman, 2006. and in Dictionary of Media and Communication Studies.
- 2 - Watson, James and Hill, Anne, 6th edition, (2003), pp. 86/87.
- 3 - Othman, Zeyad, (2008).
- 4 - Koa, Moeen, (2007).
- 5 - MIFTAH, (2008), <http://www.miftah.org/Arabic/Display.cfm?DocId=9255&CategoryId=11>
- 6 - Abu Dheir, Farid, (2007), P. 292
- 7 - Hamas has been accused of being part of a regional coalition with Iran and Syria. However, though Hamas does not deny that it has strong relations with those two countries, and that it is being sustained politically and financially by them, it strongly denies that it serves their agenda in the region. Moreover, accusing Hamas of serving Iran and Syrias agenda was not supported by evidence.
- 8 - Ibid. p. 291.
- 9 - Ibid.
- 10 - Dr. Ghazi Hamad, Spokesperson for the Tenth Government, agrees in an exclusive interview for this research that "Hamas' rapid transfer from a movement to a Government" resulted in an overlapping between the movement and the Government discourses. He stressed that Hamas' discourse was that of opposition and a movement, which was reflected in its performance later in the Government. (Hamad, Ghazi, Interview, Gaza, 5/6/2008)
- 11 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 22/4/2006.

- 12 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 22/4/2006.
- 13 - Hamad, Ghazi, Interview, Gaza, 6/5/2008.
- 14 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 8/10/2006.
- 15 - Hamad, Ghazi, Interview, Gaza, 6/5/2008.
- 16 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 18/12/2006.
- 17 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 24/6/2006.
- 18 - Statement by Hamas' Government on 21/1/2007.
- 19 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 14/12/2006.
- 20 - Statement by the ousted Government on 23/10/2007.
- 21 - Statement by Fawzi Barhoum, Spokesperson for Hamas in Gaza on 5/5/2008, found on the following link: [http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd9oXL5mYGoqdoEEylumw4pQpkF3IoWTpo6dlZWYbHE%](http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd9oXL5mYGoqdoEEylumw4pQpkF3IoWTpo6dlZWYbHE%20)
- 22 - Statement by the ousted Government on 30/10/2007.
- 23 - Statement issued by the Information Office of Hamas on 8/7/2006 found on the following link: [http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd9oXL5mYGoqdoEEylumw4pQpkF3IoWTpo6dlZWYbHE%](http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd9oXL5mYGoqdoEEylumw4pQpkF3IoWTpo6dlZWYbHE%20)
- 24 - Statement by the ousted Government on 18/7/2007.
- 25 - Statement by the ousted Government on 12/10/2007.
- 26 - Statement by the ousted Government on 8/7/2007.
- 27 - Statement by the ousted Government on 12/10/2007.
- 28 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 5/9/2006.
- 29 - Rizqa, Yousef, 31/5/2006, http://www.palestine-info.com/arabic/hamas/hewar/2006/1_6_06.htm
- 30 - Hamad, Ghazi, Interview, Gaza, 5/6/2008.
- 31 - Hamad, Ghazi, Interview, Gaza, 5/6/2008.
- 32 - Statement by the ousted Government on 27/12/2006.
- 33 - Statement by the ousted Government on 9/10/2007.
- 34 - Undated statement issued by the Information Office of the ousted Government, in the period of the events in September 2007.
- 35 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 16/8/2006.

- 36 - *Alayyam*, 15/6/2007.
- 37 - Statement by the ousted Government on 4/9/2007.
- 38 - Statement by the ousted Government on 15/12/2006.
- 39 - Statement by the ousted Government on 9/10/2007.
- 40 - Statement by the ousted Government on 6/9/2007.
- 41 - Decision by the Office of the Prime Minister / Interior Minister on 19/9/2007.
- 42 - Statement by the ousted Government on 15/9/2007.
- 43 - Statement by the ousted Government on 13/8/2007.
- 44 - Statement by the ousted Government on 16/7/2007.
- 45 - Statement by the ousted Government on 21/10/2007.
- 46 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 6/4/2006. Furthermore, the researcher Moeen Koa, indicated that Hamas changed its media discourse during some stages against its charter in the interest of public relations, especially after the elections. (Koa, Moeen, (2007), p. 47)
- 47 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 8/4/2006.
- 48 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 16/4/2006.
- 49 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 4/5/2006.
- 50 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 17/5/2006.
- 51 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 28/9/2006.
- 52 - Hamad, Ghazi, 16/10/2007, <http://www.aljazeeraatalk.net/forum/showthread.php?p=761115>
- 53 - *Alayyam*, 9/12/2006.
- 54 - Statement by the ousted Government on 3/10/2007.
- 55 - Statement by the ousted Government on 15/9/2007.
- 56 - Press statement by Hamas Spokesperson in Gaza, Sami Abu Zuhri, on 13/4/2008, [http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd9oXL5mYGoqdoEEylumw4pQpkF3IoWT-po6dlZWYbHE%](http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd9oXL5mYGoqdoEEylumw4pQpkF3IoWT-po6dlZWYbHE%20)
- 57 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 16/6/2008.
- 58 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 17/6/2006.
- 59 - *Alayyam*, 7/7/2006.

- 60 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 26/6/2006.
- 61 - The Government's statements exactly matched those of Hamas on this issue in a number of statements, among which was the statement by Khalid Mish'al published in *Alhayah Aljadida* on 11/7/2006, in which he stressed that the solution is prisoner exchange. Also the statement by Government Spokesperson Ghazi Hamad, which was published in *Alhayah Aljadida* on 29/8/2006. In addition, there was the statement by Prime Minister Ismael Haneya mentioned earlier. Dr. Ghazi Hamad explained this position indicating that the Government's discourse differed from that of the movement regarding the Shalit's issue. He said: "We called for preserving his life (the Israeli soldier prisoner Jilad Shalit) to for treating him well. We also called for the necessity to have negotiations (for prisoner exchange). I believe that discourse was a good one and differed from that of Hamas Movement. We, as a Government, were responsible for the overall circumstances, and we had to present a position." Hamad, Ghazi, Interview, Gaza, 5/6/2008.
- 62 - Statement by the ousted Government on 28/9/2007.
- 63 - Statement by the ousted Government on 12/10/2007.
- 64 - Undated statement by Spokesperson for the ousted Government, but the event took place in September 2007.
- 65 - Statement by the ousted Government on 13/9/2007.
- 66 - Statement by the ousted Government on 15/9/2007.
- 67 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 29/12/2006.
- 68 - Maan website, 29/5/2007, <http://www.maannews.net/ar/index.php?opr=ShowDetails&ID=69362>
- 69 - Hamad, Ghazi, Interview, Gaza, 5/6/2008.
- 70 - Election program for the Change and Reform Bloc, 2005, http://www.pal-cec.org/pdf/hamas_programme_election.pdf
- 71 - Alsha'er, Naser Eddin, Interview, Nablus, 28/5/2008.
- 72 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 9/12/2006.
- 73 - Alnoono, Taher, Interview, Gaza, 6/5/2008.
- 74 - Alnoono, Taher, Interview, Gaza, 6/5/2008.

- 75 - In a special interview for this research, Dr. Naser Eddin Alsha'er thought that the Government was betting on the Arab position in its media discourse, and that it was a losing bet. It was clear that none of the Arab governments was able to depart from the American policy in creating good relations with the Government, and lifting the siege. (Alsha'er, Naser Eddin, Interview, Nablus, 28/5/2008).
- 76 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 30/4/2006.
- 77 - Statement by Fawzi Barhoum, Spokesperson for Hamas in Gaza on 4/5/2008. [http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd9oXL5mYGoqdoEEylumw4pQpkF3IoWT-po6dlZWYbHE%](http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd9oXL5mYGoqdoEEylumw4pQpkF3IoWT-po6dlZWYbHE%20)
- 78 - *Alayyam*, 20/12/2006.
- 79 - Written statement by Ghazi Hamad, former spokesman for Hamas' Government on 16/1/2007.
- 80 - Written statement by Spokesperson for the ousted Government on 14/8/2007.
- 81 - Hamad, Ghazi, Interview, Gaza, 5/6/2008.
- 82 - Alnoono, Taher, Interview, 5/6/2008.
- 83 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 20/4/2006.
- 84 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 8/5/2006.
- 85 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 4/4/2006.
- 86 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 25/12/2006.
- 87 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 12/4/2006.
- 88 - http://www.moheet.com/show_news.aspx?nid=129833&pg=2, 29/5/2008.
- 89 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 3/4/2007.
- 90 - <http://www.ikhwanonline.com/Article.asp?ArtID=34728&SecID=450>, 22/5/2008.
- 91 - Hamad, Ghazi, Interview, Gaza, 5/6/2008.
- 92 - Written statement by Spokesperson for the ousted Government on 4/9/2007.
- 93 - Written statement by the ousted Government on 25/9/2007.

- 94 - Press statement by Spokesperson for Hamas in Gaza, Fawzi barhoum on 9/4/2008. [http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd9oXL5mYGoqdoEEylumw4pQpk-F3IoWTpo6dlZWYbHE%](http://www.palestine-info.info/ar/default.aspx?xyz=U6Qq7k%2bcOd9oXL5mYGoqdoEEylumw4pQpk-F3IoWTpo6dlZWYbHE%20)
- 95 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 9/6/2007.
- 96 - Hamad, Ghazi, Interview, Gaza, 5/6/2008.
- 97 - Alnoono, Taher, Interview, Gaza, 5/6/2008.
- 98 - Hamas Charter (1988), Article 14.
- 99 - *Alhayah Aljadida*, 9/10/2006.
- 100 - Alsha'er, Naser Edeen, Interview, Nablus, 28/5/2008.
- 101- This was confirmed by Deputy Prime Minister of the Tenth Government. Dr. Naser Edeen Alsha'er in an exclusive interview, where he confirmed that the both discourses of the Government and Hamas did not differ most of the times. He thought it was a loophole that should have been dealt with. (Alsha'er, Naser Eddin, Interview, Nablus 28/5/2008). Government's Spokesperson Dr. Ghazi Hamad attributed the overlapping "to lack of separation between the Government and the movement, because a number of Hamas' officials took positions within the Government. Because the movement considered itself the protector of the Government, it adopted and advocated all its positions." In addition, some ministers' (who were also movement officials) discourses were sharp-toned due to personal considerations. He added that both positions (for the movement and Government) originated from the same source. (Hamad, Ghazi, Interview, Gaza, 6/5/2008).

On the other hand, we find the Spokesperson for the ousted Government, the post military resolution government, Taher Alnoono, denied in an interview exclusive for this research, that there were any overlapping in the two discourses. He stressed that the Government Spokesperson's authority stemmed from the Minister's Council, not the movement. He did confirm, though, an intersection of the two discourses considering that Hamas was responsible for forming the Tenth Government. (Alnoono, Taher, Interview, Gaza, 15/6/2008)

- 102- There were a number of criticism for the conflicting statements by officials of Hamas and its Government (this does not mean that the others did not have conflicts either.) Nabil Amr, Presidential media advisor, considered that failure of officials and their conflicting statements compel them to accuse the media of being inaccurate. (Alhayah Aljadida, 18/9/2006)
- 103- Both Deputy Prime Minister in Hamas' Government, Naser Edeen Alsha'er, and Government Spokesperson, Dr. Ghazi Hamad, agree that the Government's discourse was largely influenced by the siege, where the Government found it necessary to adopt a discourse that defends its policies and seek to break the siege against the Palestinian people. In other words, the siege did not leave the Government with real choices in its discourse. (Alsha'er, Naser Eddin, Interview, Nablus, 28/5/2008, and Hamad, Ghazi, interview, Gaza, 5/6/2008)

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ملخص

تركزت الأنظار حول حركة حماس، الحركة الفلسطينية الإسلامية الناشئة، التي اختطت لنفسها طريق المقاومة ضد الاحتلال الإسرائيلي، ونأت بنفسها عن التسوية السياسية، معتبرة أن من حق الشعب المحتل أن يمارس مختلف أنواع المقاومة ضد الاحتلال. وقد زاد الاهتمام بهذه الحركة بعد فوزها في انتخابات المجلس التشريعي للسلطة الفلسطينية عام ٢٠٠٦، وهي السلطة التي وقعت اتفاق أوسلو مع إسرائيل، واتخذت طريق التسوية السياسية أسلوباً لمعالجة الصراع. والمفارقة وقعت حين شكلت حركة حماس الحكومة العاشرة؛ حيث نشأ وضع غاية التعقيد، وهو: حكومة يقوم برنامجها على رفض اتفاق أوسلو (الذي أنجب السلطة)، في سلطة وجدت وفق صيغة محددة، هدفها إنهاء الصراع بطريقة سلمية.

وقد راهن الكثيرون على أن حماس سوف تغير من نهجها بعد دخول السلطة، بحيث تصبح (بحسب وصف البعض) معتدلة، وتتخلى عن المقاومة، وتقبل بإسرائيل وبالتسوية السياسية. ولكن أياً من هذا لم يحدث. فقد أصرت حماس على مواقفها؛ الأمر الذي ولد أزمات متعاقبة على الساحة الفلسطينية، ما زالت تتوالى حتى كتابة هذه السطور. وفي الوقت نفسه، أشار العديد من الكتاب والسياسيين والإعلاميين، إلى أن هناك تغييراً ملموساً في خطاب حماس الحركة، وفي خطاب حماس الحكومة. وقد وصف البعض هذا التغيير بأنه إشارات من حماس، يجب على الدول الغربية (وبخاصة الولايات المتحدة) وإسرائيل أن تلتقطها، وتبني عليها، على اعتبار أن حماس قوة فلسطينية أصبح لها ثقل وحضور سياسي بارز في معادلة الصراع. في هذه الدراسة، يهدف الباحث إلى تلمس الخطاب الإعلامي لحكومة حماس، في دراسة تعتمد التحليل النوعي لخطاب رموزها، ويلجأ إلى اقتباس فقرات من خطاب حماس، لتوضيح الفرق بين الخطابين. ويصل الباحث إلى عدد من النتائج، من أهمها: وجود تداخل بين خطابي الحكومة والحركة، ووجود شكل من أشكال المرونة في خطاب الحكومة، مقارنة بالحركة. وكذلك تحقيق الحكومة لنجاح محدود في اتباع خطاب يتناسب مع كونها "حكومة". وأخيراً، عدم وجود هامش واسع للحكومة لتطوير خطابها، بسبب الضغوط الهائلة التي تعرضت لها، والتحديات التي واجهتها، خارجياً وداخلياً؛ الأمر الذي يشير إلى أن المجتمع الدولي لم يعط حماس وحكومتها فرصة لتطوير سياستها وخطابها الإعلامي.

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- * تهدف إلى معالجة المشكلات المعاصرة والقضايا المستجدة من وجهة نظر الشريعة الإسلامية.
- * تشمل موضوعاتها معظم علوم الشريعة الإسلامية: من تفسير، وحديث، وفقه، واقتصاد وتربية إسلامية، إلى غير ذلك من تقارير عن المؤتمرات، ومراجعة كتب شرعية معاصرة، وفتاوي شرعية، وتعليقات على قضايا علمية.
- * تنوع الباحثون فيها، فكانوا من أعضاء هيئة التدريس في مختلف الجامعات والكليات الإسلامية على رقعة العالمين: العربي والإسلامي.
- * تخضع البحوث المقدمة للمجلة إلى عملية فحص وتحكيم حسب الضوابط التي التزمت بها المجلة، ويقوم بها كبار العلماء والمختصين في الشريعة الإسلامية، بهدف الارتقاء بالبحث العلمي الإسلامي الذي يخدم الأمة، ويعمل على رفعة شأنها، نسأل المولى عز وجل مزيداً من التقدم والازدهار.

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
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- ١٢ - هل تقرأ الحويات بانتظام؟ ☐ نعم ☐ لا
- ١٣ - هل تقرأ الحويات فقط إذا كان موضوعها له علاقة بتخصصك؟ ☐ نعم ☐ لا
- ١٤ - هل تقرأ الحويات فقط إذا كنت ستستعين بمادتها كمرجع لبحث؟ ☐ نعم ☐ لا
- ١٥ - هل تحتفظ بالحويات بعد قراءتها؟ ☐ نعم ☐ لا
- ١٦ - اقتراحاتك لتطوير الحويات وتطوير خدماتها للقارئ:

.....

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مثال:

- أحمد محمد عبدالخالق، معجم الألفاظ الشخصية، الطبعة الأولى - دولة الكويت، مجلس النشر العلمي - جامعة الكويت، ٢٠٠٠م/ ص ١٥.
* المرجع السابق، ص ٢٦.

- وفي حالة وجود فاصل هامش مختلف يذكر على النحو التالي:
* أحمد عبدالخالق، معجم الألفاظ الشخصية - ص ٣٥.

ثانياً - المصادر والمراجع:

يرتب ثبت المصادر والمراجع ترتيباً ألفبائياً، بحسب الأسماء المشهورة للمؤلفين.
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مثال:

الجاحظ، أبو عثمان عمرو بن بحر، كتاب «الحيوان»، تحقيق: عبدالسلام محمد هارون، ط ٢، مطبعة مصطفى البابي الحلبي وأولاده - مصر، ١٩٦٥م.

٥ - شروط قبول الأبحاث في الحوليات:

- أ - لا تقبل الحوليات البحوث التي سبق نشرها في أي مجلة علمية أو غيرها.
- ب - أصول البحوث المقدمة للنشر لا ترد ولا تسترجع، سواء أنشرت أم لم تنشر.
- ج - لا يجوز نشر البحوث في جهات أخرى بعد موافقة الحوليات على نشرها، وإذا ثبت ذلك، فستتخذ إدارة الحوليات الإجراءات القانونية المتبعة بهذا الشأن.
- د - يمكن للباحث نشر بحثه في جهات أخرى، بعد الحصول على إذن كتابي مسبق من رئيس التحرير، وبعد انقضاء ثلاث سنوات - على الأقل - على نشره في الحوليات.

هـ - تمنح المجلة للباحث خمسين نسخة من بحثه المنشور إهداء.

٦ - ترسل البحوث وجميع المراسلات الخاصة بالحوليات إلى:

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- ١ - حوليات الآداب والعلوم الاجتماعية، مجلة فصلية علمية محكمة، تصدر عن مجلس النشر العلمي بجامعة الكويت، تنشر البحوث من الجامعات والمؤسسات العلمية العربية والأجنبية في الموضوعات الأدبية والاجتماعية والإنسانية.
- ٢ - تنشر الحوليات البحوث والدراسات الأصلية، باللغتين العربية والإنجليزية، على ألا تتجاوز صفحات متن أي بحث ٢٠٠ صفحة، ولا تقل عن ٥٠ صفحة (في المتن دون الهوامش والمراجع).
- ٣ - قواعد تسليم البحوث:

- أ - يقدم البحث مطبوعاً من ثلاث نسخ، على ورق (A4)، وعلى مسافة واحدة، وبنط (١٤)، مع القرص المرن الخاص به.
- ب - يرفق الباحث ملخصاً للبحث مطبوعاً باللغتين العربية والإنجليزية؛ في حدود ١٥٠ كلمة للغة العربية، و ٢٠٠ كلمة للغة الإنجليزية.
- ج - يرفق الباحث مع البحث سيرة علمية مختصرة، مطبوعة باللغتين العربية والإنجليزية، تشمل أهم مؤلفاته وأبحاثه.
- د - يقدم الباحث إقراراً كتابياً بأن البحث المقدم لم يسبق نشره في أي مجلة علمية أو غيرها.
- هـ - تقدم الخرائط، والأشكال، والرسوم بأصولها الصالحة للطباعة، أما الصور الفوتوغرافية فتطبع على ورق لماع، مع ضرورة تقديم الشريحة الأصلية للصور الملونة.
- و - في حال رغبة الباحث نشر الصور، أو الخرائط، أو الأشكال البيانية ملونة، يلتزم دفع تكاليفها.

- ٤ - يراعي الباحث عند كتابة هوامش البحث ومصادره ومراجعته ما يلي:

أولاً - الهوامش:

- أ - توضع الهوامش في نهاية كل فصل، أو في نهاية البحث في حالة عدم وجود فصول.
- ب - ترتب أرقام التوثيق بطريقة متسلسلة حتى نهاية كل فصل، أو حتى نهاية البحث في حالة عدم وجود فصول.
- ج - تثبت الهوامش عند ذكرها لأول مرة كاملة على النحو التالي:
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اهتمام الأقسام العلمية لكليتى الآداب والعلوم
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