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Independent Labor Movements (ILMs) and the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) after 25th January Egyptian Revolution

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**Independent Labor Movements
(ILMs) and the Political Opportunity
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Independent Labor Movements (ILMs) and the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) after 25th January Egyptian Revolution

Abstract

The paper assesses the effect of the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) ⁽¹⁾ on the role of Independent Labor Movements (ILMs) after January 25th Egyptian Revolution, based on a case study of Misr Spinning and Weaving (Mahalla Company). It analyzes the development of the role from 2006 until the end of Morsi's rule, through utilizing the three main determinants of the Political Process Model (PPM), within a framework of mobilizing structures, the political opportunity structure and the cultural framing. The paper argues that although the Egyptian Revolution had to provide positive environment for ILMs in Mahalla Company to pursue their legitimate right of existence in independent trade unions and federations, many concerns have been raised about their role after the revolution as a consequence of both their worse conditions and their lack of political vision within ILMs, including this missing of theoretical and actual steps. Such economic and political lack workers suffered gave both the political regime of Mubarak and Morsi, and even SCAF after the revolution, the full opportunity not only to create a state of divisions and controversies among workers as an attempt to weaken their collective activities but also to fill the labor milieu with several political

parties and coalitions that serve their own interests, which contradict to those of workers. The case study of Mahalla Company affirms this argument. Additionally, the study highlights that the workers lack the political vision, and this does not only enable several political forces, such as the National Democratic Party (NDP), the ex-ruling party and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), and the ruling power after the revolution, to fill this gap via imposing their ideologies and visions on workers. In addition, it also leads to the exposure of these movements to inevitable divisions, conflicts, and fragmentations as well.

Key Words

Independent Labor Movements (ILMs); the Political Process Model (PPM); Neoliberalism (NL); Socioeconomic Conditions; Political Opportunity Structure(POS); Collective Vision; Trade Unions; Muslim Brotherhood (MB); National Democratic Party (NDP); Egyptian Federation of Independent Trade Union (EFITU); Egyptian Democratic Labor Congress (EDLC).

Introduction

The January 25th revolution in Egypt and its following political and economic developments had dramatic effects on the role of social movements, in general, and the role of Independent Labor Movements (ILMs) in Mahalla Company, in particular. The new role of ILMs in Mahalla Company has been reflected in their new patterns of relationships with newly established political parties and movements, on one hand, and the political regime and its traditional supporters including the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) and its affiliated trade unions, the management of Mahalla Company, and the big business owners, on the other hand.

The principles of civility, freedom and social justice that were emerged by the Egyptian revolution have provided positive environment for ILMs to obtain their economic and social rights that the International Labor Organization (ILO) calls for and to realize their legitimate right of establishing independent trade unions that was disregarded during the regime of Mubarak. However, the deteriorated socioeconomic conditions of workers and the delay of establishing independent trade unions under the regime of the Muslim Brothers (MBs) under President Morsi was the incentive for this paper to compare the roles of these labor movements within Mahalla Company after the revolution until the end of Morsi's rule to their roles before the revolution starting from 2006.

This research addresses the effect of the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) on the role of Independent Labor Movements (ILMs) in Mahalla Company after the revolution with particular emphasis on their exposure to division attempts, the utility of repressive and ideological means exercised by the political regime against them, and the intended delay of issuing the law of independent trade unions.

In addition, the paper gives an attention to the transformation of the role of the ILMs in Mahalla from concentrating on narrow workers agenda that mainly includes financial demands such as salaries, bonuses, and industrial safety to the more important political question of re-configuring their relation with the state.⁽²⁾

This paper considers the workers protests of 2006 as the first physical confrontation of workers against the state apparatus and marked the first and crucial shift from work-in tactic to work stoppage.⁽³⁾ Such strikes represented a major change in the history of the workers' movement as they constituted one of the main crucial factors in bringing about the January 25th Egyptian Revolution. The 2006 protests and the violence events afterwards have been influenced by several international and domestic conditions. From the international standpoint, the neo-liberalism ideology, which shaped the policies of international economic organizations, such as the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in developing countries had

negative effect on the workers' socio-economic status. These policies led to the reduction of state intervention in the economy and the implementation of privatization programs, regardless of the socioeconomic conditions of workers.

From a domestic standpoint, the implementation of the open-door policy and market-oriented practices⁽⁴⁾ from the 1970s to the 1990s, led to the withdrawal of the government from the economy and the encouragement of the international and local private sector to step in the economy.⁽⁵⁾ The movement towards economic reform in Egypt has not been associated with a parallel movement towards social, political and institutional reforms. This lack of integration between the two types of reforms put pressure on the Egyptian workers and led to a severe economic crisis and deteriorated public services. The domestic pressing socio-economic conditions put pressure on the labor to voice and to act in radical forms.

To investigate the effect of the role of political opportunity structure on the role of ILMs in Mahalla Company after January 25th Egyptian Revolution, the (POS) addresses international and domestic conditions and to what extent these conditions can lead either to the development or to the contraction of ILMs in Mahalla, the position of the political regime, and the administrative policies of Mahalla towards the workers and the productivity of the company.

Beside, this study adopted the thought of Althusser to figure out the nature and development of such differences between the two political regimes, before and after the revolution, in using both the repressive and ideological apparatuses to convince subjects that they have the legitimacy to behave in such ways. It seeks to identify the extent to which the ruling regime, before and after the revolution, develops its techniques of using their ideological and repressive apparatuses.

This paper highlights the importance of establishing independent trade unions as a necessary instrument for expressing workers interests, needs, and aspirations, because official ones such as the ETUF and its followed trade unions represent the thoughts and interests of the political regime.

IMPORTANCE OF THE PAPER

This paper addresses the role of ILMs movement after the January 25th Egyptian Revolution from a comprehensive political and socio-economic vision that is based on the following considerations. First, it monitors the extent of which the main dimensions of the political opportunity structure formulated and reformulated the actions and reactions of ILMs within Mahalla. It clarifies the impact of international and domestic conditions on workers' settings within their company. It recognizes the impact of the repression of the political regimes of Mubarak, the (SCAF) and Morsi, and their polarization to

the (ETUF) and the management of the company on the productivity of workers, their socioeconomic settings and their various reactions. To demand the rights of workers, the research analyzes the extent of which did opposed political forces tackle The (Repressive) State Apparatus and the (Ideological) State Apparatus accompanying by deteriorating socioeconomic conditions that the political regime used to maintain the order of the state.

Second, it discusses the specificity of the protests established by ILMs in Mahalla asserting their real ability to change the trajectories of other Egyptian labor movements. Therefore, Mahalla Company is a model of protests to all other industrial companies in Egypt. This model influenced ILMs at other industrial companies and led to robust waves of protests among workers in Egypt that lasted for half a century, as workers in other Egyptian factories, like workers in Mahalla, started to formulate their demands. Also, sequences of labor strikes managed to gradually achieve certain gains; such as obtaining some rights for workers⁽⁶⁾, and imposing their terms on, not only the political regime's priorities, but also the agenda of the Ministry of Manpower specifically, which has been unable to stop the momentum of these protests.⁽⁷⁾

Third, these movements internalized the arduous economic conditions and realized that these consequences had taken place due to the domination of the authoritarian political regime and its implementation of neoliberal policies, including privatization policies. This vision drove

them to express opposition and make significant reactions via establishing protests everywhere, and demanding the state to improve their working conditions. Such vision further influenced them to call for ousting Mubarak and his political regime, in spite of their full awareness of the physical and compulsive power of the Egyptian state apparatus.

Forth, it discusses the future of socioeconomic development in Egypt and its affects both on and by working conditions of Egyptian workers, which are well represented, expressed and enhanced by ILMs, which attempt to get rid of the manifestation and imminent subordination of the ETUF. When the working class in Mahalla decided to launch series of protests from 2006 until 2008, and mingled between their worsened socioeconomic conditions and the corrupt rule of Mubarak, they represented the suffering of the impoverished population in Egypt and its desire to make a change to improve their conditions.

In addition, the specificity of these movements comes after the outbreak of the 25th of January 2011, which led these ILMs to establish new laws securing their freedom and allowing them to establish independent trade unions and fair affiliated parties. Such autonomous bodies can empower them to both actualize their interests and aspirations, and criticize governmental policies if they do not include the economic and political rights of laborers and other Egyptians.

Moreover, ILMs in Mahalla played effective roles in establishing independent trade unions as parallel and legal entities to other formal unions, especially after the Revolution because the stance on the role of ETUF⁽⁸⁾ and its affiliated trade unions did not change. Instead of achieving the interests of the political regime, it was expected that ETUF and its affiliated trade unions would seek to fulfill the interests of workers. Yet these formal entities support the interests of MB, as the research will illustrate in this paper.

Furthermore, the political regime of MB⁽⁹⁾ led to a difference in ILMs' roles in Mahalla Company, as well as their allies' attitudes and agendas after the Revolution. ILMs and their supporters believe that the political regime had no vision or plan in tackling the most economic and political issues of Egyptian citizens in general and the working class in particular. They also believed that under the rule of MB, the political regime aimed to create an atmosphere of controversy, division and polarization between workers. Accordingly, workers hardly seek to get their liberty and make use of such political constraints. Though the supporters of MB in Mahalla Company managed to increase the area of conflicts and controversy among workers, unsolved socioeconomic problems aggravated further series of protests.

Besides, ILMs in Mahalla Company have strategic potentials for achieving social change in Egypt as a whole, specifically taking into account the worst socioeconomic

conditions of Egyptians under the rule of MB. This fact is realized by the supporters of the political regime of both Mubarak and Morsi, causing them to render these movements weak, fragmented, and unaware.

Research Objectives

The research aims to analyze the main elements of the political opportunity structure (POS) and to what extent ILMs make use of them before and after January 25th Egyptian Revolution.

The research seeks to analyze the international structures and the domestic conditions within the Egyptian community and their effect on workers. It, also, discusses to which extent such settings either support or hinder the role of workers in Egypt in general and within Misr Spinning and Weaving Company in Mahalla in particular.

The research, also, assesses the position of the political regime towards the main issues of workers. Such assessment extends to include the political regime of: Mubarak, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), and Morsi.

In addition, the research tackles the Policies of Gazel-El-Mahalla Company and the holding company towards workers and the extent of which these formal structures can endorse cooperation and cohesion of workers with each other, in either getting their rights or performing their protests and other collective actions as well.

Eventually, the research draws the future vision of ILMs regarding issuing a law of independent trade unions that can be acceptable to workers in general and within Gazel-El-Mahalla Company in particular.

Research Questions

The Main Research Question

Did the political opportunity structure affect the role of ILMs in Misr Weaving and Spinning Company in Mahalla after January 25th, 2011 Egyptian Revolution?

Research Sub-questions

- How did ILMs make use of POS before and after the Revolution?
- To what extents have domestic and international conditions led to the evolving or undermining of ILMs in Mahalla, after the 25th of January Egyptian Revolution?
- To what extent did the political regime of: Mubarak, the (SCAF), and Morsi lead to increase the productivity of workers, get workers their rights, and empower them to achieve their demands?
- How did the main Policies of Gazel-El-Mahalla Company and the holding company effect the activities and collective actions of ILMs performed, before and after the revolution?
- What is the future vision of ILMs regarding issuing a law of independent trade unions acceptable to both workers and the political regime under the rule of MB?

METHODOLOGY

This paper adopted a qualitative methodology to collect detailed accounts in such areas of concern. The selection of the sample is based on purposive, non-random technique using a set of criteria including; age, work status (workers and leaders) and the political affiliation. In order to include both young and old workers, the age of respondents ranges from mid-twenties to seventies. In addition, conducting interviews with workers and leaders has to represent three main groups: representatives of the previous political regime under the rule of Mubarak, representatives of the previous regime under the rule of Morsi and representatives of workers, who are not politicized, to reflect the interests and demands of workers. The total number of the sample is forty-five respondents. It consists of forty-one workers and four labor leaders, out of which seven are females.

The research used a number of tools in data collection process, conducted from 5 September 2012 to 13 April 2013 including:

- Two focus groups with a total of 20 workers and leaders. They focused on four areas that are connected to the role of ILMs as follows: the perception of themselves within ILMs, the protesting activities before the revolution since 2006, reasons for their exposure to divisions, and the establishment of legalized independent trade unions. These two focus groups were organized on 10th and 12nd

of September 2012, with twenty workers. Fifteen of them are males and the other five are females.

-Informal interviews with five workers: three males and two females. From the 5th to the 8th of September 2012, the paper organized and conducted informal interviews with five workers, three males and two females. These interviews aim to understand workers' conditions within the firm and the nature and difference of domestic and international factors in developing the activities of ILMs.

-Formal structured interviews with close ended questions which were carried out with four leaders of ILMS and also members in various political parties, and nine workers. Between the 12th and 16th of September, the researcher conducted formal interviews with nine workers in Mahalla. The interviews were conducted with two leaders of ILMs and five workers. In addition, the researcher conducted interviews with a journalist, and a member in the coordinating committee of the Tagammu Party, the left wing Egyptian party.

-The final stage covers interviews with 'resource persons'; Mourad Wahba, Professor of Philosophy; Ali Abu-Leila, Professor of Sociology; Ahmed Bahaa Shabban, the General Coordinator of the National Association for Change; Mohamed Abd El-Azeem, the prominent member in the coordinating committee of workers at El-Tagamu' Party; Elhamy El-Mergany, the member of the coordinating committee in both the public syndicate and workers' rights; Kamal Abu-Eita, head of EFITU; and Kamal Abbas, head of ETUWS and EDLC.

1. ILMs WITHIN MAHALLA COMPANY: CONCEPT AND CHARACTERISTICS

The Misr Spinning and Weaving Company was founded in 1927 by a group of Egyptian businessmen in collaboration with Banque Misr “an Egyptian bank for Egyptians only”, which was established after the 1919 Egyptian Revolution. It began by providing capital for large-scale Egyptian industrial facilities, and considered Mahalla Company to be its flagship enterprise.⁽¹¹⁾ The company was the first to be nationalized by then president Gamal Abdel Nasser in 1960. It began to diversify its cotton sources and products in 1975 after it established the garment unit to complement its cloth factory.⁽¹²⁾ To help modernize the country, the United States Agency for International Development provided \$96 million in loans to the government in 1976. In 2004, the company employed 23,000 workers and exported 46,000 tons of cotton yarn, 150 million square meters of fabric, and 5 million garments annually.⁽¹³⁾ In 2005, it employed 26,000 workers, and company facilities included 8 spinning mills, 10 weaving factories, processing units and labs, and recreational centers.⁽¹⁴⁾ The company remained nationalized despite the large-scale liberalization of other sectors of the Egyptian economy. Efforts to privatize many textiles companies, including Misr Fine Spinning and Weaving in Kafr Al- Dawar, were blocked by strike action. Following the global financial crisis of 2008, Misr Helwan entered into \$21 million in debt, which the Egyptian State News Service stated it was able to reduce to \$16 million in debt the subsequent year through a debt settlement program.⁽¹⁵⁾ It currently sells approximately 70%

of its production to domestic markets, with the remaining production sold primarily to Europe.⁽¹⁶⁾

The concept 'Independent Labor Movements' (ILMs)⁽¹⁷⁾ refers to authentic and self-generated movements that emerged as a result of socioeconomic pressures imposed on workers. These pressures that several workers suffered are the outcomes of the implementation of international and domestic policies; international policies aim to apply neo-liberalism's policy, and domestic policies include the implementation of unplanned economic restructuring reforms, such as privatization. Such worsened conditions led workers to organize themselves, create independent entities and establish a series of protests. As agents of change, ILMs are characterized by "collective consciousness", which are based on the principles of unionism, tolerance, and strength, either obvious or imminent. Although they follow ETUF and its affiliated trade unions, *the arm of the state* seek to institutionalize their movements⁽¹⁸⁾ and establish independent trade unions and federations, which have to be acknowledged by a law guaranteeing the freedom of such informal bodies.

For some workers, ILMs in Mahalla Company metaphorically represent "a revolution that erupts from workers, who carry the Egyptian economy on their shoulders, but are still hungry and needy". In describing the situation of the workers, El- Attar explained: "*They [workers] are poor like any other marginalized people in Egypt. They assured that several big business owners*

“corrupt businessmen”, who are intentionally supported by the political regime of Mubarak, appropriated all the wealth of the country to their own benefit. So, workers in Mahalla decided to express their anger and change these corrupt settings through establishing non-stop protests.”

In the personal interview with El-Attar (2012), he explained that:

“ILMs in Mahalla represented all the downtrodden Egyptian citizens, and compared the government to a seemingly deaf bureaucratic officer, sitting on the upper floor and surrounded by solid glass and walls, which do not allow him to hear or see any worker. Seeking to prompt the officer’s attention to look into their complaints, ILMs in Mahalla desperately pelted him with stones, destroying all glass and walls around, and thus forcing this officer to listen to their grievances and negotiate with them.

Using such metaphorical description, El-Attar meant that the workers, via demanding their rights, organizing negotiations and staging protests, imposed their will on the government officials. ILMs also represent a group of young workers, who decided to demand and defend their legitimate rights, which were aggressively usurped by the former oppressive regime under Mubarak.

The leaders of ILMs are the corner stone of the movement as they reach out to workers, educate them about their rights and garnered them the support they needed in their endeavors. One of the leaders of Mahalla explained:

“We cannot stand up for the rights of workers alone, rather workers should support us. We, as leaders of ILMs, meet on regular basis with workers to acquaint them with their rights, and how they can claim these rights through peaceful protests.”⁽¹⁹⁾

In addition, the participation of female workers⁽²⁰⁾ is considered one of the main characteristics of ILMs since 2006. In general, female workers are perceived as ‘apolitical’ in their factories. They believed that if they engage in political activities and any other collective actions within their company after the end of their work hours, they will be exposed to the violence of the police apparatus and damage their reputations.⁽²¹⁾ However, the situation, in Mahalla, has differed since 2006; female workers have actively participated in the labor protests and incited their male co-workers to participate. They observed that their female colleagues precede them to involve in sit-ins and confront the police apparatus without fear. Labor protests, in Mahalla, included all women, who are deprived of decent income, the class that Mubarak fallaciously claimed he would take into his consideration as a target group and enhance their conditions.

In a personal interview with El-Said (2012), she declared:

“We are the courageous women from Egypt, who decided to demand workers’ rights and largely make use of negotiations and discussions with state officials without fear. We are the courageous women who did not worry about any angry reaction from the State Security

and any possible physical assaults. We are so proud that we successfully made such a positive transition not only at workers' level from 2006 to 2008, but also at all categories of the Egyptian community on the 25th of January, the Egyptian Revolution."

The existence and development of ILMs in Mahalla are closely connected to the establishment of the ETUF, the only official and acknowledged federation and trade unions by law 35 of 1976, and its affiliated trade unions, which consist of approximately 23 unions. This formal entity is established to promote the ideas and demands of a group of workers, stand as a support entity in defending the rights of their members, confront economic and social pressures, and respond to the call for the nationalistic defense of their rights.⁽²²⁾ It is also supposed to guard the terms and conditions of their members from management and guarantee their regular meetings and negotiations with both employers and officials.⁽²³⁾ Thus, and according to ILO, the Labor Federation and its affiliated trade unions have to act as mediators between the state and employers on the one hand, and workers on the other.

Instead, no change occurred in the role of the ETUF, and its followed trade unions, as it did not aim to achieve workers' urgent needs and demands. *"There are negative roles of these official entities, which completely followed the interests of the former political regime and its ruling party, the National Democratic Party (NDP), with its*

supporters of crony entrepreneurs against workers' interests and rights, whether before or after the revolution", explained Abd-El-Azeem one of the interviewees.

Consequently, to increase workers' awareness of their rights, extensive activities were performed and crystallized by the formation and development of the activities of ILMs. Such activities, before and after the 25th of January Egyptian revolution, extended to include protesting, publishing bulletins, statements and periodical magazines, organizing meetings, demanding setting a minimum and maximum limit of wages, demanding other social and political rights, and eventually, formulating four drafts of a new law for the freedom of trade unions.

After January Egyptian revolution and the breakdown of the Mubarak regime, state-controlled ETUF, and its affiliated trade unions, could have transformed its role and could have lost its monopoly over the representation of workers but none of this actually happened. Some workers went further to believe that the federation continued to act as the arm of the state under Morsi as they did under Mubarak.

As such, ILMs in Egypt, with the assistance of their allies, tried to establish independent trade unions, which have the ability to achieve recognition and growth in size and position.⁽²⁴⁾ It is believed when these entities acquire the recognition they will be engaged in collective bargaining. Such a tool will be utilized to reach an

agreement including setting up national wage rates equal to international standards in similar industries. Likewise, like most developed, industrialized countries in the late nineteenth century, when these trade unions grew in size and consolidated their positions, workers can then use their pressuring power within these unions in order to pass legislations. These legislations allow workers to gain privileges such as safe working conditions, adequate health insurance, a maximum limit of working hours to be an “eight-hour day” and a minimum wage limit. They adopted backing social policies such as sickness, unemployment insurance, and old age pension.⁽²⁵⁾

After the Egyptian Revolution, two independent federations were established, the Egyptian Federation for Independent Trade Union (EFITU) and the Egyptian Democratic Labor Congress (EDLC), including 507 trade unions⁽²⁶⁾; but, they have not yet been officially registered until now. Further, MB representatives Khaled El-Azhari and Mohammed Abd-El-Zaher determined to revive a draft law that had been submitted through the Labor Force Committee to the People’s Assembly before its dissolution in 2005, a move which delayed strategically the issue of a new law for independent trade unions. They also refused to consider reservations and concerns expressed by the workers and their labor leaders in Mahalla, who largely supported the draft law designed by Ahmed El-Bourai, Professor of Labor Law at Cairo University and international expert of labor relations.
⁽²⁷⁾ El-Azhari and Abd-El-Zaher not only rejected this

proposed draft law, but they also delayed trade union elections until a new trade union law was agreed upon.

2. THE EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENT OF ILMs IN EGYPT

The origins of the Egyptian labor movement lie in the British occupation of Egypt, which began in 1882.⁽²⁸⁾ During the British Colonial era, poor economic conditions witnessed an increase in the number of unskilled workers, a reality which of course led to the inability of a vast swath of the population to gain financial and professional entitlements.⁽²⁹⁾ As a reaction, especially with the turn of the nineteenth century, these workers conducted a series of collective actions and organized protests. The first protest took place in 1889 by workers of the Eastern Company of Tobacco. Such strikes culminated in 1919 to include workers, students, and many others.⁽³⁰⁾ The Wafd party, which did not limit itself to the struggles of the working class, engaged in leadership roles in the labor movement, and supported the position of workers in the workplace and organization of workers. Through the 1920s, organized strikes increased, as there were 24 major strikes from August to December 1919, and 84 more strikes during 1920 and 1921. By 1921, there were 38 unions in Cairo: 33 in Alexandria, 18 in the Suez Canal region and 6 others throughout Egypt. Their total membership comprised of almost 20,000 members.⁽³¹⁾ In 1952, Egypt had a dynamic and effective labor movement that played an integral role in the overthrow of the British-backed monarchy.⁽³²⁾

In the 1930s, with the rise of the political activism of the Egyptian workers in their workplaces, the president of the General Federation of Labor Unions (GFLU) urged them to avoid the influence of political parties, which manipulated them to achieve their own interests. He further advised them to align themselves with the entities that support them and abandon those that exploit them. This shift in workers' attitudes is synchronized with the growing of the communist movement in the textile industry, which encouraged workers to substantiate their demands as independent entities. With regards to the tendency of trade union federation to form trade unions, it is worth noting that although Al-Wafd adopted Law 85 of 1942 -the first legislation that allows trade unions to exist legally- , it prohibited establishing a unified trade union federation, and placed restrictions on forming unions. These limitations that the Al-Wafd Party set on establishing trade unions led these entities to be decreased, decentralized, and not robust enough to oppose the direction of the Party.

In 1952, Nasser came to power, and his postcolonial government intended to secure its dominance, in part, through the undermining of independent trade unions. Actually, it was the state under Nasser that established the first federation of trade unions in 1954. In the 1960s, with the prevalence of state socialism, no protests were held, because the workers' demands were achieved. As a result, the role of official trade unions, during this period,

focused merely on providing recreational activities to workers such as the organization of summer vacations.⁽³³⁾ Since 1954, Nasser's government did not implement the International Labor Office (ILO) convention number 98 of 1949 on "the Right to Organize and Collective Bargaining", and convention number 87 of 1948 on "Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organize." Moreover, and through the governmental domination over the terms and conditions of working organizations, Nasser aborted any possibilities for workers to establish independent labor movements and trade unions and organize protesting. Yet, Nasser introduced laws that improved Egyptian's standard of living, including job security and benefits. Such reforms are followed by other privileges that include providing workers with health care, subsidized food, housing, pensions and profit-sharing. Thus, most workers complied with Nasser's slogan of "the workers do not demand; we give."⁽³⁴⁾

Widespread riots erupted when Sadat opened the door for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) policies that reduced most of the positive outcomes that state socialism had introduced to workers, and decreased food subsidies and other basic commodities in 1977. Under Sadat Law 35 of 1976 (the Trade Union Law) permitted only one national union per industry to be established, and granted the government greater control over the unions, especially the ability to enforce specific bylaws for local union committees and

ETUF affiliate unions, encompassing those covering elections and eligibility to run union office. Furthermore, Law 1 of 1981 and Law 12 of 1995 stripped any remaining meaningful autonomy from local union committees and the latter also required local union committees to pay 25 percent of their funds to the government-controlled national unions, and 10 percent to ETUF. Even though workers have the right to strike under law 12 of 1995, this practice was hard to be achieved, because establishing strikes were subject to the approval of two-thirds of the national ETUF affiliate's leadership.⁽³⁵⁾

Throughout the period between 2003 and 2010, the Mubarak regime enacted Law 12 of 2003. From a technical standpoint, it replaced all of the previous laws governing labor-management relations. Yet, it followed many of the provisions of Law 35 of 1976, Law 1 of 1981, and Law 12 of 1995, including rigid limits on the right to strike, since a super majority vote of the executive committee of a national union was required for a local union to strike. It sustained ETUF's domination on trade unions and allowed governmental intervention.⁽³⁶⁾

Between 2004 and 2008, over 1.7 million workers were involved in more than 1900 strikes against ETUF⁽³⁷⁾ for what they claimed was its unjust, hierarchical structure and its obedience to Mubarak's NDP. Since 2006, Egypt has witnessed a noticeable escalation in the number of strikes and protests, especially in

Mahalla Company, culminating on the 8th of April 2008, demanding higher wages and better working conditions, and raising opposition to ETUF.

To summarize, Nasser and Sadat's governance was described as a "democratic bargain", which forced Egyptians to put off their rights to political participation in exchange for achieving socioeconomic welfare through a project of national independence.⁽³⁸⁾ Mubarak, in order to guarantee this democratic bargain throughout the first ten years of his rule, combined elements of Nasser and Sadat's policies, attempting to strike a balance between the respective national liberation project with the statist economic policy and the shift to market oriented economic privileges with promises of welfare starting in the 1990s. Through a series of privatization policies and creating an alliance between authority and business, the economic gap was widened between the minority of big business owners on the one hand, and the majority of the middle and lower classes, including workers, on the other.⁽³⁹⁾ This made it almost inevitable that a series of protests would crystallize and materialize by the 25th January Egyptian Revolution. After the Egyptian Revolution, and under the rule of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), the Egyptian labor movements, especially in Mahalla, were becoming divisive and fragmented as this research will illustrate in detail.

3. THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The research will rely on the structure of political opportunities in assessing the activities of ILMs since 2006. It adopts various dimensions of political opportunity structure; namely: *i)* the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political regime, both Mubarak and Morsi's one; *ii)* the stability or lack of the broad set of elite alignments that typically under-grid a polity; *iii)* the presence or absence of elite allies; *iv)* the state's capacity and inclination to repression.⁽⁴⁰⁾ ; *v)* improved or deteriorating socioeconomic conditions affecting the political opportunity of workers;⁽⁴¹⁾ and *vi)* the ability or inability of workers to create political opportunities by and for them.

In order to assess POS before and after the revolution, the research employs the following measures: *i)* the extent of workers' responsiveness to the international and domestic conditions around them and the impact of these conditions on workers and their company; *ii)* the extent of repressiveness of previous political regimes and the reaction of workers to this sort of oppression; *iii)* the extent of contribution and cooperation of opposed political forces; *v)* workers, and their socioeconomic settings, in their relation to the management of Mahalla Company; and *vi)* the way workers perceive themselves at both the professional and political spheres.

Our analysis will employ Marx and Althusser's views concerning the means utilized by political regimes to

oppress its citizens. Marx notifies us that human beings are “destined to freedom⁽⁴²⁾” as freedom is a fundamental component of what makes us all human and that the state is a “machine” of repression, which enables the ruling classes to ensure their domination over the working class. Yet Althusser confirms that the notion that all people are free is merely an imaginary construction which helps to “mystify” the exploited and keep them aligned while reinforcing the power of the ruling class.⁽⁴³⁾ Additionally, he (1970) differentiates between two bodies of the state apparatus: the body of institutions which represent the repressive state apparatus, on one hand, and the body of institutions which represents the body of ideological state apparatus⁽⁴⁵⁾, on the other.

Althusser claims that the State Apparatus consists of two overlapping but distinct set of institutions: the repressive institutions through which the ruling class enforces its rule and the ideological State Apparatuses that are obviously distinct and specialized institutions.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Both RSA and ISAs are working together to maintain the order of the state. The main difference between RSA and ISA is that RSA functions primarily ‘by violence’ and that ISA functions primarily ‘by ideology’. Althusser writes: “The (Repressive) State Apparatus functions massively and predominantly by repression (including physical repression) while functioning secondarily by ideology... For their part, the (Ideological) State Apparatuses function massively and predominantly by ideology, but they also function secondarily by repression.”⁽⁴⁷⁾

He found that RSA is more unified and controlled in implementing the functions of big business men while ISAs are more elusive, diverse and contested terrains where capitalists confronted more difficulties in securing their agendas. Capitalist class structures employ these two different set of apparatuses in parallel to sustain their positions.⁽⁴⁸⁾ In dealing with its citizens, including workers, the Egyptian political regime under the role of either Mubarak or Morsi employs its power through both the ideological and repressive state apparatus. The ideological state apparatus uses all national institutions not only to stereotype and trivialize its citizens' minds and souls for serving its interests but also to impose its dominant ideology and the repressive one employed all the oppressive tools of the state to forcefully subject people that tend to either criticize the deteriorating economic and social conditions or organize consequent protests.

Both oppressive and ideological tools used by the political regime of Mubarak to control Egyptian citizens were accompanied by deteriorating socioeconomic conditions and that led to dissatisfaction among workers, ultimately precipitating a series of protests.⁽⁴⁹⁾ These series of resistance movements were increased and escalated. In Mahalla, the protests that erupted from 2006 until bringing about the Egyptian Revolution reflected multiple cases of resistance, existing in the bodies and souls of workers, which implied thorough meanings and opportunities. They clearly show the extent to which the

workers have benefited from the political opportunity created due to the deterioration of the socioeconomic conditions and the weakness of the political regime and the political participation as well.

On the other, MB aimed by all repressive and ideological state apparatus to reproduce ideological conditions from an extremist Islamic religious perspective prohibiting any one to intervene, criticize, or review. They managed to produce and reproduce ostensible legal and political conditions for capitalist exploitation based on using Islamic religious slogans to pass their agenda and enforce people to accept it without any sort of discussion because what they have made is considered, for them, under the umbrella of religious legitimacy. So, no way to intervene in all what they have taken as your interference violates the religion 'absolutes'. This context can be supported by what Althusser mentioned: "Priests and Despots ... 'forged' the Beautiful Lies so that, in the belief that they were obeying god, men would in fact obey the Priests and Despots, who are usually in alliance in their imposture." ⁽⁵⁰⁾ Moreover, the bourgeoisie believes its own ideology as strongly as the proletariat. It has to 'believe in its own myth' that all men are 'free', free to work or not, free to hire at the lowest price as possible-'before it can convince others.'⁽⁵¹⁾

When MB began its rule in Egypt on June 30, 2012, their agenda changed from oppressed members under the Mubarak regime into the dominant, oppressive political

regime. It was so keen to press its ISAs to interpellate and thus to subjectivize individuals via utilizing religious context that will facilitate passing ideological thoughts and following capitalist exploitations. They aim further to have such oppressed subjects imagine that their subjectivities are internally self-generated. Such individuals believe that their conformity to the needs of capitalist class structures is a life path freely chosen by an independent and autonomous subject. In Althusser's words, the individual within modern capitalist societies is interpellated by ISAs as "free" so that he/she "freely accepts...subjection."⁽⁵²⁾

According to some interviewees, MB aimed to sell Mahalla Company, lay off its workers and prevent them from establishing acknowledged free trade unions. Accordingly, workers that go against such unfair policies are viewed by the political regime of Morsi and its proponents as offenders of the law and the Islamic religion as well. Such endless illegitimate attempts to control all workers' resources, positions and interests in their workplaces, in ETUF, and in other free trade unions' channels led workers to organize a series of protests in several factories, including Mahalla, and the civil disobedience in several Egyptian governorates, then, toppling the regime of Morsi.⁽⁵³⁾

4- THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE IN MAHALLA COMPANY BEFORE 25TH EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION:

This part investigates the role of ILMs in Mahalla before the 25th January Egyptian Revolution. The chapter

argues that the worsening socioeconomic conditions during the rule of Mubarak, especially during the last ten years of his rule, empowered ILMs, and their allies, in Gazel-El-Mahalla to make use of the political opportunity and constitute common identity, values, and meanings that pushed them to organize several protests, design creative banners, hold meetings and negotiations.

It, also, examines the extent to which the workers benefited from political opportunities through focusing on four specific aspects: *i)* the international structures and the impact of neo-liberalism on directing the policies of the Egyptian government to implement open-door and privatization initiatives; *ii)* domestic policies and their effect on the economic conditions of workers in Mahalla; *iii)* the policies of the previous political regime of Mubarak and its police apparatus in dealing with collective actions of workers practiced in Mahalla; *iv)* the policies of Gazel El Mahalla Company and their impact on actualizing the interests of workers.

4.1 INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT

Concerning the international context, there is a real disparity between what neo-liberalism calls for in the literature and the impact of adopting its policies on developing countries ⁽⁵⁴⁾, including Egyptian workers. Neoliberalism is both a body of economic theory and a policy stance. Neoliberal theory claims that a largely unregulated capitalist system (A “free market economy”) not only embodies the ideal of free individual choice, but

also achieves optimal economic performance with regard to efficiency, economic growth, technical progress, and actual justice. The state does not undertake such boundless economic roles as it restricts to defining property rights, following-up on contracts, and amending the money supply. Accordingly, State intervention to correct market failures is viewed with suspicion, on the basis that such intervention can escalate more problems than it solves.

Besides, the neo-liberal state, as perceived by its opponents, promotes strong individual private property rights.⁽⁵⁵⁾ It also assumes the rule of law, individuals' right to freedom of action, expression, and choice, and the institutions of freely designing social contracts and functioning markets and free trade, where market-driven calculations have an influence on the management of populations and the administration of special spaces.⁽⁵⁶⁾

Such trends of neoliberalism were not actualized in Egypt. The authoritarian political regime in Egypt since 1952 relied on the centralization of the government. After Sadat adopted the open-door policy, the government intended to insert few big businessmen, as ministers, into the government which materialized when Mubarak took the power. Yet, these businessmen, who wielded both wealth and authority, did not work to actualize the interests of workers. Though they showed themselves as representatives of the free market, they failed to fill the vacuum of services previously purveyed by the state. With a state discharging itself of its basic roles in fulfilling

citizens with basic needs and services, and turning to the private sector to satisfy these needs, the Egyptian working class was increasingly left to fend for itself.⁽⁵⁷⁾

In addition, the authoritarian political regime in Egypt followed negative practices on applying privatization. It privatized large and productive corporations, cut down workers' financial and legitimate rights, deprived them from participating in developing their companies' policies, and discussed privatization of their factories based on market-driven calculations.⁽⁵⁸⁾ Regrettably, such factories were sold at their book value, which was by far less than their actual market values.⁽⁵⁹⁾

Neoliberalism has both an economic and political dimension, though it operates mostly through the interests of expert-managers, particularly stakeholders, financial operators, industrialists, conservative or social democratic politicians.⁽⁶⁰⁾ Related to the Egyptian case, workers organized several strikes when they realized the interconnected relationship between their worsening economic conditions and prevailing political corruption based on the adoption of neoliberal policies. The former political regime, under Mubarak, did not create an institutionalized social dialog with workers in order to fulfill their rights; instead the regime used political polarization, when required. It went against workers' interests by forming a coalition with ministers from entrepreneurs and politically informed people, such as members of NDP. Furthermore, Abu Eita, the head of EFITU and the current Minister of

Workforces, stated: *“The victory of Egypt’s independent labor unions and movements is a real triumph for the workers of the world against the international system of capitalism and imperialist globalization which the policies of neoliberalism one of their representation.”*⁽⁶¹⁾

It can be argued that the implementation of neoliberalism in Egypt had a negative impact on its domestic economy and on the working class, because implementing reform programs under the neoliberalism-based agreements during the 1990s led the Egyptian government to gradual withdrawal of the state from the economy and encouraged international organizations and the private sector to intervene. The movement towards economic reform in Egypt was not associated with a parallel movement regarding political and institutional reforms. This lack of consistency between the two tracks added to the woes of the Egyptian citizens, who were forced to interact with the pressures generated from a market without efficient and adequate institutional mechanisms allowed and legitimized by the government.

Consequently, under the Mubarak regime, workers suffered deteriorating economic and labor conditions. Poverty rate rose from 16.7 percent of GDP during 1990-2004 to 22 percent during 2000-2009.⁽⁶²⁾ Unemployment rate increased from 11 percent during 1996-2006 to 13 percent in 2011.⁽⁶³⁾ According to the Strategic Economic Report of 2006, while the relative share of GDP derived by property owners increased from 51.5 percent in the

late 1980s to 71.4 percent in the late 1990s, the relative share of salaried workers in GDP declined from 48.5 percent to 28.6 percent during the same period.⁽⁶⁴⁾ The quality of employment became worse, and the percentage of employment in the informal sector increased. The rise in unemployment rates and increasing informal employment reflected a loss of social security for formal sector workers, who were involved in the official labor federation and its affiliated unions. The latter did not worry about workers' demands and instead served as the mouthpiece of the regime.

The impact of neoliberalism on the formation of independent labor movements has been examined by many studies. For example, Gapasin and Yates (2005) argued that neo-liberalism has created difficulties for workers who opted to organize themselves into unions and political organizations. Yates (2001) asserted that the global nature of the neoliberal economy is hostile to unionization, as mobile capital does not support strengthening the role of unions in demanding the rights of workers. As long as the target groups of neoliberalism are the capitalists, it can simply create conditions in which unions cannot survive. Another study⁽⁶⁵⁾ showed how neo-liberalism seeks to dominate labor by global capital by situating his analysis in the global context. He argued that neoliberalism has weakened nation-states, and marginalized labor. Okedon suggested, instead, the viability of community-based initiatives as an alternative to corporate-led globalization.

In his study of globalization and diversification of Islamic Movements, Kuru (2005) claimed that the more Islamic movements make use of international opportunity structures, the more they support globalization. He continued to claim that the more the normative framework of such movements is tolerant, the more they back globalization. He added that the relationship between having a tolerant normative framework and being pro-globalization is closely interconnected.

ILMs in Egypt went against globalization as the implementation of neoliberalism; one of its representations led to worsen the economic and social conditions of them. However, through analyzing the situation of the Egyptian labor movements in Mahalla towards international opportunity structures, it can be generally observed that members of ILMs separate between the policies that are formed by the Western countries and their ethical tendencies amidst their societies. While the members of these movements are against the policies of globalization that worsened the conditions of workers, the normative direction of the majority of workers in El Mahalla, who are anti-globalization, amidst the Western citizens is not totally aggressive, but tolerant at times.

As a result, the implementation of neo-liberal economic policies in Egypt has negatively affected the workers, as such did not represent a real political opportunity for the working class. Globalization has weakened the state influence on economic and socio-cultural life in

the labor milieu. In addition, the state implemented privatization disregarding social dimensions, sold public enterprises at their book value, and transferred Egyptian markets from export-led to import-led markets. Yet, workers benefited from both the legitimate involvement in transnational labor movements and the international conventions preserving workers economic and social rights. These international spheres encompassing diverse experiments, frameworks, experiences and agreements empowered workers not only to practice their collective activities and design the draft law of independent trade unions but also to have logical justifications in criticizing other drafts that are proposed by the political regimes if they do not reflect their interests nor secure their rights.

1.2 Domestic Conditions

The open-door policy that allied with the business sector⁽⁶⁶⁾ together with the neo-liberal agreements in the 1970s through the 1990s, led to the Egyptian government's gradual withdrawal from the economic and social spheres. Paczynska (1992) discusses two outcomes of privatization: the early retirement scheme and changing the labor law. A lack of progress in negotiations between the government and the trade union confederation was also noted. He concluded that workers' living standards became more precarious over the course of the 1990s, and that the number of strikes and protests began to rise.

Following neo-liberal policies recommended by IMF and WB, Mubarak ⁽⁶⁷⁾, gradually, but cautiously, executed privatization policies. For example, between 1993 and 2003, 197 public enterprises were privatized, and their workers were either laid off or forced into early retirement⁽⁶⁸⁾. From July 2004 to March 2006, the Ministry of Investment sold 80 public sector enterprises. ⁽⁶⁹⁾ In July 2006, the government further burdened the workers, when it increased the prices of electricity, transportation, and communication portals.⁽⁷⁰⁾ These processes of privatizing public enterprises led to the devaluation of the Egyptian pound, an increase in the price of food staples, an increase in poverty and unemployment rates, a decrease in the share of workers' salaries in GDP, the exclusion of the middle class, and the marginalization of popular sectors. Such negative impacts triggered the people's response to organize more than 1,000 strikes from 1998 to 2004, with more than 250 protests in 2004 alone.⁽⁷¹⁾

Furthermore, between 2003 and 2010, the Mubarak regime passed Law 12 of 2003, known as the New Labor Law, to replace all previously issued laws governing labor-management relations. The new law followed many of the provisions of Law 35 of 1976, Law 1 of 1981, and Law 12 of 1995, which collectively impose strict limitations on the right to strike. A supermajority vote of the executive committee of a national union was imperative to go on strike. The law also meant to strengthen ETUF's dominance over trade unions, and it facilitated the government's intervention.

All of the above-mentioned governmental restrictions are a result of the failure of the private sector to fill the gap from the withdrawal of the public sector which had previously provided workers with their basic needs and services.⁽⁷²⁾ In response, series of protests had erupted. In general, and according to the Egyptian daily newspaper Al-Masry Al-Youm, there were 222 labor strikes, sit-ins, and demonstrations in 2006, and 580 other forms of protest in 2007 widespread in Egypt.⁽⁷³⁾ As stated by the Land Center for Human Rights, between 2008 and 2010, Egypt witnessed a noticeable increase in the size of protests, demonstrations, and strikes that reached 300.⁽⁷⁴⁾

In terms of the Mahalla Company, since 2006, Egypt has witnessed a noticeable increase in the number of strikes and protests. For instance, between 2004 and 2008, over 1.7 million workers were involved in more than 1,900 strikes.⁽⁷⁵⁾

The mass strikes of 27,000 Mahalla Company's workers in 2006 and 2007 empowered labor workers to up the ante.⁽⁷⁶⁾ Their economic demands turned political, forcing a re-configuration of their relation to the state.⁽⁷⁷⁾ According to the Land Center for Human Rights report (2009), the year of 2008 witnessed 400 events of workers' collective actions with the participation of around 300,000 to 500,000 workers as the protests reached their pinnacle in April 6, 2008, when the workers demanded raising their wages and improving working conditions and garnered opposition to the ETUF.⁽⁷⁸⁾

There were malpractices implemented within the Egyptian government that led to a drop in workers' wages, the execution of early retirement plans, and the exclusion of workers as legitimate candidates for trade unions' elections in 2006. These practices consist of the rigging of elections of labor unions by the regime in 2005, and the acceleration of the pace of privatization by Ahmed Nazif, the former Prime Minister, who took office in 2004. According to one of the interviewees in Mahalla⁽⁷⁹⁾, this unjustified exclusion of workers by the proponents of Mubarak's regime caused 400 demonstrations and encouraged workers to form parallel committees that stressed the free choice of their own representatives, their full independent responsibility in establishing their legality, and the invalidity of the ex-elected committees.

4.3 Mubarak's Political Regime

The economic and political pressures imposed by the Mubarak Regime provided a real chance for workers, like all of the other social classes, to make use of "political opportunity structure". Workers could not support such worsening conditions anymore. Consequently, the ruling pact and democratic bargain followed by the system of Mubarak could not guarantee the sustainability of his political regime.⁽⁸⁰⁾

Mubarak's regime and its supporters mixed the economic and political privileges. They targeted the interests of specific big business owners who engaged in the political sphere and became members in the committee

of policies (Lagnet El Syasaat) at the People Assembly. This combination between political power and economic privileges led them to be the dominating and ruling class that could protect their interests. These interests led to the ignorance of the economic and social demands of the working class that led them to stage a series of protests.

Reacting to the consonant waves of protests in Mahalla, the regime of Mubarak and its adherents tended to implement two specific mechanisms; co-optation and repression. For example, State Security (SS) continued to oppress workers' rights in reacted to their protesting in aggressive ways. It also appointed the members of ETUF and its trade unions in order to guarantee their loyalty. In 2006, SS embarked on a plan to tarnish the image of leaders of ILMs among workers in Mahalla. However, when workers faced the leaders of ILMs during a number of thorny issues in order to assess their reactions, leaders of such movements proved their transparency towards the workers and their movements and workers soon realized the fallacy of the SS's account.⁽⁸¹⁾

Concerning the negative role of ETUF and its trade unions, their role was devoted to realize the interests of both the proponents of Mubarak regime and big business owners, who support the political regime of Mubarak. Yet, they did not serve the main concerns and needs of workers and they attempted to prevent workers from protesting. One of the workers⁽⁸²⁾ explained:

“Workers of Mahalla Company confronted the oppressive power of SS, which appointed most of the members of ETUF and its trade unions. They did not fulfill the demands and rights of workers, but the interests of both the Egyptian police apparatus and the head of the company.”

The oppressive practices of these negative and co-opted entities increased the awareness of workers and encouraged them to express their anger, combining their economic and political demands, and staging consequent protests as possible means to get rid of such ongoing oppression and corruption.

Repeated attempts by proponents of the Mubarak regime to exploit SS and ETUF and to undermine the interests of workers intensified conflicts and divisions among workers before the strikes of April 2008 by recruiting some Mahalla leaders⁽⁸³⁾ in ETUF who used to voice the workers' demands. With regards to the April 2008 protests, the practices of the police and the State Security Apparatus (SSA) were extremely aggressive. Initially, when workers felt that the representatives of this committee of the 25,000 workers were engulfed by the supporters of the regime of Mubarak, some workers went against the committee that negotiated on behalf of the workers, against the wishes of the management at the Mahalla Company, and participated in demonstrations, which took place in the main square of Mahalla against the regime. The confrontation lasted

two days (6-8 April), during which security forces arrested 331 people, beat up hundreds, wounded nine, and shot a 15-year-old boy in the head while he was standing in the balcony with his family.

Then, Mahalla workers called for a general strike supported by the Egyptian social movement “Kifaya”, the major coordinator of workers, and other political parties; however, the strike was aborted when 100 political activists were arrested on the eve of April 6th.

⁽⁸⁴⁾ When it was announced that Kifaya supported the April 6th strike, George Isaac, one of the movement’s founding members, was arrested three days later along with 50 others. The charges against Isaac were the typically fabricated accusations the Mubarak regime repeatedly directed against its opponents. ⁽⁸⁵⁾ According to Abbas, General Coordinator of CTUWS ⁽⁸⁶⁾ *“When 25 academics and journalists traveled to Mahalla on April 11th to visit families of the injured in the protests, they were detained 20 km out of the city. If anything, these practices proved that Mubarak’s regime intentionally resorted to despotic measures against unarmed civilians to thwart protests.”*

In addition, the State Security, according to El Attar, one of the interviewees, played an essential role in decreasing the number of ILM leaders, from 106 in December 2006 to only seven in February 2007; five men and two women. He further explained that “the State Security recruited many workers, and seven leaders. Actually,

one of these leaders worked as an agent for the State Security reporting the plans and movements of the other the leaders. On the other hand, the leaders diligently worked to increase their numbers and motivate workers. They managed to attract six to seven new members to be heads of the groups. Every couple of days, State Security and Central Intelligence (CI) detained at least five workers. Moreover, State Security recruited some workers and offered them concessions in order to either report or halt any possible protests. Both SS and CI managed to entice almost half of the workers' leaders to stand against their fellow workers. The workers became divided over the holding of protests. Only half of them were in favor of demonstrating. ⁽⁸⁷⁾ Punitive measures were taken against some leaders like El-Attar and El-Said; both were demoted and their salaries were diminished significantly.

Some interviewees went further to claim that after such unforgettable events in April 2008, both the General Intelligence and the State Security apparatus started to intervene and repress citizens. Such repression led people to passively revise their situations and to be more terrified and less resistant. Both people of Mahalla and media correspondents intended to forget what happened and what workers have done through the event, after it was covered by media, and was watched and appreciated by all people in the world. Therefore, some analysts did not expect workers in the Company to go on strike again. Analysts did not anticipate the

recurrence of such protests before the elapse of a long period of time. One of the workers pursued that such negative reaction from the regime towards workers widened the gap between labor and politics, and so far, the labor movement has been fearfully hesitant to get involved in politics.

The combination between achieving their economic demands and getting rid of the political corruption constituted a major problem for the political regime and its followed and oppressive institution; the State Security. When workers became more aware, they became convinced that fulfilling their demands was directly related to toppling the corrupt political regime. This regime privatized and undermined the national economy in favor of the direct interests of the regime and its beneficiaries, as well as the international agenda that supported the adoption of neo-liberalism policies, including privatization. In addition, the State Security (SS) proved to be a “repressive machine”, exercising all means of despotism on workers. The police managed to diminish the protests in Mahalla through using direct, coercive power of arresting, beating, detaining, and killing against people from across the Egyptian social spectrum, including workers, citizens, and intellectuals from social movements.

Meanwhile there are four types of protest policing, which include the cooperation between the police force and demonstrators, the negotiation by considering police as mediators between demonstrators and non-

demonstrators, ritualistic stand-off via more aggressive presence of police and total control by the massive presence of police forces. Practical experiences of policing system with workers during the protests confirmed that police resorted to both mechanisms as the last form of protest policing is consisted of the ritualistic stand-off and the total control for dispensing the protests via using massive police forces in an excessively aggressive way.

The political opportunity for ILMs in Egyptian industrial factories, in general, and in Mahalla, in particular, was available as there was a bias across allies of the ruling party NDP in the face of other leftist, liberal, and religion-based parties.⁽⁸⁹⁾ Also, there were influential allies from different political parties and movements, which viewed ILMs as the only legitimate political arena that can allow them to exercise pressures on the authoritarian political regime and to make use of their unexploited political experiences and programs as a result of the repressive apparatus of the state. Conflicts escalated between workers, joined by their allies from different political forces, and the elite, who were supported by official bodies, including ETUF and its affiliated trade unions. These available opportunities empowered ILMs in Mahalla Company to hold a series of protests from 2006 until the eruption of the Revolution in 2011.⁽⁹⁰⁾

It can be concluded that the relationship between the workers in Mahalla and the political regime under Mubarak represents two sides having different positions for each.

This sort of relationship was based on the different and sometimes the antagonistic interests between them.⁽⁹¹⁾ The regime of Mubarak and its supporters used all the state apparatuses; the ideological such as: the public media, ETUF and its trade unions constituting the arm of the state oppressed workers and prevented their expression of anger and opposition. These formal entities have all control resources; money, repressive tools, knowledge, and high-ranking positions. Additionally, they seek to deprive workers of any source of power through cutting their financial rights, stereotyping their minds via organizing meetings to support the political regime and its ruling party NDP, and depriving them the right to engage in significant awareness campaigns.

In addition, the political regime resorted to use physical and psychological tactics to violate and intimidate its opponents. Moreover, the regime misled citizens by claiming that the socioeconomic status was improving and that Egypt's global standing was advancing. Therefore, workers were wrong to criticize the regime of Mubarak and conduct protests.

Besides, they utilized the repressive apparatuses through using the police apparatus. For example, when workers resorted to staging protests, the symbols of the regime pushed the police apparatus to use all repressive physical ways to get rid of these actions opposing to their plans. So, the government, the army and the police following Mubarak regime imposed the

economic dominance of the ruling class through force or the immediate threat of using it.

4.4 Workers and the Policies of Gazel-El-Mahalla Company

The management of Mahalla Company attempted to sell the Company at its book value instead of its market value. To achieve this, it exerts all possible efforts to facilitate the privatization of the Company. For example, management tended to either sell the machines utilized by cheapest prices or break them down by using clothing of different quality or type. It also did not intend to mend or upgrade the maintenance unit of the company. Added to that, the whole company production was sold to Abd-El-Samea-El-Shami, a businessman and a member of the NDP. All of these attempts negatively affected the socioeconomic status of workers, and led them to realize that the position of their company was embedded in the position of the Egyptian society. Consequently, they established a series of protests mixing economic and political issues and demanding the ouster of the political regime. In other words, workers reacted to the corrupt productive settings to set up their collective actions and ask for the overthrow of the Mubarak regime.⁽⁹²⁾

There are several evidences confirming the intentional direction of labor administration for privatizing Mahalla Company: the administration sought to co-opt officials and push them to implement its policy. For Example, Mohsen-El-Gilani did not accept in 1991 to take part

in the responsibility of selling the company when he was its chairman. However, when he took over the presidency of the holding company, he changed his mind and became the first man to advocate the idea of selling public enterprises.⁽⁹³⁾

The organizers of the company's management sought by all means to support the privatization of the company via its consonant certainty that public enterprises do not become the property of the people. Also, there is no objection to the sale based on the claim that the company incurs losses. This conviction facilitated officials from the company to execute the process of selling the profited companies and that any public company can be sold at the cheapest price of any book-value of the company. However, the companies that have been privatized and supervised by Egyptian big business owners were exposed to more loss as some of their workers were laid-off and others are still working, but remained under hard working conditions.⁽⁹⁴⁾

Also, some ILM leaders recruited by the Mubarak regime intentional malpractices within the firm led to losses and the reduction in the productivity of Mahalla Company that are manifested in the following:

- Damaging the quality of cotton in El Mahalla, which was known by its long staple, was considerably implemented. Mohsen-El-Gilani, the former chairman of textile factory, began spinning and working with

short staple cotton, which is called cotton sweeping with low quality, instead of the high quality and long staple cotton.

- Importing the latest machines in order to develop the factory units 6 and 16. It was supposed to operate these machines on the best types of yarn, but they operated them on plain cloth, which was used to make tents and jeans.⁽⁹⁵⁾ Hence, machineries were vandalized by relying on short staple cotton, yarn nature-like polyester and even linen. There were also no spare parts for these machines. The only workshop in Mahalla, which was the top at the national level and was producing spare parts for all machines, was broken down and non-developed.⁽⁹⁶⁾
- The Textile Company was exposed to extremely poor conditions that adversely impacted its productivity. Rejecting these conditions, workers staged demonstrations. Only then, the government repaid the debts owed by the company. When a new head of the company took office, he followed the same practices of his predecessor, who intended to cause incurring losses. Such being the case, the claim will be that the company is pointless with low production qualitatively and quantitatively; hence, it should either be leased or sold. Since 1994, the management of the Company started to rent some of its production lines. For instance, textile rental unit number 2 was rented to Korea, but it was later claimed that this

sector, which was been leased, was incurring losses. Now, the Korean textile production line belongs to Abdul Sami al-Shami, the famous entrepreneur and a member of NDP.⁽⁹⁷⁾

- One of the most important heads, who tried to spoil the textile company in Mahalla, is Moataz Bellah Abdel Maksoud (referred to as Abdul Almfssod as workers called him, or the follower of corruption in English,). He is the head who controlled all the facilities of the company. When he was appointed a minister, he replied that he would be a minister while remaining the head of a textile company, and then he was appointed head of the holding company for the textile trade, but under the condition of being held under the chairmanship of Mahalla Company.⁽⁹⁸⁾

Moataz Bellah Abdel Maksoud, the ex-head of the Holding Company, also dealt with textile products, which were not standardized and had defects and put them on El-Taawon Exhibition (the Cooperation Exhibition) to be sold in Mahalla. To cover up his financial position within Mahalla Company, Moataz did this false replacement specifically before CAO demanding him to discuss the budget in 2003. However, he possessed managerial skills that enabled him to cover the financial position of the company in front of CAO. Therefore, it was a deliberate sabotage by the management of Mahalla Company, and not a spontaneous one. On the other hand, the textile company is a subsidiary of the holding company, so that

it cannot make any decision without the approval of the holding company, through which Moataz configured the company's boss for the subsidiaries.⁽⁹⁹⁾

To conclude, ETUF, in collaboration with the State Security (SS) and the Central Intelligence (CI), launched aggressive campaigns against workers in Mahalla when they exposed the corrupt practices exercised in the process of companies' privatization. While the officials of the state unjustifiably presume that such companies incur losses that have to push these enterprises to be privatized, workers refuted such fallacious claims as there was no logical reason regarding selling profitable companies. For instance, and for several leaders within ILMs of Mahalla, the goal of the protest that took place on the 30th of April 2008 was to explore and expose the reasons behind the so-called losses incurred by Mahalla Company, despite the fact that they were making substantial profits.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

The exaggerated insistence of the management on privatizing the company on illogical pretexts led some ILM leaders to publish several documents and statistics in the periodical labor bulletin, proving thereby that some public enterprises are exposed to the privatization process in spite of their getting adequate profits.⁽¹⁰¹⁾

Definitely, the previous political regime under Mubarak,⁽¹⁰²⁾ and more specifically in the last ten years, gave Egyptians, especially workers, the full political opportunity, as the

socioeconomic conditions reached their worst levels. There was no political space for actualizing real political participation under the Mubarak Regime and that led to protests and created instability.⁽¹⁰³⁾ Neo-liberalism policies amalgamated undermining the Egyptian economic growth as the government started, in the 1990s, to privatize state-owned enterprises at their book value, and selected the productive ones to be privatized. Such processes adversely impacted the socioeconomic conditions of workers, and led to a series of protests in Mahalla, manifested in December 7, 2006 and April 6, 7, 8, and 30, 2008, especially under the negative roles of ETUF and its affiliated trade unions. Thus, these processes served the interests of the state and entrepreneurs instead of fulfilling workers' interests and demands.

With regards to political opportunities, the Egyptian workers were empowered to bring about a series of protests due to the pre-existing civil society, the political opposition and the use of the social media and other means of telecommunications, which paved the way for protesters to launch a series of protests.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾

Workers did not only make use of the political opportunities, but they also created more strategies.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾ They managed to organize themselves, identify the political arena, and create awareness campaigns. Accordingly, they were empowered enough to launch protests, make collective bargaining, organize negotiations, and

substantiate resistance against the political regime and persistence to resume the protests, involving all sectors of the Egyptian community, which was made possible due to combining the economic and political demands. It is noticeable that the mechanisms and shared meanings used in 2006, 2008, and the January 25th Egyptian Revolution incidents are of the same origin.

5- THE POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE IN MAHALLA COMPANY AFTER 25TH EGYPTIAN REVOLUTION:

There was an expectation saying that the role of such movement will improve and become more institutionalized. It was also anticipated that the workers would acquire their right to establish independent trade unions by the virtue of a fair law that secures such right. However, the situation after the revolution fell short. In Mahalla Company, ILMs were exposed to intentional divisions and fragmentations, for reasons not only limited to the intervention of Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF), the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and the remnants of the regime of Mubarak within the labor milieu, but also due to the lack of a clear political vision before these movements though they were supported by their adherents of different political trends. Such lack of vision did not enable them to avoid differences and actualize their legitimate targets.

This part discusses the main dimensions of POS that are used to assess the role of ILMs in Mahalla

Company after the 25 January Revolution, and how these movements dealt with political developments, and the extent of which these movements with its political allies address the escalating developments within the Company under the rule of SCAF from one hand and the rule of Morsi, the representative of MB, on the other.

To ascertain the availability of POS within ILMs after the revolution, the research adopts four main measures: *i)* The international context, with emphasis on the new agenda the US designed for the Middle East after the Arab Spring; and the situations of workers in Egypt, in general, and in Mahalla Company, in particular. *ii)* The domestic conditions in relation to the economic policies and directions of the political regime of Morsi and their impact on workers. *iii)* The political regime under the rule of both SCAF and MB with their repressive police apparatus and the extent of which such oppressive ways practiced on workers constituted political opportunities for workers within ILMs. *iv)* The position of the registration of independent trade unions after the revolution, and whether they represent just a non-existent potential or a tangible reality.

It is noticed that workers in Mahalla Company are divided⁽¹⁰⁶⁾ into three main groups during the rule of Morsi: first, the group representing MB, and that El-Attar and El-Said are its main leaders.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾ Second, the group representing the political regime of Mubarak and that Wedad El-Demerdash and Faysal Lakousha group

are its main figures. And finally, the independent group, which represents workers' interests and not inclined to specific political ideology, is not politicized. The majority of workers did not follow a specific political ideology as the most important point for them is keeping ILMs alive, fulfilling their needs, increasing the wages and profits, and preserving the company from being privatized.

There are several reasons that result in the occurrence of a case of diversification of workers' vision and direction as well; like establishing one opposed coalition serving the interests of MB in front of the one of the workers'. In addition, the establishment of political parties whose names stick to the principles of the Egyptian revolution in spite of their loyalty to either the regime of Mubarak or the regime of Morsi. Moreover, the tendencies of ILMs' leaders became divisive to include the interests of the regime of Mubarak, or the regime of Morsi, or the interests of workers. Besides, the main reliance of the political regime on the police state as a repressive apparatus through the interim rule of SCAF and the regime of Morsi. The end of SCAF is to cross its interim rule without more conflicts and protests and preserve the symbols of Mubarak regime. However, the end of MB, for some workers, is to neutralize ILMs through giving them inapplicable promises till MB's full domination on ETUF and its affiliated trade unions and that can facilitate undermining their movements and demands. On the contrary, some claim that different views of workers

under these rapid developments Egypt passes by do not mean that ILMs in Mahalla Company are exposing to division⁽¹⁰⁸⁾.

To explain the main constituents of encouraging or aborting the political opportunities of workers and the reasons and consequences of these acute divisions taken place within ILMs in Mahalla, this part tackles the four dimensions of the POS mentioned as follows:

2.1 International Context

Movement scholars have conceived the structure of political opportunities in terms of domestic political institutions and processes, disregarding the impact of global political and economic processes in structuring domestic possibilities for successful labor collective actions.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ However, there is a real effect of international conditions on constituting domestic politics and policies as well as international changes occurred inevitably affect the domestic conditions, especially in the Middle East.

After the Revolution, which highlights the principles of civility, freedom and social justice, a shift against neo-liberal policies was expected because it did not take the wider social impact of the reform among their priorities, and had an adverse effect on social cohesion across various classes of the community. As Walkins (1995) argues that neo-liberal policies failed to provide workers with a 'framework for poverty reduction' connected to social welfare programs, which are inadequately protected and

that reflected on deepening the gap between the poor and the rich.⁽¹¹⁰⁾ However, the application of neo-liberalism continued during the interim rule of SCAF, and became more intensified under president Morsi. This ongoing application of neo-liberal policies can lead to either close or sell running factories, and the high reliance on imported products, which will negatively impact the future of Egyptian workers and their factories. MB is committed to a market-based economic system of complete external dependence. They emulate the Turkish economic model.⁽¹¹¹⁾ They, also, called for establishing the “Renaissance Project”, which has been criticized for circulating the same neoliberal formulae and its vagueness of the content and its lack of a timetable of implementation. This inability was represented by the attempt to raise taxes and the continued vilification of ongoing labor strikes.⁽¹¹²⁾

On the other hand, the US foreign policy, after the Revolution, showed contradiction between its international interest and democratic principles it calls for. Different point of views of US actions was proposed. But, the US administration not only took a stance against Mubarak and Omar Suleiman, its strategic ally as representatives of the neo-authoritarian regimes, but it supported the rule of MB as a substitute.⁽¹¹³⁾

Consequently, the international order, in geopolitical terms, witnessed the new formation of the Middle East, after the Arab Uprisings, as there is a persuasive conviction that admits that internal political changes in

the Arab world, including Egypt, will cause imbalance in the balance of power across the region in front of Iran, Turkey, Israel, and the West. And the major key issues to the West's analysts is that to which extent the uprisings will lead to the democratization of the Arab Middle East and their effect on Arab society to get rid of longstanding authoritarian regimes, which prevailed throughout the political life, and replace them by extremist Islamic powers as tools more submissive for the West.⁽¹¹⁴⁾

The main concern of international forces was that the region of the Middle East, including Egypt, would enter a period in which MB will begin to involve in politics. Despite there are several fears and worries concerning the possibility of MB to deal with politics⁽¹¹⁵⁾, the Islamic power, which can make anything and everything to preserve on its political authority, can contribute to implement the international alliance's interests and undermine the will and aspiration of Egyptians after the Revolution. One of the most important evidence proving that the international forces supported MB is the American financial support that assists MB to win in the presidential election. Such financial support reached \$1.5 billion. As a response, the American Congress held a large investigation concerning the justification of spending \$50 million for supporting campaigns of MB to win presidential elections.⁽¹¹⁶⁾

In detail, on April, the Obama administration quietly released \$1.5 billion as foreign aid to the new Egyptian

government, now dominated by a Brotherhood-led-coalition in parliament—soon to be joined by an Ikhwan (i.e., Brotherhood) luminary as president.⁽¹¹⁷⁾ In this concern, the U.S. Senate candidate Barry Hinckley, a Republican, said:

“Obama gave the Muslim Brotherhood a billion and a half dollars last week, you know, in Egypt. We need that money here. A billion and a half dollars could really help Rhode Island, quite frankly. We probably need it, in my opinion, more than the Muslim Brotherhood needs . . . And we give them a billion and a half dollars? That’s a problem in my book. We need to focus our resources here.”⁽¹¹⁸⁾

According to Arabic News Channel TV 14 reported on by Egypt Daily News, Obama managed confidentially to bring eight billion dollars to the Muslim Brotherhood—not the Egyptian government—as payment to guarantee that a large portion of the Sinai Peninsula be delivered to the terrorist organization Hamas, an acknowledged enemy of both the United States and Israel.⁽¹¹⁹⁾

To sum up, international interests are larger than domestic ones, as there are Israeli-American and Arab, especially Gulf countries’ interests, which played an essential role, for some analysts, in undermining: the potential opportunities of Egyptian people, the legitimate demands of the Revolution, and the positive changes can the impoverished groups gain. To actualize its own interests and undermine Egyptian human potentials

as an introduction to dominate the Middle East, such international alliance managed to set a well-organized plan that aims to support the rule of MB in Arab Spring's countries, especially after the Arab Spring arouses fears, because it bears a rejection of the Arab autocrats' decades of servility toward Israel and the West⁽¹²⁰⁾. The popular demands are also aimed at reforming Arab States policies toward Israel and Palestine. Therefore, both the intensified implementation of the neoliberalism to lessen the socioeconomic levels of Egyptian citizens and pave the way for formulating the new Middle East in order to serve the interests of the west are considered the two pillars for MB to implement all repressive and ideological ways to secure their permanent existence as a dominant ruling class and stand against strikes organized by the working class and that increased the challenges ILMs and their allies from political parties and movements confronted.⁽¹²¹⁾

In addition, cross-national and international differences in their agendas were in favor to MB, the tool that can achieve the new Middle East plan. These differences that negatively affected the institutional features of political systems should have significant effects on the trajectories of ILMs in Mahalla Company. Moreover, the lack of an adequate political vision among workers and the partial success of MB to create the differences and divisions of ILMs in Mahalla, the study will show later, negatively affected the trajectories of ILMs in Mahalla

concerning the organization of a considerable number of protests and other collective actions.

2.2 Domestic Conditions

In the aftermath of the 25 January Egyptian revolution, and under its interim rule, it is obvious that SCAF had a specific task, which was the preservation of the remnants of Mubarak's political regime, securing its existence during its interim duration and saving its way out, as possible. Yet, SCAF did not concern about the working class. If it considered this class, it would guarantee its sustainability in the political regime. Its policies towards workers were indirect, as it ostensibly announced that its intention is to exert all possible efforts to preserve symbols of the political regime of Mubarak by the same ways the previous regime followed.⁽¹²²⁾ These ways, according to an interviewee⁽¹²³⁾, are based on adopting aggression, implementing stick and carrot policy, and creating conflicts and differences within ILMs.

Thus, it is broadly argued that the military dominance of the Egyptian state after Mubarak left no room for democratic alternatives.⁽¹²⁴⁾ In addition, Amin (2011) pursued by expecting that there is an alliance between SCAF and MB for weakening workers' ability to organize their movements again and establish independent entities.

Concerning MB, and related to their contribution in the improvement of the economic conditions of Egyptian workers after the Revolution, no real change happened

in the direction of socioeconomic restructuring of the country, after electing Morsi as president, as it relied on the neo-liberal policies. MB accepted reactionary neoliberal policies and be submissive to the enforcement of US because it was unable to present real and integrative socioeconomic program.⁽¹²⁵⁾ The core of the Renaissance Project of MB is to attract global capital relied on getting loans that come from international institutions. For example, Morsi's government has applied for a \$4.8 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), confirming that it tends to comply with the conditions of IMF whereas budgetary austerity and other neoliberal reforms, including carrying out drastic structural reforms, go. This reflects more domination and incorporation in global economic and monopolized markets. Such domination includes European and American countries, in addition to Gulf ones, which rely on the oil economy. Instead of the reliance on diversified economy, the political regime of Morsi adopts factor- based economy, which focuses on gathering wealth. So, there is no hope in such tendency MB follows in developing the economy based on collecting wealth, and not increasing the productivity.

MB neither increased the productivity of workers nor abandoned following neo-liberal policies. This claim dues to several reasons as follows: Initially and through the first hundred days of the rule of Morsi, and according to an interviewee of workers⁽¹²⁶⁾, the big business owners representing Mubarak regime like, Mohamed

Abo-El-Einen and Mohamed Farid Khames, with the president held meetings with about fifty five of multi and trans-national corporations. Such corporations do not represent the interests of their workers, who launched several protests against them from the United States and Italy as these international entities are against the interests of their workers. Also, these corporations contaminate the environment, as such contracts signed with them will entrench the corruption, domination, and more humiliation among Egyptian workers. In addition, the prime minister calls Egyptians to adopt the policy of austerity, and at the meantime MB signed an agreement with IMF stipulating that Egypt will take loans.

Added to that, in Tahrir Square, when President Morsi promised that he would commit to international conventions and agreements that Egypt has signed, he meant the agreements that are ratified with the United States and Israel, but not the international agreement securing economic, social, and cultural rights, which Egypt has signed on and ratified by the People Assembly. If he ratified such international acknowledgements, in favor of workers' interests, he would put a clear basis and vision reflecting the perspective of the political system amidst workers.⁽¹²⁷⁾ But, Morsi and his political regime that were enforced by the guidance office of MB insisted on setting a basis leading to undermining the system as a whole and that has a negative influence on the Egyptian rights, including workers'.⁽¹²⁸⁾

Besides, the article (243) of the constitution that stipulated that workers and peasants had to be represented in People's Assembly and the percentage had to be 50 percent had been removed from the new draft. Such existence of both workers and peasants, before, guarantees such representation, even if it was inadequate representation. In addition, MB tended to undermine the rights of women as a partner with men in building up the productive community, as the articles of the draft of the constitution did not put women on equal footing with men according to the main principles of citizenship, but they situated the position of women subjected to the views of their own directions which differed with other neutral Islamic trends. Such attitude could abort about a half of the mental and productive forces within the Egyptian community in general and inside the labor milieu particularly.

Furthermore, the Egyptian industry is still administrated by symbols of Mubarak regime as Mr. Fouad Abd El-Aleem, the former head of Misr Spinning and Weaving Company, became now the Vice President of the Holding Company, and that Mohsen El-Gelany became the President of the Company. This fact raises several concerns, from the experts, about how Egypt was not undertaking the cut-off with Mubarak regime, and about how the uprising would not practically undermine Mubarak's regime, and they highlighted the role the media played in such concern.⁽¹²⁹⁾ Consequently, there

are, still, ongoing attempts from the political regime of Mubarak to undermine ILMs in Mahalla Company.

Eventually, the continuation of organizing protests as the statistics in recent two months revealed that about 1,500 of protests in Egypt were established, and about 19 ones launched in a one day.⁽¹³⁰⁾ These rates are considered the highest worldwide. The new, in such protests, is that, through staging such protests: protestors constituted a coalition that includes white and blue collars, employees, the popular movement and other marginalized categories from slums.

So, it seems like there is an organized plan, pursued by MB, to undermine the constituents of the Egyptian community, including the labor movements in Mahalla Company. It tends to use specific mechanisms of cooptation in the labor milieu via creating a sort of cleavage among leaders of workers and impose specific names, from either Ikhwan or their proponents in trade unions and in ETUF. There was a noticeably intentional empowerment to members of MB to penetrate not only all governmental institutions, but also the working class itself, especially in one of the most important factories in Egypt, Mahalla Company. To realize its Ikhwanish plan and gain new positions whether in Mahalla Company or in trade unions and ETUF, MB tends to co-opt other members, from leaders and workers. To compensate its inefficiency in tackling the demands of workers and the loss of its history among workers, MB

attempts to increase its proponents among workers to be ready to constitute the trade union laws that serve its interests. More profoundly, MB attempted to create parallel entities in opposition to the ones existed by workers such as: the opposed; coalition, political party, protests, and workers to address any possible actions can workers undertake.⁽¹³¹⁾

2.3 ILMs and the Political Regime

This part is divided into two main elements: the role of ILMs in Mahalla under the rule of SCAF, and the role of these workers during the rule of Morsi.

2.3.1 ILMs and the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF)

Military, as a second dominant group, played an important role in the economy, and the military officials have been appointed as provincial governors, heads of state companies and other prestigious bureaucratic positions.⁽¹³²⁾ These privileges provided to military men prolonged Mubarak's regime through securing the electoral outcomes. According to WikiLeaks (2008), the Egyptian state has given the military ownership of wide areas of land in the Nile Delta and the Red Sea Coast in exchange for the absolute obedience. Through the past three decades, the military has connected to land expropriations, and the most recent case was that of the northwest coast.⁽¹³³⁾ Also, the military keeps its business dealings secret, exempts for paying taxes, and has

free access to a secured labor market.⁽¹³⁴⁾ To deal with privatization and attract critical foreign investment, military-owned-companies were compelled to improve the quality of their outcomes, especially in the hotel industry.⁽¹³⁵⁾

This background can justify the fact that SCAF was cruel with workers and leaders in Mahalla Company after the Revolution. It set about 120 of missiles within Mahalla Company⁽¹³⁶⁾. It urged, via its soldiers, both public and the Military Intelligence to create disagreements and divisions among workers. Such aggression, according to Charbel (2011b), led SCAF to issue a warning against labor strikes stating that:

“Noble Egyptians (Mowatinoun Al Shorafaa) see that these strikes, at this delicate time, lead to negative results.” What explains cruelty with workers in the aftermath of the Revolution, and under the rule of SCAF, is the following situation: when representatives of SCAF negotiated with laborers, they mistreated workers. For example, through February 15, 2011, workers raised several demands like; increase the incentives per month, increase the allowances of development and production from 17 to 25 months, increase the annual profits from 8 to 10 months, determining the minimum and maximum limit of salaries, resigning the head of the company, resigning the head of judicial sector, developing the hospital that follows the company, and excluding Reda El-Sayem, the General Manager of the company and a General who was brought via the Public Security.

During the negotiation, workers selected a representative of workers to constitute a group of negotiation from workers discussing demands with soldiers from the military. At the beginning, the military soldiers accused El-Attar and some other workers of their inflexibility and inability to reach a compromise with soldiers in favor of workers' interests. When they failed to make such division between some leaders and workers, they began to make a negotiation in Tala't Harb Square in front of company's management. Representatives from the military attended like the governor, his deputy, and their assistants—about seven soldiers.

The way of negotiating and treating workers was noticeably aggressive like the way police follows towards them before the Revolution. El-Attar said that Colonel Wael, at the beginning of the negotiation, said to workers:

“Don't forget the military judges; I swear to bring you all before them.” El-Attar replies “If you do not make an official apology to us, I, with my colleagues from leaders and workers, will withdraw from such talks with the delegate of workers. We are negotiating after a revolution, Sir and there is a revolutionary legitimacy for us now.” As a result, Colonel Wael officially apologized and negotiations were resumed but failed on the first day.

On the fourth and fifth day in the City Council, and to secure workers, who are responsible for holding the negotiation, and their company from possible and

aggressive reaction from the military, other workers divided themselves into two groups: the first group circulated the negotiators from workers in the City Council. The second group stayed in the company, and they spread in front of all gates of the company. El-Attar assured that this protest succeeded and the workers gained their profits, because there was one leadership and fixed demands.

It can be confirmed that the methods of the military governor apparatus inside Mahalla Company are the same ones followed before by the Central Security followed by Ministry of The Interior under Mubarak regime via spying, surveillance and calling workers for investigating them at nights...etc. These methods are applied now under Morsi regime. For example, Mahmoud El-Barah, the member of Coordinating Committee before the revolution, who is in favor of MB, is appointed now as the responsible for security in Mahalla. To conclude, the methods of persecution and domination, exercised with workers, represent the implementation of carrot and stick policy towards workers, despite of various political regimes that ruled Egypt till now.⁽¹³⁷⁾

Regarding the role of Essam Sharaf, the Prime Minister of Egypt during the rule of SCAF, workers differed in their attitudes concerning his contributions in the fulfillment of workers' interests. Some workers went with him by mentioning that Essam Sharaf invited several categories from the Egyptian community and organized

a meeting with them, including the industrial sector. He did not ignore any Egyptian social group and called for determining the minimum wage (limit of salaries). But, there was an intentional tendency to weaken the role of Sharaf from the supporters of the regime of Mubarak and the military, because Sharaf, who took his office via the legitimacy of the revolution from Tahrir Square, attempted to satisfy legitimate demands of workers and the marginalized groups in the Egyptian community. Such needs are contradicted to the interests of both the proponents of the regime of Mubarak and SCAF.

On the contrary, for some other workers, Sharaf was characterized by passivity as he inclined to MB; he did not increase the basic salary of workers nor implement any decision without taking the acceptance of the SCAF, which was the only effective actor in designing decisions and directions of Egyptian citizens. Although Sharaf was so obedient and not participant in changing workers' worse conditions, especially after the Egyptian Revolution, he did not participate in any sort of corruption ⁽¹³⁸⁾.

It can be noticed that though the tendency of SCAF reflected the consonant aggression towards the working class, in general, and workers of Mahalla, in specific, leaders of independent trade unions managed to gather themselves to form EFITU, and establish more independent trade unions. These leaders envision that this transitional period is considered a meaningful opportunity for workers to actualize judicial and

professional gains that can empower workers to fulfill their demands. For example, when SCAF appointed Hussein Megawer, the ex-president of ETUF,⁽¹³⁹⁾ to be the Minister of Manpower and Migration, EFITU protested outside of ETUF office and threatened to make a march to protest against Megawer's appointment. As a result, SCAF fired Megawer and installed Ahmed El Borai instead.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾

To sum up, the mechanisms used by SCAF did not differ from ones followed by Mubarak regime as the Military Governor aims to actualize personal interests, not workers' ones as they appointed Abd-El-Aleem as a General Commissioner of Mahalla Company, who became now the head of the Holding Company for Spinning and Weaving Industries. He is the man who was fired by workers because of his accusation of company's theft. Wael-Abd-El-Azeem, the lieutenant colonel in the military, appointed Ahmed Maher, the engineer, to be a head of Mahalla Company. Maher does not know anything about the Company and cannot take any decision by himself, till this moment, but by the orders of the Military Governor and now according to Morsi's political regime's interests.

Obviously, the Military Governor showed his persecution to workers when SCAF issued the law criminalizing workers, who establish protests and strikes. Consequently, protests were established everywhere, and some workers were put in prisons in sentences ranging from one to five years.⁽¹⁴¹⁾ And the transitional

government claimed that the anti-strike law is not meant for other peaceful demonstrations, but halting any “counter-revolution” from overtaking the Egyptian Revolution, but the anti-strike law included independent trade unions, the central part of the revolution.⁽¹⁴²⁾

2.3.2 Morsi’s Political Regime

Under the rule of Mubarak, MB was exposed to several means of oppression and exclusion. When their position taking changed after the Revolution from imprisoned and oppressed individuals to those who are ruling Egypt, it was expected that they would seek to set-up more fair, civilized and developmental country, based on the principles of democracy and social justice for all categories, especially the lower class including workers. However, through my conducting interviews in Mahalla, several workers argue that MB’s random policies proved that the main target for them is establishing Islamic state based on undermining all the principles of the revolution; which they called for with other political trends, getting rid of the idea of developing factories and their workers. They followed the policies of divisions and cooptation that are matched to their economic plans, which rely on commerce and importing commodities and products in favor of their representatives from big business owners, and sustain their rule by using both the ideological and repressive tools of state apparatus as possible.

Before the revolution, leaders of MB downplayed the implementation of sharia and adopted a more general

discourse of democracy and political freedom directed to the general audience. The London-based newspaper Al-Hayat quoted a leading figure of the 'guidance office' of the group who stated that the main priority at this specific moment was not sharia but more reliance on the principles of democracy as 'the gravity of the situation has reduced rifts between different political trends to this old-new common ground.'⁽¹⁴³⁾

Currently and after their taking over the power, the position of MB changed as they intended to widen the gap between them and other political and civic forces in Egypt, in favor of some specific Islamists movements like: Hamas and El-Gihad etc.⁽¹⁴⁴⁾ In other words, regional and religious interests for them prevailed to exclude the national ones and create more marginalization to the Egyptian people, including workers after the Revolution and the ongoing protests in Mahalla were the clear evidence in this context.

Concerning the position of MB inside the labor movement, MBs had nothing to do with workers as they had neither noticeable history nor tangible roles with them. Through tracking the labor protests since 2006, there were no leaders or famous representatives of MB.⁽¹⁴⁵⁾ It did not believe in labor movements and had no contribution with them; their members were not aware of labor movements' mechanisms of defense and clashes. On the other hand, and for the head of CTUWS, MB could create conflicts and tensions in case

of its actualization of personal interests; yet, they did not make such tensions for actualizing common national interests or serving a specific class like the working one that opposed to them.⁽¹⁴⁶⁾

To falsely claim that it had real contributions to ILMs in Mahalla after the Revolution, MB ostensibly attempted to involve their representatives in any workers' activities and negotiations. For example, to display their demands, when workers organized a meeting with the Minister of Manpower and formed a delegation to meet the minister, on their way to the minister office they found Mr. Mohamed El-Ganayni, the chemist engineer of Mahalla Company and the representative of MB waiting for them there without any previous agreement with him as his existence was according to a call from Yousri Bayoumi, the treasurer in the Coordinating Committee of ETUF and one of leading figures of MB in Mahalla Company. As a result, media untruly claimed that MB participated in negotiations between workers and the minister etc.⁽¹⁴⁷⁾

One of the leaders of ILMs, who represents the interests of workers and does not belong to any political trend, claimed that MB have recently adopted the principle of peaceful reconciliation, as they sought to undermine any way of making contentions, or protests through which workers in Mahalla Company did activate and combine between their economic and political demands like what they have made before with the political regime of Mubarak. For example, when

workers in Mahalla initiated to establish the last protest, taking place on July 15, 2012, members of MB with its representative leader, El-Attar, claimed that there was no need for this protest, because MB would see to workers' demands and fulfill them gradually. But the protest was established, in spite of such pressures coming from MB and its followers. This protest, for him, was successful as it broke any sort of fear expected from Morsi's regime. This protest broke out because of the promises workers were taking concerning getting their profits, which they did not get, and demanding toppling Fouad Abd-El-Aleem, the corrupt former head of Mahalla Company, who currently became a consultant and then the head of the Holding Company that is responsible for all spinning and weaving companies in Egypt.⁽¹⁴⁸⁾

On the other side, the proponents of workers, who support MB, claimed that it supported the labor movement. The members of MB specified a time to communicate with workers each week as they worked through a specific agenda based on three main strategies. First, develop the industry; second, insert specific criteria, for the industry, to regain its strength and third, increase the ability of the Egyptian industry to compete globally. They pursued by recommending that Egyptian workers have to take an appropriate period of time in assessing the activities of MB with them, but I think that such agenda, like MB's project called "Renaissance", reflected a broad and ambiguous strategy that cannot be applied and achieved in a specific period of time.

ILMs in Mahalla are divided into three main groups: the first group supports MB represented by El-Attar, the second group represents the regime of Mubarak and its ruling party NDP⁽¹⁴⁹⁾ represented by Lakousha, and the third represents the concerns of workers who are not politicized and represent themselves, their demands, and not a specific ideology in collaboration with leftist parties and the democratic front of 6th of April movement.

For example, and through July 15, 2012, each group supported the trend it inclined to. Muslim brotherhood followed the conciliatory policy with workers in Mahalla. El-Attar, who supported MB and has been promised to take positions in ETUF, aimed to prevent workers from establishing protests. The second group, which hold up the previous political regime, followed the neutral attitude. The third group, which represents the majority, insisted on protesting.

Added to that, the members of MB formed a coalition entitled “the supporters of workers in Mahalla Company” in opposition to “the coalition of workers of Mahalla Company”. This double-edged policy of MB toward the independent movements caused an actual division and conflict among them. The object was clearly engulfing some leaders, who inclined to pass the interests of MB, and isolating the other independent leaders and their proponents from workers, who inclined to implement the interests of workers.

Further, MB implemented the same practices performed by the former political regime. It attempted to redesign the organization of formal trade unions; ETUF and its affiliated trade unions, to be its iron arm for defending the new attitudes of the political regime of Morsi, regardless of achieving the interests of workers.⁽¹⁵⁰⁾ To reach this goal, it penetrated the management of Coordinating Committee that is responsible for the activities of ETUF. They constituted a temporary committee for such management, including from four to five members, belonging to MB. One of the members was the Minister of Manpower under the rule of Morsi. Thus, workers could not complain about anything bothering them, and could not find reliable entity either to defend or represent their real needs. Even ILMs themselves could not support workers after such clear division and suspicion among them. Workers did not know what to do: either establishing the protests, or improving the productivity of the company.⁽¹⁵¹⁾

Not only did MB penetrate the Coordinating Committee, but they also intervened in the programs of training centers (Workers' Culture), which aimed to provide awareness campaigns within the company. They were politicized in favor of MB, and that practice pushed a former member in the official labor trade union committee to criticize MB and refuse the new constitution and accused them that they were responsible for the deficiencies of the previous political system. It also issued statements confirming that it would assign some

workers and leaders, who supported MB, in ETUF and its affiliated trade unions on September, 2012. Such statement was issued from the Syndicate of Engineering in Mahalla, in which members of MB had meetings with some former leaders from workers in Mahalla. According to the statement, these workers would get positions as heads of trade unions, or members in board of directors, whether in trade unions or in ETUF.

Concerning issuing the law of independent labor unions, when Ahmed-El-Borai⁽¹⁵²⁾ was appointed as the Minister of Manpower, workers and their coordinating Committee initiated to discuss the law of the freedom of trade unions. However, MB did not activate it, but objected to several articles therein, for instance, the necessity for making the duration of trade union to be five years instead of four ones. As long as MB dominated on formal professional syndicates, they were against formulating independent trade unions, because if such idea became successful, it would be disseminated to include other professional syndicates controlled by MB. In other words, if the idea of establishing independent trade unions and professional syndicates disseminated, the role of MB in such entities would fade away.⁽¹⁵³⁾ Seeking to broaden the political opportunities of workers and in actualizing the freedom of independent trade unions⁽¹⁵⁴⁾, there was a coalition between the EFITU, with other independent forces and political parties in confronting El-Azhari's draft law of the freedom of trade unions.

When El-Azhari failed to impose the draft law, which MB proposed at the dissolved People's Assembly, and that workers insisted on the ratification of the draft provided by Mohamed El-Borai, the ex-Minister of Manpower, El-Azhari delayed both issuing the law of trade unions and the elections for selecting their leaders for six months.

Such delay raised an argument between workers; some went with such delay of the election till issuing the new law of trade unions, as the current law number 35 of 1976 is full of gaps and contradictions⁽¹⁵⁵⁾. Other workers feared such delay as they expected MB to be on their ways to co-opt new workers from leaders of ILMs representing their interests, and entrench them in such delayed election. Meanwhile, a statement was issued by the Syndicate of Engineering that was distributed and specified new positions offered to specific leaders, loyal to them, in the new formation of trade unions and federation.⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ Workers had to continue their pressure on the government for issuing the new law of trade unions including the comments and modifications suggested by workers.

Not only did MB seek to dominate ETUF and its trade unions without giving workers in Mahalla and other factories their rights to participate, except for its opponents, but it also imposed a new draft law undermining such freedom, whereas it is supposed to give workers the freedom to establish independent

trade unions. Some respondents from workers and leftist parties assured that Khaled El-Azhari, the Minister of Manpower, discussed the draft law of trade unions, which MB proposed before within the dissolved People's Assembly; however, it was criticized by several workers in Mahalla under the supervision of workers office followed by several leftists' parties. When El-Azhari received such notices and comments prepared by workers on the draft law, both he and Ahmed Abd-El-Zaher,⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ the head of ETUF, objected to all of them. Accordingly, the issuing of the law of trade unions and the elections for selecting the leaders from workers of trade unions were delayed for six months.

It can be concluded that according to the new positions and interests of MB, it stick to the agenda of the political regime of Mubarak. MB practiced the same methods of repression, in some cases fiercer, with workers that were practiced on them before via criminalizing the conduct of protests or detaining and imprisoning the protestors. To monopolize all the sources of power in their own hands, MB also used the same apparatuses the previous regime relied on. These included the police, ETUF, and its affiliated trade unions.

The MB realized early the potential of the ILMs to agitate politically. This much was evidence by the number of protests specifically in Mahalla, not to mention its role in the Egyptian revolution, but also in other factories. The MB took precautions therefore, which meant that

they restricted their opportunities and squeezed them politically. MB implemented ideological policies that secured their existence within the ruling class. Within the labor environment, they established the opposed coalition versus the workers coalition. They incorporated themselves into ETUF and issuing a rule stipulating that its employees in the federation could not continue in their work if they were over sixty years old and they have made a hidden agreement securing the appointment of the supporters of MB from workers to reach about (30%) of the whole percentage of the members of ETUF, who represented the previous political regime of Mubarak.⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ To entrench their neoliberal ideology with workers in Mahalla Company and according to some interviewees, MB aimed to sell Mahalla Company, lay off its workers and prevent them from establishing registered and independent trade unions. Accordingly, workers that went against such unfair policies were viewed by the political regime of Morsi and its proponents as offenders of the law and the Islamic religion as well. Such endless illegitimate attempts to control all workers' resources, positions and interests in their workplaces, in ETUF, and in other independent trade unions' channels led workers to organize a series of protests in several factories, including Mahalla, and the civil disobedience in several Egyptian governorates.

Within the Egyptian community, they specified specific religious and media channels to insert their own extremist and religious principles and to replace cultural thoughts

with dogmatic ones ‘cultural-paradigm-shift’ serving their coming tendencies. Most importantly, they established specific schools entrenching the ‘Ikhwanished’ thought.⁽¹⁵⁹⁾ They imposed their constitution by force without popular consensus on its articles that did not represent them and their interests whereas MB refused to endorse the ‘confused’ constitution, formed to serve its purposes. This approach of undermining laws and civil instability⁽¹⁶⁰⁾ hindered the attempts of ratifying the proposed law of free trade unions and led to consequent series of protests within Mahalla and other companies all over Egypt.

Furthermore, MB passed the constitution though many critics raised concerning several articles. In addition, there was a specific article of the constitution stipulating that there was a positive relationship between gaining wages and the production of workers’ factories and those most Egyptian factories suffered throughout the rule of Morsi either the halt of several companies or the noticeable decrease in their productions. When workers decided to stage protests to criticize this constitution article, MB ‘the ruling regime’ led their adherents to recruit more workers to stand against the opponents of the constitution. Consequently, supporters of MB viewed that the opponents of the constitution are offenders of the Islamic religion.⁽¹⁶¹⁾

Regarding SCAF in relation to ILMs, several workers assured that it used some ways of threats against workers and leaders. It used several methods of warning

directed to several effective leaders, and they threatened workers by placing about 120 military vehicles inside Mahalla Company, claiming that the Military Governor was attempting to secure strategic companies.⁽¹⁶²⁾ But, the synchronization between putting such huge vehicles and using ways of threat and repression reflected an intentional aggressive direction towards workers and leaders. The political forces were not strong enough, and the military governor with the help of the security of the company tended to deepen the differences and plant their agents among workers. Such division under worse economic and productive conditions led to weaken the activities of ILMs. Some workers went further to mention that SCAF came to preserve the interests of the symbols of the political regime.⁽¹⁶³⁾

In addition, SCAF, through its interim rule, tended to achieve the stability; however, it tended to deepen the differentiation between workers and co-opt weak workers to get possible information about any potential intention from workers to launch protests and negatively exploit recruited elements from workers to devalue the protest and create more divisions and problems. So, according to interviews conducted with workers and leaders, there is no difference between the ways previous political regime under Mubarak has used with workers and the ways used with workers by SCAF, but the mechanisms, used by the Military Governor, were more directly aggressive and arrogant.⁽¹⁶⁴⁾

It was found that ILMs constituted the essential factor to bringing about the Egyptian revolution. It employed several aggressive ways in managing negotiations and creating differences. In other formula, the interim government of Essam Sharaf dealt with workers by fulfilling their urgent demands, without finding radical solution for them, even if these solutions could take more time. Although Sharaf resorted ostensibly to satisfy all parties: SCAF, the Egyptian people, especially workers, he was not concerned about fulfilling the interests of workers. If he did not indeed ignore their demands, he would have determined the minimum and maximum limit of wages, and increased their basic salary, rather than just giving them temporary incentives and bonuses.⁽¹⁶⁵⁾

It can be noticed that under the rule of SCAF, labor movements in Mahalla Company appeared more aware, organized, and revolutionary. The Military Governor did not rely on direct confrontation with workers of Mahalla Company, but he, instead, resorted, through its persistent attempts, to construct a blockage between aware and organized workers, and other workers adopted the same methods followed before; providing concessions, recruiting needy workers, and creating more divisions and differences among workers as much as possible.⁽¹⁶⁶⁾

Regarding MB, it deepened the socioeconomic crises, especially among workers and adopted the principle of peaceful reconciliation as they sought by all apparatuses whether by using religious and negotiation (ideological)

or by using the oppressive ways that it largely used in recent times (repressive) to undermine any way of making contentions, or protests through which workers in Mahalla Company could activate and might combine between their economic and political demands like what they have made before with the previous political regime under Mubarak. Consequently, MB, after the revolution, did not manage to display economic plans securing the improvement of the productivity of companies and factories and focused on signing agreements with trans-national corporations, in collaboration with the capitalists representing the political regime of Mubarak. These transnational corporations were well known by contaminating the environment. ⁽¹⁶⁷⁾

The political regime not only co-opted some leaders and promised them to take specific positions and privileges, but also workers and leaders were divided into three main groups as illustrated before. In collaboration with EFITU and EDLC, which had to unite, and the leftist and liberal parties, the third group, which represented the majority of workers, followed all means to have recognized independent trade unions that could empower them to legalize their own activities, conduct collective bargaining, establish labor parties, and participate in formulating industrial legislations and labor policies as well. ⁽¹⁶⁸⁾

Concerning political elites, most political parties did not provide workers with any possible opportunities.

On the contrary, they made use of workers' cycles of contentions and stick them to workers' achievements. However, as long as actualizing workers' demands was embedded in the Marxist context (Marxist Manifesto), several interviewees noted that the leftists, including the Tagammu and the Egyptian revolutionary parties, were the most sincere trends in understanding and escalating workers' awareness and demands as well.⁽¹⁶⁹⁾

Except for Kifaya movement, other social movements did not offer any tangible contributions or additions to labor movements in Mahalla Company, but they acquired their popularity and fame from several protests held by workers in Mahalla. After the revolution, when several political entities suddenly appeared representing NDP, MB, and even those which pretended to represent the spirit and principles of the revolution, most of them were financed and directed to fragment leaders and workers, revived the importance of the previous political system under Mubarak, and introduced new stage propagating the religions attitude.⁽¹⁷⁰⁾

In general, MB sought to formulate Islamist political entities, regardless of achieving workers' interests and needs as a part of the interests and needs of the whole Egyptian community. There were about 20 Islamist-oriented parties that were either officially registered or in the process of completing their paperwork. Also, there were dozens of Islamist movements, blocs and networks that are noticeably evolving in the public sphere.⁽¹⁷¹⁾

Not only did MB divert its tendency from religious activity into political one for filling the vacuum within the political sphere resulting from the dissolution of the ex-dominant ruling NDP and fighting against their counterparts from other liberal, leftist, and secularist trends, whether they were established or in the process of being established, but it aimed also to undermine the labor movement in Mahalla via not giving its independent trade unions the legitimacy of existence. Such acknowledged existence could empower workers to ask for their rights and needs, improve their professional capacities and awareness, and participate in industrial negotiations, agreements and policies as well.⁽¹⁷²⁾

Conclusion:

This paper reaches a set of conclusions as follows: The first conclusion is that the bad conditions of workers and the clear lack of political vision within ILMs in Mahalla Company, including this missing of theoretical and actual steps, gave both the political regime of Mubarak and Morsi, and even SCAF after the revolution, the full opportunity not only to create a state of divisions and controversies among workers as an attempt to weaken their collective activities but also to fill the labor milieu with several political parties and coalitions that serve their own interests which contradict to those of workers.

What deepens the divisions among workers is that the supporters of the regimes of Mubarak and Morsi aimed to achieve their full interests and to sustain its

settings without any opposition over those of workers. To reach their goals, they resorted to their supporters to rise the internal bickering among workers. To prove that, the number of elections' candidates for trade unions in 2006 was 53 out of 6000 of workers, but, currently, and after the revolution, the number of elections' candidates reached 203 out of only 5000 of workers.⁽¹⁷³⁾ This example clarifies that several workers are eager to be leaders, and not just members regardless of the qualifications that they have to acquire to enable them to be leaders. This fierce competition among large number of candidates, for respondents, reflects the interventions of the state security, it, also, reflects the existence of co-opted workers who accept to be agents of the regime in order to create more problems and divisions among workers. Abu-Eita asserted that:

"We believed that the spirit of January 25 Egyptian Revolution will empower Egyptian workers to regain their stolen rights; however, we found that rights of workers after the revolution were extremely declined. For example, the number of workers, who were involved in trade unions, before the revolution, and who were laid off, is 56. After the revolution, the number was noticeably increased to be 650."⁽¹⁷⁴⁾

Political regimes of Mubarak and Morsi, who did not contribute and participate in ILMs before, managed to make a coalition and dominate the facilitating committee of ETUF after the revolution. The trade union of Mahalla

Company itself, for example, contributed to increase the differences when it decided to give workers an increase in their salaries and stated that this bonus between workers in equal amounts of money. Workers perceived that the increase of the salaries is supposed to be paid according to years of their professional experience. When workers attempted to explain such increase through classifying the salary based on years of experience, the union rejected to pay the increase according to such criterion and that led to increase controversy and problems among workers.⁽¹⁷⁵⁾

The second conclusion is that the bad conditions of the working class in Egypt during the rule of Mubarak are the result of the implementation of neoliberal policies that led to the increase of poverty and unemployment rates. These conditions became worse under the rule of Morsi. The implementation of economic and restructural reforms enforce the Egyptian economy to be hardly diversified, vulnerable to natural and external shocks, and highly dependent on external rents and the private sector. Under such market-oriented reforms, Egypt, during Mubarak regime, has begun to take anti-labor measures and to revise their labor laws in order to serve the interests of big business owners 'new economic agents', pave the way for stronger state control in economic and political arenas and shrinking the rights and entitlements of workers claiming that such policies can provide more labor market flexibility and allow the Egyptian industry to be competitive at international levels.⁽¹⁷⁶⁾

On the other hand, the economic policy of Morsi, like the one of Mubarak, has deepened the neo-liberalism and that led to worse economic conditions during the Mubarak era and was a key component of bringing about series of protests against him.⁽¹⁷⁷⁾ They relied on the commercial investments based on importing commodities, discouraged the industrialization process within Egyptian factories, including Mahalla Company. Additionally, they resorted to the big business owners that represent the political regime of Mubarak like, Mohamed Abo-El-Einen and Mohamed Farid Khames, and held, with them, several economic meetings all over the world. In a response, the Prime Minister, Hisham Kandil, calls Egyptians to adopt the policy of austerity as the only way for MB to take loans from IMF in order to save the Egyptian economy.

In regards to the Egyptian workers, the MB did not change the policies, and the employees brought by the State Security, of ETUF, with its affiliated trade unions, which is still considered the arm of the state. Instead, they utilized this union to encourage neoliberal policies, deprive workers of having their financial entitlements, converting their united entity into fragmented units, and direct their minds via organizing meetings and forming coalitions that advocate the political regime and its ruling party FJP. Furthermore, according to interviewees, members of MB have made an agreement with members of ETUF stipulating that members of MB get

30% of ETUF's board of directors⁽¹⁷⁸⁾ and that members of the previous political regime maintain the remaining percentages of the board, which amounts to 70% as an initial step for MB to dominate and take the major share of the Federation afterwards.

MB did not ratify the international agreement securing economic, social, and cultural rights of workers nor display economic plans that guarantee the improvement of the productivity of companies. Besides, it removed from the new draft of the constitution the article stipulating that workers and peasants represented in People's Assembly and the percentage has to be 50 percent.⁽¹⁷⁹⁾ More profoundly, it delayed the law of trade unions and that prevented both EFITU and EDLC from getting their official acknowledgement and registration. And that, in turn, stop workers to ask for their rights and needs, to improve their professional capacities and awareness, and to participate in industrial negotiations, agreements and policies as well.⁽¹⁸⁰⁾

Workers were badly affected by MB's adoption of neoliberal policies and when workers, Within Mahalla Company, in collaboration with El-Tagammu party, discussed their bad conditions and asked for their financial rights, MB attempt to either engulf workers to criticize them or accuse them of secularism, and infidelity.

MB did not allow workers to implement the political rationality and benefit from legal facilities that empower

them to have an adequate freedom to demand their rights, actualize their interests, conduct negotiations, and participate in forming labor legislations...etc.⁽¹⁸¹⁾

In addition, while the government did not privatize Mahalla Company, the management and policies practiced in the Company implemented the main items of privatization: the management of Mahalla Company intended to reduce the size of workers, adopt the early-pension system 10 years ago, refuse appointing any new workers, and cut down the experienced workers.⁽¹⁸²⁾

Such persistence of the MB to resume neoliberal policies renders workers to give their priority to mainly fulfilling their financial and economic demands and that their concerns about politics have declined. Such political concern missed within the labor milieu enables workers to widen their opportunities and rights of participating in forming labor legislations and policies, and their own perspectives in getting a better future.

The third conclusion is that ILMs in Mahalla Company missed the political vision as a logical result because of the absence of ideological vision in the political systems of Mubarak and Morsi and their adherents from one hand and the allies of ILMs on the other. The Egyptian state that used to have a strong ideological project and strong welfare policies during the two decades after independence suffered during the rule of Mubarak the apparent lack of a state ideological project.

MB⁽¹⁸³⁾ did not establish an integrated Islamic project as its members alleged. MB diverted its tendency from religious activity into political one⁽¹⁸⁴⁾ without either setting up a clear plan or taking advice from experienced figures. Rather, it recruited its disqualified members for filling the vacuum within the political sphere resulting from the dissolution of the ex-dominant ruling party; NDP and the weakness of other political parties.⁽¹⁸⁵⁾

Instead of having a real plan, they have the ability to justify their tendencies and decisions that serve the interests of the “guidance office” and their international organization.⁽¹⁸⁶⁾ For example, when members of MB negotiated to take loans from IMF, their supporters considered this policy religiously legitimate (Halal) one. Yet, they had viewed it forbidden (Haram) when they represented ‘unlawful’ group and when they were not members of the ruling regime under the rule of Mubarak. Moreover, some interviewees asserted that tours, which were made by Morsi, to China and other European countries led to signing about 55 contracts with industrial corporations, from different countries, which polluted the environment and for such reason the workers of these corporations launched a series of protests against these corporations.⁽¹⁸⁷⁾

Additionally, most interviewees asserted that the political regimes of Mubarak and Morsi resorted to the utilization of the ideological and repressive state apparatuses on workers in order to implement the

policies of neoliberalism and sustain their positions as powers that combine between authority and capital.

The tangible role of Islamist networks of charities as a result of the withdrawal of the state from providing people with basic services during the rule of Mubarak is considered one of elusive and ideological mean, for Islamists, in order to convince needy people that MB is the only way out for them to cover their basic needs; yet, their target is the reach the 'ruling' regime in Egypt and the Middle East.⁽¹⁸⁸⁾

When they got power, they failed to find sustainable solutions for the Egyptian impoverished people and terminate their suffering. Conversely, they deepened their socioeconomic crises, especially among workers and adopted the principle of peaceful reconciliation as they seek by all apparatuses whether they by using religious and negotiation ways (ideological) or by using the oppressive ones that they largely used in recent times (repressive) to undermine any attempt of workers to make contentions, and protests.⁽¹⁸⁹⁾

The research, finally, revealed that the increase of workers' awareness and their ability to formulate a political vision is closely connected to the establishment of independent trade unions.⁽¹⁹⁰⁾ Economic and social mobilization of workers can be actualized through informal world of labor movements, because formal institutions tend to disempower and exclude them.⁽¹⁹¹⁾

In other words, the processes of politicization and mobilization of the role of ILMs in Mahalla Company and the improvement of their working conditions are closely connected to the freedom of trade unions that secures their attainment of their economic and social rights.

The involvement of workers in trade unions makes leaders' goals be more powerful and meaningful, and empower ILMs in Mahalla to perceive their current activities and predict their future contributions. It can empower workers to find a deeper relationship with its own members, who are so keen to fight for setting and achieving their set of demands. When workers have been inspired by a vision that reflects a real social change, the labor movement within free trade unions can grow in numbers; have bargaining strength, and become collective power. This vision, also, has to reflect the priorities that workers know it, and free unions have to be courageous enough to say it.⁽¹⁹²⁾

The participation of workers in labor unions under the power of the law that was disregarded by Mubarak regime and delayed by Morsi's reflecting workers' priorities and demands will not only free them from the monopoly of the state and its adherents "ETUF and its affiliated trade unions", but it also sustain their independence from the effect of political parties and movements as well as equal partners. Bacon said:⁽¹⁹³⁾

"Changes taking place in our unions and communities today can be the beginning of something as large

and profound. With more radicalism and imagination, the obstacles we face can become historical relics as quickly as did those of that earlier era.”

The present research offers several recommendations:

- 1- Trade unions' law, which reflects real interests of workers, has to be ratified by the next political regime. This law aims at securing laborers rights and giving them the full freedom to establish independent trade unions in order to get rid of state-dominated trade unions. These unions represent worker interests and pave the way towards more stability of the Egyptian economy.
- 2- The state has to guarantee the employment of workers within adequate healthy environmental conditions and secure the unemployment assistance in case of the state inability of employing workers. The state has to oblige to secure the full protection of workers via imposing specific regulations including the determination of a fixed minimum and maximum rate of salaries matching to the increase of both prices and inflation as well, the establishment of independent trade unions and parties without previous conditions or reservations, the provision of financial assistance to unemployed workers, the allowance for workers to organize protesting and peaceful strikes, and the ratification of signed international agreements securing the economic and social rights of workers.

- 3- There is a necessity for all political forces, leaders and workers of ILMs in Mahalla, and independent trade unions to unite and represent one trend. If the unionism was applied with an agreement and cooperation with all political power' trends, ILMs will have a vision in managing their interests; collective actions, independent unions and parties, and the formulation of social and industrial policies. There is a need for establishing unification that is based on the old and new generation within the working environment.
- 4- Leaders⁽¹⁹⁴⁾ have to undertake new responsibilities; they have to be aware of the pros and cons of Labor laws and workers' trade unions, especially independent ones, and mutual duties and rights. Workers must have a new vision with long-run structural reforms; they have to design databases, including labor laws as a guideline to workers, and hold conferences, symposia, and courses.
- 5- There is a necessity of a judicial reform "Legal Opportunity", which can empower workers to safeguard their constitutional rights⁽¹⁹⁵⁾, including establishing independent trade unions. This sort of reform can be formulated by judges, specialists, and workers themselves. For instance, the establishment of specific rules can regulate the access to and cost of approaching the court and that can enable workers to defend their rights and share policy-making process.

When the cost of access to the court declined, marginalized groups from workers can take the opportunity to access and affect the political process and outcomes. Courts can play a considerable role as active participants in the political process, offering effective legal opportunities to workers, who suffered a lack of financial and organizational resources, to resume demanding their entitlements.⁽¹⁹⁶⁾ Such legal facilities can empower workers to strengthen their organizational repertoire and regain all their rights, including the one for practicing peaceful protesting.

الهوامش

- 1-The Political Opportunity Structures are considered one of the three basic determinants of the Political Process Model (PPM). El-Mahdi (2009) focused on PPM in explaining the rise of protest movements that took place in 2004/5. This model includes POS, mobilizing structures, and cultural framing. By using these three determinants in analyzing PPM of the protest movements in Egypt, she concluded that these determinants were crucial in analyzing the rise and expansion of Egyptian workers' roles.
- 2-Joel Beinin. (March 2011). "Work is Politics". Z Net. **The Spirit of Resistance Lives**, 2008 May 6 and Panthea Lee. Institutional Overview: The Labor Movement in Egypt from Revolutions to Institutions.
- 3- Rabab El Mahdi. (2011). **Labour Protests in Egypt: Causes and Meanings**, Review of African Political Economy, 2011, P: 398.
- 4-The application of the privatization policy in Egypt led to the following results: first, the selling of companies, which made profits. Second, the dispensing of companies was based on selling according to their book value, and not the actual one. Third, early-pensions disregarded broad sectors of labor workers, and left them to confront increases in prices, and inflation by themselves, without any governmental intervention to reduce the deteriorating socioeconomic situation.
- 5-Hamdi Abd El Azeim. (1998). **the Human Development**. "the managerial renaissance's series". the ninth edition. El Sadat Academy for Managerial Sciences. Cairo, P: 42-44.
- 6-For instance, when workers of Mahalla Company established protests in September 2006 and halted production for less than a week, they won an immediate bonus equivalent to 90

days' pay, incentive pay is linked to basic pay and subject to a seven percent annual increase, and that the days of the strike is considered a paid vacation (Beinin 2007).

7-Moustafa El- Basyouni, **The Crisis of Syndicate Organization in Egypt**, Socialist Papers, The Center of Socialist Studies, 2009 and Khaled Ali Omar, **Workers and the Social Resistance**, Co-ordinate Committee for Rights and Labor and Professional Freedom, the Law Center of Hisham Mubarak, 2007.

8-ETUF and its affiliated trade unions are considered the arm of the regime, and they fulfill the interests of the political regime, regardless of those of the workers.

9-Even though the political regime under Morsi is represented by the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP), the research will refer to the Party as MB, instead, as the interviewees within the labor environment referenced the political regime of Morsi or Islamists in general as MB not as FJP.

10-These interviews do not follow a set-up structure or consistent criteria. Such interviews do not require scheduling time with respondents. Every conversation with applicants will take a different form which makes it very difficult to compare and contrast between respondents. Informal interviews are used in the early stages to understanding the settings of ILMs within the firm of Mahalla and the domestic and international factors affecting the role of ILMs in Mahalla. Moreover, such details would be useful to serve as the base for conducting more structured interviews in the following steps.

11- Joel Beinin, **Egyptian textile workers: from craft artisans facing European competition to proletarians contending with the state**, The Ashgate Companion to the History of Textile Workers: 1650-2000, 2007:184–197.

- 12-**About Misr Helwan Spinning & Weaving Industry**. Misr Spinning and Weaving Company. Retrieved 10 December 2012 in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Misr_Spinning_and_Weaving_Company
- 13-Jozef De Coster. (14 June 2004). **Egyptian Exporters Express Quota-Free Fears**, Just-Style.
- 14- Jozef De Coster. (6 June 2005). **Egyptian industry at a strategic crossroads**, Just-Style, 15-Mona El Fiqi, **Ghazel Al Mahalla: Revamp Needed**, Al-Ahram Weekly, 17-30- 2015, P: 15.
- 16-**About Misr Helwan Spinning & Weaving Industry**, Ibid, in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Misr_Spinning_and_Weaving_Company
- 17-ILMs in Mahalla have been seen as “the largest social movement in Egypt in over half a century.” They can be explained as part of the political and economic developments taking place in Egypt, or a continuation of post democracy movements. But the question which poses itself is to what extent these movements quantitatively and qualitatively are different (Beinin 2007). They are not distinct and self-contained; rather, they grew from and give birth to other movements, work in coalition with other movements, and influence each other indirectly through their effects on the larger cultural and political environment (Meyer and Whittier 1994; El-Mahdi 2011).
- 18- There is a majority of workers who believes in the importance of establishing independent trade unions, as official trade unions are indifferent to workers’ interests. They constitute no hope for the workers, and therefore, they would like to join the two existing independent federations. On the contrary, there is a minority of workers who believe that workers have to maintain their membership in the official ETUF and its trade unions, as they have to make use of their money and assets

which they have made, but not benefited from. Accordingly, establishing independent trade unions, for this minority will not lead to unifying workers and keeping ILMs alive, but will lead to more fragmentation and division (Mohamed Abd-El-Azeem, Personal Interview, October 12, 2012).

19-Hisham Younis, the leader and the founder of Gazel-El-Mahalla workers' coalition, Personal Interview, September 12, 2012.

20-Women participation in collective actions is noticeably low as they are subjected to patriarchal domination within their families and sexual subjugation... at their homes (Bulbul 1993).

21-Lamia Yacoub Bulbul. (1993). **Serving Two Masters: Family and Factory in the Lives and Consciousness of Egyptian Women Workers**, M.A Thesis submitted to the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, Psychology of the American University in Cairo.

22-Rodney P Carlisle. (2005). **Encyclopedia of Politics: the Left and the Right**, Vol. 1. The Left, Sage Publications, P: 120.

23-Frank Bealey. (1999). **the Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science: A User's Guide to its Terms**, Blackwell Publishers, P: 133.

24-Rodney P Carlisle. (2005). **Encyclopedia of Politics: the Left and the Right**.

25-Frank Bealey. (1999). **the Blackwell Dictionary of Political Science: A User's Guide to its Terms**, P: 148.

26-Nadine Abdalla. (2012). **Egypt's Workers-From Protest Movement to Organized Labor: A Major Challenge of the Transition Period**, SWP Comments 32, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, 2012.

- 27-El Mergany, **Personal Interview**, 17 August 2011.
- 28-William Ochsenwald and Sydney Nettleton Fisher. (2004). **The Middle East: A History**, 6th ed. McGraw Hill.
- 29-Emil P Totonchi. (2011). **Laboring a Democratic Spring: the Past, Present, and Future of Free Trade Unions in Egypt**, Working USA: The Journal of Labor and Society, pp: 259-264.
- 30-The Solidarity Center. (2010). **Justice for All: the Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt**.
- 31-The Solidarity Center, Ibid, 2010 and Emil P Totonchi, **Laboring a Democratic Spring: the Past, Present, and Future of Free Trade Unions in Egypt**, Working USA: 2011.
- 32-Joel Beinin and Zachary Lockman, **Workers on the Nile: Nationalism, Communism, Islam, and the Egyptian Working Class, 1882-1954.** Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1987 and Emil P Totonchi, Ibid, 2011.
- 33-Rabab El Mahdi, **Labour Protests in Egypt: Causes and Reasons**, Review of African Political Economy. 38(129): 387-402, 2011and Emil P Totonchi, **Laboring a Democratic Spring: the Past, Present, and Future of Free Trade Unions in Egypt**, 2011and The Solidarity Center, **Justice for All: the Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt**, 2010.
- 34-Emil P Totonchi. (2011). **Laboring a Democratic Spring: the Past, Present, and Future of Free Trade Unions in Egypt**, pp: 259-283.
- 35-Marsha Pripstein Posusney, **Egyptian Privatization: New Challenges for the Left**, 210 Middle East Report, 1999, P: 38-40 and Emil P Totonchi, **Laboring a Democratic Spring: the Past, Present, and Future of Free Trade Unions in Egypt**, 2011.

- 36-Emil P Totonchi, **Laboring a Democratic Spring: the Past, Present, and Future of Free Trade Unions in Egypt**, 2011 and The Solidarity Center, **Justice for All: the Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt**, 2010.
- 37-Totonchi, **Laboring a Democratic Spring**, PP: 260-261 and Rabab El Mahdi, **Labor protests**, P: 388.
- 38-Rabab El-Mahdi. (2009). **Enough: Egypt Quest for Democracy**, Comparative Political Studies 42(8), Sage Publications, pp: 1021-1022.
- 39-William Ochsenwald and Sydney Nettleton Fisher. (2004). **The Middle East: A History**, 6th ed. McGraw Hill.
- 40-McAdam, D., J. McCarthy, and M. Zald, **Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Framing Processes-Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements**, In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*, edited by D. Mc Adam, J. Mc Carthy, and M. Zald, 1996, PP. 3-4. Cambridge: UK: Cambridge University Press.
- 41-Shinichi Shigetomi and Kumiko Makino. (2009). **Protest and Social Movements in the Developing World**, Institute of Developing Economies (IDE): Edward Elgar.
- 42-Louis Althusser, **Lenin and Philosophy**, and Other Essays, trans. B. Brewster, London: New Left Books, and New York: Monthly Review Press, 1990: 224 and 2000 Bonnie Brennen, **Communication and Freedom: an Althusserian Reading of Media-Government Relations**, the Public, Vol. 7, Issue 4, 2000: P: 6.
- 43-Louis Althusser, Ibid, 1990, P: 224 and Bonnie Brennen, Ibid, 2000, P: 6.

- 44-In Marxist theory, the State Apparatus (SA) contains: the Government, the Administration, the Army, the Police, the Courts, the Prisons, etc., which constitute what Althusser calls the Repressive State Apparatus.
- 45-Ideological State Apparatus (ISA) consists of the following institutions: the religious ISA (the system of the different places of worship), the educational ISA (the system of the different public and private 'schools'), the family, the legal, the political, the trade union, the communications ISA (press, radio and television, etc.), and the cultural ISA (literature, the arts, sports, etc...)
- 46-Luke Ferretter, **Louis Althusser**, Routledge Critical Thinkers, London and New York: Taylor and Francis Group, 2006: 83.
- 47-Althusser, Louis, **Lenin and Philosophy**, and Other Essays, trans. B. Brewster, London: New Left Books, and New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971, P: 138 and Luke Ferretter, **Louis Althusser**, 2006, P: 84.
- 48-Richard D Wolff, "Ideological State Apparatuses, Consumerism, and U.S Capitalism: Lessons for the Left in "Rethinking Marxism", **A Journal of Economics, Culture & Society**, (17) 2, 2005: P: 181.
- 49-Marie Christine Leps, **Critical Productions of Discourse: Angenot, Bakhtin, Foucault**, The Yale Journal of Criticism, 2004, 17: 263-286.
- 50-Louis Althusser, **Lenin and Philosophy**, and Other Essays, Ibid, 1971, P: 153 and Luke Ferretter, **Louis Althusser**, Ibid, 2006: 80.
- 51-Luke Ferretter, Ibid, 2006, P: 81.

52-Richard D Wolf, **Ideological State Apparatuses, Consumerism, and U.S Capitalism: Lessons for the Left** in **“Rethinking Marxism**, 2005: 182.

53-(Kamal Abbas, **Personal Interview**, 14/ 1/ 2013).

54-In general, developing countries, including Egypt, chronically suffered from the implementation of neo-liberalism policies, as they have been pressured by international financial institutions, such as WB and IMF. To follow the neoliberal line, developing countries were led to sign various agreements, ultimately, aiming at structural adjustment and economic reform. Since the early 1980s, partially or wholly, about 30 African countries have been involved in neo-liberal reform programs proposed by IMF and WB. For instance, between 1991 and 1993 in Nigeria, 35 public enterprises were privatized. In Kenya, government restrictions were enforced on unions under pressure from the WB, and Ghana witnessed an extensive liberalization of trade mechanisms.

55-David Harvey, **Brief History of Neo-liberalism**, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007: 2.

56- David Harvey, *Ibid*, P: 3.

57-Rabab El Mahdi, **Egypt’s Quest for Democracy**, Comparative Political Studies, PP: 1021-1022.

58-(Mohamed Abd El Azeim, *Personal Interview*, 12/ 10/ 2012).

59-Keith Faulks, **Political Sociology: A Critical Introduction**, Great Britain: Edinburgh University Press, 1999: 138.

60-Pierre Bourdieu, **The field of Cultural Production: Essays on Art and Literature**. Edited and introduced by Randal Johnson. Cambridge: Polity, 1993.

- 61-Kamal Abu Eita, **Televised Interview**, May 9 2011.
- 62-The Human Development Report 2007/8, UNDP, 2009.
- 63-The Human Development Report 2011, UNDP, 2011.
- 64-H. Raslan, Strategic Economic Report of 2006, Cairo: Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, 2006: 148.
- 65-Mehmet Odekun, **Globalization and Labor: Rethinking Marxism**, 18(3). Association for Economic and Social Analysis: Rutledge Publications, 2006.
- Okedon (2006) cited three main reasons for this marginalization: first, post-1980 globalization caught organized labor in a weak position, especially in industrial countries. Second, in the late 1980s and 1990s, liberal intellectual support for labor movements dwindled. Competitive political concerns, such as gender and ethnicity issues, diverted the intelligentsia's attention. Third, workers distanced themselves from the trade union movement under the grand illusion that, as consumer-citizens, they are better-off.
- 66-J. Waterbury, **The Egypt of Nasser and Sadat: The political economy of two regimes**, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2009 and Rabab El-Mahdi, Enough: **Egypt Quest for Democracy**, Ibid.
- 67-Mubarak managed to combine nationalism with market-oriented policies until 2004. This mixture allowed him to adapt his ruling to several policy shifts on the domestic and regional fronts and maintain his grip on power. Later, however, several economic and political hardships on the home front led to his losing the preexisting ruling pact and made him unable to sustain the "democratic bargain" he made before. At that time Mubarak's regime tended to alienate all, except for a few

favored big business men, who were part of the ruling class (Al-Naggar 2005).

68-Al-Naggar, A .S, **Al-Enhiaar Al-Iqtsadi Fi' Asr Mubarak (Economic decay during the Mubarak era)**, Cairo: Dar Merit, 2005 and Abu Aita, *Kamal*, **"Egyptian Worker: Our Victory is a Victory for Workers of the World"**, Socialist Worker Online, 2011. <http://www.socialistworker.org.uk/art.php?id=24326>).

69-N. Farah, **Egypt's Political Economy: Power Relations in Development**, Cairo: The American University of Cairo Press, 2009 and Joel Beinin, **"Work is Politics"**, Z Net, The Spirit of Resistance Lives, 2008 May 6, P: 4.

70-N. Farah, *Ibid*, 2009, P: 5 and Angela Joya, **The Egyptian Revolution: Crisis of Neo-liberalism and the Potential for Democratic Politics**, Review of African Political Economy, Routledge, 2011, 38(129): 367-386.

71-N. Farah, **Egypt's Political Economy: Power Relations in Development**, Cairo: The American University of Cairo Press, 2009 and Joel Beinin, **"Work is Politics"**, Z Net, The Spirit of Resistance Lives: 4-5.

72-K. Ikram, **The Egyptian Economy 1952-2000. Performance, Policies and Issues**, London: Routledge, 2006 and T. Mitchell, **Rule of Experts: Egypt, Techno-Politics, Modernity**, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

73-News Report, **Workers Leadership Forms Preparatory Committee for Workers**, the Socialist, Center for Socialist Studies, Pub. 1., July 2009 and Amr Hamzawy and Marina Ottaway, **Protest Movements and Political Change in the Arab World**, Policy Outlook. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, January 28, 2011.

- 74-M. Rodenbeck, **Holding its Breath: a Special Report on Egypt**, The Economist, 17-23 July 2010 and Angela Joya, **The Egyptian Revolution: Crisis of Neo-liberalism and the Potential for Democratic Politics**, Review of African Political Economy, Routledge, 2011, 38(129): 367-386.
- 75-Nadine Abdalla, **Egypt's Workers**, 2012, P: 2 and Rabab El Mahdi, **Labor Protests**, P: 388.
- 76-Omar, Khaled Ali, **Workers and the Social Resistance**, Co-ordinate Committee for Rights and Labor and Professional Freedom, the Law Center of Hisham Mubarak, 2007 and Nadine Abdalla, **Egypt's Workers**, 2012, P: 2.
- 77-Joel Beinin, **Work is Politics**, Z Net, The Spirit of Resistance Lives, 2008 May 6, P: 4 and Panthea Lee, **Institutional Overview: the Labor Movement in Egypt "from Revolutions to Institutions"**, March 18 2011.
- 78-The land center for human rights report. (2009): 123.
- 79- M. El-Attar, Personal Interview, September 12, 2012.
- 80-Rabab El-Mahdi, Enough: **Egypt Quest for Democracy**, Ibid, 2009.
- 81- M. El-Attar, **Personal Interview**, September 12, 2012.
- 82-M. El-Abd, **Personal Interview**, September 13, 2012.
- 83-Wedad El-Demerdash, For example, one of the leaders of Mahalla Company, and who is seen by some interviewees as one of the most powerful women all over the world, supported the Mubarak regime and criticized the protestors. El-Demerdash case shows, for some workers, how some Mahalla leaders followed their personal interests and benefitted from the political regime that offered them concessions and

professional privileges. Nowadays, some leaders have been recruited by MB who partially dominated ETUF. For instance, when some Mahalla workers' leaders sought to become members in official trade unions, they had to pledge their loyalty to Yousri Bayoumi, the treasurer of ETUF, who now represents MB (Nouh, Personal Interview, October 10, 2012).

84-Benin, Joel, **Work Is Politics**, ZNet the Spirit of Resistance Lives, Tuesday, May 6, 2008: 3.

85-Joel Beinin. (May 2008). "**Work is Politics**", Z Net, The Spirit of Resistance Lives, P: 4.

86-ETUWS is a non-governmental organization. For defending the economic and democratic rights of workers, especially their rights to establish their trade-unions freely, a number of leaders from workers established this Center in 1990. ETUWS played an essential role in establishing independent trade-unions. It is not an Egyptian union, or a trade-union. When EDLC will transfer into a union, its head will be elected, through transparent elections. This head has to be a representative to a specific trade-union, not a specific NGO (Abbas, Personal Interview, January 14, 2013).

87-M. El-Attar, **Personal Interview**, September 12, 2012.

88-Della Porta and Olivier Fillieule, **Policing Social Protest**, In the Blackwell Companion to Social Movements, Blackwell Publishing: USA and London, 2007, P: 221.

89-Ahmed Bahaaa Shaaban, **Personal Interview**, 30/ 1/ 2012.

90-Ali Mahmoud Abu-Leila, **Personal Interview**, 1/ 11/ 2012.

91-Costa, Ricardo L, The Logic of Practices in Pierre Bourdieu, Vol. 54(6), International Sociological Association, Sage Publications, 2006.

- 92-Mohamed El Attar, **Personal Interview**, 12/09/2012.
- 93-Hamdi Hussein, **Personal Interview**, 12/10/2012.
- 94-Ahmed Bahaa Shaaban, **Personal Interview**, 30/01/2012.
- 95-Maher El-Attar, **Personal Interview**, 16/ 09/ 2012.
- 96-(Hamdi Hussein, **Personal Interview**, 12/ 10/ 2012).
- 97-(Hamdi Hussein, **Personal Interview**, 12/ 10/ 2012 and Tarek Abd El Fattah, **Personal Interview**, 11/ 10/ 2012).
- 98-(Hamdi Hussein, **Personal Interview**, 12/ 10/ 2012.
- 99- Tarek Abd-El-Fatah, **Personal Interview**, 11/10/2012.
- 100-Ahmed Maher, **Personal Interview**, 12/10/2012.
- 101-Mohamed El Attar, **Personal Interview**, 12/09/2012.
- 102-Before the revolution, and under Mubarak regime, there was no unified background between the protestors and the previous political regime. However, the negotiation between both parties was the most successful way that led both of them to reach a compromise, which was not possible embarking on a series of strikes. Such compromise took place when the confrontation between the Strikes' workers and their opponents (the political regime) continued to two days (6-8 April) and that led Ahmed Nazif, the Egyptian Prime Minister, to address workers' demands and announced an increase in the month's pay for Misr workers, and 15 days increment for all other textile workers. Besides, the Minister of Investment offered other significant services and facilities.
- 103-Emil P Totonchi, **Laboring a Democratic Spring: the Past, Present, and Future of Free Trade Unions in Egypt**, Working USA, Ibid, 2011: 259-283.

104-Katerina Dalacoura, **the 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications**, International Affairs n. 88, 2012: P: 63-79.

105-Gamson and Meyer (1996) said, "Opportunities open the way for political action, but movements also make opportunities." Most movement scholars would probably say they study movements because they view them as a powerful force for change.

106-ILMs in Mahalla Company are converted into several different alliances and coalitions against each other. Some usual workers were attracted to be heads of some alliances and parties and that real leaders, who positively participated in the activities of ILMs in Mahalla, especially from 2006 to after 2008, disappeared now from the labor scene (El-Attar, Personal Interview, September 12, 2012).

107-El-Attar is only concerned with getting his own personal interests. El-Attar, at the beginning, involved in CTUWS that headed by Kamal Abbas, then he became a member in the coordinated committee of workers through which he made a propaganda to Mahmoud El-Shami, the representative of NDP, currently, he filled the application to be a member in FJP followed by MB. The second member in El-Attar group, El-Said, who was a member in Seven Girls' Committee that represents NDP, became now a member in FJP (Hussein, Personal Interview, October 12 2012).

108-Hamdi Hussein, **Personal Interview**, October 10, 2012 and Kamal Abbas, **Personal Interview**, January 23, 2012.

109-D. McAdam, J. McCarthy, and M. Zald, **Introduction: Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures and Framing Processes-Toward a Synthetic, Comparative Perspective on Social Movements**, In *Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements*,

edited by D. Mc Adam, J. Mc Carthy, and M. Zald, 1996, PP. 3-4.
Cambridge: UK: Cambridge University Press.

110-Keth Faulks, **Political Sociology: A Critical Introduction**,
Great Britain: Edinburgh University Press, 1999.

111-Alex Serafimov, **The Unfinished Revolution in Egypt: Will
Democracy Alone Satisfy the Arab Spring?** March 3 2013.
Accessed: 7/7/ 2013.

112-Reem Abou-El-Fadl, **Mohamed Morsi Mubarak: The Myth
of Egypt's Democratic Transition**, Feb 11 2013.

113-Katerina Dalacoura, **the 2011 Uprisings in the Arab Middle
East: Political Change and Geopolitical Implications**,
International Affairs n. 88, 2012: 63-79.

114-Ibid, P: 70--72.

115-Nassif Hitti. (15 July 2011). **The Arab Spring Brings on
Regional Transformation**, The Daily Star, Lebanon.

116-Ahmed Shaaban, **Personal Interview**, November 14, 2011.

117-Andrew McCarthy, Obama Funds the Egyptian Government
A Muslim Brotherhood-controlled Government Gets \$1.5
billion, National Review Online, April 7 2012.

118-Barry Hinckley, U.S. **Senate candidate Barry Hinckley
says Obama administration gave \$1.5 billion to Egypt's
Muslim Brotherhood, an interview on State of the State**,
Saturday, April 21st, 2012.

119-Kris Zane, Obama's Secret \$8 Billion Bribe to the Muslim
Brotherhood, Western Journalism, July 18, 2013, [http://www.
westernjournalism.com/obamas-secret-8-billion-bribe-to-the-
muslim-brotherhood/](http://www.westernjournalism.com/obamas-secret-8-billion-bribe-to-the-muslim-brotherhood/).

- 120- Richard Javad Heydarian, **Arab Spring, Israeli Isolation**, Foreign Policy in Focus, 2011.
- 121- Richard Javad Heydarian, Ibid, 2011.
- 122-Hamdi Hussien, **Personal Interview**, 12/10/2012, Ahmed Bahaa Shaaban, **Personal Interview**, 14/11/2011 and Mohamed El Attar, Personal Interview, 12/09/2012.
- 123-Ahmed Ali Nouh, **Personal Interview**, October 10 2012.
- 124-R. Springborg, **Game Over: the Chance for Democracy in Egypt is Lost**, Foreign Policy, 2011 February 2 and Angela Joya, **The Egyptian Revolution: Crisis of Neo-liberalism and the Potential for Democratic Politics**, Review of African Political Economy, Routledge, 2011, 38(129), P: 375.
- 125-Samir Amin, **2011: An Arab Springtime? Reflections from Egypt**, Europe Solidaire Sans Frontiers, (15/ 5/ 2011) and Takis Fotopoulos, **The Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic “democracy” in Egypt as part of the New World Order**; the International Journal of Inclusive Democracy, Vol. 8, No. 1/2, 2012.
- 126-Hamdi Hussein, **Personal Interview**, October 12, 2012.
- 127-Hamdi Hussien, **Personal Interview**, 12/10/2012, Ahmed Bahaa Shaaban, **Personal Interview**, 14/11/2011.
- 128-There was a positive relationship between the ignorance of the social conditions of the capitalist mode of production under the rule of MB and the exposure of such mode to collapse as it were disable to achieve the minimum limit of workers basic needs and demands and utilized more repressive and fascist ways in managing both RSA and ISAs. All these malpractices of MB pushed workers and other marginalized categories

that seek to actualize their subjects to confront such unfair and dominant ideology via transforming capitalist crises into transitions to socialism (Wolff 2005).

129-Miriam Fendius Elman, "the Arab Spring and the Future of Democracy in the Middle East: Rethinking Middle East Studies, Palestine", 2011. **Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and Culture**, 18(1): 98.

130-Ahmed Bahaa Shaaban, **Personal Interview**, October 20 2012.

131-Mohamed Abd El Azeem, **Personal Interview**, 12/ 10/ 2012 and Ahmed Bahaa Shaaban, **Personal Interview**, 14/11/2011.

132-M. Rodenbeck, **Holding its Breath: a Special Report on Egypt**, The Economist, 17-23 July 2010.

133- Cole and Altorki 1998.

134- Kirkpatrick, 2011.

135-The Guardian, 2011 and Angela Joya, **The Egyptian Revolution: Crisis of Neo-liberalism and the Potential for Democratic Politics**, Review of African Political Economy, Routledge, 2011, 38(129), P: 376.

136-El-Metwaly, **Personal Interview**, September 16, 2012 and Mohamed El-Attar, **Personal Interview**, September 12, 2012.

137-Hamdi Hussein, **Personal Interview**, October 12 2012.

138-Ahmed Ali Nouh, **Personal Interview**, October 10 2012.

139-Charbel claimed that ETUF opposed him not only because its leader was removed from the Ministry of Manpower and

Migration but also because he acknowledged to investigate the finance of ETUF and halted paying government subsidies to ETUF and allowed the federation, instead, to benefit from dues deductions taken from worker paychecks by official unions.

140-Jano Charbel, **A New Era for Trade Unions**, Al-MasryAl-Youm, Accessed|:March2011 <http://www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/355785> and Emil P Totonchi, **Laboring a Democratic Spring: the Past, Present, and Future of Free Trade Unions in Egypt**, Working USA, Ibid, 2011, pp: 260-261.

141-Mohamed El Attar, **Personal Interview**, September 12, 2012.

142-Dina Zayed, **Egypt Must Scrap Law Banning Strikes: Rights Group**, Reuters 2011. Accessed: March 26, 2011 and Emil P Totonchi, Ibid, Working USA, Ibid, 2011, pp: 265-268.

143-Al- Hayat 2003, p: 6 and Maha Abd-El-Rahman, "With the Islamists? Sometimes with the State? Never! Cooperation between the Left and Islamists in Egypt, British", **Journal of Middle Eastern Studies**, 36(1): 37-54. Routledge, 2009.

144-Ahmed Bahaa Shaaban, **Personal Interview**, 14/11/2011.

145-Hamdi Hussien, **Personal Interview**, 12/10/2012, Ahmed Bahaa Shaaban, **Personal Interview**, 14/11/2011.

146-Kamal Abbas, **Personal Interview**, January 14 2013.

147-Ahmed Ali Nouh, **Personal Interview**, October 10 2012.

148-Mohamed El Attar, **Personal Interview**, September 12, 2012.

149-Some remnants from NDP, who imminently represent themselves in other entities, involve themselves in specific parties like El-Wafd Party. Also, the Socialist Alliance Party,

the New Justice Party, and the Generation Democratic Party, which are headed by Nagy El-Shehaby, and taken by force from Ibrahim Shoukry, the former head of activities of the Generation Party, focused on supporting Mubarak regime and adopting the thought of previous political regime's symbols. For example, such corrupted party called for a ceremony to investigate the demands of workers, but the main target was highlighting privileges of the previous political regime and that direction led some workers to explicitly oppose the undemocratic way they behave, and others to withdraw from this ceremony.

150-Kamal Abbas, **Personal Interview**, January 14 2013.

151- M. El-Attar, **Personal Interview**, September ٢٠١٢ ١٦.

152-According to draft law on Trade Union Rights, El-Borai mentioned that the new trade union law will rely on the recommendations proposed by CTUWS. This new law will cancel law 35 of 1976 and comply with the ILO conventions, which Egypt has ratified but failed to be applied for over five decades.

153-Ahmed Ali Nouh, **Personal Interview**, October 10, 2012.

154-Tarek Abd-El-Fatah, **Personal Interview**, October 11 2012.

155-M. Abd-El-Azeem, **Personal Interview**, October 12 2012.

156-Hamdi Hussein, **Personal Interview**, October 12 2012.

157-In the labor environment, and seeking to actualize the interests of the political regime of Mubarak with its ruling party NDP, workers have a claim that Abd-El-Zaher, the head of ETUF, is against issuing new law of independent trade unions. Also, he is not concerned about workers as he does not offer them any services during his position as the head of ETUF lasted for ten years.

158-Hamdi Hussein, **Personal Interview**, 12/ 10/ 2012.

159-Al-Ahram Weekly, 18-24 April 2013. For Heikal, the siege by MB at Muqattam (where MBs headquarters is located), the circle of demonstrators around the Constitutional Court last winter and later the cordon around the Media City, are all indicators and proofs that have to be raise the concerns amidst the fate of the rule of law and civil stability in Egypt (Weekly, 18-24 April 2013: 2).

160-Someworkersclaimthatthereisno board of directors, whether elected or appointed, but there is a public commissioner, who cannot be exposed to any sort of accountability.

161-Mohamed Abd El Azeem, **Personal Interview**, October 12, 2012.

162-Mohamed El Attar, **Personal Interview**, September 12, 2012.

163-Mohamed El Attar, Ibid.

164- Ibrahim Al-Metwaly, Personal Interview, September 16, 2012

165- Ahmed El Attar, **Personal Interview**, Ibid.

166-Ahmed El Attar, **Personal Interview**, Ibid.

167- Ahmed Shaaban, Personal Interview, November 14, 2011.

168- Ahmed Ali Nouh. Personal Interview. October 10, 2012.

169-Ahmed Shaaban, **Personal Interview**, 14/11/2011 and Hamdi Hussein, Personal Interview, 12/ 10/ 2012).

170-Ahmed El Attar, Ahmed Shaaban, and Mohamed Abd El Azeem, **Personal Interview**, Ibid.

- 171-Ali Abu Leila, **Personal Interview**, November 1, 2012.
- 172- Ali Abu Leila, **Personal Interview**, Ibid.
- 173-Ahmed, El Attar, **Personal Interview**, 12/09/2012.
- 174- Kamal Abu-Eita, **Personal Interview**, February 8 2013.
- 175- Aml El Said, **Personal Interview**, September 16, 2012.
- 176- Michael D Yates, the New Economy and the Labor Movement, 2001, P: 34-37.
- 177-Rachel Shabi, **Egyptians are Being Held Back by Neoliberalism, not Religion**, the guardian, Friday 21 December, 2012.
- (<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/dec/21/egyptians-held-back-neoliberalism-not-religion?INTCMP=SRCH>)
- 178-Some workers claim that there is no board of directors, whether elected or appointed, but there is a public commissioner, who cannot be exposed to any sort of accountability.
- 179-Ahmed Bahaa Shabaan, **Personal Interview**, January 30, 2012.
- 180-Kamal Abbas, **Personal Interview**, November 14, 2011.
- 181-Mohamed Abd El Azeem, **Personal Interview**, Ibid.
- 182-Ahmed El Attar, **Personal Interview**, 12/09/2012 and Hamdi Hussein, **Personal Interview**, 12/10/2012.
- 183-The economic thought of MB is based on natural resources based economy, which is connected to collecting money and wealth from selling crude materials, and not based on diversified economy, which is connected to the productivity and providing services.

184-MB seeks to formulate Islamist political entities as there are now about 20 Islamist-oriented parties that are either officially registered or in the process of completing their paperwork. Also, there are dozens of Islamist movements, blocs and networks that are noticeably evolving in the public sphere (Al-Anani, 2013: 20).

185-Khalil Al-Anani, **Islamists Two Years after Revolution**, Al-Ahram Weekly, No. 1133, February 6, 2013, P: 20.

186-Hamdi Hussein, **Personal Interview**, 12/ 10/ 2012.

187-Hamdi Hussein, **Personal Interview**, 12/10/2012.

188-(Khalil Al-Anani, **Islamists Two Years after Revolution**, Al-Ahram Weekly, No. 1133, February 6, P: 20, 2013).

189-Ali Abu Leila, **Personal Interview**, Ibid.

190-The trade union is the one that workers establish in order to preserve their economic and social rights. There are no formal trade unions worldwide as they are supposed to be independent representing the will of them, not be formal representing the will of the political regime and their proponents from big business owners (Kamal Abbas, the head of CTUWS, TV Interview, ON TV, October 24 2013). Abu-Eita mentioned that the term “independent” added to the two new trade unions; EFITU and EDLC, is temporary and has to be removed. The formal registration will lead workers to get rid of the monopoly of the management of the Company and ETUF with its affiliated trade unions.

191-S. Laurel Weldon, **When Protest Makes Policy “How Social Movements Represent Disadvantaged Groups”**, US: the University of Michigan Press, 2011.

192- Kamal Abbas, **Personal Interview**, Ibid.

- 193-David Bacon, **A Radical Vision for Today's Labor Movement "The Importance of Internationalism and Civil Rights, Stories Photographs"**, Unions, Monthly Review, February 2009.
- 194-The characteristics of labor leaders: they have to be acceptable from workers, more aware of labor laws and rights, accept others, to link between political and professional mechanisms.
- 195-As long as there is a link between the judicial reform and policy outputs, low cost access to courts and utilizing the legal opportunity granted workers real opportunities to effectively participate in politics.
- 196-Bruce M Wilson and Juan Carlos Cordero, "Legal Opportunity Structures and Social Movements: The Effects of Institutional Change in Costa Rican Politics", **Comparative Political Studies**, 39 (3).

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- El-Said, Aml. Personal Interview. 16/ 09/ 2012. One of the workers in Gazel El-Mahalla and one of the founders of Gazel-El-Mahalla workers' coalition.
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- Maher, Ahmed. Personal Interview. 12/10/2012. A technical worker @ Misr Spinning and Weaving Company
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ANNEX (1)

INTERVIEWS QUESTIONS

Independent Labor Movements (ILMs) and the Political Opportunity Structure (POS) after 25th January Egyptian Revolution, include the following:

A) Interview questions with members of Independent Labor Movements ILMs:

- 1- What are the domestic conditions that led to formulate ILMs?
- 2- What are the external conditions that accelerate the formation and development of ILMs? In what ways they have supported such acceleration?
- 3- What is the effect of the political opportunity lost by other political parties in their supporting or undermining the role of ILMs? Illustrate your point of view?
- 4- Is there a difference in the role of political movements in supporting ILMs, before and after the revolution?
- 5- Is there a difference between the response of the state under the military council after the Revolution and the response of the state under Mubarak regime in fulfilling laborers' demands? Explain.
- 6- Does the political opportunity gained by Muslim Brothers, after the parliamentary elections, support or undermine the role of ILMs? Illustrate your point of view?
- 7- In other formula, is there a difference in the position of Muslim Brotherhood in dealing with their political allies and in

supporting the role of ILMs? In case of answering by “yes”, in what way?

- 8- What is the effect of the political opportunity lost by other political parties in their supporting or undermining the role of ILMs? Illustrate your point of view?
- 9- Is there a difference in the role of political movements in supporting ILMs, before and after the revolution?
- 10-What is the response to such demands from the SCAF?
- 11-Did the role of Egyptian Trade Union Federation ETUF change towards ILMs after the Revolution? To what extent?
- 12-Currently, do you find any obstacles preventing ILMs, which you are a member within, from their becoming formal unions or independent unions in Misr Spinning and Weaving Company after the Revolution?
- 13-In case of answering by “yes”, what are they? If answering by “no”, what are the formal labor unions established after the Revolution?
- 14-What is your future vision of the role of ILMs in Misr Spinning and Weaving Company after the Islamists winning the presidential elections?

B) Interview questions with informant people from political parties and movements, workers’ trade unions, and Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF):

- 1- What are the domestic conditions that led to the emergence and development of Independent Labor Movements ILMs?
- 2- What are the international conditions that led to the emergence and development of ILMs?

- 3- What is the effect of the political opportunity gained by Muslim Brothers, after the parliamentary elections, in supporting or undermining the roles of ILMs? Illustrate your position?
- 4- What is the effect of the political opportunity lost by other political parties and movements in supporting or undermining the roles of ILMs? Illustrate your position?
- 5- Explain the main obstacles that prevent ILMs in Egypt from their becoming formal unions?
- 6- What is the future vision of ILMs after the presidential elections on May 23rd 2012 under the ruling of Muslim Brotherhood?

ANNEX (2)

STUDY TABLES

Table 1. Labor Union Federations

% of labor force (23.346 million; working with & without salaries)	No. of workers (in millions)	No. of affiliated unions	Name of federations
16.20	3.80	23.00	ETUF
10.20	2.40	261.00	EFITU
N.A	N.A	246.00	EDLC

Source: (Abdalla, 2011: 2)

Table 2: The development of the size of trade unions and membership in ETUF (1957 – 2006)

ROUND	Number of Committees of Trade unions	Number of Public Trade Unions	Membership
First Round (57 / 61)	904	17	401,000.00
Second Round (62 / 64)	890	59	346,490.00
Third Round (64 / 71)	5778	27	1,290,810.00
Fourth Round (71 / 73)	2315	25	1,468,667.00
Fifth Round (73 / 76)	1800	16	1,560,000.00
Sixth Round (76 / 79)	1259	21	1,873,157.00
Seventh Round (79 / 83)	1793	21	2,334,583.00
Eighth Round (83 / 87)	1953	23	2,750,580.00
Ninth Round (87 / 91)	2021	23	3,101,395.00
Tenth Round (91 / 96)	1641	23	3,313,068.00
Eleventh Round (96 / 2001)	1822	23	3,610,000.00
Twelfth Round (2001 / 2006)	1745	23	3,860,000.00

Source: (Barakat & Omar 2003: 163)

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CAO	Central Auditing Organization
CI	Central Intelligence
CS	Central Security
CTUWS	Center for Trade Unions and Workers' Services
EDLC	Egyptian Democratic Labor Congress
EFITU	Egyptian Federation for Independent Trade Union
ETUF	Egyptian Trade Union Federation
FGDs	Focus Group Discussions
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party
GDP	General Domestic Product
GFLU	General Federation of Labor Unions
IGURETA	Independent General Union of Real Estate Tax Authority
ILMs	Independent Labor Movements
ILO	International Labor Organization
LO	Legal Opportunity
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MNCs	Multi-National Corporations
NDP	National Democratic Party

POS	Political Opportunity Structure
PPM	Political Process Model
SCAF	Supreme Council of Armed Forces
SS	State Security
SSA	State Security Apparatus
TUC	Trade Union Congress

مجلة العلوم الاجتماعية

تأسست عام ١٩٧٣م. فصلية. محكمة. تصدر عن مجلس النشر العلمي. جامعة الكويت
تعنى بنشر الأبحاث والدراسات في تخصصات السياسة والاجتماع والخدمة الاجتماعية
وعلم النفس والأنثروبولوجيا والجغرافيا وعلوم المكتبات والمعلومات والأعلام



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
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.....

.....

.....

الملخص

تهدف الورقة إلى تقييم تأثير محدد بناء الفرصة السياسية - أحد محددات نموذج العملية السياسية- في دور الحركات العمالية المستقلة بعد ثورة الخامس والعشرين من يناير استناداً إلى دراسة حالة تم إجراؤها على شركة مصر للغزل والنسيج (شركة المحلة الكبرى). وتحلل الورقة تطور دور مثل هذه الحركات خلال الفترة (2006 - 2013). وتضع هذه الورقة فرضية تستند إلى أنه على الرغم من أن الثورة المصرية كان ينبغي أن تهدف إلى توفير بيئة إيجابية داعمة للحركات العمالية المستقلة من أجل تحقيق حقهم المعترف به والمشروع للوجود في نقابات واتحادات مستقلة، فقد أثرت العديد من المخاوف بشأن دورهم بعد الثورة كنتيجة لأوضاعهم السيئة، والافتقار إلى الرؤية السياسية المشتركة، بما في ذلك عدم وجود خطوات نظرية وإجرائية في هذا الاتجاه.

مثل هذا الافتقار للرؤية الاقتصادية والسياسية لدى العمال أعطى النظام السياسي، لكل من الرئيسين مبارك ومرسي، وحتى خلال الفترة الانتقالية في بعض الأحيان، الفرصة الكاملة ليس فقط لخلق حالة من الانقسامات والخلافات بين العمال كمحاولة لإضعاف أنشطتهم الجماعية بين العمال أنفسهم، ولكن أيضاً لخلق بيئة العمال بمختلف الاتجاهات السياسية التي تخدم مصالحها الخاصة، والتي تتعارض مع مصالح العمال بطبيعة الحال. وتؤكد دراسة الحالة الخاصة بشركة المحلة هذا الادعاء. بالإضافة إلى ذلك، تلقي الورقة الضوء على أن العمال يفتقرون إلى الرؤية السياسية، وهذا لا يمكن فقط العديد من القوى السياسية، مثل الحزب الوطني الديمقراطي وحزب الحرية والعدالة، والسلطة الحاكمة بعد الثورة، لسد هذه الفجوة عن طريق فرض أيديولوجياتهم ورؤاهم على العمال. وبالإضافة إلى ذلك، فإنه يؤدي أيضاً إلى تعرض هذه الحركات إلى الانقسامات، والنزاعات، والتشردم.

وتتناول الدراسة عدداً من المحاور: أولاً، أهم مفاهيم وخصائص الحركات العمالية المستقلة في شركة الغزل والنسيج بالمحلة. ثانياً، تطور الحركات العمالية المستقلة في مصر منذ عام 1882 حتى الآن. ثالثاً، تحليل بناء الفرصة السياسية في المحلة قبل وفي أعقاب الخامس والعشرين من يناير من خلال رصد السياق الدولي، والظروف المحلية، ووضعية العمال السياسية في ظل النظام السياسي حكم مبارك، والمجلس العسكري، والإخوان المسلمين، إضافة إلى رصد سياسات شركة الغزل والنسيج مع العمال، وتضع الدراسة في النهاية مجموعة من النتائج والتوصيات..

المؤلف:

د. نيفين زكريا محمد أمين

- دكتوراه في علم الاجتماع، جامعة عين شمس- مصر، ٢٠٠٩.

- أستاذ علم الاجتماع المساعد، علم الاجتماع السياسي، كلية التربية، جامعة عين شمس.

الإنتاج العلمي:

الأبحاث والدراسات والمقالات:

١. إعداد دراسة بعنوان «علاقة الدولة بالمجتمع المدني» نشرت في مجلة شؤون خليجية (علمية فصلية محكمة)، مركز الخليج للدراسات الإستراتيجية «عدد ٢٦»، ٢٠٠٢م.
 ٢. إعداد دراسة بعنوان «دور المنظمات غير الحكومية في المجتمع الخليجي شراكة بلا مضمون أم مضمون بلا شراكة؟» نشرت في مجلة شؤون خليجية (علمية فصلية محكمة) مركز الخليج للدراسات الإستراتيجية «عدد ٣١»، ٢٠٠٣م.
 ٣. المشاركة في إعداد (٣) مجلدات كتاب مملكة البحرين ٢٠٠٢ - ٢٠٠٥ عرض وتقييم لأحداث عام مضى ورؤية مستقبلية (الجزء المتعلق بالمجتمع المدني البحريني)، مركز الخليج للدراسات الإستراتيجية، ٢٠٠٣-٢٠٠٥.
 ٤. نشر كتيب باللغة الإنجليزية بعنوان: Civil Society in Bahrain: London. Gulf Center For Strategic Ltd. 2004.
 ٥. نشر دراسة بعنوان «مقومات فاعلية المجتمع المدني العربي مع إشارة خاصة لحالة مصر» نشرت في مجلة العلوم الاجتماعية (علمية فصلية محكمة)، مجلس النشر العلمي بجامعة الكويت، المجلد ٢٧ العدد «١»، ٢٠٠٩م.
 ٦. نشر مقال في صفحة كاملة بجريدة الأهرام ويكلي بعنوان «تتمين الثورة» «Appraising the Revolution»، من ٣١ يناير إلى ٦ فبراير ٢٠١٣، رقم (١١٣٣)، ص: ٨.
- Please find the article:
<http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/1236/17/Appraising-the-revolution.aspx>
٧. نشر دراسة بعنوان «نحو سياسة اجتماعية متكاملة لمواجهة المشكلة السكانية في مصر»، حوليات آداب عين شمس دورية علمية محكمة المجلد (٤٠)، يناير-مارس ٢٠١٢.
 ٨. نشر دراسة بعنوان «نظام الحصة وتمكين المرأة: الحالة المصرية» مجلة بحوث الشرق الأوسط، جامعة عين شمس، مجلة علمية محكمة، العدد الثلاثون، مارس ٢٠١٢: الجزء الثاني.
 ٩. نشر دراسة بعنوان «ممارسات الثوريين المصريين ما بين التلقائية والرشادة»، كلية الاقتصاد والعلوم السياسية، جامعة القاهرة، المجلد الرابع عشر، العدد الثاني، أبريل ٢٠١٣.
 ١٠. نشر دراسة بعنوان «العوامل المؤثرة على توزيع تكنولوجيا المعلومات والاتصالات في الجامعات المصرية الحكومية: دراسة حالة على كلية التربية-جامعة عين شمس»، رايز (RISE)، المجلة الدولية في علم الاجتماع التربوي، دار نشر هيباتيا، المجلد الثالث، رقم ٢، يونيو ٢٠١٣: الصفحات: ١٦٧-١٨٧.

The Site of the article:

<http://www.hipatiapress.info/hpjournals/index.php/rise/issue/view/102>

١١. نشر دراسة بعنوان «مواطنة المرأة المصرية بين السلطة الاجتماعية والدينية في أعقاب الخامس والعشرين من يناير ٢٠١١: دراسة تحليلية»، في مجلة الشرق الأوسط، دورية علمية محكمة العدد (٤٠)، في ديسمبر ٢٠١٦.

الرسالة ٤٩١

الحركات العمالية المستقلة وبناء الفرصة السياسية في أعقاب ثورة الخامس والعشرين من يناير: دراسة تحليلية

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حوليات الآداب والعلوم الاجتماعية - الحولية الثامنة والثلاثون - ١٤٣٩هـ / ٢٠١٨م

النظام الأساسي للمجلس بما يضمن من فضّ المنازعات، وهي إشارة إلى دفع هذه المنظومة لتطوير ذاتها. كما جاء في كلمة الأمين العام تأكيداً على جهود سمو الأمير في رأب الصدع الخليجي، وتحقيق الوساطة التي ما زالت مقبولة عند الجميع في الأزمة الخليجية. ومن الإضاءات الأخرى التي تدعو للتفاؤل ما تم طرحه من تأكيد على تعزيز بناء منظومة الدفاع المشترك الخليجي حتى في ظل وجود الأزمة الخليجية. بالإضافة إلى أنه على الرغم من وجود الأزمة الخليجية تم التأكيد على أهمية دور المجلس، وأنه ماضٍ في قطع خطوات تحقيق التكامل. وقد تمت الإشارة إلى أنه تم بحث استكمال خطط التعاون العسكري والاقتصادي والأمني التي أقرها المجلس الأعلى للتعاون الخليجي، وهي مدعاة للتفاؤل. لقد جاء في هذه القمة الإشارة إلى التركيز على استكمال التعاون بين الدول الأعضاء، كما جاءت في رؤية خادم الحرمين الشريفين للوصول إلى الوحدة الاقتصادية.

فهناك بعض من المؤشرات التي تستحق أن ننظر إليها بمنظور إيجابي إزاء انعقاد القمة. ولا شك أن عملية التواصل والالتقاء التي جاءت بعد القمة الخليجية تؤكد روح التفاؤل في حلحلة الأزمة، وإن كانت بطيئة وشابها بعض من الشوائب. فانطلاق فعاليات دورة الخليج العربي الثالثة والعشرين، والتي انعقدت في الكويت، والتي جمعت الدول الست في الثلث الأخير من شهر ديسمبر من العام الماضي، وبعد انعقاد القمة، وبعدها انعقاد المؤتمر البرلماني الخليجي بعد الدورة مباشرة، واللقاءات الأخرى مثل استضافة الكويت للاجتماع التاسع والثلاثين للجنة محافظي مؤسسات النقد والبنوك المركزية لدول مجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية في هذا الشهر في الكويت، وغيرها من اللقاءات تؤكد سير الأزمة للانفراج مهما كلفت في النهاية من آثار قد تظل عالقة. إن ذلك يؤكد وحدة المصير المشترك، والذي لا يمكن لأي قطر ضمن هذه المنظومة أن يستغني عنه. هذا بالإضافة إلى ترحيب جميع الأطراف الذي لا يزال قائماً بجهود سمو الأمير بالمصالحة الخليجية التي تؤكد رغبة الجميع بتجاوز هذه المرحلة. فأبواب التفاؤل تطرق، ولا بد أن تتفتح الأبواب أمامها يوماً ما، والتي نرجو أن تكون قريبة.

في هذا العدد - وكما سبقت الإشارة - تم تخصيصه للدراسات في مجال العلوم الاجتماعية، الذي احتوى على ستة أبحاث: فقد جاءت الرسالة ٩١٤ للباحثة نيفين زكريا محمد من جامعة عين شمس في جمهورية مصر العربية لتعرض بحثها عن «الحركات العمالية المستقلة وبناء الفرصة السياسية في أعقاب ثورة الخامس والعشرين من يناير: دراسة تحليلية»، وجاءت الرسالة ٩٢٤ للباحث بشار عبد الرحمن مطهر من جامعة اليرموك في المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية بعنوان «اتجاهات الجمهور العربي نحو أخلاقيات توظيف مقاطع الفيديو المنشورة بمواقع التواصل الاجتماعي بالنشرات الإخبارية بقناتي الجزيرة والعربية الحدث». وقد جاءت الرسالة ٩٣٤ عن «اتجاهات الإعلاميين المصريين نحو استخداماتهم لشبكات التواصل الاجتماعي في ضوء الضوابط المهنية والأخلاقية» للباحث مجدي محمد الداغر من جامعة نايف العربية للعلوم الأمنية في المملكة العربية السعودية. والرسالة ٩٤٤ جاءت بعنوان «دور مواقع التواصل الاجتماعي في انتخابات مجلس النواب الأردني الثامن عشر عام ٢٠١٦: دراسة ميدانية» للباحث محمد تركي بن سلامة من جامعة اليرموك في المملكة الأردنية الهاشمية. أما الرسالتان ٩٥٤ و ٩٦٤ فجاءتا من الكويت. فالأولى للباحث فهد يوسف الفضالة من المعهد العربي للتخطيط، وجاءت ورقته عن «الهجرة غير الشرعية وانعكاساتها على الأمن الاجتماعي بالكويت»، والثانية للباحثين عبد الله يوسف سهر، وعبد المحسن جمال عن «الأمن الوطني الكويتي: المنظور السياسي الشامل في ظل المتغيرات المحلية والدولية».

تسعى الحوليات من خلال هذا التنوع في الدراسات الاجتماعية، بالإضافة إلى ندوة العدد لموضوع الساعة، أن تحقق المرجو وما هو متوقع منها، متطلعين إلى جوانب علمية وفكرية أصيلة قادمة في الأعداد القادمة، والتي تتضمن مجالات العلوم الاجتماعية والإنسانية والآداب على حد سواء.

افتتاحية الإصدار الثالث من الحولية الثامنة والثلاثين بقلم رئيس التحرير: أ.د. يعقوب يوسف الكندري

يُسم هذا العدد بأنه عددٌ مختلفٌ من جانبين: يتمثل الجانب الأول في موضوعاته التي تم تخصيصها فقط للدراسات والأبحاث الخاصة في مجال العلوم الاجتماعية، وموضوعاتها التي رأى العاملون في الحوليات عدم القدرة على تأخيرها؛ لارتباطها بواقعٍ زمنيٍّ محدد، وتأخير إصدارها من الممكن أن يفقد الأهمية العلمية للبحث، بحكم كونه صادراً ومرتباً بالواقع والمتغيرات والظروف الحالية. فجاءت الأبحاث الستة في مجال الدراسات الاجتماعية. أما الأمر الآخر، فهو الذي يتمثل في شمول هذا العدد لندوة علمية فكرية. فهي المرة الأولى التي تنظم فيها حوليات الآداب والعلوم الاجتماعية بحلتها الجديدة ندوة علمية عن موضوع مهم وحديث الساعة في الدائرة الخليجية، والمتمثل في الأزمة الخليجية. فكما تمت الإشارة إليه في افتتاحية العدد الماضي وما قبله، فإن الحوليات قد نظمت ندوة علمية مغلقة خارجة عن الدوائر الإعلامية - والتي تعتبر أحد أبرز أسباب تفاقم الأزمة - لتخرج بمجموعة من الآراء التشخيصية للواقع الراهن على المستوى السياسي، والاقتصادي، والإعلامي وأيضاً الاجتماعي. ولقد تم عقد الندوة في موعدها، وعقد بعدها اجتماع القمة الدوري الثامن والثلاثون لقادة دول مجلس التعاون لدول الخليج العربية، والذي جاء ليوم واحد في الخامس من ديسمبر ٢٠١٧، وجلستين: افتتاحية ومغلقة، وصدر من خلالها ما سمي بإعلان الكويت الذي أكد التمسك بمسيرة دول المجلس على الرغم من العقوبات التي واجهت هذا الانعقاد، وعدم التمثيل العالي في هذه القمة. فقد تداولت وسائل الإعلام لاحقاً أن التمثيل العالي قد كان مقررًا بعد الجهود الدبلوماسية الكويتية، إلا أنه قد تم تخفيضه باللمحظات الأخيرة نتيجة لأسباب تعدد طرحتها من قبل السياسيين والإعلاميين، وقد لا نكون بحاجة لعرضها هنا.

إن الأمر المهم هو انعقاد القمة في موعدها، وما أدت إليه جهود سمو أمير البلاد الشيخ صباح الأحمد الجابر الصباح الكبيرة في انعقاد القمة في موعدها المقرر. وعلى الرغم من عدم التمثيل العالي في القمة الخليجية، إلا أن هناك إضاءات تفاؤل في السير نحو انفراج الأزمة، وحتى وإن أخذت وقتاً طويلاً. وهناك مجموعة من المؤشرات التي قد تدعو للتفاؤل في ظل أجواء تشاؤمية تحيط بالموضوع. فانعقاد القمة بحد ذاته في موعدها المحدد، وفي ظروف صعبة، وفي ظل الأزمة الخليجية - يؤكد أهمية كيان منظومة دول مجلس التعاون عند الجميع دون استثناء، وقبول الجميع بالآخر. وعلى الرغم من أن الأزمة الخليجية تعتبر أكبر أزمة تمر بها منظومة المجلس منذ تأسيسها، إلا أن انعقادها أثبت أهمية المنظومة لكافة الدول مهما كانت الظروف. ولقد جاء انعقاد القمة أيضاً فرصة مناسبة للجلوس على طاولة الحوار، وقد يكون لأول مرة منذ بداية الأزمة الخليجية. وعلى الرغم من عدم الإشارة إلى الأزمة في البيان الختامي، إلا أنها من المؤكد كانت حاضرة، وقد أشار لها صاحب السمو بشكل واضح. كما أشار صاحب السمو في بداية كلمته الافتتاحية إلى أن جهود الوساطة لن تتوقف وستستمر. إن انعقاد القمة الخليجية جاء كإحدى الوسائل للتهديئة في مواجهة الخلاف الأخير، وهو يعني الجهود ما زالت مستمرة في حل الأزمة الخليجية. ومن إضاءات التفاؤل أيضاً أنه قد تمت الإشارة إلى قضايا مشتركة متعددة ومتوافق عليها بين هذه المنظومة، جاءت في البيان الختامي وبكلمة سمو الأمير الافتتاحية. كما جاءت الإشارة الواضحة إلى التأكيد على التمسك بمسيرة مجلس التعاون الخليجي. وقد أكد سمو الأمير في كلمته أيضاً تعديل

مثال: (ابن حزم، الإحكام في أصول الأحكام، جزء ٢، ط ١، دار المعارف، القاهرة، ١٩٦٦، ص ١١٦).
٢- المراجع:

(فؤاد زكريا، آراء نقدية في مشكلات الفكر والثقافة، ط ١، الهيئة المصرية العامة للكتاب، القاهرة، ١٩٧٥، ص ١١).

ويمكن الرجوع إلى العديد من المواقع التي توضح عملية استخدام المراجع، منها:
<http://quickguide/mla/com.libguides.irs.org>

ثانياً: في مجال العلوم الاجتماعية، يمكن كتابة المراجع على الوجه الموضح أدناه (APA):

١- كتابة المرجع في المتن: اسم العائلة للمؤلف متبوعاً بفاصلة، ثم سنة النشر. (يُرجى الرجوع إلى دليل التوثيق وفقاً لنظام APA لمزيد من التفاصيل)

مثال: (Cortois, 2001)

٢- قائمة المراجع: يُرجى الرجوع إلى دليل التوثيق وفقاً لنظام APA للتفاصيل.
مثال:

Jones, J. (2005). Writing with style. Style Writing Journal, 12(6), 1433-.

- موقع زيارة ويمكن

<http://www.apastyle.org>

لمعرفة القواعد الخاصة بهذا النظام.

شروط قبول البحوث في الحوليات:

أ - لا تقبل الحوليات البحوث التي سبق نشرها بأي طريقة.

ب - لا تقبل المجلة نشر أبحاث الماجستير أو الدكتوراه أو أي مستلآت منها.

ج - لا تُرد ولا تُسترجع أصول البحوث المقدمة للنشر، سواء نُشرت أم لم تُنشر.

د- لا يجوز نشر البحوث في جهات أخرى بعد موافقة الحوليات على نشرها. وإذا ثبت ذلك؛ فستتخذ إدارة الحوليات الإجراءات القانونية المتبعة بهذا الشأن.

هـ- يمكن للباحث نشر بحثه في جهات أخرى، بعد الحصول على إذن كتابي سابق من رئيس التحرير، وبعد انقضاء ثلاث سنوات - على الأقل - على نشره في الحوليات.

و- يُعرض البحث الذي تتوافر فيه القواعد المذكورة سابقاً، بعد موافقة هيئة التحرير، على مُحكمين لتقرير مدى صلاحية البحث للنشر في المجلة.

و- تمنح المجلة للباحث خمسين نسخة من بحثه المنشور، كإهداء.

تُرسل البحوث وجميع المراسلات الخاصة بالحوليات إلى رئيس التحرير عن طريق البريد الإلكتروني للمجلة.

رئيس تحرير حوليات الآداب والعلوم الاجتماعية

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قواعد النشر

في حَوَلِيَّاتِ الآداب والعلوم الاجتماعية

- ١- تنشرُ الحَوَلِيَّاتُ البحوثَ والدِّرَاسَاتِ الأَصِيلَةَ باللِّغَتَيْنِ العَرَبِيَّةِ والإنجليزيةِ في مجال العلوم الاجتماعية والعلوم الإنسانية والآداب.
 - ٢- أن تُمثِّلَ الدِّرَاسةُ إضافةً جديدةً في حقل التَّخَصُّصِ.
 - ٣- لم يسبق نُشْرُ الدِّرَاسةِ بأيِّ صورةٍ كانت، ولم يسبق أيضاً تقديمُها للنَّشْرِ إلى جهةٍ أخرى في أثناء وُرودها إلى الحَوَلِيَّاتِ. ويلتزم الباحثُ بكتابة إقرارٍ وتعهُّدٍ بأنَّ البَحْثَ المُقَدَّم لم يسبق نُشْرُهُ في أيِّ وعاءٍ نشر، أو أرسل إلى جهةٍ أخرى.
 - ٤- ألا يقلَّ عددُ كلماتِ الدِّرَاسةِ عن (١٥٠٠٠) كلمة، شاملة المراجع والهوامش والجداول، (بحُدود ٥٠ صفحة). وألا يزيدَ عددُ الكلماتِ عن (٦٠٠٠٠) كلمة (في حُدود ٢٠٠ صفحة).
 - ٥- يُقَدَّمُ البَحْثُ بالبريد الإلكتروني: (aass@ku.edu.kw) مكتوباً بواسطة مُعالِج النُّصوص Microsoft Word وعلى مسافة ونصف، وبنط (14) Arabic Simplified. في حالة البُحوثِ باللُّغة العربية، وعلى مسافتَيْن، وبنط (١٢) Roman New Times في حالة البُحوثِ باللُّغة الإنجليزية.
 - ٦- يُرْفَقُ الباحثُ ملخَّصاً للبحْث، مطبوعاً باللِّغَتَيْنِ العَرَبِيَّةِ والإنجليزيةِ، في حُدود (200) كلمة. على أن يحتويَ ملخَّصُ البَحْثِ على: هَدَفِ الدِّرَاسةِ وأسئلتها، ومَنْهَجِ الدِّرَاسةِ المُسْتَخْدَم، وأبرز النتائج المُستخلصة، وأهم الاستنتاجات.
 - ٧- يُرْفَقُ الباحثُ مع البَحْثِ سيرةً علميةً مُختصرةً، مطبوعةً باللِّغَتَيْنِ العَرَبِيَّةِ والإنجليزيةِ، تشمل أهم مؤلفاته وأبحاثه.
 - ٨- تُقَدَّمُ الخرائطُ والأشكالُ والرسومُ (إن وُجدت) بأصولها الصَّالحة للطباعة بصيغة JPG، وبمستوى دقَّة ٨٠٠×٦٠٠.
 - ٩- في حالة رغبة الباحثِ بنشرِ الصُّور أو الخرائطِ أو الأشكالِ البيانية الملونة: يلتزم بدفع تكاليفها.
 - ١٠- يراعي الباحثُ عند كتابة البَحْثِ الالتزامَ بأحدث نسخة من أحد النظامين:
أ - Modern Language Association MLA
ب - American Psychological Association APA
- يستخدم في البحوث والدِّرَاساتِ في مجال العلوم الإنسانية والآداب نظام MLA، والبحاثُ في مجال الدِّرَاساتِ الاجتماعية نظام APA، من حيثُ كتابة المراجع والهوامش في متن البَحْثِ، أو في قائمة المراجع.
- أولاً: في الدِّرَاساتِ في مجال العلوم الإنسانية والآداب، يمكن كتابة المرجع على نظام MLA على الوجه الموضح أدناه:
- ١ - الهوامش: - توضع الهوامشُ في نهاية البَحْثِ في حالة عدم وجود فصول.

- تُرتَّبُ أرقامُ التَّوْثِيقِ بطريقة متسلسلة حتى نهاية كلِّ فصل، أو حتى نهاية البَحْثِ في حالة عدم وجود فصول.
- تثبت الهوامش عند ذَكرها لأوَّلَ مرَّةٍ كاملةً على النَّحْوِ الآتي:
اسم المؤلف، عنوان الكتاب (بالبنط الأسود)، رَقْمُ الجزء، رَقْمُ الطبعة، اسم الناشر، مكان النشر، سنة النشر، رَقْمُ الصَّفحة.

الهيئة الاستشارية

أ. د. منى بيكر

جامعة مانشستر - المملكة المتحدة

أ. د. باسل حاتم

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قسم الفلسفة - جامعة عين شمس

أ. د. إسماعيل صبري مقلد

قسم العلوم السياسية - جامعة أسيوط

أ. د. محمود السيد أبو النيل

قسم علم النفس - جامعة عين شمس

أ. د. حمدي حسن أبو العينين

عميد كلية الإعلام - جامعة مصر الدولية

هيئة التحرير

أ. د. يعقوب يوسف الكندري

رئيس هيئة التحرير

أ. د. جاسم سليمان الفهيد أ. د. هادي مختار اشكناني
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د. عبد المحسن أحمد الطبطبائي د. ليلي محمد المالح
قسم اللغة العربية وآدابها قسم اللغة الإنجليزية وآدابها

د. سند أحمد عبد الفتاح
قسم التاريخ

مها إبراهيم المسعد
مديرة التحرير

حلوليات الآداب والعلوم الاجتماعية ANNALS OF THE ARTS AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

تصدر عن مجلس النشر العلمي - جامعة الكويت

فصلية علمية محكمة تتضمن مجموعة من الرسائل
وتعنى بنشر الموضوعات التي تدخل في مجالات
اهتمام الأقسام العلمية لكليتي الآداب والعلوم
الاجتماعية:

الآداب:

اللغة العربية وآدابها، اللغة الإنجليزية وآدابها،
التاريخ، الفلسفة، الإعلام.

العلوم الاجتماعية:

الاجتماع والخدمة الاجتماعية، الجغرافيا، علم
النفوس، العلوم السياسية.

الحولية الثامنة والثلاثون

الرسالة الحادية والتسعون بعد المئة الرابعة

١٤٣٩هـ / ٢٠١٨م