

حوليات كلية الآداب

تصدر عن مجلس النشر العلمي - جامعة الكويت



نبني للغة القومية

دراسة لحالة من النحديّات
في دولتين ناميتين (الجزائر وتونس)
ومقاطعة كويك بكندا

د. محمود الحبيب الذواوي

كلية العلوم الاجتماعية والإنسانية - الجامعة التونسية



١٤١٥ - ١٤١٦ هـ

١٩٩٤ - ١٩٩٥ م

الحواليّة الخامسة عشر

الرسالة التاسعة والتسعون

أ.د فتوح عبد المحسن الخترش
أ.د محمود اسماعيل
أ.د عبدالله الصالح العشيمين
أ.م.د. فاطمة عبدالرزاق
د. منيرة السقار

ثمن الرسالة

الكويت ٥٠٠ فلس - البحرين ٧٥٠ - قطر ٨ ريالات - الإمارات ٨ دراهم
- السعودية ٨ ريالات - عمان ريال واحد - اليمن الجنوبي ٥٠٠ فلس -
اليمن الشمالي ١٠ ريالات - العراق دينار واحد - مصر جنيه واحد - لبنان
١٥٠٠ ليرة - الأردن دينار واحد - سوريا ٢٥ ليرة - السودان ٥٠٠ مليم -
ليبيا ٨٠ قرشا - الجزائر ١٥ دينار - تونس دينار واحد - المغرب ١٠ دراهم.

الاشتراك السنوي لعدد (٨) رسائل			
المجلد	الاشتراك		
٦, - د.ك ١٨, -	٤, - د.ك ١٦, -	أفراد مؤسسات	الكويت
٧, - د.ك ٢٠, -	٥, - د.ك ١٨, -	أفراد مؤسسات	الدول العربية
٤٠, - دولارا ٧٠, -	٣٢, - دولارا ٦٤, -	أفراد مؤسسات	الدول الاجنبية

لأعضاء هيئة التدريس والطلاب خصم ٥٠٪

جميع المراسلات الخاصة بشروط النشرة أو أية استفسارات أخرى بشأن
الحوليات توجه إلى رئيس هيئة تحرير الحوليات - ص.ب: ١٧٣٧٠
الخالدية - الكويت: 72454 ت: ٤٨١٠٣١٩ فاكس ٤٨١٠٣١٩

حوليات كلية الآداب

تصدر عن مجلس النشر العلمي - جامعة الكويت

دوره علمية محكمة تتضمن مجموعة
من الرسائل وتغطي بنشر الموضوعات التي
تدخل في مجالات اهتمام الأقسام
العلمية لكلية الآداب

الجزء الخامس عشر الرسالة التاسعة والتسعون

١٤١٥ هـ - ١٩٩٥ م

قواعد النشر في

حوليات كلية الآداب

- ١ - حوليات كلية الآداب دورية علمية محكمة تنشر مجموعة من الرسائل في الموضوعات التي تدخل في مجالات اختصاص الأقسام العلمية بكلية الآداب.
- ٢ - تنشر الحوليات البحوث والدراسات الأصلية باللغتين العربية والإنجليزية ويراعى ألا يتجاوز عدد صفحات أي بحث ١٣٠ صفحة ولا يقل عن ٤٠ صفحة.
- ٣ - تقدم البحوث مطبوعة على الآلة الكاتبة على مسافتين من ثلاث نسخ على ورق مقاس ٢٩×٢١ سم (A 4) وعلى وجه واحد فقط وترقم جميع الصفحات بما في ذلك الجداول والصور التوضيحية، وينبغي مراعاة التصحيح الدقيق للطباعة على الآلة الكاتبة في جميع النسخ.
- ٤ - يرفق الباحث ملخصاً باللغتين العربية والإنجليزية في حدود ٢٠٠ «مائي» كلمة تنصدر البحث.
- ٥ - ترسم الخرائط والأشكال والرسم بالحبر الصيني على ورق «شفاف» حتى تكون صالحة للطباعة. أما الصور الفوتوغرافية فيراعى أن تكون مطبوعة على ورق لماع، وإذا كانت ملونة فلا بد من تقديم الشريحة الأصلية.
- ٦ - يراعى وضع خطوط متعرجة تحت العناوين الجانبية، وكذلك الألفاظ والعبارات التي يراد طبعها بنقط ثقيل.
- ٧ - تكتب في قائمة المصادر كل التفاصيل المتعلقة بكل مصنف من حيث اسم المؤلف كاملاً مبتدأ بالكنية أو الاسم الأخير، وعنوان المصنف تحت خط متعرج وذكر الأجزاء أو المجلدات واسم المحقق أو المترجم ورقم الطبعة، ومكان النشر ثم اسم المطبعة أو دار النشر، ثم سنة النشر ويتبع في قائمة المصادر النظام الآتي: الطبري، أبو جعفر محمد بن جرير.
- تاريخ الرسل والملوك، تحقيق محمد أبو الفضل إبراهيم، ط٣، مصر، دار المعارف، د. ت.
- جامع البيان في تأويل القرآن، تحقيق محمد محمود شاكر، ط٢، دار المعارف بمصر. د. ت.
- الشايب، أحمد، تاريخ النقائض في الشعر العربي، ط٣، القاهرة، مكتبة النهضة المصرية، ١٩٦٦.

٨ - تثبت الهوامش على النحو التالي :
يذكر لقب المؤلف ثم الجزء ثم رقم الصفحة ، وإذا كان للمؤلف أكثر من مصنف في البحث
فيذكر لقب المؤلف ثم عنوان المصنف ، ثم يليه الجزء ، ثم رقم الصفحة ، ويتبع في الحواشي
النظام الآتي :

- الطبري ، تاريخ الرسل والملوك ، ج ٣ ، ص ٩١ .

- الطبري ، جامع البيان في تأويل القرآن ، ج ٢ ، ص ١٢٠ .

- الشايب ، ص ٤٠ .

٩ - توضع أرقام التوثيق بين قوسين وترتب متسلسلة حتى نهاية البحث ، فإذا انتهت أرقام التوثيق
في الصفحة الأولى عند الرقم (٦) يبدأ التوثيق في الصفحة الثانية بالرقم (٧) وهكذا .

١٠ - أصول البحوث التي تصل للحوليات لا ترد ولا تسترجع سواء نشرت أو لم تنشر .

١١ - لا تقبل الحوليات البحوث التي سبق نشرها ، كما لا يجوز نشر البحوث في مجلات علمية
أخرى بعد إقرار نشرها في الحوليات إلا بعد الحصول على إذن كتابي بذلك من رئيس تحرير
الحوليات .

١٢ - عند طباعة البحث المقبول للنشر على المؤلف أن يقوم بمراجعة تجربة الطب الأخيرة بمطابقتها
على الأصل ، مع مراعاة عدم إجراء أي تغييرات فيها تختلف عما ورد في الأصل ، سواء
بالإضافة أو الحذف .

١٣ - تمنح إدارة الحوليات لمؤلف كل بحث منشور ثلاثين نسخة مجانية من بحثه .

١٤ - ترسل البحوث وجميع المراسلات الخاصة بالحوليات إلى :

رئيسة تحرير حوليات كلية الآداب

كلية الآداب - جامعة الكويت

ص. ب : ١٧٣٧٠ الخالدية

رمز بريدي : 72454

الكويت

الرسالة التاسعة والتسعون

نبني للغرباء القوميتنا

دراسة حالة من التحديات
في دولتين ناميتين (الجزائر وتونس)
ومقاطعة كويك بكندا

د. محمود الجبيل الذواوي

كلية العلوم الاجتماعية والإنسانية - الجامعة التونسية

حوليات كلية الآداب - الحولية الخامسة عشر - ١٤١٥ هـ - ١٩٩٥ م

المؤلف

د. محمود الحبيب الذوايدي كلية العلوم الاجتماعية والإنسانية -
جامعة تونس.

— دكتوراه في علم الاجتماع - جامعة مونتريال، ١٩٧٩.

— درّس علم الاجتماع وعلم الإجرام وعلم النفس في عدة جامعات منذ
عام ١٩٧٤ عربية وأجنبية.

— نشر عدة دراسات اجتماعية باللغات العربية والانجليزية والفرنسية.

— صدرت له أربعة كتب إثنان منها باللغة العربية بين تأليف منفرد
ومشاركة.

١ — دراست في «التخلف الآخر» في مجتمعات الوطن العربي والعالم
الثالث تونس ١٩٩١.

٢ — شارك في كتاب نحو علم اجتماع عربي بيرون ١٩٨٦ وإثنان
باللغة الانجليزية (مشاركة).

٣ — globalization, knowledge and society, London - Sage Publication,
1990

٤ — Capitalism and Development (Routledge London, 1993-1994).

الملخص

تُعالج هذه الدراسة موضوع عملية تبني اللغة القومية في المجتمعين الجزائري والتونسي من العالم الثالث من ناحية وفي مجتمع مقاطعة كويبيك Québec من العالم المتقدم من ناحية أخرى. نُركز هنا تحليلنا على دور القيادة السياسية الحاكمة في نجاح أو تعثر عملية تبني اللغة في كل من هذه المجتمعات الثلاثة. فوقعت الدراسة على ثلاثة عوامل (متغيرات) يُفترض أنها ذات ثقل بالنسبة لعملية تبني اللغة. هذه المؤثرات الثلاثة هي: التكوين الثقافي لأعضاء القيادة السياسية والتكوين الثقافي لرئيس القيادة والانتفاء الأيديولوجي للقيادة ككل. فاتضح من معطيات الدراسة أن دور العامل الأيديولوجي هو الأكثر حسماً سلباً أو إيجاباً في عملية تبني اللغة في هذه المجتمعات الثلاثة.

صدر من هذه الحوليات

الحولية الأولى لعام ١٩٨٠ :

- ١ - الجذور الفلسفية للبنائية
 - ٢ - صفحات مجهولة من تاريخ ليبيا
 - ٣ - ابن قلاؤس، حياته وشعره
 - ٤ - الأمير تنكر الحسامي
 - ٥ - التدرج الطبقي الاجتماعي في بعض الأقطار العربية (باللغة الإنجليزية)
- د. فؤاد زكريا
د. محمد عيسى صالحية
د. سهام الفريح
د. حياة ناصر الحجري
د. خلدون حسن النقيب

الحولية الثانية لعام ١٩٨١ :

- ٦ - علي أحمد باكثير
 - ٧ - تحليل أخطاء الطلبة العرب في استعمال أدوات التعريف والتنكير
 - ٨ - دولة الماليك ودولة مغول القفجاق
 - ٩ - المرأة والفلسفة
- د. محمد عبده
د. نايف خرما
د. حياة ناصر الحجري
د. محمود رجب

الحولية الثالثة لعام ١٩٨٢ :

- ١٠ - الروابط العائلية القرابية في مجتمع الكويت المعاصر
 - ١١ - البيئة والسلوك
 - ١٢ - عالمية الحضارة الإسلامية ومظاهرها في الفنون
 - ١٣ - لورنس ومحفوظ، دراسة أدبية سيكولوجية، مقارنة
 - ١٤ - آل قدامة والصالحية
- د. فهد الثاقب الثاقب
د. طلعت منصور
د. صلاح الدين البحيري
د. محمد رجا الدريني
د. شاكر مصطفى

الحولية الرابعة لعام ١٩٨٣ :

- ١٥ - أسلوب إذ في ضوء الدراسات القرآنية والنحوية
 - ١٦ - مفهوم التفسير في العلم من زاوية منطقية
 - ١٧ - العمل الاجتماعي في المجال التربوي
 - ١٨ - وحدة ميتافيزيقيا أرسطو ومنزلة الرياضيات فيها
 - ١٩ - مفهوم التهكم عند كيركجور
- د. عبدالعال سالم مكرم
د. عزمي موسى إسلام
د. جلال الدين الغزاوي
د. أبو يعرب المرزوقي
د. إمام عبدالفتاح

الحولية الخامسة لعام ١٩٨٤ :

- ٢٠ - نظرة في قرينة الأعراب، في الدراسات النحوية القديمة والحديثة
 - ٢١ - الأخرويات الإسلامية في الكوميديا الإلهية (باللغة الإنجليزية)
- د. محمد صلاح الدين بكر
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- ٢٢ - تسع وثائق في شئون الحسبة على المساجد في الأندلس
 ٢٣ - مشروع سوريا الكبرى وعلاقتها بضم الضفة الغربية
 ٢٤ - مفاهيم العلاج النفسي وأنماط التفاعل داخل الأسر المريضة (النشأة والتطور)

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- ٢٥ - نحة القيروان
 ٢٦ - من وثائق الحرم القدسي الشريف المملوكية
 ٢٧ - الفصاحة : مفهومها وبم تتحقق قيمها الجمالية
 ٢٨ - مشكلة التأويل العقلي عند مفكري الإسلام في الشرق العربي وخاصة عند ابن سينا .
 ٢٩ - واقع التاريخ في رواية وجوب العنف (باللغة الانجليزية)
 ٣٠ - مكانة رواية روبنسون كروزو في القصص الايطوبوي (باللغة الانجليزية)

- ٣١ - مفهوم المعنى «دراسة تحليلية»
 ٣٢ - الوصايا ومدى تطورها في العصر العباسي الأول

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- ٣٣ - بردة البوصيري قراءة أدبية وفلكورية
 ٣٤ - الارشاد النفسي تطور مفهومه وتميزه
 ٣٥ - اتجاهات الآباء والأمهات الكويتيين في تنشئة الأبناء وعلاقتها ببعض المتغيرات
 ٣٦ - علم العمران الخلدوني وعلم الاجتماع الحديث (باللغة الانجليزية)
 ٣٧ - قبيلة تميم العربية بين الجاهلية والإسلام
 ٣٨ - عيوب الكلام، دراسة لما يعاب في الكلام عند اللغويين العرب
 ٣٩ - المواقع الإسلامية المندثرة في وادي حلي
 ٤٠ - البحر في شعر الأندلس والمغرب

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- ٤١ - البيئة المائية في الأردن (باللغة الانجليزية)
 ٤٢ - وثائق جديدة عن حملة سنان باشا إلى اليمن (سنة ٩٧٦هـ / ٦٨ - ١٥٦٩م).
 ٤٣ - التوجيه والارشاد النفسي للأطفال غير العاديين (دراسة تحليلية)
 ٤٤ - المراحل الارتقائية لمنهجية الفكر العربي الإسلامي

حوليات كلية الآداب

- ٤٥ - عبدالله بن سبأ دراسة للروايات التاريخية عن دوره في الفتنة
٤٦ - ضمائر الغيبة أصولها وتطورها
٤٧ - قبيلة إياد منذ العصر الجاهلي حتى نهاية العصر الأموي
٤٨ - تاريخ العلاقات التجارية بين الهند ومنطقة الخليج العربي في العصري الحديث

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- ٤٩ - أضواء على ملكة سبأ
٥٠ - دراسة سوسولوجية حول ظاهرة الشيخوخة ودور الخدمة الاجتماعية
٥١ - هجرة الكفاءات العلمية العربية ودور مجلس التعاون في الإفادة منها
٥٢ - الفتح الإسلامي لبلاد وادي السند
٥٣ - الدولة والتجارة في العصر البيزنطي الأوسط
٥٤ - مدن التنمية في فلسطين المحتلة
٥٥ - الغزو الفرنسي للجزائر في وثيقة أمريكية معاصرة
٥٦ - رحلات جلفر الرحلة إلى ليليبوت

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- ٥٧ - التغير الاجتماعي في المدن المنتجة للنفط (مجتمع الكويت)
٥٨ - حركة مسيلمة الحنفي
٥٩ - الجاحظ والتقد الأدبي
٦٠ - التقليد والتحديث في تعليم اللغات الأجنبية
٦١ - الأحوال السياسية والدينية في بلاد العراق والمشرق الإسلامي في عهد الخليفة القائم بأمر الله العباسي (٤٢٢ - ٤٦٧ هـ / ١٠٣١ - ١٠٧٥ م)
٦٢ - تأملات في بعض ظواهر الحذف الصرفي
٦٣ - نجاح الشيخ أحمد الجابر في الإفادة من التنافس الإنجليزية الأمريكي بشأن نفط الكويت
٦٤ - المدخل السلوكي لدراسة اللغة في ضوء الدراسات والاتجاهات الحديثة (في علم اللغة)
٦٥ - جغرافية الحضار
- د. نورة الفلاح
د. إحسان صدقي العماد
د. ودیعة طه النجم
د. نايف عمر خرما
د. فوزي حسن الشايب
د. فوزي حسن الشايب
د. ميمونة خليفة العذبي الصباح
د. مصطفى زكي التوني
د. وليد عبدالله عبدالعزيز المنيس

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- ٦٦ - النظرية الاستبدالية للاستعارة
 ٦٧ - النفط والنمو الحضري بدولة الكويت
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 ٦٩ - الاقطاع في العالم الإسلامي
 ٧٠ - الجوار في الشعر العربي حتى العصر الأموي
 ٧١ - الحدود البيزنطية الإسلامية وتنظيماتها الثغرية
 (٤٠ - ٣٣٩هـ / ٦٦٠ - ٩٥٠م)
 ٧٢ - خبرات الكويت : توزيعها، نشأتها، تصنيفها
- د. يوسف مسلم أبو العدوس
 د. أمل يوسف العذبي الصباح
 د. غازي مختار طليمات
 د. محمود إسماعيل
 د. مرزوق بن صنيان بن تنباك
 د. عبدالرحمن محمد
 عبد الغني
 د. عبدالحميد أحمد كليب

الحولية الثانية عشرة لعام ١٩٩٢ :

- ٧٣ - بنو سليمان : حكام المخلاف السليماني وعلاقاتهم بجيرانهم
 ٧٤ - نهاية الأرب في شرح لأمية العرب للشنفرى بن مالك الأزدي
 ٧٥ - أفلاطون . . والمرأة
 ٧٦ - الخبز في الحضارة العربية الإسلامية
 ٧٧ - الاتجاه نحو الدين
 ٧٨ - دوار الشعب لم يعد موجوداً
 ٧٩ - الانثروبولوجيا السياسية
 ٨٠ - سدوس وتحصيناتها الدفاعية
- د. أحمد بن عمر الزيلعي
 د. عبدالله محمد الغزالي
 أ. د. إمام عبدالفتاح إمام
 د. إحسان صدقي العميد
 د. نزار مهدي الطائي
 د. شفيقة بستكي
 د. سليمان خلف
 د. محمد عبدالستار عثمان

الحولية الثالثة عشرة لعام ١٩٩٣ :

- ٨١ - إلغاء الصفة القانونية للرق في سلطنة زنجبار العربية
 ٨٢ - مشكلة الحدود الكويتية بين الدولتين العثمانية والبريطانية
 ٨٣ - جغرافية الحضر عند المدارس الغربية
 ٨٤ - علل التغيير اللغوي
 ٨٥ - رحلات جلفر
 ٨٦ - آداب الشعر العربي القديم
 ٨٧ - المصريون النوبيون في الكويت
 - النظرية النقدية لمدرسة فرانكفورت
- د. بنيان سعود تركي
 د. ميمونة خليفة الصباح
 د. وليد عبدالله عبدالعزيز المنيس
 د. مصطفى زكي التوني
 د. محمد رجا عبدالرحمن الدريني
 د. مرزوق بن صنيان بن تنباك
 د. السيد أحمد حامد
 د. عبدالغفار مكاوي

حوليات كلية الاداب

الحولية الرابعة عشرة لعام ١٩٩٤ :

- ٨٩ - الفجوة الزمنية بين الأشعة الشمسية والحرارة
أ. د. محمد بن عبدالله الجراش
- ٩٠ - الدراسة التطورية للقلق
د. أحمد محمد عبدالحالق
- ٩١ - اللباس في عصر الرسول صلى الله عليه وسلم
د. محمد بن فارس الجميل
- دراسة مستمدة من مصادر الحديث النبوي الشريف
- ٩٢ - الأغماط الشائعة لأدوار الرجل والمرأة
د. سهام الفريح
- ٩٣ - التحليل العاملي للسلوك الدراسي
د. العادل أبو علام
- المرتبط بالتحصيل الأكاديمي
- ٩٤ - الاغتراب في الشعر الكويتي
د. سعاد عبدالوهاب عبدالرحمن
- ٩٥ - فنونولوجية الاتصال الوجيه
د. عبدالله الطويرقي
- ٩٦ - سياسات الاتصال في دولة الكويت
د. نبيل عارف الجردي
- علي دشتي

الحولية الخامسة عشرة لعام ١٩٩٥ :

- ٩٧ - موقف البيزنطيين والفاطميين من ظهور الأتراك
د. عبدالرحمن محمد العبدالغني
- السلاجقة بمنطقة الشرق الأدنى الإسلامي
- ٩٨ - موقف المشاهدين في دولة الكويت من القناة الفضائية
د. محمد معوض ابراهيم
- المصرية بعد التحرير
د. ياسين طه الياسين


قسمة تقييم آراء القاريء

عزيزي القاريء

أسرة تحرير الحوليات ترحب بك وتتقدم لك بأطيب التحيات شاكرين لك سلفاً تعاونك من أجل تطوير هذه الحوليات وذلك من خلال اجابتك عن هذه الاسئلة :-

- عمر القاريء: ☐ ٢٠ - ☐ ٣٥ ☐ ٣٦ - ☐ ٤٥ ☐ ٤٥ + ☐
- الجنس: ذكر ☐ أنثى ☐
- بلد الاقامة: الكويت ☐ خارج الكويت ☐
- التعليم: ثانوي ☐ جامعي ☐ ماجستير ☐ دكتوراة ☐
- طبيعة المهنة: اداري ☐ أكاديمي ☐ مهني ☐ أخرى ☐
- مواضيعك المفضلة: لغوية ☐ اجتماعية ☐ تاريخية ☐ ادبية ☐ متنوعة ☐
- ١- كيف تحصل على الحوليات؟
☐ شراء ☐ اشتراك ☐ استعارة ☐
- ٢- هل تصلك الحوليات في الوقت المناسب؟
☐ نعم ☐ لا
- ٣- ما رأيك بحجم الحوليات؟
☐ مناسب ☐ كبير ☐ صغير
- ٤- كيف ترى مواضيع الحوليات؟
☐ متنوعة ☐ غير متنوعة
- ٥- ما هو الطابع العام للحوليات؟
☐ لغوي ☐ اجتماعي ☐ تاريخي ☐ جغرافي ☐ متنوع
- ٦- هل تقرأ الحوليات بانتظام؟
☐ نعم ☐ لا ☐ أحياناً
- ٧- هل تقرأ الحوليات فقط إذا كان موضوعها له علاقة بتخصصك؟
☐ نعم ☐ لا
- ٨- هل تقرأ الحوليات فقط إذا كنت ستستعين بمادتها كمرجع لبحث؟
☐ نعم ☐ لا
- ٩- هل تحتفظ بالحوليات بعد قراءتها؟
☐ نعم ☐ لا ☐ أحياناً
- ١٠- شعار الحوليات على الغلاف هل يتناسب وطبيعة الحوليات؟
☐ نعم ☐ لا
- ١١- ما مقياسك لنوع طباعة الحوليات؟
☐ جيد ☐ متوسط ☐ ضعيف
- ١٢- ما رأيك بسعر الحوليات؟
☐ مرتفع ☐ قليل ☐ مناسب
- ١٣- اقتراحات ترى أنها تساعد على تطوير الحوليات وخدماتها للقاريء؟





قسم الاشتراكات
حوليات كلية الاداب

ص.ب : ١٧٣٧٠ الخالدبة
الكويت 72454

البريد الجوي
**BY AIR MAIL
PAR AVION**

قسمة اشتراك

يرجى اعتماد اشتراكى فى المجلد لمدة

☐ سنة واحدة ☐ سنتان ☐ ثلاث سنوات ☐ أربع سنوات
بعدد () نسخة

ارفق طية قيمة الاشتراك نقداً/ شيك

☐ رجاء الاشعار بالاستلام و/أو ☐ ارسال الفاتورة

الاسم :

المهنة/ الوظيفة :

العنوان :

.....

.....

التاريخ / / التوقيع



مجلة دراسات الخليج والجزيرة العربية

تصدر عن
جامعة الكويت

رئيس التحرير

د. سمير خليفه (الغزالي)

المقر: جامعة الكويت - الشويخ

هاتف: ٨١٦٨٠٧

٨١٦٧٩٩

٨١٦٨٢٤

٨١٤٢٩٥

- مجلة علمية فصلية محكمة تصدر ٤ مرات في السنة.
- بالإضافة الى اصدارات خاصة في المناسبات.
- تعنى بشئون منطقة الخليج والجزيرة العربية السياسية، الاقتصادية، الاجتماعية، الثقافية، والعلمية.
- صدر العدد الاول في يناير ١٩٧٥.
- تقوم المجلة باصدار ما يأتي:
 - (أ) مجموعة من المنشورات المتخصصة عن منطقة الخليج والجزيرة العربية.
 - (ب) مجموعة من الاصدارات الخاصة والمتعلقة بمنطقة الخليج والجزيرة العربية.
 - (ج) سلسلة كتب وثائق الخليج والجزيرة العربية.
- عقد الندوات التي تهتم المنطقة او المساهمة فيها واصدارها في كتب.
- يغطي توزيعها ما يزيد على ٣٠ دولة في جميع انحاء العالم.

• الاشتراك السنوي بالمجلة

- (أ) داخل الكويت: ٢ د.ك. للأفراد - ١٢ د.ك. للمؤسسات.
- (ب) الدول العربية: ٢٠٠٠ د.ك. للأفراد - ١٢٠٠ د.ك. للمؤسسات.
- (ج) الدول الأجنبية: ١٥ دولاراً للأفراد - ٤٠ دولاراً للمؤسسات.

جميع المراسلات توجه باسم رئيس التحرير على العنوان الآتي:

ص.ب: ١٧-٧٣ - الخالدية - الكويت - الرمز البريدي 72451



المجلة التربوية

تصدر عن كلية التربية - جامعة الكويت

مجلة فصلية - تخصصية - محكمة

رئيس هيئة التحرير

د. عبد المحسن حمادة

تنشر البحوث التربوية، ومراجعات الكتب التربوية الحديثة
ومحاضر الحوار التربوي، والتقارير عن المؤتمرات التربوية

* تقبل البحوث باللغة العربية

* تنشر لأساتذة التربية والمختصين فيها من مختلف الأقطار العربية
والدول الأجنبية

الاشتراكات:	للأفراد في الكويت	د. ٢	وللطلاب	د. ١
	للأفراد في الوطن العربي	د. ٢,٥	وللطلاب	د. ١,٥
	للأفراد في الدول الأخرى	١٥ دولارا	أمريكا بالبريد الجوي	
	للهيئات والمؤسسات	د. ١٢	وفي الخارج	٤٥ دولارا أمريكا.

توجه جميع المراسلات باسم رئيس التحرير على العنوان التالي:
المجلة التربوية - ص. ب ١٣٢٨١ كيفان - الرمز البريدي 71953 الكويت
فاكس: ٤٨٣٧٧٩٤ هاتف: (٤٤٠٣) - (٤٤٠٩) ٤٨٤٦٨٤٣

مجلة العلوم الاجتماعية

تصدر عن مجلس النشر العلمي - جامعة الكويت

فصلية أكاديمية تعنى بنشر الأبحاث والدراسات في تخصصات
السياسة - الاقتصاد - الاجتماع - علم النفس الاجتماعي
الأنثروبولوجيا الاجتماعية والجغرافيا الثقافية

رئيس التحرير: د. جعفر عباس حاجي

تأسست عام 1973

ثمن العدد

الكويت (500) فلس، السعودية (10) ريال، قطر (10) ريال، الامارات (10) درهم، البحرين (1-) دينار، عُمان (1-) ريال، لبنان (2000) ليرة، الأردن (750) فلساً، تونس (1,5) دينار، الجزائر (15) دينار، اليمن الجنوبي (600) فلس، ليبيا (2) دينار، مصر (3) جنيه، السودان (1,5) جنيه، سوريا (50) ليرة، اليمن الشمالي (15) ريالاً، المغرب (20) درهماً، المملكة المتحدة (1) جنيه.

الاشتراكات

للافراد	سنة	للمؤسسات	سنة
الكويت	2 د.ك	الكويت والبلاد العربية	15 د.ك
الدول العربية	2,5 د.ك	في الخارج	60 دولاراً
البلاد الاخرى	15 دولاراً		

* تدفع اشتراكات الأفراد مقدماً

(1) إما بشيك لأمر المجلة مسحوباً على أحد المصارف الكويتية.

(2) أو بتحويل مصرفي لحساب مجلة العلوم الاجتماعية رقم (07101685) لدى بنك الخليج فرع العدلية.

* اشتراكك لأكثر من سنة يمنحك فرصة الحصول على أحد أعداد المجلة الخاصة بأزمة الخليج أو أحد

أعداد المجلة القديمة.



ص.ب.: 27780 الصفاة - الكويت 13055

فاكس: 4836026 - هاتف: 4836026
4810436

توجه جميع المراسلات إلى: رئيس التحرير

مجلة العلوم الاجتماعية - جامعة الكويت

مجلة الحقوق

مجلة فصلية أكاديمية محكمة تعنى بنشر الأبحاث
والدراسات القانونية والشرعية
تصدر عن مجلس النشر العلمي - جامعة الكويت

رئيس التحرير
الدكتور مبارك عبدالعزیز النویبت

صدر العدد الأول في يناير ١٩٧٧

الإشتراكات

في الكويت : ديناران للأفراد ، وعشرون ديناراً للمؤسسات
في الدول العربية : ثلاثة دنائير للأفراد ، وعشرون ديناراً للمؤسسات
في الدول الأجنبية : ثلاثة دنائير ونصف للأفراد ، وعشرون ديناراً للمؤسسات

المراسلات

توجه جميع المراسلات إلى رئيس التحرير على العنوان التالي:

مجلة الحقوق - جامعة الكويت

ص.ب : ٥٤٧٦ الصفاة 13055 الكويت

تلفون : ٤٨٣٥٧٨٩ - فاكس : ٤٨٣١١٤٣



المجلة العربية للعلوم الادارية

تصدر عن مجلتي النشر العلمي - جامعة الكويت

رئيس التحرير سالم مرزوق الطحيح جامعة الكويت دولة الكويت

هيئة تحرير المجلة

احمد عبد الفتاح عبد الحليم	جامعة الامارات العربية المتحدة دولة الامارات العربية المتحدة
احمد عبد الله الصباب	جامعة الملك عبد العزيز المملكة العربية السعودية
شوقي حسين عبد الله	جامعة القاهرة جمهورية مصر العربية
صادق محمد البسام	جامعة الكويت دولة الكويت

* تقبل المجلة الأبحاث الأصلية والمبتكرة في نطاق العلوم الادارية الأساسية والمجالات الأخرى ذات الصلة وذلك بما يعود بالنفع على الباحثين والممارسين في مجال الادارة ، التمويل والاستثمار ، التسويق ، نظم المعلومات الادارية ، الاساليب الكمية في الادارة ، الادارة الصناعية ، الادارة العامة ، المحاسبة ، الاقتصاد الاداري ، وغيرها من المجالات المرتبطة بتطوير المعرفة والممارسات الادارية.

* تخضع كافة الأبحاث المنشورة للتحكيم من قبل هيئة تحرير المجلة وإثنين أو أكثر من المتخصصين من ذوي الخبرة البحثية والمكانة العلمية المتميزة. وفي جميع الأحوال يتم التحكيم بشكل سري ، الأمر الذي يتطلب من الباحثين عدم إظهار ما يشير الى هويتهم في صلب البحث.

* تشمل المجلة الأبواب التالية:

- . الأبحاث .
- . التقارير العلمية التقييمية .
- . ملخصات الرسائل الجامعية .
- . الندوات والمؤتمرات .
- . الحالات العملية .

توجه المراسلات باسم رئيس التحرير على العنوان التالي:

المجلة العربية للعلوم الادارية - جامعة الكويت ص.ب ٢٨٥٥٨ الصلة

هاتف / فاكس : ٢٥٢٨١٣١ [٩٦٥]



فصلية - محكمة
تصدر عن مجلس النشر العلمي
جامعة الكويت

- صدر
العدد الأول
في يناير ١٩٨١

- تلبي رغبة الأكاديميين
والمتقنين من خلال
نشرها للبحوث الأصلية
في شتى فروع العلوم
الإنسانية باللغتين العربية
والإنجليزية، إضافة إلى
الأبواب الأخرى
الندوات، المناقشات
مراجعات الكتب،
التقارير.

المجلة العربية
للملوم الإنسانية

- نحرص
على حضور
دائم في شتى
المراكز الأكاديمية
والجامعات في العالم
العربي والغربي، من خلال
المشاركة الفعالة للأساتذة
المختصين في تلك المراكز
والجامعات.

الاشتراكات

الكويت
٣ دنانير للأفراد
ديناران للطلاب،
١٤ ديناراً للمؤسسات.

• • •
الدول العربية،
٤,٥ دينار كويتي للأفراد،
١٦ ديناراً للمؤسسات.

• • •
الدول الأجنبية،
٢٠ دولاراً للأفراد،
٦٠ دولاراً
للمؤسسات.

رئيسة التحرير
د. و. حبة نصر المحجي

توجه المراسلات إلى رئيس التحرير: ص.ب ٢٦٥٨٥ الصفاف
رمز بريدي 13126 الكويت
المقر: كلية الآداب - السويخ
هاتف: ١١٦٦١٩ - ١١٦٢٦١ - ١١٥٤٥٣ - فاكس: ١١٢٥١٤

مَجَلَّةُ الشَّرْعِ وَالْإِسْلَامِ
عِلْمِيَّةٌ مُحْكَمَةٌ تَعْنِي بِالْبَحْثِ وَالدراساتِ الإسلاميةِ
تُصدرُ عن مجلسِ النشرِ العامِّ في جامعةِ الكويتِ كلَّ ثلاثةِ أشهرٍ
رئيسُ التحرير: الدكتورُ عَجِيلُ جاسمُ النُشَيْي

تُشتملُ على:

- ★ بحوثٌ في مختلفِ العلومِ الإسلاميةِ .
- ★ دراساتٌ قضائيةً إسلاميةً معاصرة .
- ★ مراجعاتُ كتبٍ شرعيةٍ معاصرة .
- ★ فتاوى شرعية .
- ★ تقاريرٌ وتعليقاتٌ على قضايا علمية .

الاشتراكات:

للأفراد ٣ دنانير داخل الكويت - ١٠ دولارات أمريكية خارج الكويت
للمؤسسات والشركات ١٣ ديناراً داخل الكويت
٤٥ دولاراً أمريكياً خارج الكويت

جميع المراسلات توجه به باسم رئيس التحرير

ص.ب: ١٧١٣٣ - الرمز البريدي: 72455 الخالدية

الكويت - هاتف: ٤٨١٢٥٠٤ - بدالة: ٤٨٤٦٨٤٣ : ٤٧٢٣

فاكس: ٤٨١٢٥٠٤

nationalization in these three societies heavily depended on the nature of the ideological outlook of each leadership. In other words, the **political ideology** appears to be the moving force in the engineering of developing and developed societies. As such, the familiarity with the ideology of the political leadership could help us **more than** anything else to understand and predict its decisions. (94) This conclusion is in accordance with perspective of the **Verstehen Socialogie** of Max Weber. The latter stressed the crucial importance of the impact of subjective factors in the shaping of human behaviour. **Objective** linguistic, cultural, and structural factors in independent Tunisia would favor more the easy implementation of gobal Arabization in the Tunisian society than in the Algerian society. But it has been demonstrated in this study that the **ideolgy** of the political leadership in power has made the **difference** between Tunisia and Algeria as far as the Arabization process is concerned. The same is true of language nationalization in Quebec. The Parti Quebecois has succeeded more than l'Union nationale and the Liberal party in the promotion of the French language in Quebec. The difference lies in the ideology of the Parti Quebecois political leadership. Its ideology has a different project for the Quebecer Society.

(94) The predominant French educational background of the Algerian leadership had not hampered, as expected, the process of Arabization. This was due, as explained, to the intervening of the ideological factor of the political leadership.

policies of their languages and cultures. Both have sought the Self-Development model.

Conclusion

A typology of three patterns of ideology could be drawn as far as the political leaderships in question are concerned: (1) The Tunisian leadership subscribes to an ideology whose aspirations are to achieve Western oriented type of modernization. This was not **totally** consistent with the linguistic and cultural background of both the political leadership as a whole and its leader, as mentioned. They had **unbalanced** educational background. However, the soft type french colonization which the Tunisian people experienced may have played a role in making the Tunisian leadership opt for keeping good ties with France. In addition, **The pro-West ideology** of the Tunisian leadership is crucial factor for the hesitant Arabization process in the modern Tunisian society. And (2) The ideology of the Algerian political leadership during Boumediene's reign strongly advocated liberation from the dependency of the former colonizer and the establishment of independent Self-Development. That type of ideology was essentially the outcome of : (a) the harsh nature of the French colonization in Algeria and (b) president Boumediene committed Arab-Islamic background which contributed to shape the ideological orientation of the Algerian leadership. (3) The ideology of the Parti Quebecois's ruling governments aspires to accomplish separation from Canada, the ownership of Quebec resources by the Quebecois. This was not in contradiction with the linguistic and cultural background of both Rene Lesveques, the leader, and the whole political leadership. Furthermore, this ideological line was in harmony with the type of the semi-colonial experience which Quebec had known under the British colonization after 1760.⁽⁹³⁾

It is clear from what has been outlined in this study that the political decision of the three leaderships concerning the languages

(93) Projet de Souveraineté op.

results were not, however, in favour of the separation option. In spite of this, the Parti Quebecois under Parizeau's leadership continues to advocate separation from Canada.

The slogan "Matres Chez Nous" led to the adoption of a number of policies on the part of most recent governments of Quebec to reinforce nationalization processes of natural and economic resources. Attempts have been made as well to integrate more forcefully Quebec manpower and know-how in economic sectors.

The Quebec leadership has on the whole adopted a global development project which resembles very much the social democratic model used in some contemporary European countries like Sweden. Finally, the third principle of the Parti Quebecois leadership was partially crystallized because the adoption of the language legislation law called Bill 101. The latter makes of the French the official language of Quebec. It is the language of all public signs and advertisements across the Province.⁽⁹²⁾ It is as well the language which must be taught in schools to all immigrant children whose mother tongue is not English. Le Conseil de La Langue Francaise was created in order to supervise the compliance of individuals, groups and organizations with the clauses of Bill 101 and take legal means to reinforce the language Law. It was intended by this Bill 101 to make, on the one hand, Quebec French as Ontario is English, and on the other, to reduce to a minimum the linguistic and cultural English threat which Quebec faces on two fronts: The American and the English Canadian fronts.

It is against this background, that the points of similarities between the ideologies of the Algerian and the Quebecois leaderships appear to be much stronger. Both political leaderships advocate the end of economic and cultural dependency on "The Other": France and English Canada. Both leaderships have also taken a number of policies to strengthen the basic national cultural foundations of the Algerian and the Quebecer national personalities through an aggressive nationalization and promotion

(92) Bourassa's liberal party announced in Dec 1991 that it may cancel Bill 178 dealing with language public signs.

type of development which is strongly influenced by the Arab Islamic vision.⁽⁸⁹⁾

From the Tunisian and the Algerian experiences of Arabization, one could draw the following conclusion: the bilingualism/biculturalism of the political leadership interacted in two ways with its ideology: (1) There was a sort of harmony between the ideology and the linguistic/cultural background and (2) There was disharmony between them. This means that **the variable of bilingualism/biculturalism did not affect in a linear deterministic manner, both the Arabization process decision and the ideological outlook of the political leaderships** as illustrated in the Tunisian and the Algerian leaderships.

XVI . Quebec's Political Leadership And The Nationalization Of The French Language

Given the importance of the role of the ideology of the political Leadership in language nationalization process, as we have seen, the understanding of the decision of Quebec's leadership to francize the Quebecer society would require the examination of the nature of its ideology. The ideology of the Parti Quebecois under Rene Lesvequ's leadership had three principles: (1) the separation from the rest of Canada (2) Self-Development and modernization according to the slogan "Maitres chez nous": "Masters in our own country" and (3) the promotion of the cultural dimension of Quebec. ⁽⁹⁰⁾

With regard to the first principle, the Quebecois political leadership under the rule of the Partri Quebecois opted for seperation through democratic means.⁽⁹¹⁾ It had held a referendum in 1980 about La Belle Province seperation from Canada. The

(89) Again the ideological vision of the political leadership out maneuvers its educational background.

(90) Leclerc, J. langue et société, op. p. 460

(91) See the article : Projet de souveraineté du Parti Québécois in le Devoir (Montréal) le 10/09/88, p. A-9

be the final outcome of the bilingual/bicultural backgrounds of the two political leaderships, the linguistic/cultural education of their leaders and the nature of the colonial experience in Algeria and Tunisia. But the ideological outlooks do themselves influence directly or indirectly each of those factors. the latter affect in turn the ideologies of both political leaderships in question. In other words, there is a reciprocal exchange of influence between the political ideology and its components. The subtle nature of that interaction would ultimately influence the Arabization process. The variable of bilingualism/biculturalism of the political leadership was expected, as outlined before, to have its impact on the nature of the decision of the language nationalization process. The bilingualism/biculturalism of the Tunisian political leadership with its great sympathy with the French language and culture⁽⁸⁷⁾ were bound to contribute to the state of hesitation and setbacks which the Arabization decision had known under the Tunisian leadership under Bourguiba. the absence of a political decision in favor of Arabization was compatible with the Tunisian leadership's ideological outlook that desires its modernization project to be of the Western type.

In the Tunisian case, there is uneven reciprocal influence between the cultural background (bilingualism/biculturalism) of the political leadership, on the one hand, and its ideology of modernization, on the other. The impact of ideology appears to have outpowered that of bilingualism/biculturalism. Arabization was, thus, kept on hold during Bourguiba's reign.⁽⁸⁸⁾

As far as the Algerian political leadership is concerned, its predominant French linguistic and cultural background **did not** stop it from taking a political decision in favour of Arabization. This was somewhat a surprise given that type of educational background of the political leadership. As such, the Arabization process would have been motivated and influenced by the **political ideology** of the Algerian leadership whose philosophy was to establish socialist

(87) That is ideological inclination input affect.

(88) As we have stated earlier in the text, the weight of ideological factors and that of educational backgrounds on Arabization policies should not be looked at as equal.

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its reaction equal to it in power and opposite to it in the direction" could have hardly been at work in independent Tunisia under Bourguiba's political leadership.

, With regard to the ideology of development and liberation from the former colonizer dependency, the Tunisian political leadership under Bourguiba had always made attempts to keep special relationships with French and thus, avoids breaks off of relationships.⁽⁸³⁾ Those strong ties with France and its French language and culture should very likely have contributed to the unwillingness of the Tunisian leadership to take any firm decision in favor of Arabization. Since such a decision would mean somewhat the cut off of the Tunisian society's dependency relationship with the Metropole Society: The French society. That would imply eventually the dislocation of the Center/Periphery relation which had existed between France and Tunisia during the 75 years of colonization.⁽⁸⁴⁾ A Tunisian political decision in favor of Arabization would be also in contradiction with the ideological outlook of modernization as held by the political leadership under the reign of Bourguiba. Modernization, as pointed out, meant for that political leadership the preservation of the French language and culture, on the one hand, and the maintenance of strong ties with Western civilization in general; on the other.⁽⁸⁵⁾ We are here in face of **two different ideologies**. While the Algerian political leadership's ideology gives the priority to the option of independent Self-Development, the Tunisian leadership tends to be largely impressed by the Western model of modernization.⁽⁸⁶⁾ Both ideological perspectives appear to

(83) See footnote 66 above.

(84) The after independence Tunisian political leadership's great desire for Western modernization runs into two major problems (1) It is against the Self-development strategy and (2) On the political level, Western adopted modernization contradicts the system of Western modernization itself. The latter advocates the alination of political power. The Tunisian political leadership has never expressed seriously its willingness to do so since independence.

(85) See "Dependance et alinéation culturelle" in *Inépendance et interdépendance au Maghreb* par W.K. Ruf et autres, Paris, CNRS, 1974 pp. 233-279.

(86) As explained before, Tunisia is a good example where development has meant Westernization.

in Algeria as a bold manifestation of the Algerian revolutionary spirit.⁽⁸¹⁾ Given that the Algerian society was not that far from being culturally assimilated to the French language and culture, Arabization decision was a revolutionary gesture. Because cultural liberation has proven to be most difficult of all types of liberations. The experiences of most independent African countries show that their native languages have not yet been given their right place in their own societies. It was in that African context that the Arabization process in Algerian could be rightfully considered **revolutionary** in nature. This is certainly true when compared with Tunisia.

As outlined before, the story of Arabization in Tunisia was far from being identical with that of Algeria. The intricate interaction among the factors underlined above explain, to a great extent, the causes behind the stumbling policy of Arabization in the modern Tunisian society. the linguistic-cultural background of the former president Bourguiba was, as already stated, overwhelmingly biased in favor of the French language and culture. His nonenthusiastic or hostile attitude toward Arabization was not a surprise. As far as the experience of the Tunisian people with the French colonizers, it was in general less brutal and less violent. Because of its relative leniency, there were no hostile and extreme responses, as was the case of the Algerian response to the harsh French colonization, toward the French on the part of the Tunisian political leadership and people.⁽⁸²⁾ In other words, the law of physics "every action has

(81) A. Abdellatif : the sociology of revolution and its philosophy in the contemporary Algerian thought (in Arabic). In the Journal *Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi* no 117/1988 pp. 4-25.

(82) Bourguiba's extreme admiration of the west and great uneasiness/hostility with the Arab Islamic world defy rational explanation. First, he was not the only Arab or African leader who was educated in the west knows one or more of Western languages. Second, French colonizations' leniency and its short duration in Tunisia don't explain either Bourguiba's incredible fascination with France and the West in general Morocco for instance, had experienced a soft French Colonization and for a much shorter period of time (1912-56). But, Hassen II and his Father Mohamed before him are not known to have had similar admiration for the West as Bourguiba has had. As Jean Lacouture had put, Bourguiba admiration of the West is a unique case in the entire Arab world (see footnote 66 above). As such, an enlightening understanding of the personality of the former Tunisian president would require the intervention of the newly growing academic/scientific discipline of the Psychohistoriography. That is, the analysis of Bourguiba's history through the help of modern psychology's insights, concepts, theories etc... "

million lives. In other words, the French-Algerian confrontation was characterized, on the one hand, by a great deal of collective violence and rare dialogue, on the other. This was to a great extent, the opposite of what happened between the Tunisians and the French colonizers.

These three aspects of the Algerian and Tunisian struggles against the French occupation show very clearly that the Algerians paid a higher bill at all levels. These harsh realities should help further understand the nature of the Algerian leadership policy after independence. The policy was known for its desire of putting an end to dependency relationship particularly with France. This political orientation was compatible with the law of physics "every action has its reaction equal to it in power and opposite to it in its direction". This could, on the one side, account for the continuous pace of the Arabization process in Algeria and its hesitant process in Tunisia, on the other, during Boumediene and Bourguiba's ruling times.(79) It appears thus, that there was an **interaction** of a multitude of factors behind the Algerian political decision favoring Arabization. As pointed out, these factors were the strong Islamic-Arab cultural background of the president Houari Boumediene, the devastating French colonial impact on the Algerian society and the Algerian political Leadership's adoption of independent self-Development ideology.(80) The semi-inevitable outcome of the latter was the orientation of the Algerian political leadership toward the preservation of a minimum of ties with the former colonizer and the planning of the future of the Algerian society **away from dependency on France**. The pro-Arabization decision in Algeria ought to be seen as part of putting an end to the savage French cultural dependency which Algeria was subjected to under French occupation. Some analysts have considered the Arabization act

(78) Eudes, Y., *la Conquete des esprits*, Paris, Maspero, 1982.

(79) The pattern of Arabization in both countries remains practically the same under Ben Jedid and Ben Ali's reigns.

(80) The inclusion of militant Arabist-Islamist personalities in the Algerian political leadership during Boumediene's reign had certainly contributed to the consolidation of Arabization and Islamization of the Algerian society, as pointed out. This element has been generally absent from the Tunisian political leadership during and after Bourguiba's time.

with the expression "Département Français", to imply that Algeria was no more than a District/a Province of the bigger France. As such, The French colonizers had made efforts to integrate the Algerian society economically, militarily, administratively, politically and culturally to the French motherland. It was in this sense that the Francization policy of Algeria was aiming at the **undermining of the Algerian personality** through the disorganization of its basic Arab-Islamic foundations. From this perspective, the French colonization of Algeria was more brutal at all levels than that of Tunisia. By all accounts the French linguistic and cultural colonization of the Algerian society was indeed most devastating compared to the rest of the Maghrebian societies.⁽⁷⁵⁾ The French attempted to create a **total rupture** between the Algerian citizen and his Arabic language and his Arab-Islamic culture.⁽⁷⁶⁾ This had hardly been attempted by the English in their colonies.⁽⁷⁷⁾ The great interest of the French policy into the cultural dimension of colonization shows that the French colonizers had a clear view of the strategic importance of the **colonization of the mind of the colonized peoples**.⁽⁷⁸⁾ Its long term advantages were seen as superior to the military and the economic colonization. It was thought that only through the colonization of the minds of the Algerians that France could secure Algeria's dependency for a long time to come.

(3) What does distinguish the French colonization experience in Algeria from its counterpart in Tunisia was the nature of the liberation struggle fought against the French in these two Maghrebian societies. Comparatively speaking, the Tunisian liberation struggle was shorter than the Algerian one. The latter was much bloodier. The Algerian struggle costed the Algerians over one

(75) The rest of the Maghrebian societies which were colonized by France are : Morocco and Mauritania. Arabization in the pattern is not examined here for two reasons: (a) I am more familiar with language nationalization in Quebec, Algeria and Tunisia and (b) the political leaderships in Morocco in Mauritania is unlike the Algerian and the Tunisian political leaderships as far as the great enthusiasm of the lack of it toward Arabization.

(76) As mentioned in the main text of this study, the French authorities had issued a decree in 1938 making of Arabic as a foreign language throughout Algeria.

(77) Calvet, t.J., *linguistique et colonialisme* op. pp. 84-85

between Islam as a religion social system and the imperatives of the Socialism adopted then by the Algerian political leadership.⁽⁷⁴⁾

In order to identify the origin of the differences between the ideology of the Tunisian political leadership and that of its Algerian counterpart, we need to shed some light both on the background of these two Maghrebian societies, on the one hand, and their political leadership's before and after independence, on the other.

(1) The French colonization to Algeria was much longer (1930-1962) than that of Tunisia (1881-1956).

(2) French occupation of Algeria is often described as a long lasting immigration settlement in nature. That is to say, it was aiming at integrating Algeria into France: The Metropole Society. It was on this basis that the French authorities had referred to Algeria

(74) Lachref, M., *L'Algerie, nation et société* Alger, SNED, 1978. Arabization and Islamization of the Algerian society appear to be strong ideological themes of the Algerian political leaderships. This is in opposition to the ideological line of the Tunisian political leadership during Boumedienne's reign. This is in opposition to the ideological line of the Tunisian political leadership. On the one hand, the Algerian political leadership has been enthusiastic and committed to the Arab Islamic dimension of the Algerian collective personality. On the other, the Tunisian political leadership particularly during Bourguiba's rule was uncomfortable if not hostile to Arabism and Islamism. The Tunisian writer Saleh El Jourchi, referred to earlier, summarizes the Situation this way : "... Because of her admiration to Western culture and her hostility to its Arabic Islamic counterpart, the Tunisian political leadership has made many efforts to revive the Carthaginian and the Roman heritage of Tunisia. The Arab Muslim history was belittled and put down. Religion has been marginalized and ridiculed in official speeches and scientific institutions. Efforts have been deployed to theorize about the so called the Tunisian personality and the Tunisian nation. A very negative picture of the Arabs has been established in the mentalities of Tunisians. This latter have acquired a superiority complex toward the rest of the Arabs..." *Al-Wahda*, No. 86, Nov. 1991 p. 221. In our opinion, this ideological contrast between the two political leadership vis-a-vis Arabism and Islam should help explain today's political events (1991-92) on the Algerian and Tunisian scenes. On the one hand, the Algerian political leadership has recognized all Islamic oriented political parties as part of the political democratization of the country. The political leadership has also accepted the overwhelming electoral victory of the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS in French) in municipal and legislative elections since 1990. On the other, the Tunisian political leadership both under Bourguiba and Ben Ali has been opposing the recognition of any political party with Arabist or Islamic ideologies. The banning of the recognition of the so called "Annahta" as an Islamic inspired political party is a case in point. In other words, the monitoring of the dynamics of the Algerian and the Tunisian political scenes in the after independence era of these two - societies remains shortsighted and poorly insightful, if it fails to look at politics in Algeria and Tunisia through the pro and anti-Arabist Islamist ideologies of the two political leaderships discussed in this paper.

depends ultimately on the acquisition of modern languages and their cultures. No doubt, today's Japanese society is a modern society. It has become so not because of the wide spread use of English or/ and French and their cultures by the Japanese. What has really made Japan modern are the enormous economic, social, cultural, technological and scientific transformations which it has undergone particularly after the Second World War. It is far from having a solid sociological imagination to be tempted to believe that the mere use of modern languages and cultures by underdevelopment countries would automatically eradicate the roots of underdevelopment and enable them to make a real leap forward mentally and socially and join the class of advanced societies. The hard facts about the forces involved in modernization show that such an outlook reflects indeed a superficial diagnosis that ignores the depth and the layers of the structure of the phenomenon of modernization.

As far as the ideology of the Algerian political leadership under Boumediene, it tended to stress, on the one hand, the importance of the Arab Islamic components in the Algerian personality⁽⁷³⁾ and, on the other, the development of the Algerian society independently (**Self-Develpoment**) from the former French colonizer. The political decision to involve of Algerian society in a global Arabization process fulfills the development (the unfloding) of the Arab dimension in the algerian personality. The Arabization process aimed basically at stopping the manifestations of cultural alienation which the Algerian personality had severely experienced during the long French occupation between 1830 and 1962.

In order to promote the Islamic dimension in the Algerian identity, the Algerian political leadership had firmly stated that Islam is not only the religion of the Algerian people but also of the Algeiran State. Furthermore, the Algerian Constitution (La Charte Nationale) at the time had explicitly shown the numerous points of similarities

(73) Arabisation... Grandguillaume op. p. 95-134

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Bourguiba was of the belief that the battle to win modernization was unlikely to be successful without The Tunisian's knowledge of the French language and its culture. Consequently, their acquisition of French has become the major symbol for Tunisians to qualify for modernity attributes in the Tunisian society before and after independence.⁽⁷¹⁾ This pro-Western modernization ideology was bound to be an important cause which had prevented Bourguiba and his associates from reaching firm political decision in favour of a sweeping global Arabization of Tunisia.⁽⁷²⁾

But a closer analysis to the relation between the French language (or any other language) and the realization of the modernization project in developing countries shows that the correlation between the two is far from being necessary or determinist in nature. In other words, the acquisition of a given Third World society to the language and the culture of an advanced society does not necessarily make the developing country in question modern in terms of individual and collective behaviors and life-styles. The history of modernization of contemporary societies proves that modernization is the outcome of a number of factors of which technological, economic, scientific, social and cultural transformations are most crucial. Thus, the modernization process is an entire system. It could not be materialized on the ground unless its all components are put together to function in harmony with each other. It is legitimate at this point to discredit the assumption that claims that modernization of Third world countries

(71) Grandguillaume G. Arabisation et politique linguistique au Maghreb, Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 1983, pp. 45-67 et 141. Arabic unilingual and cultural Tunisians are not allowed to hold higher positions in Tunisia after independence. Linguistico-cultural discrimination is in full practice in independent Tunisia.

(72) The Tunisian political leaderships' hesitant/hostile attitude toward global Arabization is a good example of modernization as **Westernization** in Third World Countries. In other words, by restricting the promotion of Arabic in all sectors of society, the Tunisian political leadership during Bourguiba's reign had not opted for what has become known as Self-Development strategies. Specialists of development/underdevelopment studies are more and more convinced that Third World societies have better chance to win the battle against underdevelopment if they work hard on the development of their own resources. Arabization would thus, constitute in Tunisia a political decision in favor of Self-Development and away from Westernization. See on this matter: Perroux; F., Pour une philosophie du nouveau développement, Paris, UNESCO, 1981.

crystalization of that decision. As such, Rene Lesveques was in no need to impose the Francization Bill 101 on the rest of the members of the political leadership as it could have happened on the part of Boumediene in the Arabization decision of the Algerian society. Furthermore, the political democratic regime in Quebec was far from facilitating the imposition of the leader's decision on the rest of the political leadership as this often happens in undemocratic regimes like Algeria and Tunisia under both Boumediene and Bourguiba's reigns.

XV. Language Nationalization And The Political Leadership's Ideology In Algeria And Tunisia

The third factor which is thought to have had some influence on the political Leadership's decision on the language nationalization process in these three societies was the ideology of the ruling political leadership in each country. Ideology is used here to mean the set of beliefs, values and orientations adhered to by the political leadership.⁽⁶⁹⁾ Under the reign of Bourguiba, the Tunisian political leadership was greatly attached to the ideology of modernization in the Western sense of the term.⁽⁷⁰⁾ The modernization project with its Western manifestation represented the target project which that leadership aspired to achieve. This could explain the Tunisian political Leadership's strong determination, during Bourguiba's rule, to preserve a privileged place for the French language and its culture. The latter were persistently seen by Bourguiba and his followers as necessary tools for modernization to take place in Tunisian society. Such an attitude was similar to that of Mohammed Ali in Egypt and Kheyredinne Pacha in Tunisia in the nineteenth century. Egyptian and Tunisian students missions were sent to France in particular in order to learn French and modern technology. The establishment last century of the famous bilingual/bicultural (Arabic and French) Saddiqi School in Tunis was another evidence that the Tunisian authorities, long before

(69) See reference (43) above. Here we wish to elaborate on the nature of the ideology of each of the three political leaderships and how each one of them had affected the language nationalization process.

(70) Michaud, Charles, Tunisia : The Politics of modernization, London, Pall Mall Press 1964.

hardly be denied.⁽⁶⁷⁾ The political regime in both countries was presidential. That is, major crucial political decisions would ultimately depend on the president's support or opposition to them. Indeed, the influential power of the president on political decisions would be even greater in undemocratic political regimes as was the case with Bourguiba and Boumediene's rules.

As far as the role of the linguistic/cultural background of Rene Lesveques, the Parti Quebecois leader and Québec Prime minister (1976-1985), in the decision making favouring the Francization of Quebec society; all known information indicates that Lesveque's linguistic cultural background was partly similar to that of the late president Boumediene. That is, Lesveque's linguistic/cultural background was quite strong in both French language and its culture. But he mastered very well also the English language and its culture. His fluency in Shakespeare's language was well known. So was his good familiarity with the English culture. (68) It is against this linguistic/cultural background of Rene Lesveques that one could expect him to be strongly inclined to favour the Francization of Quebec as a society. As such, there were no known conflicts and hesitations between him and the rest of the members of the political leadership as to the decision taken in favour of the Francization of the province to which Camille Laurin, the minister of Culture, was the most aggressively committed. In other words, the nature of the linguistic/cultural background of Lesveques was bound to be a decisive factor for the adoption of Bill 101 making of French the official language of La Belle Province in 1977. The heavily loaded French linguistic cultural background of the rest of the members of the political leadership could only have contributed to the

(67) The following examples demonstrate beyond any doubt the two presidents' positions toward Arabization. As a president, Bourguiba had never appointed a minister of education of Zeituni or Arab Middle Eastern educational background. On the contrary, Boumediene had appointed a number of distinct Algerian who were well known personalities capable to deal with the dossier of Arabization. Two of those were disciples of the 'Ulama Association of Ben Badis. Ahmed Taleb Ibrahim and Tawfik El Madani were strongly committed to the Arabization and Islamization of Algeria. See Arabisation... Grandguillaume op. pp. 128-131

(68) This appears to have been the outcome of 2 later time learning experience of the English language when he worked as newspaper reporter during the Second World War.

partisan attitude toward the French language and its culture.⁽⁶⁴⁾ Boumediene on his part, adopted a committed attitude in favour of Arabic and its culture. This had certainly a link with the strong educational background in Arab-Islamic culture he received from his studies both in the zeituna School of Tunis and the Al-Ezhar University of Cairo.⁽⁶⁵⁾ As such, the leader's personality and his visions of things are strongly determined by his educational background. The latter is a potential force that may play a role in affecting the way he could wish to orient and shape his society.

Bourguiba's good standing in French language and his great irresistible admiration and fascination with the French culture were expected to play a role in the blockage and the setbacks which the social policies of Arabization had witnessed in the modern Tunisian society during his reign.⁽⁶⁶⁾ Contrary to this, Boumediene's determination to adopt a decisive social policy of Arabization in Algeria could be accounted for to a great extent by his educational background that gave him stronger mastery of Arabic language and its culture.

Thus, the contribution of the role of the president to the Arabization process in the Algerian and Tunisian societies could

(64) In a lecture in April 5, 89 the Tunisian writer Mahmoud El Messadi told his audience how the French teachers in the Saddiqi School were looking down on the Learned Arab-Islamic Culture as taught in the traditional school of Ezzeitouna. He confessed that their attitude had created a complex of inferiority among the graduates of the Saddiqi School and among those Tunisians who went to France to pursue their studies. Bourguiba was a graduate of the Saddiqi School. In a speech (July 29, 1968) Bourguiba stated his position on the classical (standard) Arabic this way : "no, really, the classical Arabic is not the language of the people", Arabisation... Grandguillaume op.p. 63 (this is my translation and the ones below).

(65) Boumediene's position on classical Arabic is quite different from that of Bourguiba : "learning the French language was not without profit for us. But we have to work today in a manner that the acquisition of the Arabic language becomes the concern of every individual, of every citizen and not the State preoccupation only" in *Revolution Africaine Algiers*, No. 1452, Dec. 26/91 - Jan. 1, 92, p. 24 and his intervention in April 1970 before the national Commission on education put the issue of Arabization this way: "The Arabization is a revolutionary objective," Arabisation... Grandguillaume op. p. 127

(66) Here is how Jean Lacouture a well known French writer and news commentator, described Bourguiba's overwhelming desire to belong to France (or be a Frenchman) : "No man outside France is closer to it than Bourguiba. In the Arab world, no body resembles less the Arabs than Bourguiba" *Le Monde*, Nov 9, 1937, pp. 1-4.

IVX. The Language Nationalization Process And The Linguistic/Cultural/Background Of The Leader

The Algerian and the Tunisian societies are similar to each other. Both of them belong to the Arab-Islamic civilization. Both of them have been as well exposed to a great deal of influence from French colonization. Global French linguistic/cultural impact on these two countries bears witness to this day. They are similar also in having bilingual/bicultural political leaderships since their independence, as we have pointed out. The bilingual/bicultural background of the Tunisian political leadership was of **balanced** nature, while that of the Algerian political leadership was to a great extent **unbalanced**, where the French language and culture enjoyed a better standing among the members of this political leadership under Boumediene's reign.

In spite of this, the decision of that Algerian political leadership on the language issue had, on the one hand, supported Arabization. Such a decision could be accounted for by the ideological intervening variable spelled out in table 11 referred to earlier. On the other, the Tunisian political leadership decision has been ambivalent and hesitant. On a plain **theoretical level** that could be directly linked to the balanced bilingual/bicultural background of the Tunisian political Leadership as elaborated before.

In addition to these factors involved in the Arabization process in both societies and under both political Leaderships, **the role of the leader** of each political leadership ought to be examined in this context. In other words, did Bourguiba and Boumediene play any role in the Arabization process in their own societies, one way or the other?

What eventually distinguishes the composition of the two political leaderships in question following the independence of Algeria and Tunisia was the linguistic/cultural background of the president of each one of these two countries. While Tunisia's former president Bourguiba linguistic/cultural background was of the balanced type, that of the late Algerian president Boumediene was of an unbalanced nature. However, Bourguiba was known for his

be explained by this political leadership's ideology as shown in table (I, II). The Algerian example of Arabization illustrates that the political leadership's superior background in French language and culture does **not constitute a sufficient condition** for the continuous Francization of the Algerian society. Ideological factors could always have a reverse influence on language nationalization process, as we have seen.⁽⁶²⁾

Hence, we have two types of linguistic and cultural background among the three political leaderships examined here. On the other hand, the Algerian and the Quebecan political leaderships belong to what we have called the unbalanced bilingual/bicultural background. On the other, the Tunisian political leadership enjoys rather a balanced bilingual/bicultural background. What has intensified, furthermore, the features of bilingualism/biculturalism in the Tunisian society is the extension (spread) of the phenomenon to other levels of society like the intellectual elites and educational institutions especially the Saddiqi School. All these factors have deepened the tensions and the conflicts within and between those concerned. This situation was hardly experienced by both the Algerian and the Quebecan societies. Quebec, for instance, has not witnessed conflicts among its university teachers concerning the teaching language issue: is it French or English? French is the language in Tunisian universities, the question is far from being settled yet. The situation tends to be chaotic. There is no university law that spells out the issue of the teaching language within the universities. Some teachers opt for Arabic while others choose French and often for the same subject being taught. Some of the negative implications of such a linguistic policy are reflected in the deteriorating academic levels of the students as well as in the manifest tensions among the teaching faculty members themselves.⁽⁶³⁾

(62) This confirms that educational and ideological backgrounds don't necessarily have equal impact on the dynamics of language nationalisation. Ideological factors appear to be more decisive in these matters.

(63) My personal observation in the Faculty of Human and Social Sciences in Tunis (academic years 1988-92) shows the issue of language in teaching and in examinations has been a source of tension among the teachers.

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the following: There is a potential explicit or implicit relationship between the bilingualism/biculturalism of the members of political leadership and their prevailing hesitant/hostile attitude toward Arabization. The Same appears to be true as well of the over riding Arabization. The same appears to be true as well of the over riding majority of the intellectual elites, socio-educational institutions etc... The social scientist would be inclined to foresee a more positive scenario for the process of Arabization in today's Tunisian society had the political leadership decision makers were first of all of Arab Islamic educational background.⁽⁶⁰⁾ The phenomenon of the marginalization of the Arab Islamic identity of modern Tunisia would hardly have taken place without the pronounced privileges which the French language and culture have enjoyed especially under Bourguiba's Leadership.⁽⁶¹⁾

In **Sociological terms**, dualism as cultural heritage, as psychological mentality and as social structure often leads to conflictual, ambivalent and hesitant behavior not only among the decision makers but among average individuals and social groups as well.

As far as the linguistic and the cultural backgrounds of both of the Algerian and the Quebecan political leaderships are concerned, one can state that each one of them is of unbalanced nature. In general, the French educational background is much stronger than its Arabic counterpart among the members of the Algerian political Leadership. So is the French educational background of the Quebecan leadership compared with its English counterpart. The Parti Quebecois political leadership decision in favour of greater Francization of the Quebecan society could be explained by table 1 as shown in b. While the decision of the Algerian political leadership in favour of a global Arabization of the Algerian society could only

(60) We have shown earlier that the Zeituni group has been the most vocal of all Tunisian social categories in favor of Arabization.

(61) Saleh Eddine El Jouehi, a well known Tunisian news commentator describes the situation this way "The Tunisian graduates of the Sadiqi School and French oriented educational institutions had special respect for French and Western culture... The Tunisian has learned to look down on other Arabs...", *Al-Wahda* No. 86, Nov. 1991, p. 221

roots are of Islamic and Arab nature. But the French language and its intellectual culture are particularly present as well. The widespread socio-linguistic society is a good illustration of the Tunisian split cultural identity. As far as the coexistence of tradition and modernity side by side in today's Tunisian society, the matter needs really no explanation. ⁽⁵⁷⁾

Biculturalism touches almost every important level of the contemporary Tunisian society. The Tunisian elite is no exception. The establishment by the ruling Turkish authority of the Saddiqi School in Tunis led to elite emergence of bilingual/bicultural background.⁽⁵⁸⁾ But with the coming of the French colonization to Tunisia, three types of cultural elites have emerged:

(1) The Saddiqi balanced bilingual/bicultural elite.

(2) The unbalanced predominantly French language/culture elite (les lycéens) and.

(3) The unbalanced predominantly Arabic language/culture elite (the zeitouni). But the alliance between the elites: (1+2) against the Zeitouni elite (3) had ended up with a new and more complicated form of **elite dualism**. The latter has led to tensions, confrontation and conflicts between the **two** parties. Their relations have, consequently, witnessed exchange of accusation and of blaming each other. It is against this background that we can legitimately take a look at the impact of the bilingualism/biculturalism variable on the important social policies taken by Tunisian decision makers since Tunisia's independence. The Arabization policies of the education system in the Tunisian society since 1956 have been inconsistent and at best ambiguous as we have already pointed out. ⁽⁵⁹⁾ The state of the Arabization of the Tunisian administration is far worse. The failure of the Tunisian political leadership to reach clear pro-Arabization decision would suggest to the social scientist

(57) Contemporary Algerian society is no different from the Tunisian society on these points.

(58) In sociological terms, biculturalism/bilingualism in Tunisia has had an institutionalized basis through the Saddiqi School.

(59) See footnote (52) above.

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unbalanced bilingualism/biculturalism. The Algerian political leadership's educational background in French language and its culture was **superior** to its counterpart in the Arabic language and its culture. Yet, the Algerian Political leadership's decision in favour of Arabization is to be explained by what we have called the ideological factors or the intervening variable whose influence on Arabization is of indirect nature.⁽⁵⁵⁾ (table 11, 1)

3 - With regard to the hesitant and the ambivalent position of the Tunisian political leadership toward total Arabization, the explanation is more complex. On the one hand, the majority of the members of the Tunisian leadership under Bourguiba's reign were graduates of the Saddiqi School known for its balanced Arabic/French bilingualism/biculturalism. On the other, many of them had finished their higher education in French universities in France. It could be assumed that this special factor might have played an important role in pushing the Tunisian political leadership to take at times decisions which reverse processess of global Arabization.⁽⁵⁶⁾ In spite of this, the Tunisian political leadership's bilingualism/biculturalism remains more balanced than those found among the members of the Algerian and the Quebecan political leaderships.

In our opinion, the manifestations of dualism in the Tunisian society go in fact beyond the bilingualism/biculturalism of the Tunisian political leadership to englobe other aspects of this society . Dualism in the latter appears to be more pronounced and spread than in the Algerian and the Quebecan societies. Bilingual/bicultural political leadership, like the bilingual/bicultural individual or society, tends to be more hesitant and split in taking clear one way decisions. Modern Tunisian society is rather a good living example. Tunisia's geographic location is, on the one hand, on the shores of NorthAfrica and, on the other, it overlooks the southern part of the European continent. On the cultural level, Tunisia's basic cultural

(55) See reference 40 above.

(56) The ministry of education in Tunisia had reinstated the teaching of French in the primary school's first and second year in Sept. 16, 1968. See Arabization.....Grandguillaume, op. p. 173.

Table II

The Political Leadership's ideological effect in opposition to the expected influence of its educational background	The Nature of Language decision
1 - French Language/Culture dominance over Arabic Language Culture of the members of the Algerian and the Tunisian Leaderships.	In favor of Arabization (+)
2 - English Language/Culture dominance over French language Culture of the members of the Parti Québécois ruling Leadership	In favor of Francization (+)

If we apply the displayed features in table I and II on the three political leaderships and the nature of the decisions they have taken vis-a-vis the language nationalization in their own societies, the following further explanations could be outlined:

1 - The Parti Québécois political leadership's decision in favour of the Francization of the Quebecan society is accounted for by its **unbalanced** bilingualism/biculturalism. Most members of this political leadership, as seen before, did master much better French language and its culture than English language and its culture. This type of unbalanced bilingualism/biculturalism had a positive direct effect in favor of the French language promotion. Consequently, there ought be no surprise, for the Parti Québécois adoption of bill 101 which had aimed at generalization the use of French in all sectors of the Quebec society.⁽⁵⁴⁾ (table 1, b)

2 - as far as the Algerian political leadership's decision to Arabize the Algerian society, this could be explained by its

(54) Le français au Québec, Le Monde 27.01.1989, p. 2

Table (I)

Political Leadership's bilingualism/biculturalism and Language nationalization decision: Theoretical View

The Nature of Bilingualism/Biculturalism	Arabization Decision	Francization Decision
I. Balanced bilingualism/biculturalism	±	±
II. Unbalanced bilingualism/biculturalism:		
(a) - French language/culture dominance over the Arabic language culture of the members of the Algerian and the Tunisian Leaderships.	-	+
- English language/culture dominance over the French language culture of the members of the Parti Québécois ruling leadership.	Anglicization (+)	-
(b) - Arabic language/culture dominance over the French language culture of the members of the Algerian and the Tunisian leaderships.	+	-
- French language/culture dominance over the English language culture of the members of the Parti Québécois ruling leadership.	Anglicization (-)	+

(1) The political leadership has a **balanced** bilingualism/biculturalism (a). From a pure **theoretical** point of view, the political leadership in this case would unlikely be strongly motivated to see the one way language nationalization process realized. Its stand in this regard would be rather ambivalent on the language question. Decisions on the actual language nationalization process would tend in theory to be frozen or neutralized ($\pm$).

(2) When the **unbalanced** bilingualism/biculturalism of the political leadership leans in favour of the national language and culture, the political leadership would be expected, in theory as well, to seek to take decisions that aim to promote the language nationalization process. That is, political decisions favouring (+), on the one hand, Arabization in the Algerian and the Tunisian Societies and Francization in Quebec society, on the other. In spite of those theoretical expectations, the leadership may still reverse its action and decide to promote instead the foreign language and its culture. When such a decision takes place in those circumstances, **ideological factors** are assumed to be at work. For instance, the political leadership may believe that it is through the promotion of foreign languages (English, French...) that modernization and development can be achieved. Ideological influences constitute what is called **intervening variable** in modern social sciences.⁽⁵²⁾ This type of variable has, thus, a negative indirect affect on the promotion of language nationalization projects.⁽⁵³⁾

If the political leadership's is more fluent in the foreign language and more versed in the foreign culture, then we would assume theoretically also that the political leaderships in question would not be inclined (-) to take decisions in favour of Arabization or Francization. Any contrary political decision taken by the political leaderships would have to be accounted for by the ideological factors as intervening variables, as referred to above. We summarize in the following tables (I and II) how bilingualism/biculturalism, on the one hand, and the ideological influences, on the other, affect the language nationalization processes in the Algerian, Tunisian and Quebecan societies

(52) Lexique des sciences sociales p. 37B

(53) This is applicable on the Tunisian political leadership as it will become clearer.

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analysis of the political leadership's role in the language nationalization process in each one of these societies.

In order to have a closer look at the variable of bilingualism / biculturalism we need to comprehend its subtle nature. The nature of the **bilingualism / biculturalism** of the three political leaderships in question could be classified into two categories :

(1) **The Balanced bilingualism / biculturalism** : It is that linguistico-cultural background which enables the members of the political leadership to have equal mastery of both languages and cultures. In order to meet this definition, the members of the Algerian and the Tunisian leaderships, must equally master the Arabic and the French languages and their learned cultures. As for the members of Quebec's political leadership, they must **equally** master French and English and their learned cultures. Such a balanced pattern of bilingualism / biculturalism is indeed a rare **phenomenon** among human individuals and groups throughout **humankind's long history**.⁽⁵⁰⁾

(2) **The Unbalanced bilingualism /biculturalism** : It is that bilingual and bicultural phenomenon and its culture better than the other language and its corresponding culture.⁽⁵¹⁾ The Quebec's political leadership at the time of Rene Lesveque could be cited as an example. As we have seen, the members of the Parti Quebecois political leadership master much better the French language and its culture than the English language and its culture. This is the most typical pattern of bilingualism/biculturalism found among individuals and groups in known human societies. The potential impact of these **two** types of the phenomenon of bilingualism/biculturalism on language nationalization process could be summarized in three possibilities:

(50) This is quite consistent with : "Il y aura un **bilinguisme parfait** si les deux langues ont le même pouvoir de communication sur l'ensemble des rôles sociaux..." Etant donné que cette performance se révèle plus souvent un idéal qu'une réalité, le bilinguisme de l'individu se présente la plupart du temps sous les diverses formes d'un bilinguisme différencié, donc inégal selon les situations de communication..." Langue et société p. 184

(51) Ibid

members of the political leaderships subscribe to.⁽⁴⁷⁾ It is in this sense that we use here the notion of culture in its modern socio-anthropological meaning.⁽⁴⁸⁾ We concentrate our analysis here on **three** levels of the political leadership's Cultural Background: (1) the educational background of the entire political leaderships. (2) the educational background of the political leadership's leader. (3) The ideology of the political leadership as a whole.

XIII - The Educational Background of the Political Leadership

To begin with, the educational background of the members of the political leaderships in these three countries is in general of **bilingual and bicultural nature**. On the one hand, the president, most of this ministers as well as the higher officials of the Algerian and the Tunisian governments mastered both French and Arabic and had a good knowledge of the learned Arab-Islamic and french cultures.⁽⁴⁹⁾ On the other, the prime minister of Quebec, most of his ministers and the higher government officials spoke French and English. Their knowledge of the English learned culture was on the average reasonable. Furthermore, bilingualism/ biculturalism in Algeria, Tunisia and Quebec were not confined to the members of the ruling political leadership but they were shared as well particularly by the highly educated groups in these three societies. From a socio-epistemological view, **bilingualism/ biculturalism** could be considered as a significant **independent variable** in the

(47) The concept "cultural background" used here has a broader meaning than that of the concept of "ideology" as defined in modern social sciences. Most common definition of ideology is as follows : "Ideology is a comprehensive system of ideas and beliefs that explain Man's attitude toward society and lead to a behavior consistent with those beliefs" *Lexique des sciences sociales* / M. Grawitz, Dalloz, Paris, 1988 p. 198. We know that the concept of ideology had emerged with the French philosopher Destutt de Tracy and had evolved and matured with Marx and Mannheim. The "cultural background" of the individual and the groups has been considered neither a part nor an influential force on their ideological system. It is on that basis that we have resorted to the notion of "cultural background" because it covers elements whose potential affect tends to be greater on the language nationalization processes in the three societies in question.

(48) See the concept "Culture" in *Encyclopedia of Sociology* : the Dushkin Publishing Group, Ltd. Guilford, Conn. U.S.A 1974, pp. 67-70 and *Dictionnaire critique de la sociologie* / R. Boudon, PUF, Paris, 1982 pp 133- 41

(49) This is more true of the Tunisian political leadership.

pressures, the Parti Quebecois leadership has not gone back on its linguistic decision. Unlike the political leaderships of l'Union National and the Liberal party in Quebec, the political leadership of the Parti Québécois has manifested a great deal of **independence** in taking this difficult decision.⁽⁴⁵⁾ This proves that human social actors could rule out maneuver the pressures of social forces and make things go in the direction of their ideas/ideologies. In other words, humans cannot accept the principle of the rigid Social Determinism. With this ability to take a firm stand against many odds, the political leadership proves to be a central actor in the making of language nationalization policies. Any credible scientific assessment of the latter in developing or developed societies has to reckon with the decisive input of the political social actors in these matters.

XII - The Plausible Link Between the Educational Background and Decision Making Toward Language Nationalization

The portrait drawn so far about the role of the political leaderships in the dynamics of language nationalization is very clear indeed. The political leaders of Algeria, Tunisia and Quebec have played a central role in the shaping of the nature of the orientation of language nationalization policies. The question which needs to be addressed now is this: what are the backgrounds that have made those leaders take **different positions** and adopt **different policies** toward the issue of **language nationalization**?

In order to offer a reply to this fundamental question, we have chosen to arm ourselves with the perspective of cultural sociology.⁽⁴⁶⁾ As stated before, we focus in this part of the study on the analysis of what we would like to call the Cultural Background of the political leaders in question. The concept of Cultural Background means here the following: the school based linguistic and cultural background (educational background) as well as the set of values, norms and ideological visions which the

(45) Langue et société op. p. 460

(46) Scheler, M., Problems of A Sociology of knowledge, trans. by M.S. Frings and K.W. Stikkers (ed), London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980.

in question. One tends to be **visibly committed to the global Arabization project** before and after independence. The other, to say the least, **is not enthusiastic** about global Arabization before and after Tunisia's independence. the question now: what are the forces which are behind the making **of two different political leaderships** whose countries are neighbors and whose historic-culturo-religious backgrounds are practically identical. In order to explore these frontiers, we need to rely heavily on the insights of full blown sociology of knowledge. With a firm grip on the latter, we can hope to strengthen and sharpen our knowledge of the dynamics of what we have called the educational and the ideological backgrounds of the political leaderships. But before we tackle this **ambitious part** of this study, we need to wind up our discussion here by addressing the role of the political leadership in the Francization of the Quebecker society.

XI - The Role of Political Decision in the Francization of The Quebecker Society.

As indicated before, Bill 101 is considered to be the only linguistic legislated law that has francized **most** the face of la Belle Province. Both Bill 63 and 22 before it is judged to have practically contributed very little to the real promotion of the French language in the Quebecker society. The three Bills in question were introduced by three political parties who governed Quebec from the late sixties to the mid eighties. But Bill 101 is the only bill which illustrates the crucial role that political leadership plays in language nationalization policies. The Parti Quebecois had introduced this bill in 1976 inspite of the still existing ethnico-politico-socio-economic factors that had prevented l'Union nationale and the Liberal party from adopting linguistic bills that could have served really the cause of the French language in Quebec. The anglophone community and the various immigrant groups were extremely hostile to Bill 101. So was the federal government in Ottwa. Quebec's French economic elite did not feel comfortable with this linguistic legislation. Finally, some of the English Canadian financial and economic institutions and agencies have threatened to leave Quebec or have actually moved their headquarters out of Montreal. Despite all of these

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Algeria public life. Third, Tunisia has been poorer than Algeria on the economic front, but at the same time it has had its sufficient human resources to be able to launch a vigorous campaign of global Arabization. Fourth, increasing scholarization after independence had obliged the Tunisian authorities to hire French teachers and professors (les coopérants). In economic terms, Arabization would have been cheaper had Tunisia used its own Arabizing human resources or hired needed teachers and professors from the Arab Middle East. As stated before, the Tunisian society stood a much better chance to achieve global Arabization immediately after its independence in 1956. It had adequate human infrastructures (the Zeituni and the Sadiqi graduates in particular) to do the job in the medium term at least. In opposition to this, Algeria's human infrastructures for Arabization looked very grim indeed upon its independence from France in 1962. However, as explained, it has scored better than Tunisia on the **Arabization achievement scale**. Though, Tunisia got its independence six years before Algeria.

Nothing substantial is practically left to account for the Arabization achievement difference between independent Algeria and Tunisia except **the force of the political leadership's will**. While the Arabization project figures high on the agenda of the FNL political leadership well before Algeria's independence,⁽⁴³⁾ it appeared to have occupied a low profile for the Destour/RCD political leadership of Tunisia before and after independence.⁽⁴⁴⁾ Global Arabization of independent Algeria has been on the part of the FNL political leadership, a sort of fulfilling one's committed political leadership, a sort of fulfilling one's committed political promises. The matter for the Tunisian political leadership was different. It had made no strong commitment to the global Arabization of the independent Tunisian society. So, there is no urgent need really to meet one's political promises. What is ultimately at stake here is the nature of the two political leaderships

(43) See the speech (in Arabic) on Arabization in Algeria in the Journal Athqafa (Culture) Algiers, no 101, 1988, p. 21.

(44) See the Arabic Language...footnote (39) above.

Yet the question pertaining to the crucial role of the political leadership in Arabization in Algeria and Tunisia is not settled for good. Some may argue that the matter of Arabization in these two societies has been affected by economic and social society's structures factors. That is where the real difference lies, so to speak.

In order to address this claim, we need to provide a brief profile of the **non-political forces** which may have played a role for or against the global Arabization in modern Algeria and Tunisia. As spelled out earlier, the state of the Arabic language in Algeria upon its independence was bad enough. Algerians had no national human resources to undertake the massive Arabization campaign. They had, for instance, to hire an enormous number of Arab teachers, professors etc... from the Arab Middle Eastern countries in order to Arabize their educational system.

As far as Tunisia is concerned, we stressed that the state of the Arabic language in this country upon its independence was much brighter than in Algeria. Tunisians also had reasonably adequate national human resources to undertake Arabization of the education system. The administration and the environment on their own. But inspite of these obvious advantages at the disposal of the Tunisian society, the process of Arabization in the latter lags behind its Algerian counterpart. As we have shown before, Algeria is clearly ahead of Tunisia in the Arabization of two out of three (2/3) major sectors. They are the sectors of education and of the environment.

Some might still insist that the issue of Arabization in these two societies has to be linked to economic forces. Algeria was a much richer country than Tunisia. So, she could afford to invest its petro dollars into its education system. This economic argument can hardly stand the test. First, Algeria did not become, like other OPEC countries, a petro dollar nation until the mid seventies. While Arabization had already made significant progress in the Algerian society by that date. Second, the petro dollars invested by the Algerian authorities into the Arabization of the education system or the environment could have been channelled to other desperate sectors of Algerian public life. Third, Tunisia has been poorer than

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influential force⁽⁴⁰⁾ in the blocking or in the promotion of the Arabization project. In fact, this is far from being unusual, given that **the State**, as represented usually both in the government and in the ruling parties, **does intervene** in the planning as well as the execution of nearly all social policies in Third World countries.⁽⁴¹⁾ Development projects, for instance, are often planned and worked out by the State. That is, according to the ruling political leadership's will. Such a pattern of policy making is expected in societies where democratic principles in institutions and organizations hardly exist.⁽⁴²⁾ Because of the absence of legal political opposition in most of the underdeveloped countries, their population have essentially no choice but to bear the consequences of the political leadership's decision be that of good or bad nature.

The Algerian political leadership under the late president Haouari Boumedienne was not democratic in the traditional sense of the term. So, the decision to Arabize the Algerian society was basically a political decision coming from the top of the political leadership hierarchy.

As far as the Arabization process in the Tunisian society under the leadership of the former president Habib Bourguiba, no clear-cut serious decision had been taken in favor of the global Arabization of the Tunisian society. The hesitation to undertake such a decision was in itself a political decision of an elitist nature coming from the top and thus, was far from being supported by the wider masses of the population. In both cases, the decisions taken in these two Maghrebian societies in favor or against global Arabization is a political act which shows an organic affinity with the ruling political elites who have governed since independence.

(40) Basic Research Methods in Social Science, Julian L.Simon, Random House New York, 1969 p. 31.

(41) Development and Cultural Change (Ed) Ipyong J.Kim, Paragon, House Publishers, New York, 1986.

(42) Naqib, H.K., The Oppressive State in Contemporary Arab East : A Comparative Structural Study (in Arabic), Beirut, Centre for Arab Unity Studies, 1991, p. 421.

Bill 101 stands as the most successful one as far as the promotion of a firm global Francization of Quebec is concerned.

X - The Role of Political Decision in Language Nationalization Process in Algeria and Tunisia

Our examination of the dossier of Arabization in Algeria and Tunisia has shown that Algeria has scored better in the Arabization project than its neighboring Tunisia. And this was against the greater odds that the Algerian society had to face in this domain immediately after its independence. The central claim of the thesis of this study is that the difference in **Arabization achievement** between these two countries lies basically in the role of the political leadership in each society. The term political leadership means here the political parties that have governed these two societies. The National Liberation Front (FLN in French) and the Destour party (now it is called le Rassemblement Constitutionnel Democratique: RCD) have been the two ruling parties in these countries since their independence.

On the one hand, The Algerian political leadership's decision to arabize all features and sectors of the Algerian society has enabled the latter, as pointed out, to make important strides toward the difficult realization of total Arabization.⁽³⁸⁾

On the other, The Tunisian political leadership's attitude toward Arabization has been characterized by ambiguity, hesitation and inconsistencies in its Arabization policy.⁽³⁹⁾ Thus, there appears to be a significant correlation between the political leadership (independent variable) and the nature of the Arabization decision (dependent variable) in these two Maghrebian societies. In other words, the political leadership constitutes here an important and

(38) See "The Arabic language in Algeria between its dark past and its shining present" in the Arabic newspaper : Asharq Al-Awsat 17.03.1989 p. 8.

(39) See "The Arabic language, the cultural identity and the experiences of Arabization" in the Arabic journal Al Mustaqbal al Arabi no 27 may 1981 pp. 85-100.

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2 - The Party Québécois government obliged all enterprises of more than 50 employees to have a Francization certificate, to make a Francization committee if the entreprise has 100 employees or more and to increase the presence of francophones at all levels (administration counsel, staff, hiring policies etc....). Finally, the mastery of spoken and written French is required at the work place.⁽³⁴⁾

3 - Quebec must show its French face. Street signs, advertisements... especially in Montreal must be only in French. It is the second largest French city in the world. According the ex-president of the Counsel of the French language, Michel Plourde: "An Québec, c'est le français, le Français est la Langue Commune detous Les Queb Cois: Francophones, anglophones et allophones. C'est la langue que tous les Québécois ont le droit de posséder, de savoir et de l'utiliser. Voilà la règle fondamentale de notre aménagement linguistique: le français d'abord, pour tout le monde."⁽³⁵⁾

4 - The rejection of the generalized official bilingualism. Past experience has proven that it constituted a great threat to the vitality of the French language in Quebec. The francophones represent only 2% of the North American population. Giving the same status to French and English (bilingualism) in Quebec means re-offering the dominance to the English language. Because equal rights applied to inequal languages can never lead to equal situations between them.⁽³⁶⁾

5- To settle for good the issue of the language of teaching in school for the children of the immigrant population, Bill 101 had left the freedom of choice only to those children whose parents had done their primary studies in English in Canada.⁽³⁷⁾ It is clear that

(34) Ibid p. 460

(35) Ibid

(36) Ibid

(37) Ibid p. 459

63 gave the right to parents in the Province to send their children to the school (English or French) of their choice. Therefore Bill 63 was far from enhancing the status of the French language in the education, the administration or the environment sectors.⁽²⁹⁾

Robert Bourassa, the leader of the Liberal party in Québec adopted Bill 22 in July 1974. It was thought that this was aiming to make French the only official language of Québec. But it made, instead, every body angry. The anglophone Community protested against it. Bill 22 could make them loose the privilege of having bilingual signs. They asked for the policy of **bilingualism** to be maintained throughout Quebec. Bourassa's government did not force the children of immigrants to attend French schools. Furthermore, the Liberal political leadership did not hamper the English language from dominating the socioeconomic sector in the Province. Like bill 63, Bill 22 did not improve the situation of French in Quebec.⁽³⁰⁾ On the contrary, both of them intensified the hostility between the various linguistic groups.⁽³¹⁾

The decisive bill that improved the status of the French language in Qubec was the famous Bill 101 introduced in 1976 by the political leadership of the Separatist Parti Québécois under the leadership of René Levesque. One of the principal objectives of the Parti Québécois was to assert the predominance of French in Quebec. To make Quebec as French as Ontario is English. French must be the common language of all Quebeckers at work, in school, in commerce and in business.⁽³²⁾

To put this in practice, the following policies have to be fulfilled:

1 - Simple elementary social justice would require that work, commerce and business sectors be given to the francophones. That is, the economic power should be handed to the francophones after having been for so long the privilege of the anglophones.⁽³³⁾

(29) Lanuge et société op. p. 457

(30) Ibid p. 458

(31) Ibid.

(32) Ibid p. 459

(33) Ibid

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Municipal laws appear to be lenient or indifferent on these matters. When it comes to the Arabization of administration, both Algeria and Tunisia did not score high in this sector during the ruling regimes of Bourguiba and Boumediene. This was more visible in the modern financial and economic institutions. In spite of these similarities, Algerian authorities appear to have done more to encourage Arabization in the administrative sector. For instance, the Algerian State Employer had introduced a law under the leadership of Boumediene, that makes the promotion of its employees dependent on the improvement and the passing of specified examinations' in the Arabic language.

Finally, Algerians have made more progress in the Arabization of their education system than their Tunisian neighbors. By the end of the 1970s, they had made headways in the Arabization of mathematics and sciences in general at the secondary school level. In the Tunisian educational system, French has been the teaching language of mathematics and sciences since Tunisia's independence in 1956.

IX - The Parti Québécois and Quebec's Sweeping Francization

In Quebec after 1960, the Francization meant basically the use of French in commerce, finance and industry sectors as well as in public administration, work activities, public/private services, public signs and commercial advertising. The Francization of the education system was a low key issue. Since the French Quebecers had kept their language in an adequate standing use, as pointed out before. So, unlike in Algeria and Tunisia where Arabization of the education system was an urgent need, the Francization of Quebec's education system did not raise major difficulties on the whole. Three political parties had legislated three bills to address the issue of the Francization in Quebec. The party of l'Union nationale (1968-70) was known for its bill 63 which was issued in response to the immigrants protest at Saint-Leonard against the decision of the school superintendents to force their children to go into French schools. The political leadership of l'Union nationale opted for the policy of multi-culturalism advocated by the federal government. Bill

language in Quebec upon the beginning of its Quiet Revolution in 1960s, we could say it was much better than the state of Arabic in Tunisia in 1956. The language of the education system is one measuring indicator of that difference between Quebec and Tunisia. While Quebec has used French as its native teaching language throughout the primary, the secondary and the university levels, **Tunisia has not** since its independence, used Arabic as the language of teaching mathematics and sciences at the secondary and the university levels.

In spite of the odds facing Arabization in Algeria upon its independence as outlined already, the state of Arabic in Algeria under the political leadership of the late president Haouari Boumediene (1965-1978) was in general better than it was in Tunisia during the former Tunisian president Habib Bourguiba's reign (1956-1987). The Arabization of the environment has become a reality in Algeria. Arabic letters have become the dominant features of street signs and instructions inside and outside private and public institutions and buildings. the use of foreign language(s) has not, however, been prohibited. The writing of foreign language (s) could be added when necessary like in those institutions where the presence of foreigners is very visible. Hospitals, police stations, banks, hotels, embassies, roads intersections and emergency places. The environment Arabization law stipulates that everything in Arabic must be written in bigger and more prominent Arabic letters rather than the smaller letters of the foreign language(s) which carry the same sign(s) referred to in Arabic.⁽²⁸⁾

Compared to the sweeping Arabization of the environment in Algeria, the environment in Tunisia since independence has been bilingual. Arabic and French exist side by side in street signs, public and private institutions shops, restaurants. And this practice is well spread in villages, towns and cities. Unlike in Algeria, the foreign letters/words may be written bigger than the Arabic ones or occupy a better strategic overlooking place in the given street signs.

(28) As it stands, the global environment of Arabization in Algeria does not find its equivalent neither in Saudi Arabia nor in Egypt. Both of these two countries still have a bilingual environment (arabic and English).

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Quebec Francization and the ending of Quebec anglophone or bilingual face, we can mention here two social groups: (1) The nationalist groups and (2) some of the Province's school superintendents. The decision made by the latter in 27-06-86 and obliged the immigrants of the district of Saint-Leonard to send their children to the French schools. The Jean-Batist Movement is one of the aggressive nationalist groups known for its campaigns in favor for the promotion of French as the only official language of Quebec.⁽²⁶⁾ As far as those groups who had held opposing positions against the Francization of Quebec, we can mention **three** main ones:

(1) The anglophone group whose main basis is the West side of the city of Montreal. English residing in Quebec have demanded that Quebec remain at least bilingual.

(2) Non-English immigrants to Quebec have been hostile to the attempts of Francization to the Province. They wished to keep, at least, the option of free choice of schools (French or English) where they can send their children.

(3) The French economic elite: According to Marc levine, this group has different views concerning the issue of the Francization of Quebec. In other words, this elite is not completely enthusiastic about the Francization of the private sector and the middle class public service.⁽²⁷⁾

VIII - More Substantial Arabization in Algeria Than in Tunisia

As described, Algeria, Tunisia and Quebec had each of them many social forces that were hostile to language nationalization. Furthermore, the state of the Arabic language in Algeria upon independence was in a much more deteriorated situation than was the case of Arabic in Tunisia. As far as the state of the French

(26) The declining of Quebec French population and the increasing immigration into the Province in this period were bound to raise the concern of the general French population toward Quebec linguistico-cultural protection. See 27 below.

(27) Levine, M., *The Reconquest of Montreal : Language Policy and social change in a Bilingual City*, Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990, 285 pp. I consulted its review by Brazeau in *Contemporary Sociology*, vol. 20, no 3., May 1991, pp. 370-371.

The period which began in 1840 and lasted until 1960 was the period where Quebec coexisted in Canada as a minority. This was so when Ontario and Quebec made up the two Canadas by the terms of the law of the Union or by the Charter of the Confederation (1867) to which six more provinces had gradually joined later on Quebec and Ontario. The state of the French language had continued to deteriorate with the minority status that Quebec held within the Canadian Confederation. Here is how abbot Thomas – Aimé Chandonner described the linguistic situation: “Every where, in our public places, in our streets, in our offices, in our living rooms, you hear the resonance of the invading accent of a foreign language. Some have gone as far as inflicting their mother tongue with foreign turns of phrases and translate their first name, their family name, the name of their forefathers by their equivalent foreign names.”(24)

The AANB did not give Quebec more than a very slim provincial autonomy. It imposed on Quebec bilingualism in its parliament as well as in its courts. It is not exaggerated to say that Quebec of 1867 and beyond was hardly more than a colony of the federal Canadian government.(25)

Unlike the cases of Arabization in both independent Algeria and Tunisia, the case of Francization of Quebec saw the light, in the period of the so called the Quiet Revolution. The latter is known to be the period of the modernization of Quebec between 1960 and 1980.

VII - Attitudes of Quebecker Social Groups toward Francization

The promotion of the status of the French language was one of the accomplishments of Quebec modernization. We need in this context, like we did in the discussion of the Arabization process in the Algerian and the Tunisian societies, to identify the social groups on the ground who had favored or opposed the Francization of Quebec. As to the social categories in Quebec who had supported

(24) Ibid p. 446

(25) Ibid p. 448

Arabization issue. Their number and power have been on decline since the closing by Bourguiba's regime of the Zeituna's Mosque at the secondary school level in the mid sixties (1965).⁽²²⁾

VI - The State of the French Language in Semi-Colonized Quebec

The state of the French language in the New France (Quebec) before the so called la Revolution Tranquille (the Quiet Revolution) 1960-66 can be examined in two periods (1) The British colonization period and (2) the Canadian Confederation period. Officially the British occupied New France between 1760 and 1840. In reaction to the threat of the victorious conqueror, the French society had responded by defending its religion, its language and its laws. But this did not mean for instance, that the French of the New France remained immune from the influence of the English language. Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859) speaks of the anglicization of the French language this way:... "the lawyers I saw there who were considered to be the better ones of Quebec... spoke French with Norman accent of the middle classes. Their linguistic style was vulgar and full of strange words and English sentences!"⁽²³⁾

(22) Ezzeituna educational system exists since the mid-sixties only at the University level : The Zeituna University. It becomes clear from the profile of Algerian and Tunisian social groups just discussed that educational as well as ideological backgrounds are crucial factors in determining the social group's attitude toward Arabization. The Zeituni were unambiguously for Arabization. It is their educational background (Arabic Islamic education mainly) which is at work. Once the Algerians and the Tunisians receive bilingual/bicultural or French language/ culture dominant backgrounds, the risks for not favoring Arabization become greater. The assessment of the role of educational background on the attitude of the political leadership toward Arabization becomes legitimate indeed. The slogan of 'Tunisification' has had a clear political connotation. It has been a response against Arabism ideology especially during Nasser's time. Under Bourguiba the Tunisian political leadership had to give a new meaning to the Arabic word (Al Qawmiyya). The latter means Tunisian nationalism. While (Al Qawmiyya) Arabic original meaning means Arab nationalism. After Bourguiba, the use of the words national/nationalism (watani wataniyya) is gaining ground. Nonetheless, the use of Al Qawmi (Al Qawmiyya) is still wide spread. It creates confusion. The message remains, however, clear. Since Bourguiba, The Tunisian political leadership has underemphasized the importance of Arabism for Tunisians.

(23) Leclerc, J., *Langue et société, Québec*, Mondia Editeurs, p. 442; (The translation is mine here and below).

great sympathy among Muslims; because it is the language of their Holy Book: The Qur'an.⁽¹⁹⁾

In order also to understand the dynamics of the question of Arabization in Tunisia, we need to look at the positions of certain social groups. G. Grandguillaume speaks of the attitudes of four main social categories toward Arabization.

(1) The Urban Bourgeoisie is culturally a homogenous social category whose presence prevails in the main cities of Tunisia, like Monastir and Tunis. The Es-Sadiqi school was this bourgeoisie's main reference. Es-Sadiqi School was this bourgeoisie's main reference. Es-Sadiqi School stands for bilingualism/biculturalism. Grandguillaume believes that this social category was clearly **oriented toward the West** and more interested in what has become known as 'Tunisification'. That is, the promotion of everything Tunisian including the promotion of Tunisian Arabic dialect instead of the standard Arabic language.⁽²⁰⁾

(2) The State's employees (les fonctionnaires): the majority of this social category was French educated and more oriented toward modernity and national (Tunisian) issues. Grandguillaume considers this social group as being little interested in total Arabization.⁽²¹⁾

(3) **The State's beneficiaries:** This social category includes Tunisian merchants, farmers, shop-owners, grocers etc... They needed social stability to develop their activities. Their social conservatism had made them on the cultural level more attached to Islam and Arabization.

(4) The Zeitunian group is made of those Tunisians who were educated in the Zeituna Mosque in Tunis and elsewhere in the main cities of the country. A number of the Zeituna's graduates travel to Middle Eastern Arab universities to pursue their university studies. As expected, they have been the **most vocal** and militant on the

(19) Ibid p 152

(20) Ibid p. 141

(21) Ibid p. 142

and the general population at large toward Arabization. In Algeria, we limit ourselves to the Arabization attitude of four social categories: (1) The army: G. Grandguillaume thinks that "the army was not interested directly in Arabization, though the ministry of defense was among the most Arabized ministries. However, Arabization becomes important for the army as a means of holding political power."⁽¹⁶⁾ (2) The technocratic bourgeoisie: this is the social group that has the upper hand in management of administration and control of the economic sectors run by the State. According to Grandguillaume, "the position of this bourgeoisie toward Arabization is rather ambivalent. On the one hand, they were hostile toward the process of Arabization. On the other, under the pressure of the State duty (the political governing power) they felt compelled to express a favorable attitude vis-à-vis Arabization."⁽¹⁷⁾ (3) The Arabizing social group: the members of this group belong either to the Association of 'Ulama or to those Algerian students who have graduated from Ezzeituna in Tunisia or from the Arab Middle East Universities like Cairo, Damascus and Baghdad universities. As expected, this social group strongly favors Arabization by conviction and by political strategy.⁽¹⁸⁾ Many of these educated men, like Tawfiq El Madani and Abdelhamid Mehri, had played an important role in the Arabization of the Algerian education system when they were appointed by the late president Boumedienne as ministers or high officials in the Ministry of Education. (4) The public sector employees: The Arabization of the public sectors constituted a threat for the Francized employees who feared to be replaced by the Arabized public sector employees.

As for the general Algerian population, Arabization must have found some support among its ranks. This was due mainly to the religious factors. Islam is the overwhelming religion of Algerian Arabs as well as Berbers. And the Arabic language draws usually

(16) Ibid p. 151.

(17) Ibid

(18) Ibid p. 150

laws, like it had done in Algeria, prohibiting the teaching of Arabic or considering the latter a foreign language in Tunisia. (2) The Tunisian society has had the oldest and the well renowned teaching and scholarly oriented Mosque of Ezzeituna. The core of its taught subject matters were Arabic language, Islamic disciplines like Quranic or Hadith studies and Figh (Jurisprudence). Natural sciences, chemistry.. were also taught but at a very rudimentary level. Arabic was the language of teaching of all subjects. The great number of the graduates of Ezzeituna enjoyed thus, a good command of the Arabic language and a good knowledge of Islam. (3) Tunisia had also the famous Es-Sadiqi School. It was bilingual throughout the primary and the secondary school levels. its graduates were known for their outstanding bilingualism/biculturalism in the Arabic and the French languages as well as their cultures. So The Tunisian society **had both the graduates of Ezzeituna and of Es-Sadiqi School** as good human resources that could be used for Arabization after independence. In the words of G. Grandguillaume "the knowledge of Arabic (in Tunisia) had been adequately maintained, so it should not create major worries vis-à-vis Arabization." (15)

This brief description of the state of the Arabic language in both Algeria and Tunisia upon their independence shows very clearly that The Tunisian society had a **better chance** of success than its Algerian counterpart in its ability to launch the campaign of Arabization. Two factors support this: (1) The graduates of Ezzeituna and Es-Sadiqi School constituted an important human resource in the Arabization of education, the administration and the environment. (2) unlike the Algerians, Tunisians had in general kept a good standing of the written and the spoken Arabic. This would make Arabization an easier task.

V - Attitudes of Algerian and Tunisian Social Groups toward Arabization

The destiny of the Arabization processes in both societies depended greatly also on the positions of the various social groups

(15) Ibid p. 45.

The state of the Arabic language in Algeria **immediately** after its independence in 1962 was a gloomy one. As pointed out, the French occupation had intended to dismantle the Arabic Islamic foundations of the Algerian society and consequently, the Algerian collective personality. In order to marginalize the place and the status of Arabic in Algeria, the French colonial authorities had passed a law in 1938 making **Arabic a foreign language in the Algerian society**. To counter the continuing deteriorating state of the Arabic language and Islam in colonized Algeria, serious efforts were made by the Association of "Ulama" to teach Arabic and Islam throughout Algeria.⁽¹³⁾ The French authorities had put all kinds of obstacles to put an end to the activities of the Association of 'Ulama. In spite of that, the well known Arabist-Islamist militant leader of the Association, Abdelhamid Ben Badis, succeeded in the face of the French oppression to have his famous statement: "Islam is our religion, Arabic is our language and Algeria is our nation" became the slogan of an overwhelming number of Algerians especially during the armed struggle against the French occupation. "In spite of those efforts, writes Gilbert Grandguillaume, the situation of the Arabic language was far from encouraging in 1962, the year of Algeria's independence. Arabic was largely ignored. It did not show up in the teaching programs except in the section of dead languages. Furthermore, the parallel teaching of **dialectical** Arabic or Berber constituted a competition for the Arabic language. The situation was so bad at that period, so that for many Algerians, it might seem impossible to see Arabic taking its real place in the life of the country before very long."⁽¹⁴⁾

In comparison with Algeria, the state of the Arabic language in Tunisia had a much better standing in 1956, the year of its independence from the French colonization. This was expected at least for three reasons: (1) The French occupation had not passed

(13) Rabah, T., The conflict between the 'Ulama Association and the Occupation Government (1933-39) (in Arabic) Al Mustaqbal Al Arabi No 47, Jan. 1983; pp 53-65.

(14) Grandguillaume, G., Arabisation et politique linguistique au Maghreb, Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 1983, pp. 96-97. (The translation is mine here and below).

groups toward language nationalization and c) what has been achieved in language nationalization in each society after gaining independence/autonomy and being governed by the new political leaders.

IV - the State of Arabic in Independent Algeria and Tunisia

Our assumption of the centrality of the decisive role of the political leaderships in Arabization in contemporary Algeria and Tunisia remains at this point a plain working hypothesis. To have scientific credibility, the latter must have supporting evidence from the grass root social reality of these two societies. Political leaders as social actors don't normally behave in a vacuum. Their behaviour ought to be looked at closely within the Socio-linguistic context. This does not mean, however, that their political decisions are exclusively the outcome of the rigid laws of the socio-linguistic determinism. Human actors enjoy a lot of freedom in their maneuvering even within extreme social constraints. ⁽¹¹⁾

So, let us look at the socio-linguistic factors that may have hindered or helped the process of Arabization in the Algerian and the Tunisian societies after their independence. That is, we should examine: (1) The state of the Arabic language in Algeria and Tunisia after independence. (2) The positions of the different social groups toward the undertaking of the Arabization policy processes. The French colonization is known to have emphasized very strongly the primordially of linguistic and cultural colonization of the colonized.⁽¹²⁾ The French colonial slogan: *la mission civilisatrice* (the civilizing mission) meant that one of the principal aims of French occupation of other peoples around the globe was to socialize and assimilate, through the teaching of the French language and culture, the populations who fall under its domination. French colonization of Algeria constitutes the best illustration of colonial attempts to **break down** the very foundations of the cultural components of the collective basic personality of the colonized peoples.

(11) The Symbol theory, op.

(12) Calvet, L.J., *linguistique et colonisation*, Paris, Payot, 1974, pp. 84 - 85.

- (3) Languages tend not to eliminate each other when they belong to different origins like Semetic and Indo-European origins.

When languages cannot eliminate each other in a given society, the scene is set for conflict to emerge between them. According to Professor Wafi "the events which occur between languages are like those which occur between living individual beings and their groups. They interact and fight with each other, they compete for survival and they look for victory and domination".

The three factors mentioned above make the relation between Arabic and French in Algeria and Tunisia, on the one hand and the relation between French and English in Quebec, on the other, highly potential for conflicts. In the case of Algeria and Tunisia, the foreign / invading French language has no chance to entirely eliminate Arabic as a native language of the majority of the Algerian and Tunisian population. First, the French colonizing population was so small in size compared with the size of the native population in these two countries. Second, Algerian and Tunisian societies have a good rich civilization and culture. Third, Arabic and French belong to two distinct language origins. Likewise, these three criteria can be applied on the co-presence of French and English in Quebec. The French speaking population in this Canadian province constitutes 80%. The people of Quebec is descendent of the French culture and civilization. Finally, French and English are significantly of different language roots.

It is against this background, that the issue of language nationalization in Algeria, Tunisia and Quebec is bound to raise a lot of conflict. This is due to its very nature just described and due to the role of the social factors involved in it as they will be fully dealt with in the rest of this paper.

In order to evaluate and assess more accurately the role of the political leaderships in language nationalization issues, we need to have at least a brief portrait of a) the state of the language before independence/autonomy, b) the positions of the various social

(10) Wafi, A. A., Language and Society (in Arabic), Cairo, Dar Ihyya El- Kutub.

development processes. (3) Methodologically, social scientists are obliged to choose their particular variable(s). Because they can't deal with all potential variables in a single study of limited space. It is, therefore, in order to focus especially on the educational and ideological parameters of the political leaderships and their plausible impact on language nationalization processes. The clustering together of 'educational and ideological backgrounds' does not mean, in any way, that the influence of 'educational background' is equal to that of 'ideological background' as far as the issues of language nationalization are concerned in Algeria, Tunisia and Quebec. The components of cultural symbolic systems are not exempted from the phenomenon of **differential influences** on the human actors. Our study should, thus, constitute a testing ground for the influence differences which the educational and the ideological backgrounds may have had on the decisions of the political leaders vis-à-vis the language nationalization issues examined here.

III. Languages' conflicts in these three societies

The issue of the promotion of the widespread or the exclusive full use of Arabic in Algeria and Tunisia, on the one hand, and the full use of French* in the Canadian province of Quebec, on the other, constitutes a classical case of languages' conflicts. In a very interesting book in Arabic entitled "Language and Society", the late Egyptian contemporary sociologist Ali Abdelwahid Wafi outlines the forces which make the foreign language unable to eliminate the native / local language. Three factors deserve more attention here:

- (1) The small disproportionate size of the invading / foreign population. That is, the smaller the size of the latter compared with the size of the native population, the less likely the language of the colonizer / the invader / the foreigner will be able to destroy the language of the native majority.
- (2) The highly civilizational and cultural level of a given population protects its language from being eliminated by a foreign / invading language.

*French is more widely used in Quebec than Arabic is used in both Algeria & Tunisia.

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creatures as well as artificial intelligence machines is the complex quantitative and qualitative set of symbols of which only humans are gifted with. Thus, individual and collective social action is decisively affected by human cultural symbols. Thus, educational and ideological backgrounds of the political leaders in the Algerian, Tunisian and Quebecker societies are assumed to be strongly **deterministic** to the nature of language nationalization in each one of these societies. This does not mean, however, that we conceive of no role to the economic and structural factors in the language nationalization issues at hand. We are quite aware that there are several forces, though of potential different weights, involved in the shaping of the destiny of the language nationalization processes. yet, we have chosen to focus on the role of educational and ideological backgrounds of the political elites in the unfolding of the language nationalization processes in this limited sample of contemporary New societies. Three major reasons justify amply our choice: (1) We consider Homo Sapiens to be first of all Homo symbolicus.⁽⁹⁾ That is, humans are the symbols users par excellence. They are cultural by nature. Consequently, the educational and ideological backgrounds of the political leaders are but central features of the Homo Symbolicus. To use them as critical forces that orient and shape the political leaders' decision toward language nationalization is strongly compatible with the underlying assumptions associated the notion of the Homo Symbolicus. (2) Furthermore, studies in the areas of development/underdevelopment are saturated by the heavy use of such concepts like the Homo Economicus, the Homo Politicus etc.. The introduction of the notion of Homo Symbolicus in addressing language nationalization, as one manifestation on the way to overcome the Other Underdevelopment, represents an opportunity to test the credibility of the concept Homo Symbolicus in dealing with the analysis and the understanding of the dynamics of development/underdevelopment in today's societies. This type of exploration should widen our horizons on the role of humans and their ideas/ideologies in the movement and the direction of the

(9) Elias, N., The Symbol Theory~ Kilminster, R. (ed) London Sage 1991

of those countries.⁽⁷⁾ But there are hardly any articulate studies that have focused their attention on the role of the political leaders in doing away with the former colonial or semi-colonial superstructure, in the Marxist sense of the term, of the Other Underdevelopment. This is our main concern here. To be more specific, we examine: (a) the role of the political leaders in the language nationalization policies in contemporary Algerian, Tunisian and Quebecker societies and (b) what we would like to call the **educational** and the **ideological** backgrounds of the political leaderships that may have shaped the nature of language nationalization processes in these three societies. On the one hand, educational background means here the type of education the members of the political leaderships have received. That is, whether the education was bilingual/bicultural or traditional/modern. On the other, we are interested in the ideology⁽⁸⁾ of the political leaderships in these three societies. Whether the ideology in question was generally self-made and self-reliant or it was generally as well Other dependent and Other reliant. Educational and ideological backgrounds of the political leaderships are assumed here to be **crucial variables** on which depends greatly the outcome of the language nationalization in Algeria, Tunisia and Quebec. Our assumptions on the central role of the educational and ideological variables in the language nationalization processes stem from the observation that human symbols are central in the making of the human actors identity as well as their motivation. Ideas, thought, language, religious beliefs, mythes, ideologies, science, knowledge, cultural values and norms etc... constitute the matrix of human cognition for individuals, groups and social collectivities. In other words, what distinguishes **radically** humans from non-human living

(7) a) *Developpements politiques au Maghreb*, Camau, M. et al (editors), Paris, CNRS, 1979, Eisenstadt, S.N., (b) *Readings in social Evolution and Development*, New York, Pergamon Press, 1970, pp. 379-420, c) Hammond, N., *Social sciences and the New Societies*, East Lansing, Michigan State University, 1973, pp. 95-116.

(8) The most common definition of ideology is as follows : "Ideology is a comprehensive system of ideas and beliefs that explains the human being's attitude toward society and lead to behavior consistent with those beliefs" *Lexique des sciences sociales*/M. Grawitz, Dalloz, Paris, 1988, p. 198. For an elaborated analysis of the concept of ideology see Boudon R./ *L'Ideologie*: Paris, Fayard, 1986.

widespread inferiority complex attitude toward the West found among the population of developing nations is the other component of psychological nature of the Other Underdevelopment, according to our own conceptualization.⁽⁴⁾ Viewed this way, the Other Underdevelopment is but an integral part of underdevelopment as a global and a complex phenomenon. We examine in this essay the language nationalization policies undertaken in these three societies which fell under the domination of colonization or semi-colonization.⁽⁵⁾ As such, the ever increasing promotion of native language(s) vital global use in former colonized/semi-colonized societies has to be seen a social action of liberation from the burden of The Other Underdevelopment. Efforts made by the New nations to overcome the latter have to be also considered as appropriate paths to affirmative authentic self-development. The self-development strategy has become the slogan of an increasing number of development specialists.⁽⁶⁾

II - Thesis of the Study

Modern social science literature on development/underdevelopment is concerned. Countless studies have dealt with the role of the political leadership in the Third World and with the processes of industrial, economic and social developments in many

(4) Ibid pp. 226-29

(5) Some may argue that Quebec's inclusion into the comparison is not appropriate. The province of Quebec is after all not a country. It is just one single province of the ten Canadian provinces which make the greater Canadian society. Nonetheless, four reasons justify, in our opinion, the use of Quebec case in our study : (a) Quebec is diplomatically not a country but it has all the characteristics to be studied as a society. (b) It shares with Algeria and Tunisia the issue of language nationalization, the dependent variable of this study. (c) It is argued in this study that the role of the political leadership has been crucial in the dynamics of language nationalization in these three societies. (d) The inclusion of Quebec is intended to show that not only cross-cultural and civilizational studies are possible but also the cross-developed/underdeveloped areas studies are not to be discarded out right. The following book is basically a comparison between Poland and Quebec : National Survival in Dependent societies : Social Change in Canada and Poland, Breton, R. and al. Ottawa Carleton Univ. Pr. 1990.

(6) Perroux, F. Pour une philosophie du nouveau development, Paris, UNESCO, 1981.

I - The Other Underdevelopment and Language Nationalization

This study is an attempt to address the issue of language nationalization in the Algerian, the Tunisian and the Quebecker Societies. The term language nationalization means here the linguistic social policies that are undertaken to promote the exclusive use of the native language of the **majority**⁽¹⁾ of the population in the education, the public/private administration and the environment sectors. Language nationalization constitutes a case study of what we have called "The Other Underdevelopment"⁽²⁾ We have argued that contemporary societies especially of the Third World do not suffer only from economic, industrial, social underdevelopment... But they do suffer as well from Cultural and Psychological Underdevelopment. On the one hand, the lack or the limited use of their own native language(s) in the functioning of their societies is considered to be just one of the systems of the cultural dimension of The Other Underdevelopment.⁽³⁾ On the other, the

(1) The existing used languages in these three societies are as follows : (a) In Algeria, there are three main languages used. They are Arabic, Berber (or the Amazighiyya) and French. While the latter is an inherited linguistic heritage from the long period of French colonization (1830- 1962) of Algeria, Arabic and Berber are authentic Algerian native languages. However, Arabic is spoken by the majority of Algerians. As such, it meets the criterion we set out for the study of language nationalization. Based on this, the state of the Berber language in Algeria is not to be examined. Because it does not fulfill our condition : to be the native language of the majority of the population. though the current Algerian crisis may help promote more recognition of the Berber language as the second native official language. In linguistic terms, Tunisia is more homeogenous than Algeria. According to some estimates there is only one percent of the population who still speaks Berber. So Arabic is practically the single native language of Tunisians. As for the French it is a foreign language that has its roots with the French colonial occupation of Tunisia (1881-1956). Putting the existing linguistic mosaic of immigrants and native Indians and Eskimos aside, Quebec uses French and English as the languages of the two founding groups (as they are called in Canada). They are the French and the English Canadians. Recent statistics indicate that 80% of the population of Quebec speak French and the rest speak English. As such, the majority of Quebeckers consider themselves as French. So the French language is considered to be the native language of the majority in Quebec, while English is seen as a second or a foreign language.

(2) DHAOUADI, M., An Operational Analysis of The Other Under- development in the Arab world and the Third World, International Sociology vol. 3 no, 3 Sept. 1988, pp. 219-234.

(3) Ibid pp. 222-26

**Language Nationalization:
A Case Study of The Challenges of
The Other Underdevelopment in
Algeria, Tunisia and Quebec**

Abstract

The issue of **Language nationalization** process in Third World and developed societies (Algeria, Tunisia and Quebec) is addressed in this study.* A closer look at the political governing leadership's role in the success or failure of language nationalization is underlined. **Three** sociological factors are examined: The leadership's educational background, the educational background of the head of the leadership and the **Ideology** of the entire leadership. It is found that the latter sociological variable has been **most crucial** determinant force in these three societies as far as the success or the failure of the language nationalization process is concerned.

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